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ABSTRACT
Violence, rival governments, and the influence of the United States
Army were the three major features of Reconstruction in Louisiana.
During Reconstruction the A m y often intervened in Louisiana politics,
and neither the Democrats nor the Republicans could make plans without
knowing how the A m y would react.
Between 1862 and 1867 the A m y generals who commanded troops in
Louisiana overshadowed the state’s civilian government.

According to

Lincoln's wartime policy, generals Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel Banks
tried to create a civilian government that would be acceptable to
Congress, but Congress refused to admit Louisiana’s representatives.
After the Civil War, generals Philip Sheridan and Edward Canty
established martial law*in the state, supervised elections, cooperated
with the Freedman's Bureau, provided supplies to schools and charities,
and ruled on the operations of railroads and banks.
In 1867 Congress passed the Military Reconstruction Acts, dividing
the former Confederate states into five military districts, levying
requirements for readmission, and instituting military government until
those requirements were net.

Commanding the Fifth Military District

(Louisiana and Texas), Sheridan strictly adhered to the letter of the
Acts, registered thousands of blacks and excluded hundreds of former
Confederates from the voting rolls.

Moreover, Sheridan required blacks

to serve on juries, desegregated the New Orleans streetcars, and removed

vi

uncooperative Democratic officials frcsn office.

These actions caused

Democratic hostility toward Sheridan, but he fostered the growth of the
Republican party in Louisiana.
Angered by Sheridan's actions, President Johnson transferred him to
the Great Plains.

General Joseph Mower temporarily oaimanded the state,

and tried to continue Sheridan's pro-Radical policy.

However, Mower was

succeeded by General Winfield Hancock, a well Known Democrat.

Hancock

rescinded sons of Sheridan's orders and appointed Democrats to office,
steps which hurt the cause of black rights.
After naming afoul of General in Chief Ulysses Grant, Hancock was
replaced by General Robert Buchanan, who carefully supervised the
election of a new governor.

In 1868 Congress approved Louisiana's new

constitution and admitted the state's congressmen and senators, bringing
an end to military government.

During the remainder of 1868,

N.

General Lovell Rousseau ooramanded the state's garrison and usually gave
assistance to the Democratic party.

Consequently, Louisiana voted for

Democratic candidate Horatio Seymour in the presidential election of
1868.
During the 1870s the Amy's influence in Louisiana politics
diminished, but the military continued to be an important factor.

The

A m y frequently provided guards at the polls during elections, protected
the state legislature from attack or usurpation by the Democrats, and
attempted to safeguard the freedmen.

Twice during the 1870s the

situation in Louisiana became so grave that President Grant ordered
Sheridan to return to the state.

Without the support of the Amy,

Louisiana's Republican government could not have continued in office.
From 1871 to 1875 General William Emory was responsible for maintaining
vii

the peace between the Republicans and Democrats.

Always acting in a

restrained manner, Enory had to use his soldiers to prevent riots, but
he was not always successful.

In 1874 the Democrats attempted to

overthrow Rs^oublican Governor William Kellogg, but Emory used his troops
to put Kellogg back in office.
In 1875 Emory was replaced by General Christopher Augur, who
purposefully retained aloof during the struggle for power following the
election of 1876.

For the first time the A m y failed to support the

Republican claimant for the governorship of Louisiana.
Eventually, President Hayes recognized Democrat Francis Nichoils as
the governor of Louisiana.

Hayes ordered the troops to leave New

Orleans and return to their barracks outside the city.

Hayes' orders

signified the end of the Amy's involvement in the state's governmental
affairs.

vill

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES
The military records in the National Archives pertaining to
Louisiana during Reasnstroction are voluminous and accessible.

After

examining the records of several departments, the need for a system of
abbreviations became obvious.

Below are sore example citations and the

list of abbreviations used in the footnotes.
Capt. E. R. Ames to Quartermaster, Dept la, January 17, 1866,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 80, RG 393, NA.
Explanation: Captain E. R. Ames to the Quartermaster of the
Department of Louisiana, January 17, 1866, in Department of
the Gulf records, vol. 80, Record Group 393, National
Archives.
William Pitt Kellogg to AAG, Dept Gulf, February 7, 1874, in
Dept Gulf, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA.
Explanation: William Pitt Kellogg to the Assistant Adjutant
General of the Department of the Gulf, February 7 , 1874, in
Department of the Gulf records, letters Received, Record Group
393, National Archives.
AAAG
AAG
AG
AGO
CG
00
C/S
Dept
Dept
Dept
Dept
Dept
Dist
DSL

Gulf
La
La&Texas
South
Texas
La

Exec. Docs.

Acting Assistant Adjutant General
Assistant Adjutant General
Adjutant General
Adjutant General's Office, Washington, D.C.
Commanding General
Commanding Officer
Chief of Staff
Department of the Gulf
Department of Louisiana
Department of Louisiana and Texas
Department of the South
Department of Texas
District of Louisiana
Department of the South-Late: designation given to
bound letter-book volumes in the National Archives
which were formerly filed with the Dept South, but
transferred to the Dept Gulf records.
Executive Documents, Congressional
ix

5 MD
GO
HQAJSA
MilDivGulf
MilDivMo
MilDivSW
Misc. Docs.
NA
No.
Reed
RG
SO
97

Fifth Military District
General Order
Headquarters, United States Anry
Military Division of the Gulf
Military Division of the Missouri
Military Division of the Southwest
Miscellaneous Docunents, Congressional
National Archives
Number
Received, as in "Letters Received"
Record Group, National Archives collections
Special Orders
Secretary of War
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"Within the American military heritage," Marcus Cunliffe ooncxoded,
"was a habitual assisnption that soldiers mist always defer to
civilians. . .

However, in the years after the Civil War the united

States A m y controlled or greatly influenced the government of the
Southern states recently in rebellions

This period of military doninar

tion over a section of the nation was unique in American history.

No

previous experience had prepared Americans to endure either the stigma
2
of defeat foilcs<?ed by occupation and military government, or the
responsibility of adninistering hostile states and their people.
Generals and lesser officers ruled on matters of justice, finance,
transportation, education, labor, and charity.

Congress and most

Northerners also expected the A m y to protect the Southern Negroes,
former slaves who had been emancipated during the war, but who had no
definite rights or responsibilities of citizenship.

Under the circum

stances in 1865— Southern governments disrupted or deposed, millions of
ex-slaves uncertain of their condition, and thousands of ex-Confederate
soldiers returning to their hemes— the A m y was the only agency of
the Federal government that could have policed the South.

Although the

military occupation was obviously necessary, many Americans naturally
^Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians:
America, 1775-1865 (New York, 1973), 438.

The Martial Spirit in

2C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (rev. ed., Baton
Rouge, 1968), 19.
xi

found unpalatable the idea that any part of the nation should be divided
and regulated by A m y generals.
A striking exception to the tradition of Atiglo-American civilian
government was Oliver Cromwell's edict in the 1650s dividing England
into twelve military districts each governed by a major general.

But

Cromwell's Protectorate was extraordinary in British history, and the
dominion of the Puritan generals seated to make the British more
receptive to reestablishing the monarchy.
Prior to 1865 the United States A m y had little experience with
military government.

In 1848, following the Mexican War, the A m y

occupied parts of Mexico and operated a military government in
California territory, assignments which had same duties similar to
Reconstruction after the Civil War.4 Volunteer troops, not regulars,
comprised most of the occupation forces in Mexico and California.
Likewise, volunteers predominated in the occupation forces in the
Southern states, until regulars gradually replaced them.
Radical Republicans in Congress hoped to achieve certain goals in
the South during Reconstruction. Many Northerners, particularly
Republicans, wanted Negroes to vote in elections, hold elective and
appointive offices, serve on juries, pay taxes, receive education at
public expense, choose their own jobs, and rest safely in their homes.
Of course, the Radicals did not specify all these things in their
programs, but they wanted the South to acknowledge that the freedmen
•^Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, 32.
^Theodore Grivas, Military Governments of California, 1846-1850
(Glendale, Cal., 1963). A discussion of the similarities in the duties
of the California ooitmanders in the 1840s and the Southern ocmmanders
during Reconstruction follows in Chapter 1.
xii

would have civil and political rights.

The Republicans proposed various

laws and Constitutional amendments to make their goals binding.

However,

the hostility of Southerners toward blacks, Republicans, and the United
States Army made these goals unattainable in a few years.

Instead,

decades of supervision were needed, and the Radicals' crusade lasted
less than ten years in most Southern states.
Military influence, sanctioned by Congress, lasted in all of the
states of the former Confederacy well into 1868, except in Tennessee
which had been readmitted in 1866.

In 1868 Arkansas, North and South

Carolina, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana all regained their represen
tation in Congress.
two years later.

Texas, Mississippi, Georgia, and Virginia followed

After readmission, the Amy's influence diminished

because civilian governments administered the states.

However,

Republican governors continued to call on the A n y for protection.
Conservative white Democrats wanted to dislodge the Republicans from
power.

Gradually, state by state, local Democrats did regain control.

They did so through the use of increased voter registration, higher
Democratic turn-outs at elections, control of county and municipal
offices, economic coercion, and varying amounts of intimidation and
violence against Republicans.

The last Southern Republican governor,

Stephen B. Packard of Louisiana, abandoned his claim to office in
April 1877.
During the years 1866 to 1869 the Army was more capable of
responding to Republican requests for

d than in the 1870s because the

War Department stationed an average of 21,000 troops per year in the

xiii

South from 1866 to 1869. ^ From 1870 to 1876 the average size of the
entire Army was only 29,400.® During the 1870s the Army had to give
increased attention to Indian-fighting in the trans-Mississippi
West, and Congress consistently voted to reduce the size of the military
establishment each year.

Between 1870 and 1876 only about 7,500 troops

per year served in the South.7 The mere threat that the military would
send soldiers to trouble spots in case of violence did not stop violence
from occurring.

In the later years of Reconstruction the Army found it

impossible to meet every real or imagined Republican need.
The actions of the Army in Louisiana during Reconstruction can he
divided into two parts.

In the first period, between 1865-1869, the

Army exercised its greatest and most consistent influence.

During these

years the generals ccxrananding the state supervised the many details
connected with readmitting the state and partially achieved the goals of
the Radical Reconstruction program.
In the second phase, between 1870-1877, the control and influence
of the A m y declined, but never ended completely.

At selected times,

the military intervened in civil affairs just as it did during the 1860s.
But it became more difficult to guarantee the newly won rights for the
Negro.

The generals had fewer troops at their disposal and often

neglected to use their full powers.

Louisiana Democrats increased their

^This average is arrived at using the troop totals found in the
chart in James E. Sefton, The United States A m y and Reconstruction,
1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 260-61.
6See the chart detailing the yearly strength of the A m y in
Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States A m y (New York, 1967),
567.
7Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 260-61.
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anti-Republican activities and boldly used violence as a weapon to
remove Republicans from office.

The events of the presidential election

of 1876 and its aftermath culminated an extraordinary era in the history
of Louisiana and the nation.
This study will approach Reconstruction in Louisiana mainly from
the perspective of the generals who commanded the state.

The Army

worked closely with the Freedman's Bureau, an organization which has
Q
been ably treated by Howard A. White.
Ey necessity, there will be
discussions of politics and politicians, and some attention will be
given to the enlisted soldier, but the attitudes, actions, ideas, and
influence of the generals will stand above the other subjects.

toward A. White, The Freedman's Bureau in Louisiana (Baton Rouge,
1970).

CHAPTER I

HIE BEGINNINGS UNDER BUTLER AND BANKS
On the night of April 24, 1862, Flag Officer David Glasgow
Farragut of the Union Navy prepared final orders for the seventeen ships
and gunboats of his fleet selected for a dangerous assignment.

Several

days of sporadic fighting lad failed to reduce Forts Jackson arid.
St. Philip on the Mississippi River, forts which were the keys to the
defense of New Orleans.

Deciding not to engage in lengthy siege opera

tions which would involve using the troops of Major General Benjamin F.
Butler, or to continue to attack the forts directly, Farragut determined
that he would attempt to run by the forts under cover of darkness and
then steam upriver to capture the "Queen City of the Confederacy."

It

was admittedly a bold plan, and some of his subordinate commanders
opposed it as too hazardous.

Nevertheless, Farragut believed the

chances of success outweighed the risks involved.
The Union vessels got underway by 3:30 a.m. and. drew opposite the
twin forts a few minutes later.

Almost immediately the Southern batter

ies began an intense barrage of cannon fire.

The gunboats of the

Confederate River Defense Fleet quickly supported the shore batteries.
The battle lasted about three hours.

The heavy Confederate fire forced

three Yankee ships to turn back and scored several hits on the other
ships.

But the Confederates suffered worse losses.

Fleet lay sunk or grounded on the banks.
tions, the forts surrendered.

Most of the Defense

Vulnerable now from two direc

Farragut's gamble had succeeded.

The

2
remaining fourteen Federal ships, each damaged to sane extent, moved
unmolested toward New Orleans.3Confederate General Mansfield Lovell ordered the evacuation of his
troops and supplies from the city when he realized that the Union Navy
was fighting its way past the river forts.

As the ships cane into sight

of the defenseless metropolis on April 25, Farragut saw that the "levee
of New Orleans was one scene of desolation, ships, steamers, cotton,
coal, etc. were all in one ccnrnon Maze."

Thick black smoke curled up

from burning munitions and other property abandoned by the retreating
Confederates.

A mass of citizens and slaves lined the store to stare at

the oncoming warships, each topped with the familiar red-and-white
striped flag whipping in the breeze.

An observer on the bank remembered

later that all of the gunports on the ships gaped open, with cannon
protruding like even M a c k teeth.

The anchors splashed into the

Mississippi one by one, and soon a longboat with sailors and marines
moved into store.

The captain commanding the landing party made

arrangements for the city's formal capitulation the next day.

2

General Lovell left New Orleans without detailing an officer to
represent the Confederate government at the surrender.

Therefore,

Mayor John T. Monroe and the City Council entered into negotiations with
Farragut on April 26, and by noon United States flags were posted on the
Federal mint, the post office, the Customs House, and the city hall.
Farragut waited patiently for a few days while General Butler brought up
^Charles L. Dufour, The Night the War Was Lost (New York, 1960),
265-85; John D. Winters, The Civil War m Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1963),
90-97.
2
Farragut's observation quoted in Dufour, Night the War Was Lost,
300, and see also ibid., 301-303; New Orleans Daily Democrat, April 24,
1877.

3

some of his troops, and then, not without some relief, the Navy turned
over command of the city to the Arm/ on May 1, 1862.

The long ordeal of

the United States A m y in Louisiana Reconstruction had begun.
*

*

*

General Benjamin Franklin Butler saw from the start of his command
in the Department of the Gulf that there were two main tasks before him:
to occupy and pacify the city of New Orleans, and to launch military
operations designal to capture more Confederate territory.

At a time of

few Union victories, the Reconstruction of Louisiana was well down the
list of Butler's objectives.

After a short tin® in coimand, Butler left

a legacy of controversy in Louisiana which followed him for the rest of
his eventful life.
"Reconstruction" was a contemporary term of the 1860s.

It meant

generally the procedure or requirements demanded for the states of the
Southern Confederacy to return to the Union.

Historian Herman Belz has

demonstrated that the debate over Reconstruction started almost as soon
as Southern troops occupied Fort Sumter.

President Abraham Lincoln held

that these states had never left the Union and needed only to be
restored to "their proper relationship" with their sister states.
politicians disagreed.

Other

These men believed that the eleven wayward

states had actually seceded and that stiff conditions should be set for
the Confederates to meet before they could return to the Union.

All

parties to this debate agreed that any Reconstruction plan must abide by
the Constitution.

Part of the problem was that the Constitution

3Dufour, Night the War Was Lost, 304-309; Winters, Civil War in
Louisiana, 98; Gerald M. Capers, Occupied City: New Orleans under the
Federals, 1862-1865 (Lexington, 1965), 46-51.

4
mentioned neither secession nor Reconstruction.

A variety of concepts,

ideas, and proposals of "restoration/' as the process was alternately
called, were put forth by several northern congressional leaders.4
Ben Butler undoubtedly would have found the forum of Congress
congenial.

Hie had served as a Democrat in the Massachusetts legislature

for several years.

During the ©notion-filled presidential campaign of

1860 Butler had supported John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky instead of
the national Democratic Party's nominee, Stephan A. Douglas*

The out

break of war required many more officers to lead rapidly expanding
armies, and President Lincoln had scanned a wide field of politicians as
possible generals*

Butler's appointment indicated Lincoln's desire to

gain support for the war from Northern Democrats by selecting some of
than for high military service.
From the 18,000-man expeditionary forte which invaded Louisiana,
Butler assigned 2,500 troops to garrison New Orleans and issued a
lengthy proclamation declaring martial law in the city and throughout
the surrounding area.

The pronouncement listed several regulations.

Proper respect was hereafter demanded for the United States flag.

The

killing of any Union soldiers by civilians would be considered murder
and not acts of war.

All saloon owners were to register their busi

nesses with the A m y provost marshal.

There was nothing particularly

exceptional about, this proclamation.

It was based on Butler's recent

experiences on the Virginia coast, where he had served before going to
5
Louisiana.
^Herman Belz, Reconstructing the union (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969), 1-14
and passim.
Proclamation by Benjamin F. Butler, May 1, 1862, in War of the
Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128

5
The United States A m y did not have a wealth of background
experience as a force of occupation in hostile territory.

For nine

months at the aid of the Mexican War* the A m y had held a large portion
of the country* including the capital of Madoo City* while the two
nations considered the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Peace negotiations lasted longer than ecpected, to the discomfort of
both the A m y and the Mexican citizens.

Nevertheless, routine daily

activities went on and after a tine military occupation developed into
an accepted pattern.

The A m y supervised local Mexican elections.

Uhited States soldiers also regulated local saloons, checked civilians
for concealed weapons, enforced curfews, and arrested vagrants.
Oourts-martial decided cases of American soldiers and cases involving
Mexican citizens and American soldiers.
involving only their own nationals.

Mexican courts handled cases

A m y officers cooperated with local

officials, with the clear understanding that military orders were always
paramount.

Both sides realised that this arrangement was temporary,

though indefinite, and few serious incidents marred the postwar
occupation.

However, after the A m y withdrew no effort was made to

synthesize the experiences in Mexico into a manual for future soldiers
who might need to deal with problems of politics, martial law, and
occupation.

Most officers and soldiers viewed the Mexican episode with

distaste, and the A m y was just as glad to leave as the Mexicans were to
see it go.6
parts in 70 vols., Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Series 1, vol. VI, 71720. (Hereinafter cited as Official Records. All references are to
Series 1 unless otherwise indicated.) Capers, Occupied City, 60? Frank
Freidel, "General Orders 100 and Military Government," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XXXII (March, 1946), 546.
6Justin H. Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," American Historical

6
Another phase of military occupation grew out of the Mexican War,
one which had even more similarity to the Army's later role in
Louisiana.

The united States acquired almost one-half of the Republic

of Mexico as a result of the fighting.

California, Arizona, Nevada,

Utah, and parts of other states Mould later be cut from this new land.
However, rather than simply a terporary military occupation, the A m y
administration in the captured territories north of the Rio Grande was
a prelude to United States civil government.

Military control was so

complete and so pervasive that it was more than just a time of martial
law, it was military government.

Theodore Grivas has best explained the

difference in his study of California territory.

Martial law is usually

temporary, brought on during a tine of "disaster or enemy invation" when
civil law may be "suspended," but not cancelled.

Military government is

designed to replace civil government and is usually used in hostile
territory or captured enemy land which will later be annexed.
concluded:

Grivas

"Martial law supports civil government; military government

supplants it."7
What followed in California in the late 1840s was a military
government of the kind that later had to be used in the South during and
after the Civil War.

Due to a variety of complicating factors (many of

which were later experienced by soldiers in Louisi ana), civil authorities
in California did not take full control until more than four years after
Review, XXIII (January, 1918), 288-98; Ralph H. Gabriel, "American
Experience with Military Government," ibid., XLIX (July, 1944), 632-37.
7Theodore Grivas, Military Governments in California, 1846-1850
(Glendale, Cal., 1963), 13-16. Grivas also mentions the subject of
"military law," which concerns uniformed military personnel, and can be
found in the old Articles of War or the more recent Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
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American forces had arrived.

Civil functionaries, such as mayors,

judges, and city councils, existed, but all served on the approval of
the military oomnander.

In many instances the military replaced a

variety of civilian officials with men more acceptable to the United
States occupation.

For easier administration, the senior general sub

divided California into districts, where subordinate officers exercised
control.

Disgruntle! European citizens sometimes were arrested by the

Army for contravening military regulations.

In September 1846 the Army

thwarted a revolt by Californians who tried to oust the invaders and
restore Mexican government.

Final.ly, in 1849 the Army oomnander

registered voters and called for a territorial constitutional convention
O
to prepare California for statehood.
Unfortunately, as was true after
the occupation of Mexico, the War Department did not require the military
commanders of California to prepare a handbook for future generals
charged with political duties.

Much of what they had to deal with was

encountered again in Louisiana and elsewhere in the South.
*

*

*

Before its capture, New Orleans was the largest and most
cosmopolitan city in the Confederacy.

More than 170,000 residents had

been busy in a variety of private and oonmercial enterprises.

Several

thousand of these had left to fight in the war or to avoid the Federal
occupation.

Despite its surface appearances of civilization, General

Butler thought that the city was "untamed," and in the confusion of the
first days after the surrender, a host of administrative details awaited
his attention.

At first Mayor John Monroe refused to meet with Butler

8Ibid., 86-89, 92-93, 105-108, 112, 141-45, 214, 218-20, 222.
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to discuss these problems, but later a conference was arrange!.
Hundreds of persons were destitute, and many more appeared to be on the
verge of starvation.

Initially, captured Confederate rations, and later

on, Federal supplies were distributed to the needy.

The general prohi

bited the use of Confederate money after May 27, 1862, and required that
banks and businesses switch to United States currency.

9

The people of New Orleans continued to demonstrate their zeal for
the Confederate cause.

Several ministers in the city refused to substi

tute the phrase "President of the Unite! States" for "President of the
Confederate States" in their regular prayers.

Therefore, Butler closed

some churches and suspended some pastors from their pulpits until a
change in supplication and attitude was made.^
A more worldly matter next captured the attention of the Louisiana
commandant.

Many woman in New Orleans had repeatedly shown disrespect

for the Army by unladylike gestures, words, or actions, including
spitting on soldiers as they wallced on the streets.

Butler believed

that such indiscretions might encourage more cohesive opposition if
allowed to continue.

Accordingly, on May 15 he issued an order which

earned him condemnation throughout the South.

Henceforth, Butler

promised, whenever troops were insulted by women of whatever social
station, and whether "by word, gesture, or movement," such "ladies"
would "be regarded and held liable to be treated as [women] of the town
9
Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge,
1974), 2: Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Beck (Boston, 1892), 373-74,
387-88, 392-93; Hans L. Trefousse, Ben Butler; The South Called Him
Beast! (New York, 1957), 108-10, 116; James Parton, General Butler In
New Orleans (New York, 1864), 413-32; Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking
History of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1935), 91-96.
1^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 5-6; Trefousse, Butler, 119.
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plying [their] avocation."

The citizens of New Orleans were outraged by

this pronouncement and condemned it as barbaric.

Butler was vilified in

the Southern press, sharply criticised by the English and French
ministers to the United States, and castigated toy other foreign consuls
in Louisiana.

However, after the order was posted, such insulting

incidents from New Orleanians of either sex noticeably declined.

11

Mayor Monroe of New Orleans sent a strongly worded letter to Butler
protesting the so-called "woman order."

This letter provided Butler

with the reason he needed to remove Monroe from office.

Actually, the

mayor had repeatedly hindered the city's administration since the
surrender.

Monroe was also hurt by his affiliation with a group of

Confederate veterans who styled themselves tie "Monroe Guards" and had
maintained connections with Southern forces outside the city.

In his

place Butler designated Colonel George F. Shepley of the 12th Maine
Infantry acting mayor. ^
Following Monroe's ouster and arrest, most of the city council, the
police chief, and a judge were dismissed for failure to cooperate with
military authorities.
at Fort Jackson.

Some of these men were confined for short terms

Butler made Captain Jonas H. French temporary police

^GO No. 28, Dept Gulf, May 15, 1862, in Official Records, XV, 426;
Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, 132; Trefousse, Butler, 110-13; Butler,
Butler's Book, 415-22; Richard S. West, Jr., Lincoln*s Scapegoat
General: A Life of Benjamin F. Butler, 1818-1893 (Boston, 1965),
139-43.
■^John T. Monroe to Butler, May 16, 1862, in Official Records,
XLIII, 526; GO No. 24, Dept Gulf, May 10, 1862, inl M d ., VI, 724;
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton
Rouge, 1964), 43V; Robert J. Futrell, "Federal Military Government in
the South, 1861-1865," Military Affairs, XV (Winter, 1951), 182. From
June 1862 to March 1864 four other Army officers served appointive terms
as mayor of New Orleans. See John S. Kendall, History of New Orleans
(3 vols., Chicago, 1922), I, 293-94.
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chief, and until civil trials restmed, a military oonmission presided
over most court cases.13
Butler's conduct since the surrender of New Orleans had earned him
the hatred of people throughout the South*

The "woman order" and the

suspension of civil government, events so distasteful to Louisianians
and Southerners, ware followed by an act that probably ruined Butler’s
chances to carry out effective Recoistruction activities.
On April 26 William B. Mumford, a local gambler, tore the United
States flag from its staff atop the mint building, ripped the flag to
shreds, and distributed the pieces to an appreciative crowd.

Although

he had had two or three cohorts, Munford received widespread credit for
this bold act of vandalism, a patriotic deed in the eyes of most New
Orleans newspapers.

When Butler learned of the escapade, he promised to

have Mumford severely punished.

Within a few days, Federal authorities

arrested the gambler, and a military court sentenced him to be hanged.
In spite of the public outcry against the verdict, and even after a
meeting with the gambler's wife, Butler refused to change the court's
ruling.

On June 7, 1862, Munfoxd was executed as an example that

Federal authority or its symbols could not be violated.

14

It mattered little that over the next several months Butler and his
officers gave New Orleans fair and reasonable government.

Etotional

Louisianians still cherished too much Confederate spirit to acknowledge
■^Futrell, "Military Government in the South," 186-87? Capers,
Occupied City, 69; West, Scapegoat General, 146-47; Trefousse, Butler,
113-14; Howard P. Johnson, "New Orleans Under General Butler," LoiusTana
Historical Quarterly, XXIV (April, 1941), 497-99; Janes G. Randall,
Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (rev. ed., Urbana, 1964), 40-41.
^Trefousse, Butler, 115; Parton, Butler in New Orleans, 346-54;
West, Scapegoat General, 149-52; Butler, Butler's Book, 437-46.
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any inprovements made by the man who now carried the nickname "Beast"
Butler.
One of the first projects to benefit the city was a massive cleanup
operation.

July marked the start of the dreaded three-month yellow

fever season.

Hie unacclimated Union troops were vulnerable to this

disease, which had reportedly killed over 50,000 people in Louisiana
since 1840.

Detailing unemployed Whites and Negroes, Butler ordered

streets, gutters, ditches, and canals thoroughly scraped and cleaned,
which led to a great improvanent in city sanitation.

Sate local offi

cials, failing to cooperate in the project by taking an oath of loyalty
to the Union, were removed from office.

Replacements came from soldiers

or local Union supporters who returned to Louisiana or reactivated their
dormant feelings.

Butler5s sanitation and quarantine program succeeded,

and neither citizens nor occupation forces suffered from an outbreak of
the terrible "yellow jack."^
Having ensured the city's health, Butler now set out to change its
loyalty.

According to an agent of the Treasury Department, Butler

boasted "that in six months New Orleans should be a Union City or— a
home of the Alligator" [sic]. Butler made an even more remarkable
prediction to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton;

by August many Iouisi-

anians would ''return . . . their allegiance!' to the Federal government.
On June 10 Butler stipulated that all public officials in occupied
-^Butler to Mayor & Council of New Orleans, May 9, 1862, in
Official Records, VI, 723-24; Butler to Gen. George Shepley & Council of
New Orleans, June 4, 1862, ibid., XV, 462-63; Trefousse, Butler, 120-21;
Capers, Occupied City, 66, 73, 88, 91; Jo Ann Carrigan, "Yankees versus
Yellow Jack in New Orleans, 1862-1866," Civil War History, IX (Septem
ber, 1963), 248-60; William A. Russ, Jr., "Disfranchisement in Louisiana
(1862-1870)," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVIII (July, 1935), 558-59;
William E. Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction," (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1953), 60.
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Louisiana must take an oath of Loyalty to the Union within five days or
leave office.
their posts,

Faced with this requirement, many summarily resigned
E\n±harmore, any resident (foreigner or citizen) desiring

to use the courts in civil or criminal cases had to pledge his fidelity
to the United States.
taken the oath.

Three rronths later only about 14,000 persons had

Prompted further by the threatened confiscation of

their property (under the congressional Confiscation Act of July 12,
1862), some 68,000 people renewed their allegiance.16
Butler's predictions of a change in Louisiana's loyalty were overly
optimistic.

For example, several newspaper editors remained opposed to

the Union, and their irreconcilable attitudes showed clearly in print.
Between May and November 1862, Butler suspended the publication of six
Crescent City papers and one in Baton Rouge.

17

Even as Butler pressured and cajoled Louisianians into renewing
their loyalty, he lost some of his power over the state.

On June 10

Lincoln appointed George Shepley, recently promoted to brevet brigadier
general, military governor of Louisiana.

This split the responsibili

ties of command in the Gulf Department.

Apparently, tactical military

operations were left to Butler while Shepley dealt with political
^Treasury Agent George S. Denison to Mrs. E. S. Denison, June 10,
1862, in James A. Padgett (ed.), "Some Letters of George S. Denison,
1854-1866: Observations of a Yankee on Conditions in Louisiana and
Texas," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIII (October, 1940), 1183;
Butler to Edwin M. Stanton, June 10, 1862, in Official Records, XV, 466;
West, Scapegoat General, 172; Trefousse, Butler, 116; Capers, Occupied
City, 92-94; Willie M. Caskey, Secession and Restoration of Louisiana
(Baton Rouge, 1938), 59-62.
■^Butler to Stanton, June 28, 1862, in Official Records, XV, 502503, SO No. 235, Dept Gulf, July 31, 1862, ibid., 533; SO No. 513, Dept
Gulf, ibid., 595-96; Butler, Butler's Book, 377.
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reconstruction. These assignments were never made clear, and this led
inevitably to friction between the two generals.
Butler failed to win success in the field.
was recaptured by the Confederates in August.
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The city of Baton Rouge

Following this reverse,

he devoted much of his tine to strengthening the New Orleans defenses.
However, Butler made an important contribution to the Union war
effort by enlisting large numbers of Negroes into the Federal Army.
first blacks were hired only as laborers.

At

Then in July and August,

Butler argued with General John W. Phelps over a proposal to induct
Negro slaves into a special unit.

Phelps was a former regular Army

officer from Vermont, who had resigned from the service to devote his
time to the. anti-slavery crusade.

Apparently, the Butler-Phelps feud

concerned how the black troops would be raised and who would do it,
rather than if they would be recruited.

At any rate, Phelps again

resigned from the Army over the dispute, and Butler reaped the credit
for black enlistments.

With the approval of the War Department, Butler

raised three regiments of a "Corps d'Afrique" in Louisiana.

Other

states, including those in the North, raised similar units which fought
in several battles and played an important role as garrison troops after
the war.

19

Controversy continued to swirl about Butler's head.

Foreigners in

New Orleans, most of whom were pro-Southern, strenuously objected to
18Stanton to Butler, June 10, 1862, in Official Records, XV, 471;
Stanton to Shepley, ibid., Series III, vol. II, 141; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 17; Randall, Constitutional Problems, 227-28.
Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, 113-24; Butler, Butler's Book,
491; Warner, Generals in Blue, 368-69. The most complete account is
Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Amy, 18611865 (New York, 1966), 17, 24, 57-66, and passim.
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orders which required them to swear an oath of loyalty to the Union.
Many of them had cooperated in concealing Confederate money and supplies
when the city fell.

Butler set out to confiscate all Confederate funds,

a goal which sometimes required entry into European consulates.
particular problem demanded diplomacy and tact.

This

Perhaps some Confederate

sympathy by foreigners could have teen overlooked.

Butler's highhanded

ness in this natter alienated not only the New Orleans European ccmnunity,
but simultaneously antagonized Secretary of State William H. Seward.

A

move was soon afoot in Washington to have the troublesome general
replaced with someone less abrasive.

20

Butler heard rumors of his impending removal in September.

Higher

authorities managed to quiet his fears for several weeks, but in early
November President Lincoln chase Major General Nathaniel P. Banks as the
new commander of the Department of the Gulf.

21

Before Banks arrived, a congressional election was scheduled in
Louisiana.

Lincoln, bypassing Butler, sent orders concerning the

election to General Shepley.

Some symbol of Louisiana's Unionism was

needed, and new representatives in Congress seemed just the thing.
Prior to the election on December 2, Butler encouraged loyal voters to
form the Union Association, a political organization designed to assure
victory for the pro-administration candidates, Michael Hahn and Edward H.
Durell.

Hahn was a winner, but a Treasury agent named Benjamin F.

Flanders defeated Durell for the second seat.

Lincoln certainly wanted

2®Trefousse, Butler, 124-27; West, Scapegoat General, 192-98;
Butler, Butler's Book, 429-36.
^Butler to Henry W. Halleek, September 1, 1862, in Official
Records, XV, 558; Halleck to Butler, September 14, 1862, ibid., 572;
Trefousse, Butler, 132-33; West, Scapegoat General, 200.
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Congress to accept these representatives. Success in this election, he
thought, might encourage some states to leave the Confederacy.

22

A few days after the election, General Banks arrived in Louisiana.
On December 17 Butler relinquished command and left the state several
days later.

General Shepley retained his post as military governor.

Louisiana was gladly rid of Ben Butler.

23

The questionable honesty

of his administration, stories of which were later exaggerated, received
justifiable criticism.

Several Army officers and Treasury agents made

personal fortunes in cotton dealings in 1862.

Among others, Andrew

Jackson Butler, brother of the departed general, profited from inside
information at department headquarters.

Southerners accused the general

himself of stealing a variety of personal and state property, but the
charges were never proven.

24

These and other revelations did nothing to improve Butler's image.
It would have made little difference to Southerners if he had had the
honesty of a saint.

Butler's list of "sins" was too long for his

redemption, and for years after the war he was roundly criticized by the
state's newspapers.

The "Beast" made excellent copy.

Despite decades

22Abraham Lincoln to Shepley, November 21, 1862, in Roy P. Basler
(ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (9 vols. New Brunswick,
N.J., 1955), V, 504-505; Belz/ Reconstructing the Union, 110; Caskey,
Secession and Restoration, 63-65; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,
15-17.
23GQ No . 107, Dept Gulf, December 17, 1862, in Official Records,
XV, 611; Nathaniel P. Banks to Halleck, December 18, 1862, ibid.,~6T3;
Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, 147-48. After the war, Butler served
several terms in Congress as a Republican between 1866 and 1875. He was
elected governor of Massachusetts in 1882. The Greenback Party nominated
him for president in 1884. He died in 1893.
24Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 66-69; Capers, Occupied City,
83-84; Trefousse, Butler, 122-24.
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of vilification, however, Butler's administration was not nearly so bad
as it was sometimes portrayed.

Admittedly, he had used some unnecessar

ily harsh methods, but the task was to convince Louisiana that Federal
authority had returned permanently.

This required oaths of loyalty,

removal of civil officials, and even sterner measures in son® cases.

25

The experience of Butler's successors demonstrated that the path of
Reconstruction in Louisiana was a difficult one to follow.

Indeed, it

became even more twisted and complex.
*

*

*

Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, like Ben Butler before him, had left
Massachusetts politics to wear the stars of a Union General.

However,

Banks possessed broader political experience, including service as a
state legislator, Speaker of the House in Congress, and governor of
Massachusetts.

Recognized as a political maverick throughout his

career, by 1861 Banks had settled into the Republican party and thus
rated consideration for a high military appointment.

It scon became

evident that Lincoln had not chosen a military expert to replace Butler.
On the contrary, according to Allan Nevins, Banks was "a clever,
interesting, showy politician without much depth or purpose" whose prior
"service in the Shenandoah suggested that he had little aptitude for
war."

Banks relied on political influence to retain his cormiission,

26

25New Orleans Times, February 9, 1869; New Orleans Crescent,
January 24, 1869; Lafayette Advertiser, March 27, 1869; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 18; Capers, Occupied City, 71-72, 74-75, 87.
26Allan Nevins, War Becomes Revolution, 1862-1863, p. 402; vol. II
of The War for the Union (A vols., New York, 1959-1971).
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Banks realized that considerable pro-Confederate sentiment remained
in New Orleans, but he decided to relax the severity of military
occupation in Louisiana.

For example, a new order reopened all churches

previously closed by Butler, even if the ministers refused to pray for
President Lincoln.

Furthermore, he released several civilian prisoners

held in confinement on Butler's order.

In yet another effort to win the

support of Louisianians, Banks issued a Christmas Eve proclamation which
declared that the war was not a war on slavery, but instead was a
struggle to preserve the Union.

Therefore, Lincoln's Emancipation

Proclamation did not apply to occupied Louisiana.

Banks added, however,

that marry unexpected results could cone from such a great Civil War, and
at its end the institution of slavery probably would cease to exxst.

27

Banks quickly learned of the tremendous burdens of public
administration which the Army had acquired.

He vented his displeasure

to Major General Henry W. Halleck in Washington.

In New Orleans, Banks

wrote, there was "an immense military government, embracing every form
of civil administration, the assessment of taxes, fines, punishments,
charities, trade, regulation of churches, confiscation of estates, and
the working of plantations, in addition to the ordinary affairs of a
military department." For the time being, Banks continued most of
Butler's public works programs and the food distributions to the needy.
n o . 118, Dept Gulf, December 24, 1862, in Official Records,
XV, 624; Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 71; Fred H. Harrington,
Fighting Politician: Major General N. P. Banks (Philadelphia, 1948),
93-94, 104.

28Banks to Halleck, January 7, 1863, in Official Records, XV,
639-40; SO No. 66, Dept Gulf, ibid., 1111; Harrington, Fighting
Politician, 99.
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Banks had been sent to Louisiana to give the North victories in the
field, but his political background naturally made him interested in
Reconstruction, which placed him directly at loggerheads with Military
Governor Shepley.

General Shepley believed that everything of a non-

tactical nature was under his control.

A specific argument erupted over

command of the provost marshal1s office, which heretofore Shepley had
directed.

In a special order, Banks shifted the provost marshal's

operations to his own headquarters.

He further decreased Shepley's

power by ordering all future civil cases to be brought before the
Louisiana Provisional Court, established by Lincoln in Decenter 1862 to
lessen the responsibility of the courts-martial.

Once divested of

control of the provost marshal's post, Shepley's prestige in the state
began slowly to decline.

But the military governor was jealous of his

remaining powers, and he continued to oppose Banks whenever possible.

29

Thereafter the political and economic influence of Banks became
more pervasive, and this was especially true in matters concerning Negro
labor and black troops.

Butler had dabbled in making rules for planta

tion workers and had posted troops to guard some plantations near Union
lines.

Thinking they were free, many blacks had left their family

plantations and wandered unregulated in the countryside.

On January 29,

1863, Banks issued a lengthy and comprehensive order on Negro labor in
Louisiana.

The plan required blacks to sign a yearly contract with an

onployer of their choice.

The contract called for a ten-hour workday

for the laborer; for his part, the plantation owner had to furnish
2%anks to Shepley, January 27, 1863, in Official Records, XV,
1097-98; Harrington, Fighting Politician, 101-102; Futrell, "Military
Government in the South," 183; Randall, Constitutional Problems, 41.
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adequate food, clothing, shelter, and give pay in wages or part of the
crop.

The Army appointed supervisors to monitor the agreements on both

sides and see that blacks were not mistreated.

Flogging was outlawed.

The order threatened vagrants with arrest and a term of unpaid labor on
public works.

Word of this plan spread among rural Negroes, most of

whom soon returned to the plantations,,

30

The enlistment of Negro soldiers drew Banks' attention.

Within

thirty days of his arrival in Louisiana, the new commander began
recruiting qualified blacks into regiments of all ants.

So long as the

War Department authorized new units, Banks continued to create them.

By

the end of the war, more Negro regiments had been raised in Louisiana
than any other state.

31

Military matters aside, Banks began to take a keen interest in
Louisiana politics and its relation to national problems.

In Washington,

Louisiana's new representatives Hahn and Flanders were given seats in
Congress, but only for the remainder of the existing term which expired
on March 3, 1863.
one month.

Therefore, they enjoyed their positions for less than

Even so, the recognition of the Southerners pleased Lincoln.

The President held that these men were due their seats in Congress
on

00 No. 12, Dept Gulf, January 29, 1863, in Official Records, XV
666-67. Banks' plan was revised in February 1864 by GO No. 23, Dept
Gulf, February 23, 1864, ibid., XXXVI, Pt. 2, pp. 227-28. The first
administrator of the plantation program was Colonel George Hanks.
Chaplin Thomas W. Conway later replaced him. See Harrington, Fighting
Politician, 104-105.
^^Twenty-one regiments of United States Colored Troops were raised
in Louisiana. Tennessee was second with five. See the excellent
discussion in Cornish, Sable Arm, 103, 126-29, 247-48. About 5,000 white
soldiers also enlisted in the Union A m y from Louisiana. See Frederick H.
Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion (3 vols., New York, 1959),
III, 1212-14.
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because Louisiana had never really been out of the Union.
cans and several Democrats disagreed with this idea.

Many Republi

Particularly

debatable was the legality of an Anrry general (in this case, Shepley)
conducting Federal elections in a state that did not have a civilian
governor.

In the opinion of many congressional leaders of both parties,

Hahn and Flanders had been improperly elected.

Lincoln's supporters had

managed only momentarily to gain approval of these representatives.

32

Back in Louisiana the political factions which formed during
Butler's short tenure now matured into three alliances.

The factions

initially all belonged to the pro-Union Free State Party, virtually the
state's only functioning political party.

The Democrats had become so

discredited hy secession and war that temporarily no politician in
occupied Louisiana carried that label.

The largest faction of the Free

State Party was the Moderates, led by Michael Hahn and supported by
Lincoln and Banks.

The Moderate wing was composed of old Louisiana

Whigs and Union men, mostly either natives or longtime residents of the
state.

The Moderates favored the destruction of slavery but did not

advocate immediate civil rights or political privileges for blacks.
Close to the Moderates in some beliefs, yet differing with them on
others, were the Radicals, guided by Benjamin Flanders and Thomas J.
Durant, a skilled lawyer from New Orleans.

The Radicals not only wanted

slavery abolished, but they also demanded civil and political rights for
Negroes as scon as possible.

Before the end of 1863 the Radicals

announced that if Reconstruction was to succeed, blacks must be given
the vote.

Only a few natives or long-term residents, such as Flanders

and Durant, adhered to the Radical wing.

Many of its backers were agents

^Belz, Reconstructing the Union, 110-15.
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of the Treasury Department or other recent arrivals to the state.

A

handful of A m y officers, among them General Shepley, were Radicals.
The third group was called the Conservative Unionists.

Primarily

native planters and businessmen, they preferred retaining the institu
tion of slavery.

Obviously, most Conservatives did not want blacks to

be given any rights.

Two of the most prominent Conservatives were

J. Q. A. Fellows and Edmund Abell.

Although all three factions supported

the Union and wanted Louisiana fully reinstated, their views on slavery
and Negro rights kept than divided.

Over the next several months, any

ex-Confederates who became eligible to participate in politics joined
the Conservative Unionists, which made them even more conservative.
factions drifted farther apart through the summer of 1863.

The

33

In August Lincoln ordered Banks to create a new constitution for
Louisiana.

The President desired the state to abolish slavery on its

own, since a new constitution which disallowed slavery would help con
vince the North that Louisiana was sincerely redressing its own faults.
Of course, such a constitution must be written by civilians, but Lincoln
urged Banks to expedite the process as much as possible.

Shepley had

appointed Durant registrar of voters, and Lincoln presumed that a
registration drive was under way.

Lincoln also suggested that Banks

^^Qn Louisiana political factions see Harrington, Fighting
Politician, 100-102; Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 97-103; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 21-22; T. Harry Williams, "General Banks and
the Radical Republicans in the Civil War," New England Quarterly, XII
(June, 1939), 268-80; James P. McCrary, "Moderation in a Revolutionary
World: Lincoln and the Failure of Reconstruction in Louisiana"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1972), 159, 203-204.
(Hereinafter cited as McCrary, "Lincoln and Louisiana.")
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establish same Negro schools, a project which the general had already
started on his own.
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But Lincoln was mistaken about the voter registration.

Despite

later additional orders from Secretary of War Stanton, Shepley did not
press Durant in his duty.

The registrar hesitated to enroll voters

until the Radicals gained additional strength.

Banks learned that few

new voters were on the rolls, and he cancelled the scheduled November
Louisiana congressional election.
have been elected anyway.

Two Conservative Unionists claimed to

Neither Banks nor Shepley acknowledged the

voting as valid, and Congress did not seat the Conservatives.

All this

caused Lincoln to tell Banks that he was "bitterly" disappointed over
Louisiana’s political difficulties.

The President wanted a new regis

tration effort at once to form "a tangible nucleus which the remainder
of the State may rally around. . . .
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Early in December Lincoln issued a "Proclamation of Amnesty and
Reconstruction," better known as his Ten Percent Plan.

It was not

really a "plan" at all, but a tentative guideline designed to entice the
Southern states away from the Confederacy.

The President offered

amnesty to all Confederates except high civil and military leaders.

To

receive amnesty, Southerners were required to swear an oath of future
loyalty and agree to abide by all wartime measures on slavery.

When ten

percent of the voters in the 1860 presidential election in any one state
^Lincoln to Banks, August 5, 1863, in Basler (ed.), Works of
Lincoln, VI, 365; Harrington, Fighting Politician, 108-10.
35
Stanton to Shepley, August 24, 1863, in Official Records, XXVI,
694-95; McCrary, "Lincoln and Louisiana," 140, 170-73; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 22; Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 80-86; Lincoln to
Banks, November 5, 1863, in Basler (ed. ), Works of Lincoln, VII, 1.
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had sworn this oath, a new loyal state government could be formed, and
once this government abolished slavery, the chief executive would
consider the state reconstructed.

Any congressmen or senators elected

by these states still required the approval of Congress itself before
they were seated.

This proclamation indicated that Lincoln believed the

executive was responsible for leading the Reconstruction process.

But

in no way did the President demand congressional recognition of any new
governments that might come into being.

Lincoln was relying primarily

on General Banks and Louisiana to demonstrate the feasibility of his
proposal.^
To do all that the President wanted, Banks claimed he must have
control over all facets of Reconstruction in Louisiana.

Hie requested

that Shepley be transferred and Durant be removed as registrar.

Lincoln

soothingly replied that all along he had intended for Banks to be the
complete "master" of Louisiana, both civil and military.
there simply to "assist" the department commander.
that Durant stay in his job.

Shepley was

But Lincoln insisted

It was important, he said, for

representatives of all factions to participate in the "free stats
0 7

reorganization of Louisiana, in the shortest possible time."
Banks, reassured by Lincoln's letter, began a voter registration
drive and designated February 22, 1864, as the election date for
governor, lieutenant governor, and other executive offices.

Prospective

voters were required to take the oath of future loyalty in Lincoln's
■^Presidential Proclamation, December 8, 1863, in Basler (ed.),
Works of Lincoln, VII, 53-66; Belz, Reconstructing the Union, 156-58;
McCrary, "Lincoln and Louisiana," 176-89.
37
Lincoln to Banks, December 24, 1863, in Basler (ed.), Works of
Lincoln, VII, 89-90; Harrington, Fighting Politician, 143.
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proclamation.

Furthermore, Banks declared that on March 28 delegates to

a constitutional convention would ha chosen in a separate canvass.

In

both of these elections Banks altered the old Louisiana constitution of
1852.

By decree he increased the number of legislators to be elected

from New Orleans, which in the past had been discriminated against in
favor of higher representation from the rural parishes.

Similarly, more

delegates to the constitutional convention would be allowed from the
Crescent City.
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Some political leaders, particularly several Radicals, believed
that Banks had purposefully reversed the logical sequence of the
elections.

The constitutional convention should come first, they

contended, before the election for state officers.

Apparently, Banks

and Hahn, working closely together, concluded that holding the guberna
torial election first was likely to strengthen the Moderate faction and
put them in a better position to influence the drafting of the
constitution.
At the Free State Party convention on February 1, 1864, the Radical
and Moderate Republicans split over their nominee for the governorship.
The Radicals angrily quit the hall and, convening separately, nominated
Benjamin F. Flanders.
endorsement.

Michael Hahn easily obtained the Moderates'

In an unusual effort to attract broad support, both groins

selected James Madison Wells for lieutenant governor.
native Louisiana planter from Rapides Parish.

Wells was a

The obvious division of

38
Proclamation by Banks, January 11, 1864, in Official Records,
Series III, vol. IV, 22-23; GO No. 35, Dept Gulf, March 11, 1864, ibid.,
170-72; Harrington, Fighting Politician, 144.
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the Free-Staters fired the hopes of the Conservatives, who put forth
their own candidate for governor, J. Q. A. Fellows.
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On election day Banks encouraged Union soldiers to vote.

The

number of troops which actually cast ballots is disputed, but these
votes probably did not affect the outcome of the election.
vote was tabulated, Hahn won with over 6,000 votes.

To the surprise of

some, Fellows finished second with almost 3,000 votes.
in third place and tallied only about 2,200 ballots.

When the

Flanders trailed
Wells was handily

elected lieutenant governor.
Banks was quite pleased with these results, primarily because Hahn
had won.

Also, the number of votes was over twenty percent of the

ballots cast in Louisiana’s 1860 presidential election and thus exceeded
the requirements of Lincoln’s ten percent plan.

Ecstatic, Banks wrote

Lincoln that Louisiana "will become in two years, under a wise and
strong government, one of the most loyal and prosperous States that the
world has ever seen."

Unfortunately, like Butler's overly optimistic

predictions a few months before, Banks divined more in Louisiana's
potential than was actually there.
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Hahn was inaugurated on March 4.

Eleven days later Lincoln

replaced Shepley with Hahn, who now also became military governor.

41

3 % c C r a r y ,
"Lincoln and Louisiana," 228, 234-37, 241-42; Belz,
Reconstructing the Union, 190-91? Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,
27-28.

40For the results of the February 22 election see Harrington,
Fighting Politician, 144-46? Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 30;
John R. Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in Louisiana (through 1868)
(Baltimore, 1910), 62. The quote is from Banks to Lincoln, February 25,
1864, in Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, 133-34.
4^Lincoln to Michael Hahn, March 15, 1864, in Official Records,
Series III, vol. IV, 182.
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Hahn found the duality of his civil-military governorship cumbersome.
The ten percent plan gave the state a sanblance of civil administration,
but the Army really predominated.

With the war continuing, it was

impossible to arrange it any other way.
On March 28 Banks carried out the next step on his agenda, the
election of constitutional convention delegates.

The voters overwhelm

ingly supported the Moderates, but several Conservatives and a few
Radicals were also selected.

At the opening session on April 6, the

convention chose Edward H. Durrell, a Moderate, as president.

A Harvard

graduate, Durrell had been a lawyer and judge in Louisiana since 1834.
Fran the opening gavel until adjournment on July 23, 1864, the
convention delegates debated several key issues.

It was widely agreed,

a few conservatives excepted, that the institution of slavery would be
abolished.

Whether these new freedmen would receive any rights was

unclear.

Consideration of suffrage for blacks engendered a lengthy

dispute.

The proposal was defeated, but the constitution provided that

the right of suffrage for Negroes could be granted by an act of the
legislature in the future.

Other important clauses in the constitution

increased representation for New Orleans in the legislature, provided
for segregated public schools, and established minimum wages and hours
for laborers on public works.
rejection by the voters.

The document now faced approval or

As an afterthought, the delegates passed a

resolution giving President Durrell the power to reoonvoke the convention
if necessary.

It appeared possible the charter might be rejected, and

therefore the convention might have to meet again to consider revisions
or write another constitution.
brought about the resolution.

This was apparently the logic that
The delegates gave slight consideration
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to the legality of this unusual procedure in July 1864, a fact which
later had ominous consequences for the Anry, Louisiana, and presidential
42
Reconstruction.
Soon after the convention sat for its first meeting, General Banks
suffered two consecutive defeats at the hands of Confederate forces in
north Louisiana.

Grand strategy as planned by President Lincoln and

Major General Henry W. Halleck called for the Red River campaign of 1864
to be one in a series of successes on all fronts for Union arms that
might end the war in that year.

Instead, Confederate General Richard

Taylor trounced Banks at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill and forced the
Northerners to retreat to the lines held at the start of the campaign.
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Upon hearing the results of the campaign, Lincoln, with Grant's
approval, decided to appoint a new commander in the Southwest.

The

President appointed Major General Edward R. S. Canty, a West Point
graduate and Mexican War veteran, to command the new Military Division
of West Mississippi, which included Arkansas, the Texas coast, and all
of Louisiana west of the big river.

Banks remained in a secondary

capacity as commander of the Department of the Gulf and concerned
himself mainly with political activity in Louisiana.

It took Canby

several days to make the trip from Washington, D.c. to New Orleans,
^2The most thorough account of the convention is McCrary, "Lincoln
and Louisiana," 280-312. See also Caskey, Secession and Restoration,
116-40; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 67-87; Harrington,
Fighting Politician, 147-48; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 43-52,
104.
^^Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, 340-80; Ludwell Johnson, Red
River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War (Baltimore, 1958),
128-62.
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where he assumed command on June 9, 1864.
attention primarily on field operations.

Thereafter, Canby focused his
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Meanwhile, Lincoln ordered Banks to prepare an election for state
legislators, congressmen, and ratification or rejection of the new
constitution.

On September 5 Louisiana conducted its fourth election

under military supervision since 1862.
a six to one margin.
state legislature.

The constitution was approved by

The voters selected three congressmen and a new
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It appeared then that Banks had done all that was possible in
Louisiana.

In September 1864 the President ordered Banks to Washington,

where the general lobbied in Congress for the acceptance of Louisiana's
congressmen and the recognition of the new state constitution.
remained in the nation's capital until March 1865.
best efforts were unproductive.

Banks

However, all of his

The hopeful Louisianians were rot

seated, and the state was left with an unapproved civil government
overshadowed by military power.
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Major General Stephen A. Hurlbut was chosen to replace Banks as
canmander in the Department of the Gulf.

B o m in South Carolina,

Hurlbut had moved to Illinois where he prospered as a lawyer and
Republican politician.

He led volunteers at Shiloh, participated in the

44GO No . 192, AGO, May 7, 1864, in Official Records, XXXIV, Pt. 3,
p. 490; Halleck to E. R. S. Canby, May 7, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, pp. 49192; AAG Oliver Matthews to Lt. Lyon, June 8, 1864, ibid., Pt. 4, p. 265;
Warner, Generals in Blue, 67-68; Max L. Heyman, Prudent Soldier: A
Biography of Major General E. R. S. Canby, 1817-1873 (Glendale, Cal.,
1959), 206-33; Harrington, Fighting Politician, 159-60.
4^Lincoln to Banks, August 9, 1864, in Basler (ed.), Works of
Lincoln, VII, 486; Harrington, Fighting Politician, 149.
4^Belz, Reconstructing the Union, 268; Harrington, Fighting
Politician, 163-65; McCrary, "Lincoln and Louisiana," 342-49.
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Corinth campaign, and later commanded the Memphis garrison under Major
General William T. Sherman.

Upon taking command, Hurlbut immediately

ran afoul of Governor Hahn.

The responsibilities of department command-

er and military governor were still unclear, and Hurlbut attempted to
increase his own powers.

For example, he placed restrictions on

gambling halls and required licenses for all houses of prostitution in
the Crescent City.
on Sundays.

Moreover, he closed all amusement and gaming places

47

Governor Hahn objected to Hurlbut*s orders and claimed that the
Army had needlessly invaded the domain of civil government.

Hahn, b o m

in Bavaria in 1830 and a resident of Louisiana since 1851, took his
office very seriously and resented Hurlbut*s intrusions.

The real core

of the dispute was the status of Louisiana's government.

In a letter to

Canty's headquarters, Hurlbut called "the present civil government of
Louisiana . . . an experiment liable to be cut short at any time by mili
tary orders."

Until "approved and receive! by Congress," the state was

"wholly within the scope of martial law." For his part, Canby recog
nized the need for both practical and political judgment when dealing
with Louisiana's peculiar government, supported as it was by the
President.

But Canby concluded that "all attempts at civil government,

within the territory declared to be in insurrection, [were] the creation
of military power, and of course subject to military revision and
control."48
^Warner, Generals in Blue, 244-45; GO No. 139, Dept Gulf,
September 23, 1864, in OfficiaT Records, XLI, Pt. 3, p. 316; Capers,
Occupied City, 117-18; Futrell, "Military Government in the South," 191.
AO

Stephen A. Hurlbut to AAG C. T. Christensen, October 22, 1864,
and Canby to Hurlbut, October 29, 1864, in Official Records, XLI, Pt. 4,
pp. 412-13.
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The presidential election of 1864 confirmed the opinions of the two
military coarananders.

Lincoln received Louisiana's electoral votes.

However, Congress neglected to count these votes when it became clear
that the President was reelected without them.

49

This unorthodox proce

dure cast great doubt on the validity of Louisiana's government.

Canty

and Hurlbut seemed to favor the Conservatives and operated a military
government rather than use the full possibilities of the Constitution of
1864.

Governor Hahn's powers were so weak that he could not fill vacan

cies on a public works commission.

Hurlbut did so instead.

If wartime

Reconstruction was to succeed, an end to bickering was imperative.
Lincoln stressed to Canty that it was "a worthy object to again get
Louisiana into proper practical relations with the nation. . . .

Much

good work [was] already done, and surely nothing can be gained by
throwing it away."
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Unfortunately for Lincoln and his followers, a majority of Congress
did not find "much good work" in Louisiana.

In February 1865, after

heated debate over the issues, the national, legislature refused to seat
the Pelican State representatives.

Presidential Reconstruction remained

incomplete. ^
49
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 54.

^^Linooln to Hurlbut, November 14, 1864, and Lincoln to Canty,
December 12, 1864, in Basler (ed.), Works of Lincoln, VIII, 107, 164.
For the continuing struggle between Hurlbut and Hahn, see Hahn to
Hurlbut, and reply, both December 1, 1864, in Official Records, XLI,
Pt. 4, pp. 735-38. For an article which supports Hahn and gives his
background, see Amos E. Simpson and Vaughn B, Baker, "Michael Hahn:
Steady Patriot," Louisiana History, XIII (Summer, 1972), 229-53.
^McCrary, "Lincoln and Louisiana," 350-59, 370-76; Ficklen,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 91.
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In spite of this setback, Louisiana Free State leaders continued as
if it were only a matter of tine before Congress accepted Lincoln's
ideas on restoration.

Governor Hahn quit the anomalous governorship.

The Louisiana legislature elected him to a vacant seat in the U. S.
Senate, but the solons refused Hahn admission just as they had turned
down Louisiana's congressmen-elect.
office, Hahn's importance faded.

Mow without the influence of either

52

Janes Madison Wells was inaugurated governor of Louisiana on
March 4, 1865, replacing "Senator" Hahn, and the new executive quickly
guaged the shifting political winds in the state.
veterans had about them an air of determination.
public expression of their section's defeat.

Returning Confederate
Most of them gave no

To the contrary, an

unquenched defiance remained in the hearts of many ex-soldiers.
was gone, and the Confederates understood this.

Slavery

Yet they refused to

admit that the social fabric woven over so many decades in the South had
been irrevocably ripped apart.

Southern leaders, and Wells among them,

knew that unless Congress passed extraordinary legislation to deprive
the Confederates of their voting rights, these veterans comprised the
constituency of the future.
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After Wells had been in office a few days, General Hurlbut
permitted him to appoint Dr. Hugh Kennedy mayor of New Orleans.

Kennedy

was the first civilian to hold the office since the military had arrived
in 1862.

The mayor's pro-Oonfederate sympathies soon became evident.

^Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, 404; Walter M. Lowrey, "The
Political Career of James Madison Wells," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XXXI (October, 1948), 1023.
"’^Michael Perman, Reunion Without Compromise; The South and Recon
struction, 1865-1868 (Cambridge, 1973), 3-53, 110-11, 234.
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Wells, who at first associated with the Moderates, gradually associated
himself with the Conservatives.

Instead of the Republican Hahn in

office, as the war went through its final agonies, a neo-Democrat was
governor of the Southern state which had been longest under Federal
occupation*
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To unsettle natters further, General Hurlbut decided to resign from
the Army.

Obviously, Louisiana needed a new ooranander.

Canty recently

had concentrated his efforts on the capture of Mobile, Alabama, which
eventually fell on April 12.

He knew that Louisiana needed evenhanded

leadership, with emphasis on firmness.

Lincoln disappointed Canty,

however, by reassigning N. P. Banks to the Pelican State.
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Before Banks reached New Orleans, exhilarating and shocking news
struck the country.

On April 9, 1865, the A m y of Northern Virginia led

ty General Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox.

A few days later,

as the North celebrated, John Wilkes Booth mortally wounded
President Lincoln in Ford's Theater.

An uneasy feeling gripped many

Northerners as Andrew Johnson, a former Democrat and former slaveowner
from Tennessee, was sworn in as President.

The new chief executive was

heartened by the surrender of General Joseph E. Johnston's tired
Confederates in North Carolina.

Only one major Southern field force now

remained, General Edmund Kirby Smith's anry in Louisiana and Texas.
Meanwhile, Banks resumed command of the Department of the Gulf on
April 22.
C

Following Hahn's resignation, Banks had to work with a n&t

A

Kendall, History of New Orleans, I, 295; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 58-59; Lowrey, "Political. Career of Wells," 1024-30.
55Canby to U. S. Grant, March 5, 1865, in Official Records, XLVIII,
Pt. 1, p. 1092; SO No. 132, AGO, March 18, 1865, ibid., 1206; Hurlbut to
Canby, April 23, 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 163.
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governor who showed himself at odds with the programs and government
Banks had patched together over many months.

Wells' conservative

appointees displeased Banks, and he replaced several of then, including
Mayor Kennedy with A m y officers and cooperative civilians.

Kennedy

protested his removal, and Canty allowed him to be reinstated over the
lame objections of Banks, who resigned from the Army.
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On May 17 the Adjutant General's Office in Washington created a new
command structure for the military departments.

The Military Division

of West Mississippi was abolished, and Canty took charge of an expanded
Department of the Gulf, which included Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
and Florida. ^
After his resignation, Banks remained in Louisiana for several
months.

He occupied himself with a law practice and sought support for

the Moderates.
disregarded.

His impact was negligible and his advice often
Finally, in disgust, Banks returned to Massachusetts in

September 1865.
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Before he left, Banks had the opportunity to observe

the manner in which professional soldiers handled Reconstruction.

He

could easily have concluded that the challenges of Louisiana politics
were no easier for West Pointers to master than they had been for him
and Butler.

^ G O NO. 42, Dept Gulf, April 22, 1865, in ibid., Pt. 2, pp. 15657; Kendall, History of New Orleans, I, 297.
57GO No , 95, AGO, May 17, 1865, in Official Records, XLVII, Pt. 2,
p. 475.
50Banks was active in Massachusetts and national politics for many
years as a state senator, congressman, and U.S. marshal.
See
Harrington, Fighting Politician, 166-69 and passim.

CHAPTER II
SHERIDAN, CANBY, AND "THE SEED OF THE REBELLION"
General in Chief Ulysses S. Grant considered several major generals
for assignments to the new Army military divisions.

For several

reasons, he selected Philip Henry Sheridan to deal with the problem
presented by General Edmund Kirby Smith's Confederate troops west of the
Mississippi River.

"Little Phil" Sheridan stood only five feet five

inches tall, but he was an aggressive fighter.

He had revamped and

revitalized the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac.

Later, Sheridan

directed an independent army to victory over Confederates in the Shenan
doah Valley, and this campaign made him a hero throughout the North.
Moreover, friendship bound Grant and Sheridan, a comradeship built upon
mutual respect and nurtured through battles from Mississippi to
Appomattox.

After the ceremonies there, the General in Chief gave his

diminutive friend one of the little tables used for preparing the
surrender papers.

The next month, on May 17, 1865, Grant drafted orders

posting Sheridan to command the Military Division of the Southwest.'*’
^Sheridan was b o m to Irish immigrant parents on March 6, 1831,
probably in New York City, but possibly on the ship from Ireland shortly
before it arrived in America. [See Lawrence Frost to John M. Carrol,
March 16, 1972, in John M. Carrol, Custer in Texas (New York, 1975),
25n.] The Sheridan family soon moved to Ohio, where Phil spent his
childhood. In 1848 he received an appointment to West Point. After
taking an extra year to complete the four-year course (he was suspended
for fighting with an upperclassman) Sheridan graduated in 1853. See
Richard O'Connor, Sheridan the Inevitable (Indianapolis, 1953), 18-38.
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At first this assignment disappointed Sheridan because his orders
required him to leave Washington before the Grand Review of the Union
Army, scheduled for May 23 and 24.

A personal meeting with Grant

convinced Sheridan of the need for quick action.

Find Kirby Smith,

Grant said, and demand his surrender or defeat him in the field.
General Edward R. S. Canby in Louisiana and General Joseph J. Reynolds
in Arkansas had already been notified that Sheridan would be in overall
oomxand of their troops.

Grant also ordered the Fourth Corps at

Nashville and the Twenty-fifth Corps in Virginia to proceed to the
Southwest as reinforcements.

Once assembled, this powerful force could

certainly overpower Kirby Smith.
Grant then disclosed an additional unwritten feature of Sheridan's
orders.

As Sheridan knew, in 1861 French armies of Bxperor Napoleon III

had invaded the Republic of Mexico.

Achieving a tenuous hold on the

country, Napoleon seated Austrian Archduke Maximilian on the throne of a
new "expire." Secretary of State William H. Seward had vigorously, but
fruitlessly, protested this violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The

invaders benefited from the misfortune of a United States caught in the
throes of secession and Civil War.
changed.

But in May 1865 that situation had

Large veteran American armies stood ready to drive Maximilian

from Mexico if he did not leave voluntarily.

Sheridan's mission includ

ed protecting the Rio Grande frontier and possibly invading Mexico.

He

was to leave immediately and until he reached his headquarters in New
2
Orleans, Canby temporarily commanded the division.
%lysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (2 vols., New
York, 1886), II, 546; Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H.
Sheridan (2 vols,, New York, 1888), II, 209-210; Ulysses S. Grant to
Philip H. Sheridan, May 17, 1865, in War of the Rebellion: Official
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As he traveled south from Washington, Sheridan learned that Kirby
Shiith had surrendered.

Confederates in western Louisiana quit the field

on May 26, and those in east Texas capitulate! on June 2.

Sheridan had

hoped to deliver the coup de grace himself, but was pleased that the War
of the Rebellion had ended.

The domestic hostilities over, Sheridan's

staff began to prepare elaborate plans for an invasion of Mexico, while
the general sought advice on the best defensive positions for his own
troops along the Mexican border.

Several garrisons remained on duty in
3
Louisiana; the Army established others in north and central Texas.
Sheridan and Grant shared similar opinions on the problem of the
French in Mexico.
puppet regime.

Both officers favored action against Maximilian's

Sheridan called the Austrian duke "a part of the

rebellion," and Grant believed the Civil Whr would not end until the
4
French were expelled from Mexico.
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128 parts in 70 vols.,
Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Series 1, vol. XLVIII, Pt. 2, p. 476.
(Hereinafter cited as Official Records. All references to Series 1
unless otherwise indicated.) Carl C. Rister, Border Command;
General Phil Sheridan in the West (Norman, 1944), 9-10; Dexter Perkins,
A History of the Monroe Doctrine"'(Boston, 1955), 129.
^Sheridan to Grant, June 5, 1865, in Ulysses S. Grant Papers
(Department of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.;
microfilm copy at Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge.)
Kirby Smith Surrender Terms in Official Records, XLVIII, Pt. 2, pp. 600601; Grant to Sheridan, May 28, 1865, ibid. , p. 639; Sheridan to Grant,
May 29, 1865, ibid., p. 647; GO No. 1, MilDivSW, May 29, 1865, ibid.,
p. 648; Joseph H. Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith, C.S.A. (Baton
Rouge, 1954), 477-78; Robert L. Kerby, Kirby Smith's Confederacy: The
Trans-Mississippi South, 1863-1865 (New York, 1872), 424-26; Rister,
Border Command, 18^
4Sheridan to Grant, June 4, 1865, in Grant Papers. For Grant's
opinions see especially Grant to Sheridan, August 13, 1865, ibid.
See
also Howard K. Beale (ed.), The Diary of Gideon Welles (3 vols., New
York, 1960), II, 317, 322.
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Grant therefore had given Sheridan plenty of troops for the task.
More than 30,000 soldiers had been ordered to Louisiana and Texas,
including 8,000 cavalrymen under veteran generals George A. Custer and
Wesley Merritt.

Sate of these troops went directly to Texas, while

others (sane of wham had only recently enlisted) trained and organized
at Alexandria and Shreveport in Louisiana before moving into Texas in
August.

Canby distributed his 25,000 troops throughout Louisiana, but

an order from Sheridan might relocate them at any time.

Likewise,

Reynolds prepared his 12,000 soldiers in Arkansas for any new directives.
In late June Sheridan made an inspection tour of his division.

5

Upon returning from Texas, Sheridan sent Grant a report filled with
information about Mexico.

The French had obtained some cannon and other

equipment which had belonged to the Confederacy.

Under Kirby Smith's

surrender terms, this war material reverted to the United States, but
some recalcitrant Southerners had instead transported the guns into
Mexico.

Grant ordered Sheridan to demand the return of the artillery,

but not to cross the border without authorization from the Whr
Department.6
Sheridan struggled with the problem dealing with the French in
Mexico, but soon a vexing situation developed which he and other
^Sheridan to Grant, June 8 (two communications) and June 13, 1865,
in Grant Papers; Manuscript Returns, Dept Gulf, June 1865, in Records of
AGO, RG 94, NA; Rister, Border Command, 9, 11; Sheridan to John A.
Rawlins, June 19, 1865, in Official Records, XLVIII, Pt. 2, pp. 924-25;
Sheridan to Rawlins, June 28, 1865, ibid.,~p. 1014; William L. Richter,
"The Army in Texas During Reconstruction, 1865-1870" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1970), 43-47; Jay Monaghan,
Custer: The Life of General George Armstrong Custer (Boston, 1959),
256-(>0.
g
Sheridan to Grant, June 28, 1865, Grant to Sheridan, July 1, 1865,
in Grant Papers.
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officers had experienced during the Civil Whr— the conflict of
overlapping commands.

The Military Division of the Southwest included

all of the area west of the Mississippi River and south of the Arkansas
River, roughly consisting of southwest Arkansas, the Indian Territory,
Texas, and most of Louisiana.

However, Louisiana also belonged to

Canty's Department of the Gulf, which additionally contained Mississippi,
Alabama, and Florida.

Canty usually tendered help quickly and did not

hinder the operation of the division.

On the other hand, he sometimes

responded to Sheridan's orders with the tone of an equal rather than a
subordinate.

Therefore Sheridan requested outright control over Canty's

department, and in July 1865 the War Department responded by creating a
new conglomerate called the Military Division of the Gulf, which
contained Indian Territory, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and
Louisiana.
states.

Sheridan held supreme ccrrenand over all troops in these

Eventually this unwieldy arrangement was discarded, and the

division was reduced to Florida, Texas, and Louisiana.

Canby, who had

previously directed a department wnth four states, now commanded in only
one, Louisiana.^
7Sheridan to Rawlins, July 7, 1865, Grant to Sheridan, July 6 and
13, 1865, ibid.; GO No. 95, AGO, May 17, 1865, in Official Records,
XLVIII, Pt. 2, p. 475; Sheridan to Rawlins, June 29, 1865, ibid.,~
pp. 1024-25; Sheridan to Rawlins, July 3, 1865, ibid., p. 1042; GO No. 1,
MilDivGulf, July 17, 1865, ibid., p. 1087. Initially Texas and
Louisiana formed one department, commanded by Canby, within the Division
of the Gulf. In August, on Sheridan's request, each state was appro
priately made a separate department. Canby remained in Louisiana (see
GO No. 24, August 6, 1865, in GO, Dept La, RG 393, NA). In October,
Mississippi was shifted to the Military Division of the Tennessee (see
GO No. 142, AGO, October 7, 1865, in Official Records, XLVIII, Pt. 2,
p. 1238). In August 1866 the Military Division of the Gulf became the
Department of the Gulf, containing only Florida, Texas, and Louisiana
(see GO No. 59, AGO, August 6, 1866, in Philip H. Sheridan Papers,
Department of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

As other generals had done after the Mexican War, Canby and
Sheridan commanded troops who had to occupy hostile territory.

Martial

law was commonplace throughout the South, but the Army gave its generals
no clearly defined mission or goal at the outset of postwar occupation.
No one knew how long the Army would .retain after civil governments
resumed operations.

For a tine, at least, "American soldiers would

regulate the lives of millions of other Americans,"

8

while civil offi

cials in Washington decided exactly how the former Confederate states
would resume their places in the Union.
Canby enforced martial law and wrestled with most of the sticky
political questions of military government.

Sheridan, however, inter

vened in Louisiana Reconstruction only from time to tine, devoting his
main attention to the Texas frontier.

Since 1862 the military, as a

matter of course, had dominated politics in Louisiana.

Canby had

inherited a variety of de facto powers from his predecessors, Butler and
Banks.

Soldiers worked intimately with Treasury agents and other

bureaucrats.

These officials carried out the important task of confis

cating cotton and other property owned by the Confederate government.
Butler had started the confiscation of Confederate holdings, but Banks
relaxed enforcement of the Confiscation Act of 1862.

Working under this

law, special agents of the Treasury Department, assisted by Canby and
his troops, confiscated millions of dollars worth of derelict property.
Benjamin F. Flanders, the Radical political leader, became one of the
^Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton, The Life and
Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York, 1962), 437.
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most active Treasury agents, collecting more than five million dollars
worth of materials for the Federal government.

9

One of Flanders' assistants found that the Army did not always
cooperate with the special agents.

When the Federal oorrmandant of

Alexandria unexpectedly withdrew a guard from several bales of confis
cated cotton, unknown "parties" made off with the valuable white stuff.
The agent lamented that everyone in the "Cuntry" wanted "to take all
they [could] from the government.

Nevertheless, the provost marshal

usually assigned guards for material consigned to Flanders in New
Orleans.

Soldiers protected confiscated property both in transit and at

storage depots.

Satie cotton and other goods undoubtedly had belonged to

the Confederate government, but other oammodities were privately owned.
Flanders and other Treasury agents decided ownership disputes and
usually ruled against private individuals.11
Canby believed that the trouble and disagreements caused by cotton
outweighed the value of the revenue it brought to the government.

The

%\or an overview of confiscation see James G. Randall, Constitu
tional Problems under Lincoln (Urbana, 1964), 275-92. On seme of
Flanders' activities see Howard A. White, "The Freedman's Bureau in New
Orleans" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Tulane University, 1950), 27.
1%. McCarthy to O. H. Burbridge, Report of March 15, 1866, in
Benjamin F. Flanders Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge). A similar incident
was reported by AAG Wickham Hoffman to Gen. Andrew J. Smith, November 11,
1865, in Dept Gulf, vol. 79, RG 393, NA.
1% o r the Army's duties as guardians of confiscated property see
SO Nos. 90 and 93, Dept Gulf, April 23 and 27, 1866; Col. W. S. Mudgett
to AAG Hoffman, April 24 and 28, 1866; Lt. Col. De Witt Clinton to
Benjamin F. Flanders, May 1, 1866; for an example of a decision on a
private claim see B. J. Brown to Col. C. H. Beers, March 10, 1866, all
in Flanders Papers. Canty's close cooperation with Flanders is seen in
Canby to W. E. Fitzgerald (Capt., U.S. Navy), June 2, 1865, Dept Gulf,
vol. 6, and Hoffman to Flanders, July 26, 1865, Dept Gulf, vol. 79, both
in RG 393, NA.
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"cotton question in Louisiana/' Canty told Secretary of War Edwin M.
Stanton, was "so hopelessly complicated by the frauds of speculators,
the conflicts and ccsrplcxity of officers and agents of the Government
and the collusion of the planters that . . .

[it was] . . . a dangerous

cause of demoralization and dissatisfaction" for the Amy.

Canty favored

returning cotton to local planters who presented reasonably honest
claims.

In any event, Canty wanted private enterprise to handle the

cotton business and to disassociate it altogether from the Army and the
Treasury Department.

12

A new organization, the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands, supplemented the activities of the Treasury Department.

13

On

March 3, 1865, Congress established the Freedmen's Bureau to find jobs
for Negroes, regulate their wages, and take legal action against
employers who mistreated freedmen.

Bureau agents distributed food to

the needy of both races and provided assistance to Negro schools.

14

-^e . R. s. Canhy to Secretary of War (hereinafter cited as SW),
August 12, 1865, Dept Gulf, vol. 79, RG 393, NA.
13The Bureau has received its best coverage in George Bentley, A
History of the Freedmen's Bureau (Philadelphia, 1955), which supercedes
the earlier study by Paul S. Pierce, The Freedmen's Bureau (Iowa City,
1904). The Louisiana organization has been most thoroughly examined by
Howard A. White, The Freedman's Bureau in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1970).
An earlier treatment can be found in John C. Engelsman, "The Freedmen's
Bureau in Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXXII (January,
1949), 145-224. A work made less valuable by high racial bias is
Honarie A. Sherman, "The Freedman's Bureau in Louisiana" (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Tulane University, 1936). A useful article is J. Thomas
May, "The Freedman's Bureau at the Local Level: A Study of a Louisiana
Agent," Louisiana History, IX (Winter, 1968), 5-19.
l^Qn the Bureau and educational advancement see Bentley, History of
the Bureau, 169-70, 174; Engelsman, "Bureau in Louisiana," 191-264;
White, Bureau in Louisiana, 170, 179, 190-99. J. W. Alvord, inspector
of schools for the Bureau, said in his January 1866 report that great
acconplisbments had been made in Louisiana education. The report is in
Senate Exec. Docs., 39 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 27, p. 112. See also Max L.
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Annoyed by the Bureau's actions, sore Louisianians left the state, and a
few went abroad to escape the extraordinary social changes.

15

The Army enforced the rules and regulations of the Bureau, and
military officers served as assistant commissioners (i.e., state super
intendents) and local agents.

At first all the Southern states except

Louisiana received an active or retired Army officer as assistant
corrmissioner.

In August 1865 Brigadier General Absalom Baird replaced

Louisiana's civilian superintendent. Eight men, more than in any other
state, served in the office of Louisiana's assistant canmissioner
between 1865 and 1869.

Six of the eight were generals on active duty.

By late 1866 the Army had only a few officers attached to the Freedmen's
Bureau, although many former soldiers were errplqyed as local agents.

16

Aside from cooperating with the Freedmen's Bureau, Canty divided
Louisiana into two parts to facilitate administration of the state.

The

Eastern District, commanded by Major General Thomas W. Sherman, included
all land east of the Mississippi River, plus the important towns of
Brashear City and New Iberia.

District headquarters were in New Orleans.

The rest of the state conprised the Western District, commanded for a
Hyman, Prudent Soldier; A Biography of Major General E. R. S. Canby,
1817-1873 (Glendale, Cal., 1959), 265-69.
1%. W. Palfrey to William T. Palfrey, May 11, 1866, in William T.
Palfrey Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State
University Library).
I®James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 18651877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 47. Bentley found that as a "result of this
early practice of filling its offices with soldiers . . . the Bureau got
a rapidly changing, largely inefficient personnel." History of the
Bureau, 72. White discusses soldiers as ineffective agents in Bureau in
Louisiana, 33-37. See also ibid., 20-32.
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time by Canty's brother-in-law, Major General John P. Hawkins.
Major General Andrew J. Smith took over the district.

Later

17

The headquarters of the Western District was located in Alexandria,
a town General Custer's wife Elizabeth learned "had been partly burned
during the war, and was built up mostly with one story cottages."

The

site of a large cavalry training depot, as well as district headquarters,
the little town bustled with activity, but Libbie Custer "found every
thing a hundred years behind the times."

Federal troops moved into the

rough, pine-log quarters formerly occupied by Confederates outside the
town.

Alexandria experienced a short-lived economic boom as general

stores and other local businesses prospered by soldiers' patronage or
purchase orders for construction materials and other supplies.

X8

In contrast, the economy of New Orleans suffered because the city
attracted the unemployed and destitute of both races.

Throughout 1865

and 1866 the A m y donated tons of provisions to the needy, particularly
those located in the city's charitable institutions.

Along with food,

the military quartermaster and commissary regularly si^pplied wood and
coal to the New Orleans Orphan Asylum, St. Mary Dominican Convent,
V

St. Joseph Orphan Asylum, Convent of the Good Shepherd, and the Soule
Asylum for Colored Children, among others.
also made in other towns.

Similar distributions were

19

-^GO No. 4, Dept La & Texas, July 20, 1865, in Official Records,
XLVIII, Pt. 2, pp. 1094-95; Senate Exec. Docs., 39 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 13,
p. 2. These districts were discontinued in 1866. See GO No. 11, Dept
La, January 30, 1866, and GO No. 35, Dept La, April 21, 1866, in GO, Dept
La, 1866, RG 393, NA. (Brashear City later was renamed Morgan City.)
-^Elizabeth B. Custer, Tenting on the Plains (New York, 1887), 74;
Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, October 29, 1879.
l%br example, the Army also gave supplies to groups and individuals
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Along with taking care of the needy, the Array entered the arena of
business and finance.

Since the city's surrender, New Orleans banks had

operated under military control.

Butler, Banks, and Canby had appointed

A m y officers to serve on or supervise the boards of directors of local
banks.

After the cessation of hostilities, Canby initiated plans for

their reversion to civilian management.

By January 1866 most of the

banks again had civilian directors, but a few remained under military
control until later that year.

A similar situation existed with regard

to several railroad companies, which had been managed for several months
by panels of military officers.

Canby held meetings with New Orleans

city officials, Governor J. Madison Wells, and the A m y officers who
temporarily operated the railroads to determine when and how the lines
would return to private control.

20

Louisiana's Confederate veterans sometimes used these railroads to
return home, and the presence of so many former Johnny Rebs became a
cause for concern among Canty and his subordinates.

The ex-soldiers

became common sights, clustered in small groups or standing alone in the
in Franklin and Baton Rouge. See AAG Hoffman to Gen. Robert A. Cameron,
June 7, 1865, in Lafourche Dist., letters Road. (Lafourche was a subdis
trict in southern Louisiana.) Hoffman to CO, Baton Rouge, November 30,
1865, in Dept Gulf, vol. 79; Capt. E. R. Ames to Quartermaster, Dept La,
January 17, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol. 80; AAG George Lee to Quartermaster
C. G. Sawtelle, June 29 and July 2, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol. 248; AAG
Schuyler Crosby to Sawtelle, October 30 and 31, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol.
258. All of the above in RG 393, NA. See alto Wickham Hoffman, Camp,
Court, and Siege (New York, 1877), 108.
^Grant to Canby, June 3, 1865, in Official Records, XLVIII, Pt. 2,
p. 743. Canby to Governor of Louisiana, November 17, 1865; Canby to
C/S James Forsyth, November 30 and December 1, 1865; Canby to Andrew
Johnson, December 9, 1865, all in Dept Gulf, vol. 79, RG 393, NA. GO
NO. 2, Dept La, January 5, 1866, in GO, Dept La, 1866, RG 393, NA. See
also Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisiana (Baton Rouge,
1935), 97-98; and Grant to Sheridan, April 2, 1866, in Letters Reed,
MilDivGulf, 1866, RG 393, NA.
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railway stations, on the streets, and in the stores.

Some veterans

publicly carried a variety of lethal weapons, especially knives and
pistols.

Despite this bravado, veterans often came bade penniless and

without prospects.

Anry garrison commanders around the state usually

let the former Confederates alone as long as they did not disturb the
peace.

However, reports increased of so-called jayhawk bands roaming

throughout the state.

21

Made up of armed riders and usually attacking at night, the
jayhawkers indiscriminately looted and robbed both pro-Unionists and
pro-Confederates.

General Sherman issued a circular in the Eastern

District warning all "Guerrillas and Jayhawkers" to cease their criminal
activities or suffer the severest consequences.

The circular emphasized

that all suspected jayhawkers would be tried by military conmissions
instead of civilian courts.

Even with 25,000 troops in Louisiana, Canby

found it difficult to protect every parish thoroughly.

Colonel Charles L.

Norton, ooitsnanding the 98th U. S. Colored Infantry at New Iberia,
believed that "beyond the immediate vicinity of U. S. troops lawlessness
prevails to a great extent." Canby ordered frequent patrols outside the
garrison towns, and he reminded the people that martial law still
applied in the state.

Gradually, rural turbulence declined, as men

found jobs in Louisiana or other states.
eventually disappeared.

Jayhawking decreased and

22

21Major G. R. Davis to Capt. B. B. Campbell, July 1, 1865;
Col. Charles Norton to Campbell, June 3, 1865, in Letters Reed,
Lafourche Dist, RG 393, NA. Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,
1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 63, 91-94.
22Gen. R. A. Cameron to AAG Hoffman, June 26, 1865, in Official
Records, XLVIII, Pt. 2, p. 997. Circular No. 1, July 11, 1865, Dist
Eastern La; Norton to Campbell, June 30, 1865, in Letters Reed,
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In the sumner and fall of 1865 Canby directed the military
government of Louisiana virtually in the same manner as Banks had during
the war.

Although Secretary of Whr Stanton instructed Canby to cooper

ate with Governor Wells "and not to interfere with" the government
except to preserve "the peace and security of the department/' no
orders from Sheridan, the War Department, or the President had changed
ultimate military control over civilians.

23

A few days after Kirby Smith surrendered, Wells asked Canby to
remove all civil officials appointed by military orders prior to
March 4, 1865, the day Wells was inaugurated.

The governor claimed that

many of these appointees had disobeyed his directives and obstructed the
orderly return to complete civil control of the state government.
was true, at least from Governor Wells' point of view.

This

Many of the

Unionist or Republican officeholders used Wells' pro-Confederate
sympathies

to justify disregarding his orders.

24

Canby responded after giving the matter "serious consideration."
All military appointments would stand, he wrote, unless the governor
demonstrated just causes for removal, such as malfeasance, negligence,
or some criminal offense.

Of course, incumbents could be turned out if

authorized elections were held.
men offended Wells.

Otherwise, Canby wanted to know which

Any substitution, of course, had to be ordered by

himself, not by Wells.

The general did not mean to discourage the

Lafourche Dist; AAG Hoffman to Gen. Thomas W. Sherman, December 5, 1865,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 79, all of above in RG 393, NA.
23Edwin M. Stanton to Canby, May 28, 1865, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
39 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, p. 56.
2^J. Madison Wells to Canby, June 10, 1865, ibid., p. 54.
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governor by this reply.

In fact, Canby said he hoped to give up "as

soon as possible . . . all questions of civil administration," and
pledged to help Wells resume the full powers of the governorship.25
However, by September 1865 Canby grew worried about the number of
ex-Gonfederate advisors that Wells was bringing into his administration.
Moreover, the governor was getting along handsomely with the proConfederate mayor of New Orleans, Hugh Kennedy.

Canby renoved several

members of the Orleans parish school board because of their former
Confederate ties.

Mayor Kennedy protested that Canby had insufficient

grounds to remove the men, and, reluctantly, the general reinstated the
board members.

Wells accused sane officials in other parishes of

negligence in their duties, and Canby agreed to replace a few of than.
In his executive capacity, Wells appointed several tanporary office
holders in parishes which had been under Confederate control at the time
of the surrender in May.
confederates.

Most of the governor's appointees were ex-

Canby recognized that by these moves Wells had prepared a

base of support for himself in the upcoming state-wide elections in
November.26
To solidify his position, Wells ordered a new registration of
voters throughout Louisiana.

Thousands of Confederate veterans of all

ranks, taking advantage of President Johnson's Proclamation of Pardon
and -Amnesty, immediately regained their political rights.

Johnson's

^Canby to Wells, June 19, 1865, ibid., p. 55.
^^Canby to Carl Schurz, September 8, 1865, ibid., p. 56, and see
also ibid., p. 12. Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 61; Walter M.
Lowrey, "The Political Career of James Madison Wells," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly, XXXI (October, 1948), 1040-41; John R. Ficklen,
History of Reconstruction in Louisiana (through 1868) (Baltimore, 1910),

TO6..
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proclamation formed the basis for his own executive plan of Southern
Reconstruction.

Like Lincoln, Johnson assumed that the President was

mainly responsible for restoration.

His initial proclamation in May,

and three others which subsequently followed, recognized the Wells
government in Louisiana, and similar ones begun under Lincoln in
Tennessee and Arkansas.

Virginia's "loyal" government in exile returned

to Richmond from West Virginia.

For each of the remaining seven states

of the former Confederacy, Johnson appointed a provisional governor, who
would register voters and see that the state adopted a new constitution
which abolished slavery, repudiated Civil War debts, and voided the
ordinance of secession.
register.

Under this mandate, Wells called for voters to

The President gave pardon and annesty "to all persons who

participated in the . . . Rebellion" with certain specific exceptions.
Some of these exceptions were identical to those groups which Lincoln
had excluded:

civil and diplomatic officials of the Confederate govern

ment, all governors and other important civil officers of the rebellious
states, and all officers above the rank of colonel in the army or
captain in the navy.

But Johnson also excluded another distinctive

cluster of Southerners:

anyone who "voluntarily participated in said

rebellion and the estimated value of whose taxable property [was] over
$20,000."

By this last exception, Johnson snubbed his longtime personal

foes, the rich Southern planters.

However, anyone initially denied a

pardon could receive one if he applied individually to the President.
Johnson apparently derived great personal satisfaction from pardoning
thousands of ex-Confederates, especially the wealthy planters.

Upon

taking a simple oath of future loyalty to the United States, similar to

49

the one in Lincoln's old ten percent plan, a former Confederate could
regain his political rights.

27

In Louisiana prospective voters took the required loyalty oath,
registered to vote, and prepared to support Wells in November.

The old

Moderate Unionists and the once again respectable National Democrats
both nominated Wells for governor.

He ran virtually unopposed.

The old

Conservatives nominated former Confederate governor Henry Watkins Allen.
Self-exiled in Mexico, Allen was in no position to protest his unwanted
candidacy.
support.

These contestants left the Radicals without a candidate to
They showed their dissatisfaction fcy holding a separate,

unauthorized election for a special "territorial delegate" to Congress,
in which blacks would be allowed to vote.

The Radicals announced that,

because Louisiana had seceded, it must be considered a territory once
again.

The nominee for "delegate" was a flamboyant ex-Union colonel

from Missouri named Henry Clay Warmoth.

28

Canby ordered the commanders of all posts and camps to hold their
troops "well in hand" on election day, but to be prepared if necessary
"to keep the peace at the polls." The election on November 6 passed off
quietly, despite Canby's forebodings.

Wells easily retained the

governorship. So many former Confederates won seats in the legislature
2^James d . Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of
the Presidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols., Washington, D.C. , 1896-1899), VI,
310-12; Jonathan T. Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson
(Chapel Hill, 1953), 111-12; Michael Penman, Reunion without Compromise;
The South and Reconstruction, 1865-1868 (Cambridge, 1973), 121-24;
Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago, 1964),
7-8, 142-52.
28Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 106-107, 111; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 65, 71-78; F. Wayne Binning, "Henry Clay
Warmoth and Louisiana Reconstruction" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of North Carolina, 1969), 83-84.
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that its next meeting promised to look like a convention of regimental
reunions.

29

The disgruntled Radicals tried to be jubilant over Warmoth9s
election to the ineffectual position of "territorial delegate" to
Congress*

In Washington Warmoth favorably inpressed Republican leaders,

but predictably Congress refused him a seat.

Although only twenty-two

years old, Warmoth remained popular with unenfranchised Louisiana
Negroes, whose support had propelled him into the front ranks of
Southern Republican politicians.

30

Governor Wells called the legislature into special session on
November 23.

The most important laws passed in this session were sta

tutes known collectively as the Black Code, which forced Negroes to work
at agricultural labor and closely restricted their personal rights.

The

Code attempted to put the Negroes under the planters9 supervision
instead of that of the Freedmen9s Bureau and the Army.

Canty did not

like the laws, but believed that he could not void these acts of the
state legislature.
Black Codes.

One by one other Southern states each passed similar

All across the North, politicians and citizens commonly

viewed the Codes as a device to re-enslave the Negro.

31

29(30 No. 59, Dept La, October 21, 1865, in 00, Dept La, 1865, RG
393, NA; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 73, 78; Willie M. Caskey,
Secession and Restoration of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1938), 173-78.
30
Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth," 92; Caskey, Secession and Restora
tion, 180-83.

^^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 39, 100-101; Caskey, Secession
and Restoration, 188-91; McKitrick, Andrew Johnson, 10; Roland P.
Constantin, '*The Louisiana 9Black Code9 Legislation of 1865" (unpub
lished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1956).
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Wells' victory in the recent canvass gave tine state an elected
governor and legislature, but the New Orleans municipal government
continued to operate through a combination of military appointees and
elected officials.

Therefore, in January 1866 Sheridan authorized Canty

to schedule a municipal election for the Crescent City.

Sheridan left

the preparations and conduct of the balloting entirely up to Canby, who
knew that Mayor Hugh Kennedy and son© of the city councilmen had been
receiving graft and were involved in a variety of illegal activities.
The general logically prohibited any incumbent from selling city
property or granting any work contracts until after the election.
Wells, siding with Kennedy and the city council, claimed that Canby's
interference infringed on the legitimate operation of the city's
business.

Nevertheless, Canby9s order was obeyed, and he picked
32
March 12 as election day.
Wells, Kennedy, and their cronies nominated Joseph H. Moore for
mayor.

Moore9s opponent was none other than former Mayor John T. Monroe,

who had held the position when General Butler arrived in 1862.

Monroe

won the election, despite the fact that he had not been pardoned by
President Johnson.

Canty refused to allow Monroe to take office and

appointed the chairman of the city council acting mayor.

As was the

case with the legislature, ex-Oonfederates dominated the new city
council.

Undaunted, Monroe immediately applied for the necessary pardon,

and President Johnson obligingly complied with the request.
1866, Monroe again became mayor of New Orleans.

On May 15,

Canby now faced a state

^Sheridan to Grant, January 5, 1866; Sheridan to Cyrus B.
Comstock, March 2, 1866, both in Grant Papers; Heyman, Canby,
283-85.
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government dominated by men who only a few months before had been
fighting against the Union.
During all of the foregoing events, Sheridan concerned himself with
activities in Mexico and along the Rio Grande.

He and Grant frequently

oonmunicated about problems south of the border.

At a cabinet meeting

in July 1865 the President and his advisors discussed the possibility of
war because of the Mexican crisis.34
Sheridan made two trips to Texas in the surmer— July 20-August 1
and August 31-September 20, 1865.

Upon returning from the first visit,

Sheridan urged an invasion of Mexico and the capture of seme exConfederates vdx> had joined Maximilian's forces.

Sheridan knew "that

with six or eight thousand cavalry" he could "stir up the whole of
Northern Mexico."

Grant forbade any invasion but agreed that "the

Imperial troops in Mexico still require [d] watching, and before all the
seed of the rebellion can be regarded as crushed out they must go back
to their homes.

We must hold ourselves ready to demand this."

Both

generals obviously assumed that Maximilian's regime threatened the
United States.
3%eyman, Canby, 286; Caskey, Secession and
Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 148; Canby
March 18, 1866, and Canby to SW, March 17, 1866,
RG 393, NA; Lowrey, "Political Career of Wells,"

Restoration, 201-202;
to AAG, MflDivGulf,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 80,
1075.

3^The cabinet meeting is described in Beale (ed.), Diary of Welles,
II, 332-33. The Sheridan-Grant exchanges are Sheridan to Grant, July 10
(two communications), July 12, 14, 18, 1865, Grant to Sheridan, July 13
and 15, 1865, in Grant Papers. See also thirty other messages between
the two men on Texas and Mexico from June through August in Official
Records, XLVII, Pt. 2, pp. 875-1192.
330n the trips see Sheridan to Grant, July 18, 1865, Sheridan to
Rawlins, August 1, September 20, 1865. The quoted passages are from
Sheridan to Grant, August 1, 1865, and Grant to Sheridan, August 13,
1865, all of the above in Grant Papers.
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Sheridan stayed in Louisiana from October 1865 to February 1866,
and he did on occasion concern himself with Reconstruction matters.

In

October, for exanple, he issued a directive concerning freedmen to each
of his departmental commanders.

Henceforth, civil authorities would be

allowed to make decisions pertaining to Negroes which did not violate
the ex-slave's rights.

The Army and the Freedman's Bureau could inter

vene in contested cases, but Sheridan concluded that it was "hard to
enforce martial law after war has ended and a form . . . of civil
Government" existed.
In November 1865 Sheridan wrote President Johnson a letter
pertaining to the South and Reconstruction.

Sheridan suggested that

legislation alone would not solve the South's postwar problems.

In the

general's opinion, the South already appeared "northemized" to a
certain extent because of the great investment of Yankee capital.

The

nation needed to "wait and trust to a little tine and the working of
natural causes" to heal the wounds of Civil War.

"Magnanimity,"

Sheridan declared, was the best watchword, "the safest and roost manly
course" for restoring the South.

37

But Reconstruction occupied little of Sheridan's tine.

In his

eyes, the Mexican situation continued to be more important. Former
Southern officers had organized and publicized a "Military and Agricul
tural Colony" in Mexico which lured ex-Confederates south of the Rio
Grande.

Mexican insurgents requested U. S. arms and munitions to use

against Maximilian, and Sheridan considered supplying them from surplus
36sheridan to Grant, October 7, 1865, ibid.
•^Sheridan to Johnson, November 26, 1865, in Sheridan Papers
(Autograph Letters).
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stocks.

The French arrested several American soldiers who had crossed

the border for an evening of merriment and forced them to perform
repairs an one of the Imperial border forts.

Grant reminded Sheridan

that neutrality must be maintained and these incidents should not
OQ

provoke any hostilities.
Massachusetts novelist John T. Trowbridge noticed that Sheridan
spent most of his tine on Mexican matters rather than Southern affairs.
The writer was touring tie Southern states to determine the feelings and
attitudes of the section after the war and visited Sheridan's headquar
ters in January 1866.

"It was Sheridan's opinion that the Rebellion

would never be ended until Maximilian was driven from Mexico,"
Trowbridge wrote.
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During the first months of 1866 Sheridan mainly devoted his
energies to keep abreast of activities below the Rio Grande.

On

January 17,1866, Sheridan notified Grant that some American troops had
joined the Mexican assault on the border trading center of Bagdad, held
by the French.

An investigation by one of Sheridan's staff officers

revealed that thirty Negro infantrymen had participated in the attack.
From February 7 to 16 Sheridan conducted a personal inquiry into the
situation in Texas.

(Before he left on this trip, Sheridan entrusted

^®Grant to Sheridan, October 22, December 19, 1865, ibid.; Sheridan
to Canby, January 27, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol. 248, RG 393, NA; Sheridan
to Grant, October 25 and 30, November 20 (two communications),
November 26, 1865, and Grant to Sheridan, December 1, 1865, in Grant
Papers. Also pertinent are fourteen other exchanges between Grant and
Sheridan during October through December 1865 in Official Records,
XLVII, Pt. 2, pp. 1242-60. See also Richter, "Army in Texas/' 70-75;
Jack Dabbs, The French Arnty in Mexico (The Hague, 1963), 150.
39paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900 (Boston, 1937), 17;
John T. Trowbridge, A Picture of the Desolated States and the Work of
Restoration, 1865-1868 (Hartford, Conn., 1868), 402.

55

Canty with arrangements for the New Orleans city election which resulted
in victory for ex-mayor John T. Monroe.)

The day after Monroe's

election, March 13, Sheridan went on yet another ten-day excursion to
Texas.^
Even with all this travel, Sheridan gradually had to face a problem
which affected both the border situation and Reconstruction. This was
the staggering logistical nightmare of mustering out volunteer regiments.
Hostilities in the Southwest had ended more quickly than anticipated,
leaving dozens of infantry, artillery, and cavalry units of varying
strengths spread throughout Sheridan's command, with even more regiments
on their way from the East.

Following the orders of the War Department,

Sheridan and his subordinate commanders had mustered out a few units as
early as June 1865.

Usually regiments returned home for final separa

tion, but sometimes they were dismissed near their duty stations in
Louisiana or Texas.

Friends and families and home state politicians

pleaded for the discharge of all volunteers, even if their terms of
enlistment had not expired.

The civilians pointed out that the

Confederacy had been defeated and such duties as garrisoning the South
and guarding the borders were the responsibilltres of the regular Amy.

41

As Sheridan disbanded volunteer regiments, he requested that
regulars replace them.

But the regular Army contained only about 60,000

men in scattered cantonments, forts, and towns from coast to coast.
^ Q n the Bagdad problem, see Sheridan to Grant, January 17, 22,
February 2, 1866, and Grant to Sheridan, January 25, 1866. On Sheridan's
trips see Sheridan to Grant, February 7, 16, 17, March 11, 27, 1866;
Sheridan to Rawlins, March 23, 1866; Grant to Sheridan, March 12, 24,
all in Grant Papers.
41Ida M. Tarbell, "How the Union A m y was Disbanded," Civil War
Times Illustrated, VI (December, 1967), 4-9, 44-47.
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Therefore, Sheridan shuffled men between Louisiana and Texas trying to
keep an adequate occupation force in all parts of M s command.

With few

exceptions, the longer the volunteers served, the more impatient and
dissatisfied they became.

They had enlisted to fight Johnny Rebs, rot

police rural towns, guard depats, or patrol the Mexican border.

As the

summer of 1865 slipped into autumn, the feeling spread among the volun
teers that their duty in the South was worthless.

Although worried

about Maximilian, Sheridan expedited the discharges as much as he dared.
He informed the War Department that the "muster out of the Armies of the
Potomac and the Tennessee has given the troops such good grounds to ask
42
for the same" that it was "astonishing how quietly they have behaved.”
From the beginning of the disbanding process, white troops received
priority over black soldiers.43
natural.

Under the circumstances this was only

The white troops brought more political pressure to bear

against the War Department, and initially more white regiments than
black ones occupied the South.

As the process continued, the favoritism

shown in releasing whites first created a racial imbalance in the number
of regiments.

For example, on August 8, 1865, Sheridan reported a total

of 25,800 soldiers in Louisiana, 19,100 of wham were U.S. Colored
42sheridan to Rawlins, August 21, 1865, in Official Records, XLVIII,
Pt. 2, p. 1198. Harry W. Pfanz, "Soldiering in the South During the
Reconstruction Period, 1865-1877'1 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University, 1958), 24-26. Ten infantry regiments (two Negro and
eight white) were mustered out from Louisiana during the summer of 1865.
Also one infantry regiment was transferred to another state and seven
artillery batteries were discharged. See Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium
of the War of the Rebellion (3 vols., New York, 1959), III, 1089, 1174,
1177, 1179, 1213, 1247, 1284, 1310, 1401, 1488, 1649, 1669, 1670, 1685,
1690, 1694-95, 1727, 1737.
4^AAG Thomas Vincent to Sheridan, August 1, 1865, in Official
Records, Series III, vol. V, p. 96.
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Troops.

The next month the total dropped slightly, and returns stowed

23,747 officers and man in the state, divided among sixteen black
regiments, eight white regiments, and a few support troops.

44

But among

the black units, agitation was not so great to leave the service.
Recruited primarily from among former slaves, some black regiments
had received inadequate training or had not been in service long enough
to acquire maturity and experience.

Other Negro units performed their

duties as well as any white regiments.

In fact, unlike their white

counterparts, many black volunteers did not want to leave the Army.
They liked the responsible and respectable profession of arms.

The pay

was good, and the food and clothing adequate, though sometimes low in
quality.45
In Louisiana, as in other states, citizens and government officials
requested that the Army discharge black regiments because of rowdiness
or criminal acts.

However, few of the incidents proved to be serious.

Nevertheless, the mere presence of Negro troops caused resentment and
hostility in white Southerners.
volunteers had been disbanded.

By November 1866 most of the black
However, the 80th U.S. Colored Infantry

was still serving in Louisiana as late as January 1867 and was one of
the last black volunteer units mastered out on March 1, 1867.

46

4^Sheridan to Vincent, August 8, 1865, ibid. , XLVII, Pt. 2, p. 1171;
Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 261.
45Marvin E. Fletcher, "The Negro Volunteer in Reconstruction, 18651866," Military Affairs, XXXII (December, 1968), 126-27; Sefton, Army
and Reconstruction, 50-53.
4^Fletcher, "Negro Volunteer," 127-29; Heyman, Canby, 259; Pfanz,
"Soldiering in the South," 129-30; Dyer, Compendium of the War, II,
1735. Concerning complaints against Negro troops, see Canby to Wells,
August 10 and 26, 1865, in Andrew Johnson Papers (Department of Manu
scripts, Library of Congress; microfilm copy in Louisiana State
University Library), and Wells to Johnson, October 30, 1865, ibid.
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On July 28, 1866 the War Department authorized the creation of six
regiments of Negro regulars, the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st Infantry and
the 9th and 10th Cavalry.

This was the first tine in American history

that blacks had officially been inducted into the regular United States
toy.

Three of these regiments were recruited in Louisiana, and one,

the 39th, remained on duty in Louisiana for several years.

The A m y

deliberately ordered most of these black soldiers to occupy rural camps
or permanent forts (such as Forts Jackson, St. Philip, Macomb, and Pike)
not located near towns or cities.

47

In addition to relocation, the discharge of units continued apace.
Grant ordered Sheridan to "reduce the force in all your division except
Texas by mustering out troops as lew as the service will bear."
Sheridan reckoned that about 3,000 more soldiers in Texas were expenda
ble as soon as Grant no longer wanted a "threatening force" on the
border.

In January 1866 Grant gave Sheridan permission to dismiss from

the service any units under his command.

Sheridan acknowledged the

offer hut deemed "the presence of United States troops in Louisiana,
Texas, and Florida as essential for a long period, but the number could
be much diminished if we had troops of the regular Army."

In Louisiana

from September 1865 through March 1866 Sheridan mustered out twenty
infantry regiments (fourteen of then black), along with two volunteer
cavalry regiments, and three artillery batteries.

The number of troops

^Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the
United States Army, 1789-1903 (2 vols., Washington, D.C., 1903) , 1,
134-36. On the placement of black troops in forts see AAG Hoffman to
Gens. C. C. Doolittle and A. J. Snith, November 6, 1865, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 79, RG 393, NA. Sheridan said that the situation should be watched
carefully to see "how the people will behave under this concentration of
troops." Sheridan to Rawlins, November 10, 1865, in Grant Papers.
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in the Military Division of the Gulf dropped drastically.

By April 1866

only 19,112 men served in the entire division, as compared to 77,874 in
September 1865.48
On April 5, 1866, Napoleon III of France made public a secret
decision arrived at the previous November.

Napoleon stated that his

troops gradually would be removed from Mexico over the next eleven
months.

This meant that by March 1867 no foreign troops would remain in

Mexico.

Western diplomats knew that U.S. Secretary of State Seward

steadfastly had sought peaceful termination of the French intervention
for more than a year.
Doctrine.

Napoleon's decision greatly reinforced the Monroe

Seward's diplomacy, the internal pressure of the Mexican

rebels, Sheridan's theatrics on frequent trips to the border, and his
widely publicized, but never used, plans of invasion ended French
support for Maximilian.

49

Quotes are from Grant to Sheridan, September 6, 1865, in Grant
Papers? Sheridan to Grant, October 7, 1865, ibid.? and Sheridan to
Rawlins, January 27, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol. 248, EG 393, NA. Other
selected messages dealing with troop discharges are Grant to Sheridan,
October 28, December 30, 1865, March 19 and 29, 1866, in Sheridan
Papers? Sheridan to Rawlins, October 19 and 30, 1865, Sheridan to Grant,
December 15, 1865, January 7 and February 17, 1866, in Grant Papers?
AAG G. L. Hartsuff to Canty, January 3, 1866, AAG George Lee to Lt.
Col. T. M. Winston, January 10, 1866, Sheridan to Canty, February 23,
1866, Sheridan to AAG Thomas Vincent, March 1, 1866, Grant to Sheridan,
March 13, 1866, Sheridan to Grant, March 26, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol.
248, RG 393, NA. On units discharged see Dyer, Compendium of the War,
III, 1061, 1067, 1097, 1111, 1137, 1200, 1213, 1214, 1402, 1628, 1630,
1718, 1732, 1734, 1735, 1737. Troop totals are conveniently located in
Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 261. See also Manuscript Returns, Dept
La, April 1866, in Records of AGO, RG 94, NA.
4%*erkins, Monroe Doctrine, 132, 134-35? Daniel Dawson, The Mexican
Adventure (London, 1935), 390-91. Upon Napoleon's announcement of
France rs withdrawal, more troops in Texas and Louisiana were mustered
out at a rapid rate. See Sheridan to Grant, April 10 and 11, 1866,
Sheridan to Rawlins, April 17, 18, 19, 1866, all in Grant Papers. Even
with all these reductions, Sheridan cautioned Rawlins that "if the
military is entirely removed from the section of the country that it is
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But the Mexican "emperor" refused to abdicate his perilous throne
despite the pleas of several diplomats.

Because he still feared

Maximilian's disruptive powers# Sheridan made a trip to Texas in April.
He again advanced the idea of selling surplus Federal arms to Mexican
freedom fighters.50
In the midst of these developments# General Canby cxarplained to
Sheridan that the present troop level in Louisiana was "Scarcely suffi
cient for the ordinary requirements of the service."

As Canty well

knew# Sheridan had been ordered by the War Department to discharge large
numbers of troops.
Antipathy between the two generals had existed since July 1865 when
Sheridan had insisted on complete domination of the Gulf area.

Sheridan

aggravated an already touchy personal situation with Canty in February
1866 by suggesting to Grant that Canby should be mustered out of the
A m y along with several lesser volunteer officers.

This snub obviously

wounded Canty's pride.

He had been graduated from West Point fifteen

years before Sheridan.

Sheridan also criticised Canty for devoting too

much effort to civil affairs# an odd complaint from someone who gave
51
only a modicum of his time to this potentially volatile matter.
Canby became even more exasperated when he learned that members of
Sheridan's staff had investigated the Louisiana provost marshal's office
my belief that much trouble will come of it."
May 16# 1866# in Sheridan Papers.

Sheridan to Rawlins#

50Sheridan to Grant, April 27# 1866, Sheridan to Rawlins, May 1 and
July 16# 1866, in Grant Papers; Grant to Sheridan# May 2# 1866# in
Sheridan Papers (Autograph Letters).
^-Canby to AAG# MilDivGulf# March 24, 1866# in Dept Gulf, vol. 80#
RG 393# NA; Sheridan to Grant# February 20# 1866# Grant Papers; Heyman,
Canby# 291.
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and its actions in the csotton rich parishes along the Red River.

The

staff officers uncovered a variety of inproper and potentially illegal
activities in cotton trading by civilians, sate of which had been
approved or supervised by the provost marshal.

Additional probes

indicated irregularities and frauds in the Quartermaster and Commissary
departments.

The investigators also accused several plantation owners

in the Red River area of mistreating Negroes just as if slavery still
existed.

Moreover, ex-Confederates routinely persecuted and insulted

white Unionists.

The report concluded that were "it not for the pre

sence of United States troops . . . every loyal man" would be driven
from north Louisiana.52
This information pronpted Sheridan to visit the Red River country
himself.

He learned that "ten armed men with double barrelled shot guns

and revolvers" had kidnapped a prisoner from a military patrol outside
of Shreveport.

Lieutenant Colonel Anderson D. Nelson remarked that the

incident demonstrated "a great want of loyalty in the people of that
region," but at the sane time he branded it "an exhibition of border
ruffianism to shield one of their companions from punishment."
Colonel Nelson's description of Shreveport made it sound more like
Dodge City, Kansas.

Gambling in all of its various forms appeared to be

the town's major industry, and the best gambler served as Shreveport's
mayor.

Colonel Nelson cautioned that it was "dangerous to be on the
CO

streets after dark."

Appalled by these revelations about north

52Heyman, Canby, 292-93; Major James Forsyth to Sheridan,
January 11, 1866, in Letters Reed, MilDivGulf, RG 393, NA; Hoffiran, Camp
and Court, 116-17.
^Inspection Report of Lt. Col. A. D. Nelson, February 25, 1866, in
Letters Reed, MilDivGulf, RG 393, NA.
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Louisiana, Sheridan advised Canby to correct all discrepancies "at once,
even if it requires your own presence in that section.
Sheridan remained dissatisfied with Canby's handling of Louisiana
affairs.

In April Sheridan informed the War Department that almost

everywhere he looked in the Department of Louisiana he "found fraud and
abuses much of which arise from want of personal attention from
General Canby. .,.
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Under the circumstances, one general or the

other had to leave the state.
On May 5, 1866, Canby requested a transfer from Louisiana, "mainly
on the score of health."

A few days later the War Department granted

him a temporary leave and ordered him to Washington for consultations
with the Secretary of War.

Sheridan replaced Canby as commander of

Louisiana with the superintendent of the Freedman's Bureau,
General Absalom Baird, who assumed command on May 28.

Canby left for

Washington three days later, and subsequently received a new assignment
in the nation's capital.^
54
Sheridan to Canby, January 19, 1866. A similar admonition is in
Sheridan to Canty, February 23, 1866, both of above in Dept Gulf, vol.
248, RG 393, NA.

^Sheridan to Rawlins, April 5, 1866, Sheridan Papers.
^%or the decision on Canty's transfer see Sheridan to AG Edward
Townsend, May 22, 1866, ibid. See also Townsend to Sheridan, May 17,
1866, in Letters Reed, MilDivGulf; GO No. 50, Dept LA, May 28, 1866, in
GO, Dept La, 1866; Canby to AGO, May 5, 1866; Absolam Baird to AAG,
MilDivGulf, June 11, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol. 80, all in RG 393, NA.
Though perhaps uninspiring, Canby was one of the most competent of all
commanders in the South after the war. He certainly was no dictator
and did not deserve the epithet "satrap" given him by E. Merton Coulter,
The South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1947), 131.
Canty served in other Reconstruction assignments after leaving Louisiana,
including posts in the Carolines and Texas. See Heyman, Canby, 295-333,
and Richter, "Army in Texas," 311 and passim. Canby was killed in 1873
while trying to negotiate a treaty with the Modoc Indians in California.
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Taking a new interest in Louisiana's problems, Sheridan closely
examined various reports from the state's post commanders.

Some

accounts mentioned contented freedmen hard at work in the fields, and
civilian officials whose attitude and efficiency in office recently had
improved.

However, widespread bitterness over the war persisted among

much of the white population, and people were "orderly and respectful
through compulsion." One officer wrote "that without protection this
[state] would be hardly a safe haven for a citizen of the north."
Another officer reported that "respect for the 'lost cause'" was common,
even among some Union men who held public jobs.

Anyone

#10

showed

deference for the A m y or Northern men risked "all social and political
relations with their former friends and neighbors."

Several officers

cited "cases of cruelty to freedmen" in their area.

In an unusual

incident, two whites in Alexandria tried to persuade a Negro corporal of
the 80th Colored Infantry to work in their fields.

The regiment's

comnander arrested the pair and gave "them a good lecture on the altered
condition of affairs, and the absurdity of attempting to treat colored
soldiers as slaves." Elsewhere, a company of troops marched to the town
of Lake Providence to arrest four white man accused of whipping two
blacks.^
Sheridan strongly concurred with his lieutenants in the belief that
the military must remain in Louisiana to protect "Northern capital and
Union people," including freedmen as well as recent Northern settlers.
Sheridan believed that over time, with the Army alert to prevent racial
^House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 57, pp. 49-51, 131-36
gives the reports of post commanders to Sheridan1s headquarters from
April 21-July 21, 1866. See also AAG Nathaniel Burbank to CO, Baton
Rouge, July 2, 1866, in Dept Gulf, vol. 80, RG 393, NA.
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fighting, the Negro, "by the logic of the necessity for his labor,”
would gain an important and rightful place in the South.

To this end,

Sheridan thought blacks deserved and needed voting rights as insurance
for their freedom.

These beliefs obviously narked Sheridan as an

adherent to many of the ideals of the Radical Republicans in Congress.
But Sheridan mistakenly reckoned that the great majority of Louisiana's
white citizens "earnestly” wanted "a perfect Union with the other
states."'’®
Despite his public professions that the state sought reconciliation
with the Union, Sheridan thought it best to ask for an additional
regular cavalry regiment for mobile patrol duty in the interior of
Louisiana.

In a letter to Republican leader Henry Wilson, Sheridan said

that Southerners would "chafe and be restless for a long time,” and the
Army needed to retain strong and vigilant.
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However, the additional

regiment was not sent.
The pressing need for such vigilance soon became apparent because
in June 1866 Radical and Unionist members of the Constitutional Conven
tion of 1864, which had net under the direction of General N. P. Banks,
attempted to reoanvoke the convention.

The time had come when Louisiana

Radicals would have no power in the state unless they enfranchised the
Negro.

This issue had been avoided by the conservative legislatures

under Wells.

After the passage of the Black Codes, the Radicals decided

58The quotes on Sheridan's opinions are from a story in the New
York Times, May 3, 1866. Sheridan expressed similar opinions to
Senator George H. Williams, March 31, 1.866, Sheridan Papers.
^ % ‘he cavalry request is Sheridan to Rawlins, June 23, 1866, in
Sheridan Papers; Sheridan to Henry Wilson, June 29, 1866, in Henry
Wilson Papers (Department of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
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that a new constitution must grant voting rights to blacks and thereby
same themselves from political extinction. ^
Controversy surrounded the move to reconvoke the convention.
Several of the members doubted the legality of the procedure and
declined to attend a preliminary meeting on June 26; hence a quorum
failed to appear.

Governor Wells, a remarkable political chameleon, now

switched from his pro-Confederate position to a pro-Union one and
approved the reconvening of the convention.

The governor's support

stimulated the gasping convention like a transfusion, and July 30 was
set as the date for its next meeting an New Orleans.
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Sheridan undoubtedly watched these proceedings with misgivings.
(The Rio Grande was fairly quiet, as he had seen on a short trip there
in June.
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) Sheridan must have noticed the formation of two distinct

factions, one opposed to the convention and the other in favor of it.
Just as it appeared that Louisiana had finally captured Sheridan's
attention, trouble erupted on the Mexican border again.
In late June the important town of Matamoros, under siege for many
months, fell to Mexican forces opposing Maximilian.

Great excitement

rippled through northern Mexico, and rumors reached New Orleans that the
Mexican reaction to Matamoros' fall might prevent the planned departure
60,An excellent summary of the situation is Donald E. Reynolds, "The
New Orleans Riot of 1866, Reconsidered," Louisiana History, V (Winter,
1964), 5-8.
61New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 27, 1866; Lowrey, "Political
Career of Wells," 1075-80; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 156-65;
McKitrick, Johnson and Reconstruction, 422; Taylor, Louisiana Recon
structed, 104-105; Wells to Johnson, July 28, 1866, in Johnson Papers.
^Sheridan to Rawlins, June 10 and 21, 1866, Sheridan Papers.
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of French forces from the country.
up to "the diablo to pay."

In Sheridan's words, all this added

He decided he must go to Texas.
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During

his unnecessary absence a riot took place which shocked the country.
Sheridan left a New Orleans troubled by Radical agitation and
demands for Negro suffrage.

The general had backed into the job of

Reconstruction but had exerted little energy on that difficult task.
Sheridan now realized that Reconstruction was his primary responsibility.
Thereafter, he entered the labyrinth of Louisiana politics, a maze which
has always confounded patient men and which could not but exasperate a
man as inpatient as Phil Sheridan.

^Sheridan to Grant, July 3, 1866, Sheridan to Rawlins, July 16 and
21, 1866, all in Grant Papers.

CHAPTER III
SHERIDAN, BAIRD, AND THE RIOT OF 1866
The tense mood that had been evident among the New Orleans
population increased after Sheridan's departure.

It was apparent to the

Radicals that the old quorum of seventy -six delegates could not be
obtained by the Constitutional Convention until after the election of
new members on September 3, still over a month away.

Nevertheless, the

Radicals decided to hold another meeting on July 30, but clearly this
gathering had no more chance for making binding legal decisions than the
unproductive June 26 session.1
On the evening of July 27 tire Radicals staged a mass rally in New
Orleans.

Negroes made up most of the crowd.

Several speakers, includ

ing former governor Michael Hahn and dentist Dr. Anthony P. Dostie,
addressed the throng on such topics as Negro rights and the benefits of
the Republican party.

Whites later claimed that Dostie inflamed the

crowd's emotions almost to the point of riot by calling for violence
against Democratic leaders if the Radicals' demands were not met.

2

The well-publicized Radical rally only charged the atmosphere of
New Orleans and in no way made easier tire position of General Absalom
^Donald E. Reynolds, "The New Orleans Riot of 1866, Reconsidered,"
Louisiana History, V (Winter, 1964), 8; John R. Ficklen, History of
Reconstruction in Louisiana (through 1868) (Baltimore, 1910), 157; House
Reports, 39 Pong., 2 Sess., No. 16, pp. 4-5.
^Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot," 10; House Reports, 39 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 16, pp. 21-24.
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Baird, who commanded Louisiana in Sheridan's absence.

Baird's

credentials looked substantial and gave him the deceptive appearance of
being a good choice as a department conmander.

Appointed to West Point

from his hate state of Pennsylvania, Baird had been graduated from the
military academy in 1849.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, he occupied

a comfortable chair in mathematics at his alma mater.

During the first

year of the war, Baird held staff positions with the Army of the
Potomac, but later assignments sent him to field duty in the Western
Theater and to the command of a division in Sherman's "march to the sea."
Baird won the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry in an engagement
near Atlanta.

Despite his conduct in this phase of the war, staff work

and desk jobs seemed more suitable to Baird.

He ably administered the

Louisiana Freedmen's Bureau, and subsequent to his Louisiana service he
3

spent many years in the Inspector General's Department.
The reoonvoked Convention of 1864 created an extraordinary crisis
for Baird and the Amy.

Satie of the troubles steamed from the actions

of two Conservatives, Louisiana Lieutenant Governor Albert Voorhies and
state Attorney General Andrew Herron, both of whom bitterly opposed the
Negro's political advancement.

Naturally enough, they wanted to prevent

the resurrection of the convention at all costs.

Herron petitioned the

Louisiana courts to declare the old assembly illegal, and in the mean
time he sought an injunction to stop it from meeting.

The wheels of

^Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the
United States Amy, 1789-1903 (2 vols. , Washington, D.C., 1903), I, 182;
George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of
the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1802-1867
(2 vols., New York, 1868), II, 233-34; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue;
Lives of the Union Contenders (Baton Rouge, 1964), 15-16. Like several
other Civil War veterans, Baird did not receive his medal until many
years after the war. He became Inspector General of the A m y in 1888.
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justice, as usual, turned slowly.

Herron and Voorhies both feared that

before a court could declare in their favor, Baird might send troops to
guard the convention and thereby give it the sanction of the Federal
government.

Though not a Radical, Baird saw no reason to prevent the

reconvocation unless he received orders to that effect from his
superiors in Washington.

The general announced that he would use force
4

against anyone who attempted to disrupt the convention.
On July 28 Voorhies and Herron telegraphed President Johnson,
asking the President to clarify Baird's position.

Actually, they hoped

that Johnson would order the Army to ranain uninvolved.

Would the

President sustain Baird if the general used troops to protect the
convention, Voorhies and Herron inquired?

The officials emphasized the

probability that a state court would soon declare the convention null
and void, and therefore Baird would act improperly if he deployed
troops in its support.

5

Johnson's reply cheered Voorhies and Herron, but did not really
specify orders for Baird.

"The Military," declared the President, "will

be expected to sustain and not to obstruct or interfere with the
proceedings of the Courts."

Heartened by this response, the state

officials took the telegram to General Baird, who they now supposed
must see his proper course of action and not support the convention.
The general remained unyielding:

the convention could meet unless he

received orders to the contrary.

However firm he had appeared to the

4Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago,
1964), 423-24; Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot," 10.
^Albert Voorhies and Andrew Herron to Andrew Johnson, July 28,
1866, in Andrew Johnson Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
microfilm copy in Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge).
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Louisiana politicians, Johnson's massage had given Baird doubts, and he
dispatched an inquiry about the whole matter to Secretary of War Stanton.
For reasons never fully explained, Stanton did not answer Baird's plea
for orders.

Therefore, after July 28 Baird had to act on his own

initiative. ®
On July 29 Baird alerted the small New Orleans headquarters staff
of about twenty officers and men, including General Sheridan's younger
brother Michael V. Sheridan.

Baird also warned the commander of the

860-man 1st Infantry Regiment to prepare his troops to move at a
moment's notice.

The regiment occupied Jackson Barracks, named for the

hero of the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 and located three
miles below the city.

In July 1866 Baird commanded more than 5,000

troops in Louisiana, and of these 2,000 were within a few hours call of
New Orleans.

The rest garrisoned nine forts and camps across the state.

Under the circumstances, the situation did not appear to warrant a call
for outside assistance.

However, a tragic flaw marred Baird's protec

tive plans for the convention.

The general somehow misunderstood the

proposed time of the July 30 meeting.

Although the Radicals actually

convened at noon, Baird mistakenly believed that the appointed hour was
^Johnson to Voorhies and Herron, July 28, 1866; Absalom Baird to
Edwin M. Stanton, July 28, 1866, ibid. McKitrick is especially good on
this problem in Andrew Johnson, 423-24. See also Howard K. Beale, The
Critical Year (New York, 1930), 349. Thomas and Hyman offer no defense
of Stanton's neglect, except to say that the secretary did not answer
Baird because Stanton knew that the general was alreatfy determined not
to allow any disruption. Furthermore, Stanton knew that President John
son opposed the convention; and Stanton did not want openly to cross the
President by sending Baird decisive orders to protect the convention.
Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton, the Life and Times of
Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York, 1962), 489, 495-97.
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6:00 p.m.

7

The general might have averted any violence altogether had

he stationed a few companies of troops near the convention hall.

In any

case, he should have brought soldiers to a point within the city from
which they could be ordered in a few minutes to quell any trouble.
Early on the morning of July 30 the newspapers printed a special
proclamation from Mayor John T. Monroe to the people of New Orleans.
Monroe advised everyone "to avoid with care all disturbances and colli
sion . . . [so] that the good name of the city may not be tarnished and
the enemies of the reconstruction policy of President Johnson be not
afforded an opportunity . . . of creating a breach of the peace and
falsifying facts to the great injury of the city and State." The mayor
particularly warned young people against gathering near the Mechanic's
Institute, site of the convention.
prediction.

Monroe's proclamation read like a

A few hours after the newspapers which carried his words
O

were sold on the streets, the riot began.
Dozens of young men and boys congregated near the Mechanic's
Institute before noon.

Nevertheless, at twelve o'clock the Radicals met

as planned, but the quorum they had hoped for did not materialize.

The

n

At this time more troops were stationed in Louisiana than in any
other Southern state with the exception of Texas. See Manuscript
Returns, Dept La, July, 1866, Records of the AGO, RG 94, NA; Manuscript
Returns, Post of New Orleans, July, 1866, Records of the AGO (NA Micro
copy M-617, reel 843), RG 94, NA; New York Times, August 19, 1867;
James E. Sefton, The United States A m y and Reconstruction, 1865-1877,
Baton Rouge, 1967), 261. For Bairdys confusion on the time the convention was to meet and the resulting ineffectiveness of the Amy, see
ibid., 85-87; Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot," 13; and House Reports, 39
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 16, pp. 5-6, 440-64.
% e w Orleans Bee, July 30, 1866; New Orleans Crescent, July 30,
1866; New York Times, July 30, 1866. The New Orleans Daily Picayune and
the New Orleans"Tines both carried summations and comments on Monroe's
proclamation on July 30, 1866.
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president of the convention announced a recess so that some of the
missing members could be located.

At about this tine a column of two

hundred Negroes marched through the city in support of the convention.
Whites heckled the marchers on their way to the nesting site.

When the

blacks arrived at the hall, they confronted the large crowd of whites
already gathered there.

The two nobs exchanged taunts and shouts.

Paving stones and other missiles filled the air, several shots rang out,
and a bloody riot resulted.
Once the fighting began, large numbers of uniformed police quickly
appeared and fired pistols indiscriminately into the mass of milling
Negroes.

The police normally carried only nightsticks.

soon joined the melee.

City firemen

The combined force of uniformed officers and

white civilians charged the Mechanic's Institute in an attempt to drive
the convention members and their supporters from the building.

The

participation by the police in the riot rather than any attempt on their
part to curb the violence shocked the New York Times reporter who
vividly described the scene.

The white mob overpowered and outgunned

the blacks and the Radicals, who possessed only a few firearms and
9
fought mainly with clubs and brickbats.
%5ie police were able to assemble so quickly because they had been
taken from their regular beats and consolidated in their precinct
station houses. See Emily H. Reed, Life of A. P. Dostie, or the Con
flict in New Orleans (New York, 1868) , 302. For the best short
descriptions of the riot see Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot," 11-13, and
Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 167-69. For details and various
viewpoints of the action see House Reports, 39 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 16,
pp. 10-11, 17, and passim. One New Orleans newspaper (Bee, July 31,
1866) explained that as the conflict increased in intensity more police
men were called in until nearly the entire force was on hand. See also
New York Times, July 31, 1866; New Orleans Daily Picayune, July 31, 1866;
Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, July 30, 1866; New Orleans Times,
July 31, 1866.
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The New Orleans headquarters commander sent an aide to inform Baird
of the tumult downtown, and the general immediately dispatched the
troops from Jackson Barracks.

Because of the poorly chosen route, the

infantry took twice the normal time to reach the city.

Mien they

finally reached the Institute at 3:00 p.m., the riot had almost run its
course.10
The official report of the U. S. Army surgeon in New Orleans listed
thirty-eight persons killed in the fighting, thirty-four of whom were
Negroes.

The surgeon recorded 146 men wounded, including 119 Negroes,

10 policemen, and 17 white civilians.

Only one white rioter was

killed.11
All of those involved must share some of the blame for the riot.
General Sheridan needlessly left the state at a troubled time.
Mayor Monroe said later that Sheridan sought an "imaginary and bloodless
campaign" in Texas rather than face the predicament in New Orleans.

The

Radicals convened an assembly of dubious legality, and its existence
only invited public wrath.

General Baird laid incomplete and poorly

prepared plans to deal with the unsettled conditions, plans which
neither protected the convention nor prevented a riot.

Secretary of

War Stanton neglected the cry for help from one of his generals in a
dangerous situation.

City and state officials, particularly

lOHbuse Reports, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., NO. 16, pp. 16, 19, 464-66;
Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot," 13; New York Times, August 1, 1866.
11House Reports, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 16, p. 12. Willie M.
Caskey gives a highly partisan Southern account of the riot in his
Secession and Restoration of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1938), 223.
Caskey claims that forty policemen were killed or wounded and that two
hundred Negroes suffered wounds, besides forty to fifty being killed
outright. McKitrick supports the use of Bouse Report NO. 16 and
disputes Caskey's numbers in Andrew Johnson, 424-25.
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Mayor Monroe, Governor Wells, and Lieutenant Governor Voorhies, failed
to maintain order.

Many New Orleans citizens disregarded the advice of

the mayor and vigorously engaged in mob violence.

The police lost all

discipline and helped to turn the streets into a battlefield.

12

Historians are in general agreement that President Johnson and his
struggling policy of "soft" Reconstruction suffered tremendously as a
result of the New Orleans riot, which shattered the President's hopes
for an early return of Southern representatives to Congress.

The Black

Codes, Johnson's vetoes of Congressional Reconstruction proposals such
as the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 and the bill for renewal of the
Freedmen9s Bureau, not to mention Southern violence, spurred dissatis
fied Northerners to vote overwhelmingly for Republicans in both state
and national election in 1866.

13

But the impact of all this was yet to come.

While Sheridan hurried

back to Louisiana, Baird worked to improve the unstable situation in New
Orleans.

On the evening of July 30, he declared martial law and

appointed Lieutenant Colonel August V. Kautz military governor of the
city.

Two infantry regiments and a battery of artillery marched into

12Rouse Reports, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 16, pp. 5-6, 10-11, 17,
349, passim; Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot," 5-27; Walter M. Lawrev, "The
Political Career of James Madison Wells," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XXXI (October, 1948), 1082; New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 5, 1871:
(interview with Mayor Monroe).
•^William A. Dunning, Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 18651877 (New York, 1907), 79-81; Rambert W. Patrick, The Reconstruction of
the Nation (New York, 1967), 84-85; W, E. B. DuBois, Black Reconstruc
tion (NaTYork, 1935), 465-66; John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After
the Civil War (Chicago, 1961), 63-65; Finnian P. Leavens, >TLTUnion and
the New Orleans Tribune and Louisiana Reconstruction" (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1966), 67-68; Ficklen, Reconstruc
tion in Louisiana, 146; Reynolds, "New Orleans Riot," 5, 277 Sheridan
noted the same effects in his memoirs. See Philip H. Sheridan, Personal
Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan (2 vols., New York, 1888), II, 251.
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New Orleans to ensure against any further disturbances.

On July 31

Baird formed a special military oarmssion to investigate the riot.
When Sheridan arrived in the Crescent City on August 1, he found little
to do.

Rumors predicted new troubles, but Sheridan felt confident that

because he had returned no other violence would occur.

"You need feel

no uneasiness about the condition of affairs here," Sheridan wired
Grant, "I think I can arrange natters without difficulty."

14

Later, however, Sheridan sent Grant a longer telegram which showed
less self-confidence.

In this message Sheridan described the Radical

leaders of the convention as "agitators and revolutionary men," hut he
did not believe he could arrest them until they had committed an overt
act against the government.

Although critical of the convention

members, Sheridan thought the mayor and the city police had behaved "in
a manner so unnecessary and atrocious as to compel one to say it was
murder."

Sheridan decided to continue martial law indefinitely while

the military commission investigated the root.

15

As he obtained more information, Sheridan began to suspect that the
Louisiana civil officials had conspired to cause the riot.
was never proven.

However this

Nevertheless, suspicions of Mayor Monroe continued,

and Sheridan considered removing the mayor from office to improve
. .
16
relations between the military and civilians.
l^Baird to Stanton, July 30, 1866, and Philip H. Sheridan to
Ulysses S. (Sant, August 1, 1866, both in Johnson Papers; New York
Times, July 31, August 2, 1866; Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 245.
^Sheridan to Grant, August 1, 1866, in Philip H. Sheridan Papers
(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
-^Sheridan to Grant, August 2, 1866, in Johnson Papers.
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Mayor Monroe, Lieutenant Governor Voorhies, and Attorney
General Herron, recognizing that Sheridan disliked and distrusted them,
countered the general's criticism with a ten-page letter to
President Johnson.

The blame for the riot, they said fell squarely on

the Negroes and the white Radicals,

#10

w e e described as "well

organized" and "well anted." Furthermore, the civil authorities claimed
that before the riot they had taken "all precautions passible to prevent
the outbreaks.""1'7
On August 3 Sheridan told Grant that there was "quiet in the city,
but considerable excitement in the public mind," but that the military
would not interfere with the state government unless it became abso
lutely necessary.

But the Louisiana oomnander reiterated that Monroe

should be replaced and suggested that the state would benefit from the
removal of Governor Wells.

(Like Sheridan, Wells had found an excuse to

leave New Orleans prior to the riot, but he had returned in time to
witness the mass violence.) Grant replied that martial law should be
continued, but discouraged the idea of removing elected officials.
However, the General in Chief advised Sheridan not to allow the civil
18
authorities to act in any way "dangerous to the public safety."
President Johnson, meanwhile, inpatient after reading the daily
onslaught in the newspapers against his Reconstruction policies,
demanded all of Sheridan's information on the causes of the riot.
Specifically, Johnson desired Sheridan's opinion an the Radical rally
^-7Monroe, Voorhies, and Herron to Johnson, August 3, 1866, ibid.
18
Sheridan to Grant, August 3, 1866, and Grant to Sheridan,
August 3, 1866, in Sheridan Papers; Lowrey "Political Career of Wells,"
1081-83.
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and its effects on the Negroes; he also wanted to know the number of
arrests that had teen made by civilian officials.

Finally, the Presi

dent asked for a critique of the civil government's operation under
19
martial law.
Johnson received his answer from Sheridan two days later in a long
coded telegram.

Contrary to his first impressions, Sheridan now

believed that Louisiana officials did not plan the violence against the
convention.

The recall of this assembly had created much ill-will among

opposing political groups, and Sheridan gave this as the "immediate
cause" of the fighting.

Provocative activities had undoubtedly occurred

at the Radical rally, but disturbing as they may have seemed, such
public speeches and gatherings had teen held before without causing mob
violence.

Sheridan did not stigmatize anyone with firing the first shot

because of the confusion in the opening minutes of the riot.

Sheridan

accused Mayor Monroe of inflaming hostile feelings and failing to super
vise and discipline the police force.

A local Conservative judge,

Edmund Abell, had not ordered the arrest and prosecution of white
Democrats involved in the riot.
Radicals had been arrested.

Instead, several Negroes and white

Sheridan concluded by citing Governor Wells

for his oonplete lack of leadership during the crisis.

20

•^Johnson to Sheridan, August 4, 1866, in Johnson Papers. For an
example of a critical newspaper, see the anti-administration New York
Tribune, which devoted over half of its front page each day for a week
relating details of the riot (many of them false); New York Tribune,
July 31-August 7, 1866. The less emotional New York Times also gave
the riot detailed coverage, July 31-August 8, 1866.
^Sheridan to Johnson, August 5 and 6, 1866, in Johnson Papers.
The following day, August 7, Attorney General Henry Stanbery urged the
President to order Sheridan to dismiss the New Orleans police force from
duty. Johnson did not agree. See Howard K. Beale (ed.), Diary of
Gideon Welles (3 vols., New York, 1960), II, 572-73.
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The tense New Orleans atmosphere calmed considerably during the
week following the riot.

Despite rumors that new disturbances would

erupt on August 6, the day passed without incident.

The military

closely enforced an order which prohibited the sale of firearms in the
•4-. 21
city.

During August Sheridan and his staff thankfully turned their
attention away from politics and civilians to an unusual military task.
Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend in Washington ordered that the
Department of the Gulf serve as the recruiting area for three of the six
newly authorized regular regiments of Negro troops.

The planners in the

War Department hoped that many of the recruits could be found by
enlisting recently discharged Negro volunteers or even by transferring
some volunteers who had not yet been mustered out.

Special recruiting

advertisements also encouraged new enlistees, who joined with hundreds
of the best black veterans from several states to form the first
regular regiments of Negro troops in the United States Army.
The three regiments separated after they were formed.
Infantry was assigned to duty in Louisiana.
posts in Texas.

The 39th

The 41st Infantry occupied

The 9th Cavalry remained at its base in Greenville,

Louisiana, from the beginning of recruiting in August 1866 until the
regiment completed its initial training in March 1867.

During these

early months of the regiment8s existence, Sheridan did not consider the
9th as a part of his active Reconstruction occupation forces, although
had some emergency occurred the regiment might have been used.

The 9th

2lSheridan to Grant, August 5, 1866, in Sheridan Papers; Sheridan
to Grant, August 7, 1866, in Johnson Papers; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly
Advocate, August 8, 1866; New York Tribune, August 7, 1866.
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and its sister regiment the 10th Cavalry thereafter served in Texas and
at other points on the western frontier, where the black troop® fought
against several hostile Indian tribes.

The Indians grew to respect the

Negro cavalry regiments and gave them their distinctive nickname, the
"buffalo soldiers."22
On August 21 son® of the soldiers who had been brought into New
Orleans after the riot in July returned to their base at Jackson
Barracks.

Elements of the 1st Infantry retained in the city as a

precautionary measure.

Sheridan believed that he had enough troops in

the state to "maintain order" at that tine without reinforcements.

23

Since returning to New Orleans after the riot, Sheridan had become
dissatisfied with Absalom Baird's performance of his duties— dissatis
fied to the point where a change in state commanders was expected.
Newspaper editorials also lad criticized Baird for his awkward handling
of recent events.

On September 8, perhaps under pressure from Sheridan,

Baird resigned his post as assistant conmissianer of the Louisiana
Freedman's Bureau.

Sheridan took his place temporarily.

Nine days

later, on September 17, Baird received an extended, unspecified leave
from the service and left the state.

He returned to duty on December 1,

1866, as Inspector General for the Departmer c of the Lakes near the
Canadian border.

The New Orleans Republican later characterized Baird

22AG Edward D. Townsend to Sheridan, August 4 and 12, 1866,
Sheridan to Townsend, August 7, 1866, in Sheridan Papers; Baton Rouge
Tri-Weekly Advocate, August 17, 1866; Sheridan to Townsend, S e p t e m b e r 1,
1866, in Dept Gulf, vol. 258, RG 393, NA; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
September 23, 1866; New York Times, September 23, 1866; Sefton, Army and
Reconstruction, 96; William H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A
Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West (Norman, 1967), 7-11.
^New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 22, 1866; Sheridan to Grant,
August 17, 1866, in Sheridan Papers.
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as "an amiable but irresolute subordinate . . . [and a] gentleman
eminently qualified to adorn the most cultivated society but utterly
unfit to cope with" the difficulties found in a Southern state.

24

Sheridan did not choose a new district conraander inraediately
because on September 24 he was called to Texas.

Instead of a border

problem, an incident of racial violence in the east Texas town of
Brenham required investigation.

On October 1 Sheridan returned to New

^
25
Orleans.
Shortly after Sheridan's return, the military oonsnission appointed
by Baird completed its report on the riot.

Brevet Major General Joseph A.

Mower of the recently formed 39th Infantry served as chairman of the
panel.

The document revealed no new facts.

Ardent opposition to the

Convention of 1864 by a majority of New Orleans citizens was listed as
the cause of the riot.

Contradictory testimony and statements of

witnesses left the officers unable to say who fired the first shot on
July 30.

Without equivocation, they roundly condemned the unwarranted

participation in the riot by the police.

26

During the rest of October, Sheridan found more of his time
consumed by Texas troubles.

Reconstruction politics, Indian attacks on

24
The New York Times was critical of Baird twice, an August 2 and
8, 1866. The New Orleans Daily Picayune was also accusative on
September 5, 1866. See also New York Times, September 9, 1866; Cullum,
Register of West Point, II, 234; New Orleans Republican, September 6,
1867.
25sheridan to C/S John A. Rawlins, September 24, October 1, 1866,
in Sheridan Papers.
^%ouse Exec. Docs., 39 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 68, pp. 36-43. This
document is a 289-page collection of telegrams, reports, and testimony
of witnesses, and is second only in importance to House Reports, 39
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 16 for information about the details of the riot.
See also New Orleans Bee, October 9, 1866.
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settlers, and Maximilian's moribund dictatorship all demanded his
attention.

However, Sheridan also became concerned about the reports of

violence against freedmen by whites in several Louisiana parishes.

27

Sheridan studied the qualifications of his officers during this
time and selected General Joseph A. Mower to command Louisiana.
Originally from Vermont, Mower fought as an enlisted man in the Mexican
War and in 1855 obtained a lieutenant's coirmission in the regular Army.
In the Civil War he earned a praiseworthy record and eventually
commanded a corps.

Most of his duty was in the Western Theater,

including several months in Louisiana, but he also served in Sherman's
"inarch to the sea."

Since the end of the war, assignments had placed

him in either Texas or Louisiana.

Mower and Sheridan had kindred

personalities and characters, and they also had similar ideas on
Reconstruction.

Sheridan once commented that Louisiana needed a

"decisive and shrewd" commander, and both he and Grant believed Mower
fitted the description admirably.

28

After Mower's appointment, Sheridan made two short trips to Texas,
one in November and the other in December.

He kept Grant fully informed

^Bouse Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 57, gives extensive
coverage to the Texas problems. Earlier, Sheridan wanted to devote more
time to Texas affairs, but said he felt "handcuffed to New Orleans."
Sheridan to Grant, August 22, 1866, in Sheridan Papers. See also Grant
to Sheridan, October 31, 1866, in ibid., on Maximilian. Senate Exec.
Docs., 39 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 6, is a report by Sheridan during his
brief tenure as superintendent of the Freedmen's Bureau; see especially
pp. 75-76, 84-86.
Sheridan to Grant, October 4, November 3, 1866, in Ulysses S.
Grant Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; microfilm copy
in Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge). Grant to Sheridan,
November 3, 1866, in Sheridan Papers. Although he was not a college
graduate, Mower did attend Norwich Academy for two years. See Warner,
Generals in Blue, 338-39, and Allen Johnson (ed.), Dictionary of
American Biography (22 vols., New York, 1929-1958), XIII, 299-300.
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of his movements.

On December 25 Sheridan celebrated Christmas in New

Orleans for the second time.

29

Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., before the Christmas recess of the
Thirty-ninth Congress, Senator Charles Sumner introduced several resolu
tions on Reconstruction to the Senate.

In the resolutions Sumner

charged that presidential Reconstruction had been a mistake and declared
that the decisions on restoration of former Confederate states must now
be made by Congress.

Although these resolutions were not acted upon,

they indicated the swelling dissatisfaction of Republican leaders with
Johnson's policies.

With prospects of momentous political activities in

the offing for the spring session of Congress, Grant summoned Sheridan
to Washington for consultations.

30

Several factors influenced the attitude of the next Congress.
Southerners had committed a variety of indiscretions, such as the riots
in Memphis and New Orleans, the adoption of the Black Codes, and the
election of former important Confederate military and civilian leaders.
President Johnson's own actions, including his frequent vetoes of
Republican bills and his ill-advised conduct on the "swing around the
circle" political campaign also had been detrimental to the South, which
looked to Johnson for leadership and advice.

These factors helped to

produce a strong Republican showing in the fall Congressional elections.
^Sheridan to Grant, November 8, 14, 27, 1866; Sheridan to Rawlins,
December 11, 1866, all in Johnson Papers. Sheridan to Grant, November 8,
December 1 and 10, in Grant Papers. Sheridan to Rawlins, December 15,
1866, in Sheridan Papers.
30Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 180-81; Sheridan to Grant,
January 19, 1867, Sheridan to Rawlins, February 25, 1867, both in Grant
Papers. Sheridan returned to Louisiana on February 25.
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The Republicans gained enough strength in the next Congress to pass
legislation over presidential vetoes.

The Republicans were divided into

Radical, Moderate, and Conservative factions.

Despite these divisions,

Republicans found cannon ground in opposition to Johnson, a desire to
protect the political and economic gains of the Civil War years, and the
feeling that some form of protection, however mild, should be accorded
to the Southern freedmen.

Therefore, the Republican party was unified

enough to pass a series of laws which gave Congress great influence over
the Reconstruction process.

31

The Republicans passed the first of these acts on March 2, 1867,
over President Johnson's veto.

The law declared that the Southern

governments fostered by tie President were provisional and held no legal
authority.

Congress divided the South into five military districts,

whose commanders had to be either brigadier or major generals.

These

generals, once selected by the President, would hold all power over
civilian governments and courts.

The law also required the Southern

states within these districts to draft new constitutions in constitu
tional conventions.

The right to vote for delegates to these

conventions was granted to all adult males, except those disqualified
for service to the Confederacy.

Furthermore, each of these new

constitutions must contain a provision which enfranchised all adult
males who had voted for delegates to the constitutional convention.
this means blacks would be granted the right of suffrage.

By

When the

voters in each state accepted the new constitution, they were to elect a
new governor and legislators.

After the legislature ratified the

^Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 103-104; Patrick, Reconstruction,
85-89, 95; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 175-80.
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proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the state’s
congressmen would be considered for readmission to Congress.

Upon

readmission, military control would end, and the duly elected civil
authorities would resume their proper roles.

32

The passage of this law was a watershed in Reconstruction, for by
it the Congressional Republicans seized the initiative from the
executive.

President Johnson had wanted the Southern states back in the

Union quickly and had demanded only the mildest conditions for re-entry.
He did virtually nothing to ensure the interests of the freedman; in
fact, he had vetoed the bill to renew the bureau designed for that
purpose.

In Johnson’s view, the Federal government was not responsible

for assuring voting rights to the former slaves, and partly for this
reason he had discouraged passage of the intricate Fourteenth Amendment.
Perhaps a majority of Republicans would have been satisfied with the
South's easy restoration if the section had approved the amendment.
Taking Johnson's advice, the Southern states, with the ironic exception
of Johnson's home state of Tennessee, rejected the amendment.

This

action, combined with other economic and political factors, influenced
Congressional Republicans to take a new course in Reconstruction, one in
which the A m y became the agent of social and political change.
The traumatic circumstances of the post-Civil War era appeared to
demand such a radical departure from the usual American process of
debate and compromise.

What other part of the government but the Army

could oomple a large percentage of the population to abide by laws many
considered repugnant?

The Army had defeated the Confederacy and kept

^Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 109-10; Patrick, Reconstruction,
97-99; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 182-83.
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the nation from breaking apart.
the country together.

Now the Army was called on to help bind

Hereafter, assignment to the South made some

soldiers long for the trans-Mississippi plains and mountains where
Indian-fighting at least had some glory, seme professional reward or
recognition.

Service in the South held the prospect of neither glory

nor honor, only duty of the most confusing and frustrating kind—
military government.
The senior generals waited anxiously to learn which of them would
be assigned to the Southern military districts.

The Amy's role had

increased in importance, and a law of Congress awaited execution.

CHAPTER IV
SHERIDAN SEES HIS DOTY
On March 11, 1867, President Johnson chose the generals for the
newly organized Southern military districts.

With the exception of John

Pope, the appointees all had served varying lengths of Reconstruction
duty in the South.

Pope had been cormanding part of the Indian-fighting

A m y west of the Mississippi River.

He cane east and took charge of the

Third Military District, containing Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, the
last state formerly a part of the old Division of the Gulf.

Sheridan

retained command of Louisiana and Texas, together called the Fifth
Military District.
is not known.

The extent of Grant's influence on Johnson's choices

Sheridan had spoken out in favor of Radical Republican

ideas, and Grant's desire to retain the experienced general in the
Southwest nay have been decisive in Johnson's final decision.1

Soon

after his appointment as district commander, Sheridan examined sites for
additional cavalry posts on the west Texas frontier which had been
2
bothered by Indian raids.
Fifth District headquarters issued General Order No. 1 on March 19.
This document emphasized to the people of Louisiana and Texas that their
1-Grant to Sheridan, March 13, 1867, in Andrew Johnson Papers
(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); James E. Sefton, The United
States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 113-15.
l!be other experienced ccmmanders were Generals John M. Schofield, First
District (Virginia); Daniel E. Sickles, Second District (the Carolinas);
and E. 0. C. Ord, Fourth District (Arkansas and Mississippi).
0
Sheridan to Grant, March 14, 1867, in Johnson Papers.
86
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civil governments were provisional.

The Arm/ held veto power over all

actions of civilian officials in the states.

A carefully worded para

graph of the order stated that there would be no widescale removals of
civilian officeholders.

However, if any individual should "impede . . .

or delay" reorganization of the states according to the new Reconstruc
tion laws, such action would be considered grounds for dismissal from
3

office.

State politicians had received a stem warning to expect that

the laws of Congress would be rigorously enforced.
On March 23 Congress overrode another of President Johnson's
ineffective vetoes and passed the second Reconstruction Act.

This act

set September 1, 1867, as the date whan all qualified Southern voters
should be registered.

Furthermore, the statute contained details of

election procedures which had been emitted from the first law enacted
earlier in the month.

For example, the nunber of delegates to the

constitutional conventions scheduled for the fall was to equal the
largest branch of the state legislature in 1860.

Each district

commander would apportion the representation in the states he conmended
4
and then designate the location of the convention.
As Sheridan interpreted the Congressional Reconstruction Acts, he
was vested with powers, and even obligations, to make adjustments in
Louisiana's government.

On March 27 he removed from office several of

his antagonists, Mayor John Monroe of New Orleans, Attorney
% e w Orleans Daily Picayune, March 20, 1867; New Orleans Crescent,
March 21, 1867; Shreveport South-Western, March 27, 1867; Philip H.
Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan (2 vols., New York, 1888),
II, 252.
4Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 113; Rambert W. Patrick, The
Reconstruction of the Nation (New York, 1967), 109-10.
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General Andrew Herron, and Judge Edmund Abell.

All three men had

irritated Sheridan by their actions before, during, and after the New
Orleans riot of the previous July.

Monroe was by implication responsi

ble for the violent behavior of the city's police force.
failed to indict white citizens who had violated the law.

Herron had
Abell had

refrained from prosecuting those who had been arrested, and had
publicly advocated that New Orleans residents ignore the Reconstruction
laws.

Sheridan believed that the shortcomings of these men justified

replacing them with Republicans who would properly carry out the laws.

5

Removal of important public officials did not enhance Sheridan's
reputation with Louisiana's citizens.

Nevertheless, the general, having

endured months of antagonism and inactivity on the part of these
functionaries, saw no other course to take.

Grant supported Sheridan's

actions and judged that the removals were necessary to improve "the
quiet and prosperity of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana."

"I

only wrote this," continued Grant, "to let you know that I at least
approve what you have done."

Grant misjudged the result of Sheridan's
. .

order if he thought it would produce quieting effects on Louisiana.

6

^John R. Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in Louisiana (through
1868) (Baltimore, 1910), 140; GO No. 5, 5 MD, March 27, 1867, in Senate
Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 14, p. 240; Sheridan to Grant,
April 19, 1867, ibid., p. 201; Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 254-55; New York
Times, March 28, June 8, 1867.
^Grant to Sheridan, March 29, 1867, quote! in Adam Badeau, Grant in
Peace (Hartford, 1887), 102. The New Orleans Daily Picayune (March 28,
1867) said in an editorial that the "changes were unnecessary," but that
it recognized Sheridan's authority to make the removals. However, the
Picayune was apprehensive that this act was only the first of a "general
sweep from office of the civil authorities of State and city." See also
New Orleans Crescent, March 28, 1867.
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On March 28 Sheridan issued a directive that prohibited all local
elections in Louisiana until the state complied with the provisions of
the congressional laws.

Until the district commander scheduled new

elections, all local officeholders were to continue in their present
. .
7
posxtions.
Next, Sheridan turned his attention to the registration of voters
for the upcoming fall election.

Sheridan formulated his plans early so

that the Fifth District would be the first to begin registration.
However, the Reconstruction Acts did not clearly specify who was
eligible to register.

Sheridan questioned Grant on this subject.

Replying for the General in Chief, Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend
said that U.S. Attorney General Henry Stanbery had taken this and
related matters under consideration, and he would hand down an opinion
soon.

8
Meanwhile, as Sheridan and other commanders awaited Stanbery's

decisions, uncooperative civil officials continued to worry the generals.
For example, Colonel Claries Griffin, commander of the Department of
Texas under Sheridan, informed his superior that it seated that all
officeholders in Texas were "disloyal."

Griffin advised the "immediate

removal" of several officials, particularly Governor James W.
Throckmorton.

Not doubting the sincerity of Griffin's suggestion,

Sheridan said that he intended "to make but few removals."

However,

^SO No. 7, 5 MD, March 28, 1867, in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 209, p. 25.
^Townsend to Sheridan, April 2, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cong., 1 Sess., No. 20, p. 84; Sheridan to Grant, April 1, 1867, in
Johnson Papers. Grant later advised Sheridan to "go on giving your own
interpretation to the law until an answer is given." Grant to Sheridan,
April 7, 1867, ibid.
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unless Governor Wells and Governor Throckniorton became more responsive
to the wishes of Congress, they would have to be replaced by men who
would properly enforce Federal laws.

9

Grant ordered "that no removals of governors of States be made at
present."

As for lower ranking officials, he pointedly admonished

Sheridan to "make no more removals than you find absolutely necessary"
and only for "the grossest disregard of the law."

Nevertheless, if a

serious situation demanded the removal of an official, Grant firmly
believed that district commanders had the power to act, even if it was
not spelled out an the Reconstruction Acts.

10

Apparently hoping that he would not have to remove any other
officeholders, Sheridan continued with his registration plans in
Louisiana.

He initiated his program in New Orleans on April 12, the

earliest action in any Southern state.
big city.

Registration went well in the

The 20th Infantry Regiment dispatched several companies to

towns in north Louisiana to prepare for the arrival of the registrars,
while the 1st and 39th Infantry regiments supplied troops to protect
^Charles Griffin to Maj. G. A. Forsyth, March 28, 1867, in House
Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 20, pp. 62-63; Sheridan to Grant,
April 2, 1867, ibid. Although Sheridan had already removed three top
Louisiana civil officials, it is noteworthy that he still claimed to
Grant that it was his "intention to make but few removals." Sheridan
had no reason to disguise his plans or thoughts from his friend Grant.
Indeed, he had previously told Grant of his wildest ideas or soundest
plans. It may be concluded that though Sheridan did not foresee widescale removals of public officials, he would not shirk what he considered
to be his duty under the Reconstruction Acts. See also Sefton, A m y and
Reconstruction, 128, 133-35, 157, and especially 140.
l^Grant to Sheridan, April 3, 1867, in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong.,
1 Sess., No. 14, p. 195; Grant to Sheridan, April 5, 1867, in Philip H.
Sheridan Papers (Autograph Letters) (Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress). Grant was on unsteady legal grounds on this point. Another
act of Congress (July 19, 1867) later gave district commanders official
removal powers.
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registrars in the southern part of the state.

On April 20 Sheridan

appointed civilian registrars of voters in forty-seven parishes.

Ten

Army officers served as supervisors-at-large to insure that registrars
complied with all laws.

On April 21 state-wide registration began.

Sheridan anticipated no violence during the process, and he told Grant
that his "only desire [was] to faithfully carry out the law as a
military order."

As a safeguard against inproper registrations,

Sheridan tried to appoint at least one ex-Union officer to each
registration board. ^
Sheridan followed Grant's advice and carried out his own ideas on
enrolling voters.

Although Attorney General Stanbery had not made a

ruling, Sheridan's orders disfranchised hundreds of Louisianians.

The

Reconstruction Acts prohibited unspecified "executive and judicial"
officers frcm registering.

Sheridan interpreted the phrase broadly to

include governors, mayors, judges, policemen, school board members, city
councilman, and even public auctioneers.

Apparently, men who had held

these and various other offices, knowing they could not register, made
little attempt to do so.

Many other men in the New Orleans area, and

presumably elsewhere, were unable to register on the standard grounds
12
that they had performed Confederate military service.
^Sheridan to Grant, April 6 and 21, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cong., 1 Sess., No. 20, pp. 79, 83; Sheridan to Grant, April 12, 1867,
in Johnson Papers; Sheridan to Grant, April 19, 1867, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 14, p. 202; SO NO. 23, 5 MD, April 20,
1867, ibid., p. 244; Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, April 25 and May 16,
1867; AAAG Lewis Spalding to 00s 20th and 1st Infantry regiments,
April 15, 1867, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274, KG 393, NA; Spalding to CO, 39th
Infantry, May 5, 1867, ibid.
-*-%or example, see "Memorandum of those refused registration,"
April 24-July 31, 1867, in Joseph P. Homor Collection (Department of
Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library). See also
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Sheridan supervised carefully the progress of voter enrollment.
During one of his frequent investigations into the procedure he found
that Thomas A. Boylan, an aide to the New Orleans chief of police, had
intimidated Negroes and prevented them from registering.

Sheridan

suspended Boylan from duty, and when full inquiry revealed the gravity
of the charges, Boylan was removed from the police force.

13

Following Boylan's dismissal, Sheridan acted to reorganize the New
Orleans Police Department.

Actually, the general had been dissatisfied

with the department since its participation in the 1866 riot.

He

nullified a state law passed in 1866 designed to prevent former Federal
soldiers from becoming policemen.

The law held that all applicants for

the police force must lave resided in New Orleans for five years.
Sheridan issued an order which set the residency requirement at only two
years.

Furthermore, he required that henceforth at least half of the

250-man police force be ex-Union soldiers.

Sheridan now believed that

he had a reliable municipal police department.

14

The next conflict between the civil government and the A m y arose
over the Louisiana levee board.

This important state agency spent large

sums of money to construct and repair the levees along the Mississippi
River.

A committee of the state legislature had appointed the board of

Sheridan to Grant, April 24, 1867, in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1
Sess., No. 14, p. 205; Sheridan to Grant, April 16, 1867, with attached
memoranda, ibid., p. 200; Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 130;
William A. Russ, "Disfranchisement in Louisiana, (1862-1870)," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly, XVIII (July, 1935), 573.
■®"^New York Times, April 29, 1867; SO No. 25, 5 MD, April 23, 1867,
in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 14, p. 246.
14S0 No. 33, 5 MD, May 2, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2
Sess., No. 342, p. 165; Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 261-64; New Orleans Tines,
May 4, 1867.
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levee commissioners, bypassing Governor Wells in the process.

When the

legislature appropriated four million dollars for levee construction and
maintenance, Wells abolished the legislative board and selected his own
panel of commissioners responsible for spending the huge appropriation.
Each board questioned the legality of the other and asked Sheridan to
decide which was the legitimate one.

Rather than choose between them,

he formed an entirely new board and discharged both of the others.
This, of course, left neither side satisfied, but the politicians
involved did notice that Sheridan had not taken sides in the dispute.
The New Orleans Crescent described Sheridan's appointees as "well-known
citizens" who were expected to do their jobs "honestly and
conscientiously." The New Orleans Times criticized Wells and concluded
that Sheridan's actions were "justified by the facts" of the situation.
The headquarters staff sent a report of the proceedings to Army
headquarters in Washington.

15

After the levee board controversy, Sheridan kept an even closer
watch on all levels of state politics.

Fifty St. Landry Parish citizens

accused their sheriff, Janes T. Hays, of dereliction of duty; thereupon
Sheridan removed Hays and selected a new sheriff.

Next, Fifth District

headquarters announced the appointment of a Republican politician to fill
a vacancy on the Point Coupee Parish police jury.

This man was one of

many Republicans or Unionists Sheridan appointed during the coming
months.

Continuing to observe the registration process, the general

l^so No. 34, 5 MD, May 3, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1
Sess., No. 20, p. 66; Walter M. Lowrey, "The Political Career of
James Madison Wells," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXXE (October,
1948), 1088, 1090; Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 140-41; Sheridan,
Memoirs, II, 265-66; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, May 8, 1867; New
Orleans Times, May 4, 1867; New Orleans Crescent, May 4, 1867.

94
deposed a New Orleans clerk of court for issuing false certificates of
U. S. citizenship.

The fake papers enabled foreigners and ex-

Confederates to sign the voting rolls.

Registration proceeded quietly,

though many vhites refused to register because they opposed the
Reconstruction Acts.

16

In May the general had to deal with a crisis in New Orleans that
might have caused another riot.

Horse-drawn street cars had operated

for many years in the Crescent City with separate coaches for white and
black passengers.

Negroes used cars narked with a painted star, and

white patrons rode in unmarked vehicles.

Trouble began in April when

Negroes insisted on traveling in the cars usually reserved for whites.
Policemen forced blacks to continue riding in the "star cars." This
prompted Negroes to stage a more unified protest against the discrimina
tory practice, and eventually the Army became involved when black
soldiers of the 39th Infantry also attempted to ride unrestricted on the
urban transit.

At this point Sheridan stepped in.

He held a meeting

with the officers of the street car companies and persuaded them to
integrate their businesses.

Sheridan "advised the companies to make no

distinction" between white and black passengers in the future, implying
iGNew York Times, May 6, 1867; "Loyal Citizens of Opelousas and
St. Landry" to Sheridan, April 18, 1867, in 5 MD, Letters Reed, Dept of
Civil Affairs, RG 393, NA; SO No. 35, 5 MD, May 4, 1867, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 14, p. 251; Sheridan to Grant, May 4,
1867, ibid. Although few whites appeared to be registering at the
beginning of May, more signed the rolls toward the end of the month.
Sheridan to Grant, May 20, 1867, ibid., p. 207. The clerk was removed
by SO NO. 41, 5 MD, May 11, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2
Sess., No. 342, p. 166. See also Sheridan to Grant, May 11, 1867, in
Edwin M. Stanton Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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that if they did not, he would ban the horse-drawn coaches from the
streets.

17

Sheridan had won one of the earliest victories for Negro civil
rights in the South, but his motive had been practical rather than
idealistic.

Like most of the white men of his time, Sheridan believed

that the colored races were inferior to the white.

However, he would

not tolerate a situation where U.S. soldiers, regardless of color, were
discriminated against on public conveyances.

Such a circumstance might

lead to an outbreak of violence in his district.

This practical reason,

rather than ardent civil rights fervor, dictated the general's course of
action.
Black success in the star car issue may have stimulated protests on
other questions.

While Sheridan was inspecting voter registration

preparations in Texas from May 12 to May 17, a large crowd of Negro
stevedores assembled on the New Orleans riverfront and conducted a
wildcat strike for better working conditions and higher wages.

Before

any violence occurred, General Joseph Mower went down to the docks and
spoke to the excited blacks.

Supported try a troop of mounted cavalry,

Mower urged the workers to return to their jobs and threatened to bring
in troops and break the strike if the strikers caused the slightest
l?The segregated street cars had proved troublesome to
Generals Butler, Banks, and Cantry, none of whom could suitably resolve
the problem. See Roger A. Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in
Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Urbana, 1974), 30-38, and the same author's "A
Pioneer Protest:
The New Orleans StreetCar Controversy of 1867,"
Journal of NegroHistory, L I U (July, 1968), 219-33. In neither of his
writings does Fischer stress Sheridan's ultimate influence over the
crisis. See New Orleans Daily Picayune,May 7 and 8, 1867; New Orleans
Republican, May 7, 1867; New York Times, May 7, 1867; Ficklen, Recon
struction in Louisiana, 188; Sheridan to Grant, May 10, 1867, in House
Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., NO. 20, p. 75. See also John W.
Blassingame, Black New Orleans, 1860-1880 (Chicago, 1973), 190.
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disturbance.

Mower's speech and the knowledge that more soldiers had

been ordered to the scene convinced the crowd to disperse, and the
strike aided.

Sheridan returned to a peaceful city.

18

On May 24, 1867, Attorney General Stanbery announced his decision
on voting qualifications.

In Stanbery's judgment, state "executive and

judicial officers" who had sworn to support the U.S. Constitution in
the line of their jobs and then accepted an office under the Confederacy
should be disqualified.

Stanbery also excluded high state officials,

such as governors, state treasurers, state attorney generals, and other
upper echelon leaders.

Compared to Sheridan's blanket order, the

Attorney General's ruling disqualified only a few men.

Like Sheridan,

district commanders John Pope and Edward 0. C. Qrd had already issued
directives that disfranchised a variety of citizens whom the Attorney
General considered qualified to vote.

Coming from the top legal officer

in the national administration, Stanbery's pronouncement should have
been obeyed.

However, the military believed his ruling was only an

"opinion" without force of law.

Each district commander continued to
19
make his own decisions on voting qualifications.
1Q

Sheridan to Grant, May 11 and 18, 1867, Ulysses S. Grant Papers
(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); New York Times, May 18, 1867;
New Orleans Bee, May 17, 1867; New Orleans Crescent, May 17, 1867; New
Orleans Dally Picayune, May 12, 14, 16, 1867; Mayor Edward Heath to
AAG George Hartsuff, May 15, 1867, in 5 MD, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA.
Also on this trip Sheridan learned of the declining power of Maximilian.
The next month Mexican patriots toppled Maximilian's throne; and the
emperor was executed on June 19, 1867, ending the extraordinary French
adventure in Mexico.
19See James Sefton's clear analysis of Stanbery's ruling in Army and
Reconstruction, 130-31. Stanbery's opinion is printed in Senate Exec.
Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 14, pp. 275-87.
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A few days after Stanbery issued his opinion on voting, Sheridan
learned that the Radicals and blacks in New Orleans were planning a
public parade for May 29.

Since the organizers anticipated a large

crowd, Sheridan decided to bring several companies of troops into the
city and place them near the parade route.
alert at Jackson Barracks.

Additional units remained on

On the evening of May 29 a crowd of one

thousand Negroes and a few of their white supporters enjoyed a torch
light procession in downtown New Orleans.

Sheridan believed it was "the

largest political assembly" in Louisiana since 1865.

Negroes "paraded

the streets without the slightest disturbance," wrote Sheridan to Grant.
The rally concluded peacefully, making it unnecessary to call the troops
stationed nearby.

20

Sheridan had successfully weathered another crisis, but his
high-level confrontation with Governor Wells continued.

For a month

following the levee board dispute, Sheridan tried to tolerate the
uncooperative governor.

Finally, after many weeks of misunderstanding,

Sheridan decided to remove Wells from office on June 3.
The removal order offended Wells' sensibilities because it was
wedged between two others concerning ordnance inspection and street
cleaning.

21

The New York Times branded Sheridan's move as act of an

20Sheridan to Grant, May 30, 1867, in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong.,
1 Sess., No. 14, p. 211; New Orleans Crescent, May 30, 1867; New Orleans
Bee, May 30, 1867; AAAG Spalding to Lt. Col. W. H. Wood and Maj. Maurice
Maloney, May 25, 1867, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274, RG 393, NA; Spalding to
Wood, Maloney, and Lt. Benjamin Abrahams, May 29, 1867, ibid.
2^SO No. 59, 5 MD, June 3, 1867, in Johnson Papers; Richard
O'Connor, Sheridan the Inevitable (Indianapolis, 1953), 288; Sheridan,
Memoirs, II, 266-67; Lowrey, "Political Career of Wells," 1090-92;
Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 189; Sefton, Army and Reconstruc
tion, 141; New York Times, June 5, 1867. Sheridan was accused of
removing Wells "arbitrarily" by nodding Carter, The Angry Scar (New
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"impetuous cavalry leader, rather than the calm, wise
administrator. . . . "
removal.

Louisiana newspapers, however, applauded the

Several editors and many politicians had been alienated by

Wells' changing political loyalties from pro-Democrat to pro-Republican.
Obviously pleased by Wells' misfortune, the Shreveport South-Western
declared that whoever replaced Wells would do a better job.
newspapers offered similar comments.

Other state

22

Defending his action to his superiors in Washington, Sheridan
labeled Wells a "political trickster and a dishonest man" whose "conduct
has been as sinuous as the mark left in the dust by the movement of a
snake."

Wells" "subterfuge and political chicanery" could be tolerated

no longer in the Fifth Military District.

23

Wells protested his removal to President Johnson and called
Sheridan's action a "usurpation of power."

The ex-governor demanded

that he be allowed to remain in his elected office.

Andrew Herron, the

former Louisiana attorney general previously removed by Sheridan,
supported Wells in his fight to stay in office.

In a letter to the

York, 1959), 147. Another author claimed the Wells "administration
was . . . sabotaged by Federal policy. . . . " See Frank W. Klingberg,
The Southern Claims Commission, (Berkeley, 1955), 201.
^^The New Orleans Times (June 4, 1867), no friend of the Governor,
quipped: "All's well that ends Wells." See also New Orleans Crescent,
June 4, 1867; Shreveport South-Western, June 12, 1867; Baton Rouge
Tri-Weekly Advocate, June 7, 10, 1867; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat,
June 12, 1867; New York Tines, June 5, 1867. The Daily Picayune (June 5,
1867) commented that Wells had been "perverse and mischievous," but had
not blocked or obstructed the Reconstruction laws.
23Sheridan bo Stanton, June 3, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Gong., 1 Sess., No. 20, p. 65; Sheridan to Grant, June 4, 1867, ibid.,
p. 67.
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President, Herron strongly criticized Sheridan and recommended that the
general be relieved of his command.

24

Judge Thomas Durant, Sheridan's first choice as a replacement for
Wells, refused to accept the governorship.

Sheridan then appointed

Benjamin F. Flanders, a former Treasury agent who had confiscated great
amounts of cotton for the Federal government after the war.

Flanders

had been a Louisiana resident for twenty-three years, coming to the
state after his graduation from Dartmouth College in 1842.

He had

served as a Louisiana congressman before the Civil War, but had left the
state during the conflict.

Returning to New Orleans with the Federal

occupation, he resumed his political career, but had lost to Wells in
the gubernatorial election in 1864.

Although Flanders acknowledged his

Radical affiliation, he had a reputation for honesty.

Such ideological

opponents as the Alexandria Louisiana Denocrat and the New Orleans
Republican both complimented Sheridan on his choice of a new governor.
Sheridan himself believed Flanders to be a nan of "integrity and
ability.
However, Wells stubbornly refused to surrender his post.

The

obstinate Louisianian locked himself in the governor's office in the
Mechanic's Institute.

On June 7 Sheridan's aide, Major James W. Forsyth,

personally delivered an ultimatum to Wells:

leave the building

^J. Madison Wells to Johnson, June 4, 1867; Herron to Johnson,
June 4, 1867, both in Johnson Papers.
^^SO No. 62, 5 MD, June 6, 1867, ibid.; Sheridan to Grant, June 6,
1867, in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 14, p. 215; New
Orleans Times, June 7, 1867; Shreveport South-Western, June 19, 1867;
New Orleans Bee, June 7, 1867; New Orleans Crescent, June 7, 1867;
Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, June 12, 1867; New Orleans Republican,
June 7, 1867; Sheridan to Grant, June 8, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cong., 1 Sess., No. 20, p. 94.
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peaceably or be dragged out.

Under this threat, Wells finally

relinquished the office, and Flanders moved in the next day.

26

Flanders immediately demonstrated his willingness to cooperate with
Sheridan by his action in the Cyrus Stauffer murder case in Natchitoches.
Stauffer had been a Radical leader, local registrar of voters, and a
former delegate to the 1864 Constitutional Convention.

During a quarrel

over money with Natchitoches Democrat Robert Jones a fight ensued in
which Jones killed Stauffer.

Negroes in the area idolized the Radical,

and when they learned of his death a large mob demonstrated at the
courthouse demanding the arrest of the killer.

But Jones wounded

sheriff John Hughes when he tried to make the arrest.

Before the

situation got out of hand, Freedman's Bureau Agent James Cromie
requested that the military take charge of the case.

Flanders, apprised

of all the particulars of the situation, asked the Army to apprehend
Jones and his brother Richard, an accessory to the murder.

Furthermore,

to insure an impartial hearing, the governor requested that upon their
capture the brothers be tried by a military commission instead of a
civilian court.

Sheridan acceded to the governor's wishes, and

General Mower selected troops to track down the accused men.
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2% e w Orleans Times, June 9, 1867; New Orleans Crescent, June 9,
1867; New Orleans Bee, June 9, 1867; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat,
June 12, 1867; New York Times, June 9, 1867; Sheridan to Grant, June 8,
1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 20, p. 94; Sheridan
to Wells, June 7, 1867, in U.S. Army Letterbook. 1867-1868 (Fifth Mili
tary District Papers, 1867-1868, Duke University Library, Durham, N.C.).
2^New Orleans Bee, June 8, 1867; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate,
June 21, 1867; Janes Cromie to 5 MD Headquarters, June 10, 1867, in
House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong,, 1 Sess., No. 20, pp. 104-106; AAG G. L.
Hartsuff to Mower, June 20, 1867, ibid., p. 107; Benjamin F. Flanders to
Sheridan, June 18, 1867, in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No.
14, p. 223. The Joneses were finally apprehended August 10, 1867. See
New Orleans Bee, August 11, 1867.
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Meanwhile, the registration of voters that began on April 21
proceeded rapidly.

Many whites managed to register in spite of barriers

that Sheridan maintained.

The registrars received a fee of twenty-five

cents for each person who signed the voting rolls.

After most Unionists

and a multitude of Negroes had signed, seme registrars accepted the fee
frcm Confederate veterans and others Sheridan had excluded fran
eligibility.

Blacks had been encouraged to register, and by the end of

June 1867, over half of the 87,941 registered voters were Negroes.
Sheridan had planned to end registration on June 30, although the other
four military districts had been ordered to continue the process until
August 1.

The President asked that Louisiana keep its books open until

the same date.

Sheridan informed Grant that registration in Louisiana

was nearly complete and claimed that if it was continued it would create
"a broad macadamized road for perjury and fraud to travel on."

In other

words, even more undesirables might find a way to register.
Nevertheless, to placate Johnson, Sheridan consented to extend
registration to July 15.

28

Grant advised Sheridan to comply fully with Johnson's request to
extend registration until August 1.

This course, he said, would avoid

public disclosure of ill will hetween Sheridan and the President.

Grant

further suggested that Sheridan enforce his "own construction of the
military bill until ordered to do otherwise" and not to interpret
Stanbery's ruling as an order.

Sheridan was thus persuaded and informed

2®Sheridan to Grant, June 10, 18, 19, 21, 28, 1867, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 14, pp. 222, 227, 235, 237; AflG E. D.
Townsend to Sheridan, June 21, 1867, ibid., p. 235-36; Sheridan to
Grant, June 22, 1867, in Johnson Papers; Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 269-70;
Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 191; Patrick, Reconstruction, 101.
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Adjutant General Townsend that the Fifth District would conform to the
2Q
President's wishes— registration would be prolonged until August 1.
Despite Sheridan's belief that the registrars would have little to
do after the end of June, thousands of men flocked to the parish
courthouses. Almost forty thousand more man signed the rolls between
July 1 and August 1, many of whom came forward when they learned that
simple service in the Confederate Army no longer meant disqualification.
Registration ended with 127,639 Louisianians on the rolls, 82,907 of
wham were Negroes.
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On July 19 Congress, over Johnson's veto, passed the third
Reconstruction Act.

The new law permitted district commanders to remove

any civil official in their jurisdiction if the generals believed that
such a move would benefit the district and the process of Reconstruction.
Any appeals from politicians so removed were to go to General Grant and
Congress for review, bypassing President Johnson.

This third act gave

registrars final authority over any individual who desired to register.
The Radicals included a barb directed at Attorney General Stanbery.
Henceforth, military personnel were not required to obey any "opinion of
^^Grant to Sheridan, June 24, 1867, in Sheridan Papers, (Autograph
Letters); Sheridan to Grant, and reply, June 28, 1867, both in House
Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 20, pp. 92-93; Sheridan to Townsend,
June 29, 1867, in Johnson Papers; Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 271; Hans L.
Trefousse, Impeachment of a President; Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and
Reconstruction (Knoxville, 1975), 73.
-^Sheridan to Grant, July 2, August 5, 1867, in Grant Papers. In
July 39,698 men were registered. See Ficklen, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 191. E. D. Townsend to Military District Commanders, June 20,
1867, in James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols., Washington, 1896-1899), VI,
652-56. This "letter of information" stressed the validity of
Stanbery's ruling and encouraged the generals to use it as a basis for
registration.
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any civil officer of the United States."

This act increased Sheridan's

confidence because it confirmed a policy he had followed since April.

3]

Grant had attempted earlier to cover up the antagonistic
relationship between President Johnson and Sheridan, but Sheridan's
removal of state officials and his disregard for the opinions of the
U.S. Attorney General had irritated the President even more.

The

passage of the third Reconstruction Act made Johnson fear that Sheridan
might become completely unrestrained.

Now Johnson made it clear how

little he trusted the commander of the Fifth District.

In July the

President sent Brigadier General Lovell Harrison Rousseau to New Orleans
as his special representative.

Rousseau had no official powers, but

Johnson wanted Sheridan to know that he was under observation.

For

about a month the President received reports on Louisiana conditions
from Rousseau.

32

Sheridan disliked Rousseau and had even less regard for his
assignment.

After a conference with Rousseau, Sheridan revealed his

bitter and uneasy feelings in two letters to Grant.

Not intimidated by

Rousseau's presence in Louisiana, Sheridan continued to exercise his
authority.

On July 30 Sheridan removed James W. Throckmorton, the

governor of Texas, whom he considered to be an impediment to
Reconstruction. In his place the general appointed a Unionist, E. M.
^Shreveport, South-Western, July 17, 1867; New Orleans Times,
July 20, 23, 1867; Patrick, Reconstruction, 101; Ficklen, Reconstruction
in Louisiana, 183-84; Sefton, A m y and Reconstruction, 135-36; William A.
Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction (Gloucester, Mass.,
1969), 154.
32Howard K. Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles (3 vols., New York,
1960), III, 141-42; New Orleans Times, August 21, 1867; New Orleans
Daily Picayune, August 20, 1867; Lovell H. Rousseau to Johnson, July 24,
1867, in Sheridan Papers.
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Pease, whom Throckmorton had soundly defeated only a few months before
in the gubernatorial election.

Following the removal of Throckmorton,

Louisiana newspapers printed rumors that Sheridan’s transfer from the
district was imminent.

33

Undaunted, Sheridan removed twenty-two New Orleans city councilman
on August 1.

Evidence indicated that the council had badly mismanaged

city finances and increased the city's indebtedness.

The editor of the

New Orleans Bee commended most of the new oouncilmen chosen by Sheridan
and expected them to do a "satisfactory" job.

Likewise, "of the colored

men appointed" most were "of a favorable character."

On the other hand,

the New Orleans Times disapproved of the new council, especially of
prominent Negro politician Oscar J. Dunn.

Later, on the recommendation

of Governor Flanders, Sheridan replaced the mayor and two city
councilman in the southwest Louisiana town of Lake Charles.
Removals of Louisiana civil officials continued.

34

On August 4

Sheridan dismissed the New Orleans treasurer for complicity in the
misuse of municipal funds.

Two days later, military orders deposed the

mayor and board of aldermen of Shreveport, and new appointees occupied
33sheridan to Grant, July 20 and 23, 1867, in Sheridan Papers.
Sheridan later accused Rousseau of suggesting his removal. See Sheridan
to Grant, August 3, 1867, in Johnson Papers. SO No. 105, 5 MD, July 30,
1867, in Bouse Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 170; Beale (ed.),
Diary of Welles, III, 146; Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 144; Baton
Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, July 31, 1867; New Orleans Bee, July 30, 1867;
New Orleans Crescent, August 1, 1867; New Orleans Republican, July 30,
1867.
^Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 270; New Orleans Times, August 2, 1867;
New Orleans Bee, August 3, 1867; New Orleans Crescent, August 2, 1867;
New York Timas, August 2, 1867. The New Orleans Daily Picayune
(August 2, 1867) also opposed Sheridan's replacements for the council.
See also W. R. Rutland to Flanders, July 9, 1867, in 5 MD, Letters Reed
(Civil Affairs), RG 393, NA.
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their seats.

On August 8 Sheridan selected a former Army major, j. j.
OC

Williamson, to be the new chief of police for the Crescent City.
President Johnson viewed all of this activity with increasing
alarm.

He feared that if the general were not curbed, Sheridan might

replace every civil officer in Louisiana and Texas.

Johnson had already

asked the Cabinet members for their opinions on transferring Sheridan
out of the Fifth Military District.
ticklish subject.

The Cabinet divided equally on the

Meantime, Sheridan's aide-de-camp Major Janes Forsyth

sent a telegram warning the general of his impending transfer.
Despite this warning, Sheridan struggled over the draft of a
memorandum on juries, hoping to have it put into law before he left the
state.

He believed that jurors should be

selected from the state's

registered voters, including Negroes who had never exercised this
responsibility.

On the other hand, many whites who had teen disfran

chised would not be considered for jury duty, previously the exclusive
task of their race.

Grant agreed with Sheridan that jury members should

be picked from the voting lists, but he left this decision to the
district commander.

Grant strongly recommended that Sheridan plan a

schedule for the fall elections.

In the event that Sheridan was

transferred, the job of beginning a Republican state government would
0 7

already be started. '
^%ew Orleans Times, August 6 and 9, 1867; New Orleans Bee,
August 6, 1867; New York Times, August 5,1867; New Orleans Crescent,
August 6 and 9, 1867; Shreveport South-Western, August 28, 1867.
36Sheridan to Grant, August 5, 1867, in Grant Papers; Beale (ed.),
Diary of Welles, III, 149; Forsyth to Sheridan, August 12, 1867, in
Sheridan Papers; New Orleans Times, August 14, 1867.
•^Sheridan to Grant, August 15, 1867, in Grant Papers; Grant to
Sheridan, August 16, 21, 1867, ibid. See also Benjamin P. Thomas and
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On August 17, 1867, after many days of agonizing over the situation,
Johnson removed Sheridan as commander of the Fifth Military District.
General Grant, then serving as Acting Secretary of War, told Johnson
that the removal of an officer of Sheridan's stature would only
encourage Southerners to violate the Reconstruction Acts.

Taking an

extreme stand to defend his old friend, Grant claimed that Sheridan's
dismissal was "contrary to the wishes of the American people." The
President replied that he had not heard the Northern people express such
an opinion.

In fact, Johnson believed Sheridan's "rule" had "interfered

with . . . the acts of Congress." Another general must be found who
would do a better job and repair the disruption in Louisiana.
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Johnson wanted a conservative and reliable moderate general to
replace the Radical Sheridan.

The President chose Major General George H.

Thomas, hero of the battle of Chickamauga and conmander of the Depart
ment of the Cumberland.

To get Sheridan out of the South, Johnson

assigned him to the important Department of the Missouri, where he would
replace Major General Winfield Scott Hancock.

In turn, Hancock would

assume Thomas' command over Kentucky and Tennessee.

However, Army

Doctor Alexander B. Hasson reported that Thomas was suffering from a
Harold M. Hyman, Stanton, The Life and Tines of Lincoln's Secretary of
War (New York, 1962), 555.
38rhe Executive Order transferring the generals is in House Exec.
Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 57, p. 3. See also Johnson to Grant,
August 19, 1867, ibid., pp. 4-6; Grant to Johnson, August 17, 1867,
ibid., pp. 1-2; Beale (ed.), Diary of Welles, III, 174; New Orleans
Times, August 20 and 21, 1867; New Orleans Bee, August 20, 1867; New
Orleans Crescent, August 20 and 21, 1867; New Orleans Republican,
August 20, 1867; W. G. Moore, "Notes of Colonel W. G. Moore, Private
Secretary to President Johnson, 1866-1868," American Historical Review,
XVIX (October, 1913), 110; Trefousse, Impeachment of a President, 82,
101-102. Trefousse (p. 105) explains that Sheridan's removal was one of
the key events in the process which led to Johnson's impeachment.
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liver ailment and recommended that the general retain oorrmand of the
Cumberland.

Johnson concurred with the surgeon's advice and ordered all

commanders to hold their posts until further notice.
Sheridan:
commands."

Grant cautioned

"Relax nothing in consequence of probable change of
39

Johnson soon made his decision.

Agreeing with the inadvisability

of transferring Thomas, on August 26 the President simply ordered
Sheridan and Hancock to switch commands:

Sheridan would proceed "at

once" to the Department of the Missouri, and Hancock would report to the
Fifth District.40
The announcement of Sheridan's removal brought mixed reactions from
Louisiana's newspapers.

Seme were glad to see him go.

The Alexandria

Louisiana Democrat was overjoyed and severely criticized the general's
administration in a scalding editorial.

The New Orleans Tines condemned

Sheridan's "close adherence to the partisan 'requirements of Congress.'"
The Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate judged that Sheridan's rigorous
enforcement of "the law entrusted to him" had created a gulf of
bitterness between him and the majority of Louisiana citizens.

41

3^A. b . Hasson to Grant, August 21, 1867; Johnson's Executive Order,
August 22, 1867; Grant to Sheridan, August 24, 1867, all in House Exec.
Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 57, pp. 6-7. See also George F. Milton,
The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals (New York, 1930), 459.
40Johnson's Executive Order, August 26, 1867, in House Exec. Docs.,
40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 57, p. 7; New Orleans Times, August 24 and 27,
1867; New Orleans Bee, August 27, 1867.
41-Other adverse cormtents on Sheridan are found in Alexandria
Louisiana Democrat, September 4, 1867; New Orleans Times, August 24 and
28, 1867; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, August 28, 1867; New Orleans
Daily Picayune, August 21, 1867; Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, August 29,
September 5, 12, 1867; Shreveport South-Western, August 28, September 11,
1867.

108
On the other hand, two prominent New Orleans newspapers viewed
Sheridan's removal in a different light.

The Bee ran a long editorial

which read in part:
The Radicals have made up their minds to take possession
of the Southern State Governments, and run them in their own
way. The end will be reached before we find peace, and what
matters is whether it is done in the rapid, bold style of
Sheridan, or brought about little by little as in the case of
some other corrmanders. General Sheridan sees the work that
he has to do and does it promptly. That much is decidedly in
his favor; and we see no reason for blaming him for the
removal of officials elected by the people and the substitu
tion of Radicals. Congress expected him to do it. . . .
For this, then, we must blame Congress and not Sheridan. . . .
Should General Hancock or General Meade be appointgcj to
succeed him the work . . . will still go on. . . .
The New Orleans Crescent likewise made some thoughtful comments:
It would be fulsome hypocrisy to pretend that the great
majority of our citizens have not looked with aversion and
alarm upon the partisan leanings of Gen. Sheridan. But it is
just to say he has been daily more and more commending him
self to general appreciation, as well as by the candor,
directness and vigor with which he proceeded to his objects,
as by the judicious character of some of his appointments. . . .
Our people were, at all events, getting used to his rule and
were beginning to comprehend him. . . . To many of our
people, doubtless, the change of commanders will recall the
question, "whether it were not better to bear the ills we
have, than to fly to others that we know not of."43
In another editorial the Crescent commented further:
To pursue an uncompromising opposition to [the district
commanders], and at the same time to propose allegiance to
the government whose will, enacted into law, they are carry
ing out, is palpable inconsistence. [Opposition of this kind]
serves as a protest for keeping up at the north the radical
cry of disloyalty and rebellion among Southerners. [Therefore
this opposition] plays into the hands of the most virulent and
desperate enemies of the South.44
4^New Orleans Bee, August 6, 1867.
4%ew Orleans Crescent, August 20, 1867.
44ibid., August 25, 1867.
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During all the confusion over the conmand changes, Sheridan had
calmly proceeded with his adjustments in civil government.

He set

September 27 and 28 as the dates for the election of delegates to the
constitutional convention.

The New Orleans surveyor, two city attor

neys, and the city coroner were all removed for unsuitable performance
of their jobs and impeding the Reconstruction Acts.

Sheridan annulled

$103,000 worth of public works contracts on the grounds that they were
fraudulent.

He drafted the final version of a special order that

declared only registered voters were qualified for jury duty.

45

Even after he received Johnson's orders directing him to report "at
once" to the Indian frontier, Sheridan lingered on in New Orleans.
Probably he planned to remain in Louisiana until Hancock relieved him.
Until then there was much to do.
A spreading yellow fever epidemic affected soldiers and civilians
alike.

Sheridan ordered that more doctors and nurses be employed to

combat the disease.

Seeking protection from the fever, several compa

nies of soldiers relocated their bivouacs from low lying areas to higher
ground.
Infantry.

"Yellow Jack" infected General Mower and half of the 1st
Eventually more than one hundred soldiers died from yellow

fever at Jackson Barracks in 1867.
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45sheridan, Memoirs, II, 271-75; SO NO. 125, 5 MD, August 24, 1867,
in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., NO. 342, p. 172; New Orleans
Times, August 25, 1867; New Orleans Crescent, August 23, 25, 28, 1867;
New Orleans Republican, August 29, 1867; New York Times, August 18, 22,
1867.
^Sheridan to Grant, August 20, 23, 27, 1867, in Grant Papers;
Grant to Sheridan, August 21, 26, 1867, ibid.; Harry W. Pfanz, "Soldier
ing in the South During the Reconstruction Period, 1865-1877,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1958), 323-24;
Report on Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1867 by T. A. McParlin to CG, 5 MD,
May 15, 1868, in 5 MD, Letters Reed, 1868, RG 393, NA.
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In addition to matters of health, Sheridan attended to political
and economic matters during his last days as district commander.

On

August 29 Sheridan ordered the removal of a Rapides Parish sheriff and a
justice of the peace for failing to arrest the accused murderer of a
Negro.

The same day the New Orleans city controller and the St. Tammany

Parish tax collector were cashiered for improper handling of funds.

A

military directive issued on August 30 outlined a program of needed
levee repairs.

Several local newspapers wholeheartedly approved of the

planned renovations.

Then Sheridan received permission from Grant to

take a long leave in Washington as soon as he had transferred his
headquarters to the West.

This was the signal for which he had been

. . 47
waiting.
On September 1, Sheridan designated Colonel Charles Griffin the
interim commander of the Fifth District.

Four days later, controversial

"Little Phil" departed for his new assignment on the Missouri.

On

September 11, he detrained at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, headquarters of
his new department.

Hancock yielded the seat of command the following

day.
Within two weeks Sheridan began his trip east to Washington, and all
across the North big crowds accorded the diminutive general a hero's
welcome.

As a gala reception in New York he sat as guest of honor.

Sheridan was pleased to be back among people who appreciated him.
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^ S O No. 129, 5 MD, August 29, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 342, p. 172; New Orleans Tines, August 30 and 31, 1867; New
Orleans Crescent, August 21, 30, 31, 1867; New Orleans Republican,
August 29, 1867; Grant to Sheridan, August 30, 1867, in Grant Papers.
^Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 276-77; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate,
September 6, 1867; New Orleans Times, August 30, September 6, 1867; New
Orleans Crescent, September 5 and 6, 1867; New Orleans Bee, September 5,
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Sheridan believed that he had (tone a proper and necessary job of
Reconstruction in Louisiana and that his removal harmed the congres
sional Reconstruction program.

In a report submitted to Grant on

September 20, 1867, Sheridan explained how he had governed Louisiana.
It appeared to him that "nearly every civil officer within my oonmand
was either openly or secretly opposed to the law and to nyself. . . . "
Consequently, " [t]here was only one sensible course to pursue, and that
was to remove every civil officer who did not faithfully execute the
law, or who put any impediment in the way of its execution. . . . "

He

had developed this creed during twenty-one months of command in the
Southwest before Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts.

For much of

this time Sheridan did not consider Reconstruction his main task.
However, his idea of the methods that would be needed to carry out
Reconstruction according to the wishes of Congress had evolved from that
first June day in 1865 when he set foot in Louisiana.
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Phil Sheridan is a classic example of the good combat soldier who
finds it nearly impossible to shift from the aggressive and physically
dangerous theater of war to the arena of politics.

50

His military

training and experience made Sheridan easily displeased with two things:
negligence in the performance of duty and obvious violation of the laws
of Congress.

The Reconstruction Acts were to him, as Richard O'Connor

1867; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 191; Sheridan to Grant,
September 11, 1867, in Grant Papers; New York Times, September 24, 26,
27, 29, October 1, 1867.
^%heridan to Grant, September 15, 1867, in Sheridan Papers;
Sheridan's Report on the 5 MD, September 20, 1867, in House Exec. Docs.,
40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1 (SW, Annual Report, 1867-68), pp. 379-80.
5®sefton, A m y and Reconstruction, 8; O'Connor, Sheridan, 276.
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has written, like a "manual of arms," as valid as any order from a
military superior.

Sometimes generals issued incomplete or unclear

orders which lent themselves to interpretation by subordinates.
Likewise, Congress at times vaguely phrased a law as it did with regard
to the removal powers of a district commander in the Reconstruction Act
of March 2, 1867.

With no qualms, Sheridan filled in the missing

details, granting to himself powers Congress later formalized in the
third Reconstruction Act.
The instability of the tines called for a vigorous coordinator who
would adjust the state government to meet the requirements of the
national laws.

Sheridan helped establish the Army as the agent by which

these laws would be enforced.

Most importantly, if the whole process

was to succeed, voter registration had to be handled competently and
thoroughly.

Sheridan did this, giving encouragement to the freedmen

and putting up as many barriers as possible to ex-Confederates.
Determination to do a thorough job pronpted him to investigate suspi
cious individuals and situations at all levels of Louisiana politics.
Sheridan definitely shirked his duty during the 1866 riot in New
Orleans.

However, in several episodes thereafter, such as the levee

board dispute and the matter of the judicious appointments to office,
especially the replacement of the confused, uncooperative Governor Wells,
Sheridan carried out the laws strictly, but not harshly.

He replaced

administrators who he believed were genuine impediments to Reconstruc
tion or who had overtly violated Federal statutes.

He put men into

office whose dedication was needed to make Reconstruction successful.
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His removals were not haphazard, "highhanded," "arbitrary," or
summary. 51
Two factors made the problem of removals very complex.

First, he

went patently against a hundred years of American tradition and law for
a military officer to have veto power over elected officials.

The

circumstances which created such an unusual situation were, of course,
based upon the unprecedented division of the nation during four years of
Civil War.
loser.
Army.

After the war, the winning side dictated the terms to the

Congress assigned the job of enforcing these terms to the U.S.
Sheridan's enforcement was no harsher than the terms themselves.

. .
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It was not a despot, "satrap," proconsul, or merciless administrator.
Second, during Reconstruction Sheridan usually dealt with
Southerners of limited capabilities, men of secondary quality, mere
politicians, not statesmen.

The South needed gifted men during Recon

struction who knew when to concede and when to hold firm.

The defeated

section required leaders who knew how to compromise, how to make the
best of an unpleasant situation, and how to adjust to a tremendous
change in their society.

Louisiana had too few men of this type.

Those

few made little impression on the many who took the path of defiance,
resistance, and violence.

Losing the Civil War had filled these

stubborn, individualistic Southerners with sadness, frustration, and
Slpicklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 187; Carter, Angry Scar,
130, 164; O'Connor, Sheridan, 287-92. See also Sefton, Army and Recon
struction, 110, 157-58, 253.
Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877
(Baton Rouge, 1947), 131; O'Connor, Sheridan, 276, 191; William J.
Ulrich, "The Northern Military Mind in Regard to Reconstruction, 18651872: The Attitudes of Ten Leading Union Generals" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1959), 150; Paul H. Buck, The Road
to Reunion, 1865-1900 (Boston, 1937), 24-25.
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hostility.

At various tines during Reconstruction these complicated

emotions inspired hostile actions directed against Sheridan and the
other soldiers, who were primarily responsible for the South’s defeat
and subjugation.

It would have been difficult for any Federal commander

to receive cooperation from men motivated fcy such emotions, no natter
how discreet, restrained, and tactful the officer might have been.
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Sheridan believed he saw at least one positive acccmplishment
during his tenure in Louisiana.

He witnessed "some improvement in the

tone of the public in reference to the rights and privileges of the
freedmen." It became apparent during the next several years that if the
freednten were to keep these rights and privileges the Army would have to
stand guard over them.

However, in a relatively short time Sheridan had

integrated New Orleans street cars, registered thousands of black voters,
and directed them to serve on juries like any otter enfranchised citizen.
Also, several Negroes had been appointed to public office.

Sheridan's

administration did not rescue Negroes from discrimination and intimida
tion, but he attempted to lay the groundwork for their participation in
democracy.

54

Shortly before Sheridan left Louisiana in 1867, the New Orleans Bee
editorialized:

"We may blame the General for being too ready to carry

out the Congressional measures, and for displaying too much alacrity in
^^Buck, Road to Reunion, x, 31-38; W. J. Cash, The Mind of the
South (New York, 1941), 106-108, 112-16, 121? Carter, Angry Scar, 404406; Patrick, Reconstruction, 243-44; Michael Perman, Reunion Wxthout
Compromise: The South and Reconstruction, 1865-1868 (Cambridge, 1973),
3-38, and passim.
54SW, Annual Report, 1867-68, p. 379; House Reports, 39 Cong., 1
Sess., No. 30, Pt. 4, p. 123; Coulter, Reconstruction, 130-31; O'Connor,
Sheridan, 287; Ficklen, Reconstruction in louisiana, 188; Sefton, Army
and Reconstruction, 61.
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its service, tut at the same time no man believes he is acting contrary
to order [s]. . . . "

Twenty years later Sheridan wrote in his Memoirs;

"I simply tried to carry out, without fear or favor, the Reconstruction
55
Acts as they came to me."
A modem authority condenses the subject in
a similar fashion.

"Whatever they [the military ooimanders] might have

thought privately of the federal policy, they enforced it, as it was
their duty."

56

Philip H. Sheridan carried out his duty as he saw it.

5%ew Orleans Bee, August 6, 1867; Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 278.
Sheridan gave an impromptu farewell speech at the train station in New
Orleans which shows striking similarity to this passage in his Memoirs.
See New Orleans Republican, September 5, 1867. For a similar descrip
tion, see Frank A. Burr and Richard J. Hinton, The Life of Gen. Philip H.
Sheridan (Providence, R.I., 1888), 341.
56Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 253.

CHAPTER V
MOWER AND HANCOCK:

OPPOSITE ENDS

Brevet Major General Charles Griffin became the interim carenander
of the Fifth Military District when Sheridan left Louisiana on Septem
ber 5, 1867.

Like most of the Fifth District commanders, Griffin had

teen graduated from West Point, completing his studies in 1847.

He saw

only limited duty in the Mexican War and was afterward stationed in New
Mexico Territory from 1849 to 1858.

On the eve of the Civil war,

Griffin returned to West Point as an artillery instructor.

He served in

the Eastern theater from First Manassas to Appomattox, rising eventually
to command a corps in the Army of the Potomac.

After the war, he was

ordered to the Southwest and since November 28, 1866, had been Sheridan's
commander of Texas, with headquarters at Galveston.

Griffin had

consistently supported Sheridan's ideas on Reconstruction.^
In New Orleans, the Fifth District staff waited for Griffin to
decide whether they would stay in Louisiana or join him in Texas, but
the general's attention was diverted from normal administrative matters
to the spreading peril of yellow fever.

The disease had reached epidemic

proportions in August, making survival one of Griffin's main concerns.
i-Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders
(Baton Rouge, 1964), 190-91; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of
the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West
Point, New York, 1802-1867 (2 vols., New York, 1868), II, 196-97;
William L. Richter, "The A m y in Texas during Reconstruction, 1865-1870"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1970), 114.
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Health conditions were so bad in Galveston that most of the doctors had
been infected by the raging fever.

Unfortunately, Griffin never had to

decide whether or not to leave Galveston, for he contracted yellow fever
2
on September 12 and died three days later at the age of forty-one.
Griffin’s place was taken by Joseph A. Mower, senior officer in
Louisiana.

immediately upon assuming full control of his office, Mower

requested that additional troops he stationed in Louisiana to guard
against violence in the upcoming election for the constitutional
convention.

However, unacclimated troops were particularly vulnerable

to yellow fever, which had already caused the death of seven hundred
persons in Louisiana.

Therefore, Mower actually wanted permission to

postpone the election until the fever abated and then reinforcements
3
could be used to protect the polls.
The new oaranander expected election violence in Louisiana because
excitement was evident among all classes of citizens.

Increasing

nunbers of Negro semi-military organizations annoyed white citizens by
frequent drilling and unnecessary shooting practice.

White organizations,

styled "gunclubs," intimidated local Negroes, white Unionists, and other
settlers from the North.

Circuit Judge John Ilsley informed Louisiana

Supreme Court Justice James G. Taliaferro that a "panic throughout the
whole" countryside prevented government men from traveling in the
^Charles Griffin to U. S. Grant, September 3, 1867, in Andrew
Johnson Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); New York Times,
August 25, 27, 1867; Surgeon H. A. Swartworth to Grant, September 13,
1867, in U. S. Grant Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress);
Abner Doubleday to AG Lorenzo Thomas, September 15, 1867, ibid.
^Joseph A. Mower to Grant, September 16, 1867, in Grant Papers; New
Orleans Crescent, September 16, 1867; New York Times, September 24,
1867.

118
vicinity of Opelousas,

lb quiet the fear of trouble, Mower issued an

order prohibiting any extra-legal gatherings of anted men, black or
4

white.
Mower’s edict sufficiently quieted the state to enable preparations
for the election to proceed on schedule.

Governor Flanders and Repub

lican political leader Judge Henry Clay Warnoth met with the general to
discuss the situation.

Since Warmoth was commander of the Louisiana

Grand A m y of the Republic, the state’s branch of the nationwide biracial reserve organization for ex-Union soldiers, Mower asked him to
restrain his friends in the G. A. R., particularly the black members,
during the perilous election period.

In an attempt to ensure that there

would be no disruptions in New Orleans, Mower ordered twelve infantry
companies, nine of the 1st Infantry and three of the 39th Infantry,
brought into the city.

An artillery battery and a cavalry company were

sent to support the foot soldiers.

Altogether, Mower had more than one

thousand troops in the New Orleans area.
Outside of the New Orleans vicinity was the U.S. 20th Infantry, 665
men in ten companies, distributed among the important towns of Alexan
dria, Baton Rouge, Monroe, and Shreveport.

The regiment's colonel, West

^John Ilsley to James G. Taliaferro, September 4, 1867, in James G.
Taliaferro and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge; GO NO. 11, 5 MD,
September 16, 1867, in American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of
Important Events, 1867 (New York, 1868), 462-63; Mower to AAG George L.
Hartsuff, September 15, 1867, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274, RG 393, ISA; New
Orleans Times, September 17, 18, 1867; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate,
September 24, 1867. For the type of activity among the Negro groups see
Otis A. Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction (Austin, 1957),
24-25, 46-49, 66.
SMower to Grant, September 19, 1867, in Grant Papers; SW, Annual
Report, 1867-1868, pp. 472-73, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 1.
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Pointer George Sykes, had been a corps commander in the Army of the
Potomac during the Civil War and had served before the war at Fort
Jesup, near Natchitoches.6 Although other officers of the regiment had
no previous experience in Louisiana, the 20th acquired a reputation for
friendliness and cooperation with the people.

The Shreveport South-

Western cited the good conduct of the companies assigned to that town,
commenting that it had "no cause for complaint" against the soldiers of
the 20th Infantry.

Tne Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate complimented

Lieutenant Colonel Louis Watkins for his helpful actions While he
7
commanded the garrison there.
Thus, in the event of trouble Mower could depend on three infantry
regiments, two companies of the 4th Cavalry and one battery of the 1st
Artillery with a total strength of 2400 men.

This figure represented a

decline from more than 5,000 men in the state during the previous year.
Few re-enlistments, the mustering out of the last Negro volunteer regi
ments, and the transfer of another regiment caused the decline.

However,

Grant apparently believed that Mower had enough troops to maintain order,
and the reinforcements that Mower had requested earlier were not sent.
In 1867 Louisiana ranked third among the Southern states, behind Texas
and Virginia, in the number of soldiers located within its borders.

8

^Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the
United States Army, 1789-1903 (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 118-19,
941-42; Cullum, Register of West Point, II, 62-63; SW, Annual Report,
1867-1868, pp. 472-73.
7Shreveport South-Western, April 17, July 24, 1867; Baton Rouge,
Tri-Weekly Advocate, June 10, 1867. Watkins died while on duty in Baton
Rouge the following year. The Advocate (March 30, 1868) lamented his
passing and called him a "generous"'commander who had sympathy with the
people of Louisiana.
8SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, p. 310, in House Exec. Docs., 40
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Prior to the election, Mower sent out detachments of troops to
several parish seats throughout the state with orders to protect the
polls and prevent violence or intimidation of the voters.

At the

request of district headquarters, most towns closed their saloons on the
election days.

Despite widespread rumors predicting riots, the military

proceeded with the voting on September 27 and 28.

When the polls

closed, more than 75,000 men had voted in favor of a constitutional
convention and elected ninety-eight delegates.
thousand negative votes were cast.
passed with only minor disturbances.

Slightly more than four

Much to Mower's relief, the election
The scattered detachments across

the state had done a good job preserving order.

In most cases, these

troops returned to their parent garrisons during October.

9

In the days after the election, Mower followed Sheridan's approach
to Reconstruction in the Fifth District by issuing orders concerning
elections and by removing uncooperative officials.

He began by ordering

that all Texas jury members be registered voters, copying Sheridan's
similar ruling for Louisiana.

On the reocmmendation of Governor Flanders,

Mower removed a justice of the peace in St. Charles Parish on October 9.
Cong., 3 Sess., Mo. 1; Manuscript Returns, Dept Gulf, January, 1867,
AGO, RG 94, NA; SW, Annual Report, 1867-1868, pp. 472-73; James E.
Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton
Rouge, 1967), 261; Grant to Mower, September 20, 1867, in Grant Papers.
^Alexandria Louisiana Denocrat, September 25, 1867; Mower to Grant,
September 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 1867, in Grant Papers; SO Mo. 116,
5 MD, October 21, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., No.
342, p. 174. AAG Nathaniel Burbank to COs at Shreveport, Monroe,
Alexandria, Vidalia, Baton Rouge, and Amite, September 18, 1867, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 274; AAG George Baldey to COs at Vidal ia, Shreveport, Baton
Rouge, Amite, Monroe, and Alexandria, October 2, 1867, ibid.;
AAAG Hartsuff to Mayors of New Orleans and Jefferson, September 25, 1867,
in 5 MD, vol. 1; Lt. B. S. Humphrey to W. T. Gentry, September 19, 1867,
in 5 MD, Letters Reed, Civil Affairs, all in RG 393, NA.
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A few days later, Mower removed five members of the Jefferson board of
aldermen for violating Sheridan's Special Order No. 7 of the previous
March.

This order prohibited any elections for public office until the

state had drafted a new constitution and the election of new state
officers had taken place.

The alderman passed an ordinance for the

election of city officials in Jefferson.**'®
Mower's approach to the state problems disappointed the New
Orleans Crescent. In the editor's opinion, the district commander had
needlessly dismissed the Jefferson councilman.

Perhaps a more reasona

ble course would have been to invalidate the improper election and
issue a warning reminding the aldermen of Sheridan's order.

Even more

disturbing to local Democrats, Mower also removed a sheriff and a clerk
of court in St. John the Baptist Parish on the vague grounds that they
were "impediments to Reconstruction,"^'*’ without giving any specific
reasons for the removals.

In only one month, he had replaced eight

public officials.
In Louisiana the yellow fever epidemic slackened about half way
through October.

By the time November arrived, the incidence of the

disease among both soldiers and civilians had slowed down considerably.

12

Now that the yellow fever had subsided, Louisiana waited
expectantly for the arrival of General Hancock.

Most citizens expected

l0SO No. 151, 5 MD, September 28, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 342, p. 173; New Orleans Daily Picayune, October 10,
17, 1867; SO No. 162, 5 MD, October 15, 1867, in Johnson Papers.
■*-%ew Orleans Crescent, October 22, 1867.
12Mower to AG C. B. Comstock, October 21, 1867, in Grant Papers;
New Orleans Crescent, November 1, 1867; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
October 18, 1867.
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Hancock to wield his authority less arbitrarily than Mower.

Even

Sheridan had normally accompanied his removals with explanations.
Mower, however, continued in his own style on November 1 when he
removed Orleans Parish Sheriff Harry T. Hays, a former Confederate
officer, as an "impediment to Reconstruction" and for participation in
the July 1866 New Orleans riot.

Although Sheridan had reorganized the

police department, he had not removed Hays.

Mower also replaced

George Braugh, an Orleans justice of the peace, for unspecified "malfea
sance in office."

Braugh accepted his fate, but Hays sent a letter of

protest directly to General Grant.

Hays claimed that the man whom Mower

had appointed to be his successor, Cuthbert Bullitt, had embezzled
Federal funds in Louisiana after the Civil War.

Grant decided the

situation merited investigation and wired Mower to "revoke the order
appointing Bullitt," as it appeared the new sheriff had somehow
defrauded the Treasury Department.
removed Hays.

13

Mower revoked the order that

A subsequent investigation revealed that Bullitt had

illegally sold seme confiscated Confederate property and had pocketed
the money instead of giving it to the Treasury.

Mower now realized that

Bullitt was unacceptable for the "Sheriffality," and Hays resumed his
office.
Mower sought out ways to use his powers of removal and appointment.
On November 12 the general appointed a well-known Republican, R. King
13SO N o . 176, 5 MD, November 1, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cbng., 2 Sess., No. 342, p. 176; H a n y T. Hays to Grant, November 1,
1867, in Grant Papers; Grant to Mower, November 2, 1867, ibid.; New York
Times, September 24, 1867.
^Comstock to Mower, November 2, 1867, in Grant Papers; Mower to
Grant, November 3, 1867, ibid.
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Cutler, to an Orleans Parish judgeship recently vacated by a
resignation.

At the same time, Governor Flanders approved the removal

of a Jefferson Parish justice of the peace.

Within a few days, on

November 16, Mower again removed Sheriff Harry Hays,
intended to make the dismissal permanent.

This time Mower

In the same order he also

deposed an Orleans clerk of court for malfeasance and dismissed three
members of the town council of Brashear, but no reasons were given.

In

the next few days, Mower displaced six more civil officials, including a
judge and a state tax collector, calling than "impediments to
Reconstruction."

Since Sheridan's departure, twenty officials had been

removed from office.

Only the New Orleans Republican applauded Mower's

wholesale housecleaning.

15

For his next political targets, Mower chose higher appointees than
constables and city councilman.

Apparently motivated by a desire to

finish the process begun by Sheridan, Mower removal Lieutenant
Governor Albert Voorhies, the secretary of state, the state treasurer,
the superintendent of public education, the state auditor, and yet
another tax collector.

As before, Mower used the phrase "impediment to

Reconstruction" to justify the dismissals.

Governor Flanders strenu

ously objected to this latest flurry of removals, calling them
"inexpedient," and noted that some of the new appointees were unsuitable
for their positions.

The governor broke friendly relations with Mower

and suggested that Grant nullify all of Mower's orders since November 10,
leaving Hancock to make the ultimate determinations concerning these
l5SO No. 184, November 12, 1867; SO No. 188, November 16, 1867; and
SO No. 191, November 20, 1867, 5 MD, all in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 342, p. 177; Mower to Grant, November 17, 1867, in Grant
Papers.
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personnel matters.

Grant quickly agreed.

He ordered Mower to suspend

all of these removals pending the arrival of General Hancock, who would
then decide each case individually.

Ihe district ocffrsnander promptly

complied with Grant's demand.
Meanwhile, on November 23, the constitutional convention opened in
New Orleans.

Ihe delegates selected Judge Janes Taliaferro as chairman.

Negroes occupied half of the ninety-eight seats in the convention.

Many

of these black delegates were well educated, and most were respected
businessman and landowners.

Under Taliaferro's direction the convention

took four months to draw up a new constitution for the state.

17

As the convention was beginning its deliberations, General Hancock
was expected momentarily in New Orleans; in fact, on one occasion an
honor guard was called out to welcome the general, but he failed to
arrive.

Disregarding the fact that Hancock would soon take camand,

Mower threw aside caution and good judgment and requested specific
authority from Grant to remove Governor Flanders.

Mower complained that

the governor had blocked the removal of officials who were not properly
doing their jobs.

But before Grant replied, General Hancock reached New

Orleans by riverboat on the evening of November 28.

18

16S0 No. 192, November 21, 1867, and SO No. 193, November 22, 1867,
5 MD, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 342, pp. 177-78;
Benjamin F. Flanders to Grant, November 21, 1867, in Grant Papers;
Grant to Mower, November 22, 1867, ibid.; Mower to Grant, November 22,
1867, in Johnson Papers.
•^American Annual Cyclopedia, 1867, p. 464. For a good overview of
black delegates to the convention see Charles Vincent, Black Legislators
in Louisiana During Reconstruction (Baton Rouge, 1976), 48-67. The
convention and the resulting constitution are thoroughly treated in
Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974),
147-55.
18AAG Burbank to CG, Dist La, November 22, 1867, in 5 MD, vol. 1,
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Mower had directed Louisiana through the potentially violent period
of election time with no pronounced disturbances.

For this he earned

neither affection nor respect from Louisiana's white citizens.

Many of

them had been pleased by Sheridan’s departure, only to find his succes
sor even more Radical than "Little Phil." A Northern newspaper
commented that Mower "out Sheridan's [sic] Sheridan."

The New Orleans

Republican labeled Mower "a sterling custodian" of government like
Generals Butler and Banks before him.

The Alexandria Louisiana Democrat

and the Daily Picayune spoke for the majority, however, in their
criticism of Mower.

The Picayune was particularly gratified that the

general had been shunted off to the regimental headquarters of the
"dusky 39th" at Greenville, where command would not require either
"bodily or mental exertion."

19

Luckily, Mower did nothing drastic to

dislocate the foundation that Sheridan built for him.

But Mower's

impolitic and ill-considered removals marred his record.

Although he

adopted Sheridan's attitude and approach to Reconstruction problems,
Mower's solutions lacked the reasonableness and soundness of the senior
general's.
*

*

*

Winfield S. Hancock, well-known in Army circles as a Democrat,
assumed command on November 29, 1867; and on that same day he issued his
important General Order No. 40, an order which pleased most of the white
RG 393, NA; Mower to Grant, November 25, 1867, in Grant Papers.
19Brooklyn Union, quoted in New Orleans Republican, October 25,
1867; ibid., November 23 and 30, 1867; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat,
November 27, 1867; New Orleans Daily Picayune, December 5, 1867.
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people of Louisiana and Texas.

Hancock declared that "the military

power should cease to lead and the civil administration resume its
natural and rightful dominion."

The military would henceforth leave

purely civil offenses and problems to the responsible elected officials.
The rights of trial by jury, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech and of
the press were all reconfirmed.

In actual fact, Hancock’s order did no

more than spell out the conditions that legally existed under Sheridan
and Mower.

Thus, Hancock did not really institute any drastic change in

policy^ but as was soon evident, he did institute a change in attitude.
Friendly messages of welcome from New Orleanians filled the mail trays
in Hancock’s office and the post box at his home in the Garden District.
Newspapers carried editorials lauding Order No. 40.

Hanoock's wife

20
later wrote that "The gratitude was universal. . . . ”
Hancock, who was forty-three years old in 1867, had had experience
in both combat and administration,

Appointed to West Point from

Pennsylvania, he was graduated in 1844.

Like so many other officers,

the Mexican War provided Hancock with his first battlefield experience.
His combat record in the Civil War was crowned by his outstanding
20Winfield S. Hancock to Grant, November 29, 1867, in Grant Papers;
SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, p. 210; William E. Highsmith, "Louisiana
During Reconstruction" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University, 1953), 145; Glenn Tucker, Hancock the Superb (New York,
1960), 279-80; Almira R. Hancock, Reminiscences of Winfield Scott
Hancock (New York, 1887), 124-25; Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 17576; New Orleans Times, December 7, 1867; New Orleans Bee, November 30,
1867; New Qrleans~Da'ily Picayune, November 30, 1867; Baton Rouge TriWeekly Advocate, December 2, 1867. The New Orleans Crescent (Novem
ber 30, 1867), said Order No. 40 "spread a wholesome feeling of
satisfaction and reassurance among our people. . . . " President Johnson
complimented Hancock on his attitude and actions in a special message to
Congress. See James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols., Washington, 1899), VI,
595-96.
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leadership at the battle of Gettysburg.

His corps repulsed several

important Confederate assaults, including Pickett's Charge, but Hancock
received a severe wound.

Congress awarded him a special vote of thanks

for his actions in the pivotal battle.

After the war he served on two

special A m y oorrmissions and then resumed field duty against the
Indians in the Department of the Missouri.

21

One of Hancock's first duties upon assuming coxnrand in New Orleans
was to deal with the appointments and removals which had been made by
Mbwer, and usually Hancock followed the practice of replacing Radicals
with Conservatives.

On orders from General Grant, Hancock removed

Judge King Cutler from office, leaving the position temporarily vacant.
After reviewing their cases, Hancock reinstated two policemen Mower had
dismissed from the New Orleans police force.

Within four days, Hancock

reinstated three more Mower removals, a clerk of court, the state
auditor, and the state treasurer.

22

Besides replacing Mower's appointees with more conservative
officials, Hancock canceled Sheridan's order of August 24, 1867, which
allowed Negroes to qualify as jurors simply by being registered voters.
Hancock ruled that determination of "who shall and who shall not be
jurors" belonged to the state legislature.

The New Orleans Times

praised the order in an editorial with the headline "No More Negroes on
Juries."

Hancock's order did not immediately eliminate Negroes, but his

cancellation of Sheridan's edict was the first step toward virtual
2*Cullum, Register of West Point, II, 108-109; Warner, Generals in
Blue, 202-204.
22SO No. 200, 5 MD, December 2, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 342, p. 179; SO No. 202, 5 MD, December 4, 1867,
ibid., p. 180; SO No. 205, 5 MD, December 7, 1867, ibid., p. 181.
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exclusion of blacks from juries.

New Orleans residents roared their

approval of Hancock's new policy by cheering him when he appeared at an
opera house on December 7.

73

Using his authorized powers, Hancock continued his crusade to
displace the Radicals.

On December 14 he replaced the mayor of Shreve

port and the town council as well, all of whom had been appointed to
office only four months before by General Sheridan.

Five days later,

nine more men who had been removed by Mower were reinstated by Hancock.
These included Lieutenant Governor Albert Voorhies, the secretary of
state, and the director of public education.

Hancock appointed thirteen

other minor officials, such as police jurors and constables, to fill
vacancies which had occurred around the state.

Most of these new

appointees, to the delight of the state's Democratic press, were
Conservatives.24
From the time of Hancock's arrival in Louisiana, Republicans and
Democrats from various parts of the state had inundated him with letters
requesting troops.

A recurring theme of these letters was the fear that

Negroes might revolt around Christmastime „ The threat of such a holiday
rebellion had constantly worried Southerners during the prewar years,
although none had ever occurred.

He responded to these requests by

asking the Adjutant General and General Grant for more troops—
specifically white ones.

"A few soldiers at various posts under

23so No. 203, 5 MD, December 5, 1867, ibid., pp. 180-81; New
Orleans Times, Decanter 6 and 8, 1867.
24SO No. 210, 5 MD, December 14, 1867, in New Orleans Times,
December 14, 1867; Shreveport South-Western, January 1, 1868, SO No. 214,
5 MD, December 19, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 2 Sess., No.
342, p. 184; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, December 18, 1867.
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discreet commanders, to represent the Federal Authority and maintain the
laws, are in my opinion absolutely necessary," Hancock wrote, "but they
must be white:

black troops are unsuited for the performance of this

peculiar service."

Grant's secretary, Cyrus B. Comstock, replied that

three or four companies of white troops would probably be sent to
Louisiana from the Third Military District.

However, this reply most

have disappointed Hancock, for he had hoped for at least another
regiment.
Before these reinforcements arrived, important changes took place
in the command structure of the Louisiana department.

Hancock requested

that Lieutenant Colonel William H. Wood temporarily replace Mower as the
ccmmander of Louisiana and superintendent of the Freedmen's Bureau until
Brevet Major General Robert Christie Buchanan, commanding officer of the
1st Infantry, arrived in the state to assume both of these duties.
Grant approved Hancock's request, and although Mower retained oanmand of
the 39th Infantry, he had had enough of high level politics for the tine
being.
duties.

On January 2, 1868, Buchanan was ready to begin his multiple
Buchanan was a good choice as oortmander of Louisiana because he

had held two assignments in the state before the Civil War.

Like Wood

and Hancock, Buchanan was an alumnus of west Point, but he had preceded
them by many years, having graduated in 1830.
service filled Buchanan's military file:

Notations of battlefield

he had participated in the

25james M. Eddy to Hancock, December 2, 1867, and A. R. Whitney to
Hancock, December 2, 1867, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274; Hancock to AGO,
December 18, 1867, in 5 MD, vol. 1; "Petition of Citizens of Tensas and
Madison Parishes" to Hancock, December 18, 1867, in 5 MD, Letters Reed;
George W. Green to Hancock, Decenber 27, 1867, ibid.; all of above in
RG 393, NA. Hancock to Grant, December 23, 1867, and C. B. Ccmstock to
Hancock, December 27, 1867, in Grant Papers.
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Black Hawk War, fought against the Saninoles in 1837, and earned
promotion to brevet lieutenant colonel in the Mexican War.

He had

experienced some of the roughest fighting in the Eastern Theater during
the Civil War and also served for a few months in New Orleans.

As a

senior colonel, Buchanan served in Washington, D.C., on three Army
boards after the war from 1865 to 1867.
In addition to a new oomnander, Louisiana also got a new governor
in 1868.

Sheridan's appointee, Benjamin Flanders, resigned from office

because he and Hancock could not cooperate on running the state.

To

replace Flanders, Hancock chose Joshua Baker, a sixty-nine year old
planter.

Baker had lived in Louisiana for fifty-seven years and had

received one of the state's earliest appointments to West Point, gradu
ating in 1819.
and planting.

After only one year in the Army, Baker turned to the law
Between 1826 and 1860, his law practice helped him to

obtain a judgeship and a seat in the state senate.
officer in the militia.

He also served as an

A firm Unionist, but not a Radical, Baker

supported Andrew Johnson® s mild Reconstruction requirements.
Orleans Times claimed Baker's honesty was unimpeachable.

The New

27

Hancock to Grant, November 30, 1867, in U.S. Army Letterbook,
1867-1868, (Fifth Military District Papers, 1867-1868, Duke Univeristy
Library, Durham, N.C.); Grant to Hancock, December 3, 1867, in Grant
Papers; SO No. 201, 5 MD, December 3, 1867, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Gong., 2 Sess., No. 342, p. 180; SO No. 1, 5M, January 2, 1868, ibid.,
p. 187. Warner, Generals in Blue, 48-49; Cullum, Register of West Point,
II, 373-75.
27cullun, Register of West Point, I, 187-88; New Orleans Times,
January 3, 4, 12, 1868; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, January 15, 1868.
Lt. Ool. W. G. Mitchell to Flanders, December 30, 1867, in The Civil
Record of Major General Winfield S. Hancock During His Administration in
Louisiana and Texas (New Orleans [?], 1871), 22; Joshua Baker to
Hancock, January 4, 1868, in 5 MD, Telegrams Reed, RG 393, NA.
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The new year seemed a propitious time to announce other changes.
Hancock declared that it was no longer the place of the commanding
general, simply by virtue of his rank, to assume "judicial functions in
civil cases."

In the future, questions of civil law and procedure

would be handled as much as possible by the appropriate branch of the
state government.

Furthermore, voiding another of Sheridan's rulings,

Hancock agreed with Attorney General Stanbery's opinion on voter
registration:

heads of state asylums, school board members, town

councilman, and several other minor officials— heretofore disqualified
by Sheridan's order--were to be allowed to vote.

Hancock proclaimed

that it was the "duty of the members of the boards of registration,"
without direction from the military, "to decide upon the questions as to
the right of any applicant" to register.

Louisianians and most regis

trars realized that many of the men denied registration under Sheridan
were free now to carve forward and sign the rolls.

28

By this action,

Hancock influenced the voter registration process as much as Sheridan
had, but in a negative way.

Sheridan had wanted to prevent as many ex-

Confederates as possible from participating in government, so that the
Republican party could take root and grow.

Hancock allowed as many men

as he could to regain their rights, thereby speeding the eventual
recovery of the Democratic party and the demise of the Republicans.
Texas did not concern Hancock greatly while he commanded the Fifth
District.

Frontier fortifications and the need to arrange for a new

telegraph line demanded Hancock's personal attention in the Lone Star
28(30 No. 1, 5 MD, January 1, 1868, in Civil Record of Hancock,
22-23; Tucker, Hancock, 284; SO No. 3, 5 MD, January 11, 1868, in SW,
Annual Report, 1868-1869, pp. 219-21; New Orleans Times, January 12,
1868; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, March 16, 1868.
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State from January 25 to February 1.

Colonel Wood investigated a small

disturbance in Marshall, Texas, that was of little consequence.

29

Shortly after he returned from Texas, Hancock removed nine New
Orleans city councilman from office.

Two of the councilman were white,

seven were black, and all had been appointed by Sheridan.

The council

man had voted to fill a vacant municipal office, thereby violating the
national Reconstruction Act which prohibited elections to any office
until the state was readmitted by Congress.

Hancock had warned the

councilman that such an action was illegal, and he had a precedent to
support him.

General Mower had removed some Jefferson aldermen on

October 15, 1867, for holding a similar election.

Hancock dispatched a

brief report on the changes in the council to Grant on February 7, but
he was less than pleased with Hancock's action.
reached New Orleans on February 8:

30

His terse telegram

"suspend your order removing city

council of New Orleans until full report is sent." Hancock responded
that he believed an adequate susimary of the situation had already been
forwarded, and the state newspapers supported him.

For exartple, the New

2%anoock to Grant, January 21, February 3, 6, 1868, all in Grant
Papers. The report of Col. Wbod on the Marshall incident is in SW,
Annual Report, 1868-1869, pp. 254-58. See also Richter, "Army in Texas,"
129-40, 295.
30SO No. 28, 5 MD, February 7, 1868, in SW, Annual Report, 18681869, p. 222; Hancock to Grant, February 7, 1868, in House Exec. Docs.,
40 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 172, p. 1; Tucker, Hancock, 286-87; William J.
Ulrich, "The Northern Military Mind in Regard to Reconstruction, 18651872: The Attitudes of Ten Leading Union Generals," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1959), 69. The incident can be
found in Hancock, Reminiscences, 128-32. Hancock also removed New
Orleans Street Commissioner William Baker, a Sheridan appointee, for
accepting kickbacks in the letting of street repair contracts. See
Hancock to Grant, February 5, 1868; Grant to Hancock, February 7, 1868,
both in Grant Papers. Also see Hancock to Grant, February 17, 1868, in
5 MD, vol. 1, RG 393, NA. Hancock had to reinstate Baker. SO No. 50,
5 MD, March 5, 1868, in SW, Annua]. Report, 1868-1869, p. 205.
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Orleans Times endorsed Hancock1s appointees as old and dependable
citizens who 'would make good councilman.

The Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly

Advocate defended them as "reliable and competent." Grant then
retreated.

If the new appointees had been installed, he said, then

Hancock was to let them keep their positions.
council seats had already been filled.

Indeed, several of the

31

This last exchange of telegrams appeared to solve the problem.
However, ten days later on February 21, a wire unexpectedly arrived
which called on Hancock to reinstate Sheridan's old councilman.

Army

Chief of Staff John Rawlins explained that after consultations with
staff members, Grant had changed his mind and decided that Hancock's
reasons for the removals were not satisfactory, and that the councilman
had not done anything illegal.

32

Hancock permitted Sheridan's councilman to reoccupy their seats as
ordered, but he did so with "serious apprehension."

Upon reflection,

Hancock wired Grant, reiterating all his previous arguments for his
initial decision and asked Grant to reconsider his orders, but Grant
stood firm.

He did not want a misunderstanding, he said, but Hancock's

reasons dad not warrant the removal of the councilman.

33

-^Grant to Hancock, February 8, 11, 1868, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 172, pp. 2-3; Hancock to Grant, February 9, 11,
1868, ibid.; New Orleans Times, February 8, 9, 11, 1868; Baton Rouge
Tri-Weekly Advocate, February 10, 1868.
■^Rawlins to Hancock, February 21, 1868, in House Exec. Docs., 40
Cong., 2 Sess., NO. 209, pp. 10-11.
33rhe Lake Providence Carroll Record (March 7, 1868) supported
Hancock's right to make removals just like Sheridan had done. Obviously
a Democratic sheet, the Record saw Sheridan's appointees as "worthless
fellows" replaced by Hancock's "men of fitness and ability. . . . "
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The council dispute prompted Hancock to request a transfer from
the Fifth District, "where it is no longer useful or agreeable for me to
serve."

He planned to leave as scon as possible to discuss a new

assignment with President Johnson in Washington.

Hancock assumed that

Brevet Major General Joseph J. Reynolds of the Department of Texas was
the senior officer in the district and put him with command " [d]uring
the absence of Major General Hancock, or until further orders." When
Hancock departed from New Orleans on March 16, 1868, citizens and news
paper editors speculated about the permanence of the absence.

Even

Hancock himself was unsure if he would return to Louisiana, but it was
obvious he wanted a post somewhere else.

President Johnson reserved

judgment on the transfer until he conferred with Hancock.

Within a few

days after the meeting between the general and the President, Hancock
received orders to report to the Division of the Atlantic under Major
General George G. Meade.
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Hancock's approach to Reconstruction in Louisiana was a narked
departure from that of Sheridan and Mower.

Under those two officers,

the direct military influence on the state reached, its zenith.
diluted the effect of the military by a series of orders.

Hancock

Taken

together, General Order No. 40, the directive on jury selection, and the
change in voter registration greatly damaged Sheridan's efforts to aid
the Republican party and hindered his program to force equal opportunity
for Negroes.

Hancock's relaxation in voter registration requirements

•^Hancock to AG Lorenzo Thomas, February 27, 1868, in SW, Annual
Report, 1868-1869, p. 223; Tucker, Hancock, 287; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly
Advocate, February 28, March 18, 1868; New Orleans Times, March 17,
1868; New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 9, 1868; Grant to Hancock,
March 14 and 15, in Grant Papers; Hancock to Grant, March 15, 1868,
endorsed by Johnson, ibid.
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enabled some deserving whites to register, but it also opened the way
for registrars to bar blacks from signing the rolls solely on racial
grounds.
No elections, no riots, and no massive removals of officeholders
occurred in Louisiana during Hancock's time in command.

His removal of

the New Orleans oouncilmen was legal and entirely within the authority
of a district commander.

However, Grant disapproved of Hancock's action

because the oouncilmen had been appointed by Sheridan.

Although Grant

was well within his powers as General in Chief on this natter, he
undermined Hancock's position as an important independent commander and
ruled against a law Sheridan strongly supported.

Democrats saw Hancock

as a savior from Radical devils like Sheridan and Mower.

Republicans

feared that all political advances and advantages built up so laborious
ly during the past few years would be ruined and discarded in only a few
months of an administration like Hancock's.
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To the surprise of both

parties, Hancock's successor was perhaps the most objective and
fair-minded commander to serve in the state during the postwar years.

^%or an excellent summary of Hancock's time in Louisiana, see
Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 176-78.

CHAPTER VI
BUCHANAN/ WARMDTH, AND READMISSION
On March 18, 1868, from his office in Texas, Brevet Major
General Joseph Jones Reynolds took command of the Fifth District.

The

New Orleans Republican greeted Reynolds favorably, calling him "a fairminded gentleman" whose compand would "result in great good to all
classes of our people."

In contrast, a Democratic paper, the West Baton

Rouge Sugar Planter, lamented Hancock's departure and said that his
replacement "unquestionably will be of the blackest Radical stripe."^
In fact, within a few years Reynolds did ally himself closely with the
Republican party.
Although Reynolds was graduated from West Point in 1843, he saw no
corrfcat in the Mexican War.
Texas from 1845 to 1846.

Instead, he served with occupation forces in
In the latter year he began a ten-year assign

ment at the Military Academy, where he taught history and geography.
Reynolds resigned from the service in 1857 with the rank of first
lieutenant.

His A m y career apparently finished, Reynolds became a
2
professor at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.
%few Orleans Republican, March 18, 1868; West Baton Rouge Sugar
Planter, March 21, 1868.
2George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and
Graduates of the U.S. Military Acaderty at West Point, N.Y. . . . 18021867 (2 vols"., New York, 1868), II, 78-79; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in
Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge, 1964), 397-%; GO No.
15, 5 MD, March 18, 1868, in GO, 5 MD, 1868, RG 393, NA.
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The Civil War altered Joseph Reynolds' life, as it changed the
lives of so many people in the 1860s.

After Port Sumter, Reynolds left

St. Louis and returned to his boyhood state of Indiana, where he raised
two volunteer regiments.

During the war he participated in the

important battles of Chickanauga and Chattanooga and became a major
general of volunteers.
of New Orleans.

For six months in 1864 he commanded the defenses

Like many other officers, Reynolds took a demotion at

the end of the war to remain in the Army.

With the rank of full colonel

he commanded troops in Arkansas and later served along the Rio Grande in
Texas.^
Reynolds assumed control over Louisiana at a crucial time.

A new

state constitution that had taken four months to draft had just been
completed.

This document was to go before the voters for ratification

or rejection on April 17 and 18.

Prior to leaving Louisiana, Hancock

had issued an important order on voter registration and state elections.
Newly appointed registrars set out to revise the voting rolls by
striking off the names of persons who had died or moved from the state.
Simultaneously, the registrars urged qualified men not heretofore regis
tered to sign the rolls.

In this same election, Louisiana voters,

acting under a recently passed Federal law, would cast ballots for new
state officers and Congressional representatives.

4

^Cullum, Register of West Point, II, 79? Warner, Generals in Blue,
398.
^SQ No. 54, March 10, 1868, No. 55, March 11, 1868, 5 MD, in SW,
Annual Report, 1868-1869, pp. 235-37, in House Exec. Docs., 40 Cbng., 3
Sess., No. 1; Grant to Winfield S. Hancock, March 13, 1868, in U.S.
Grant Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress); Baton Rouge
Tri-Weekly Advocate, March 20, 1868? New Orleans Times, March 21, 22,
1868? John R. Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana (through 1868)
(Baltimore, 1910), 201.
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Before Reynolds could even locate a residence in New Orleans,
Brevet Major General Robert C. Buchanan replaced him as district
commander on March 25.

Buchanan succeeded to the position because Army

headquarters in Washington learned that he had received his brevet rank
of major general ahead of Reynolds.

Hancock had mistakenly assumed that

Reynolds was the senior of the two officers.

However, the adjutant

general in Washington announced that Buchanan's assignment was only
temporary, but did not specify when a permanent commander would be
named.5
Buchanan was fifty-seven years old in 1868, making him the second
g
oldest officer to command Louisiana between 1865 and 1877.
Buchanan's
age did not hinder him in carrying out his duties.

Four previous

assignments in Louisiana both before and during the Civil War had given
Buchanan a familiarity with the state that no other postwar commander
could equal.

He was unusually well qualified to be Reconstruction
7
commander of the state.

5Joseph J. Reynolds to AGO, March 24, 1868, in Telegrams Sent, 5
MD, 1868; GO No. 16, 5 MD, March 25, 1868, in GO, 5 MD, 1868; both of
above in RG 393, NA. New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 25, 1868; Baton
Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, March 25, 1868.
^General William H. Emory was sixty years old when he took command
of Louisiana in November 1871. He commanded the state until March 1875.
^Cullum, Register of West Point, I, 373-74; Francis B. Heitman,
Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789-1903
(2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 258. One of the most interesting
aspects of Buchanan's life is the effect he may have had on U. S.
Grant's military career. Buchanan was Grant's superior at two different
military posts before the Civil Whr. Apparently, great antagonism built
up between the two officers because of Grant's drinking habits.
Buchanan supposedly goaded Grant into submitting his resignation from
the service in 1854. The incidents are best described in Lloyd lewis,
Captain Sam Grant (Boston, 1950), 329-32. See also William B. Hesseltine, Ulysses S. Grant, Politician (New York, 1935), 10-11. Grant had
little to say about the problem in his Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant
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Buchanan wanted an honest and peaceful election.

He ordered a

revision of the state voting lists and designated April 3 to April 7 as
registration dates for new applicants.

While this was being done,

Buchanan received permission from Ifeshington to retain three infantry
companies from the Third District (sent previously at Hancock's
request), increasing the number of soldiers available to guard the
polls.

Buchanan issued a special proclamation which notified the

public that every man's right to vote would be protected and tliat the
Army would be quickly dispatched to any area troubled by violence.
Furthermore, military orders prohibited any nighttime political parades
or rallies until the election was completed.

Only authorized law

enforcement officers or soldiers were allowed to carry firearms in
public.

Special detachments of troops marched into normally ungarri

soned towns.

As election eve neared, Buchanan held a public review of

the troops in New Orleans and put the soldiers there on a forty-eighthour alert.

The quartermaster hired a steamboat capable of moving on

short notice an additional 250 troops to New Orleans.

The steamer

waited alongside the dock rear Jackson Barracks.

After all these
O
preparations, Buchanan was ready for the 'voting to begin.
Running for governor on April 17 and 18 were two Republican judges,
Henry Clay Warmoth and James G. Taliaferro.

Both men were Radicals, but

(2 vols., New York, 1885), I, 210. The past difficulties did not appear
to have any adverse effect on the relations between the two officers
when Buchanan was commander of Louisiana and Grant was General in Chief.
^Robert C. Buchanan to Grant, April 6, 1868, in Grant Papers;
John A. Rawlins to Buchanan, April 8, 1868, ibid.; American Annual
Cyclopedia, 1868 (New York, 1869), 433; AAG George Baldey to Chief
Quartermaster, Dist La, April 16, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274, RG 393,
NA; New Orleans Times, March 31, April 15, 1868; SW, Annual Report,
1868-1869, p. 313.
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Taliaferro received seme support from the Democrats, who did not
nominate a candidate for governor and appeared to prefer an old resident
Unionist rather than a young, brash, Northerner who had came to Louisi
ana only a few years before*

Taliaferro had recently gained prominence

by serving as the chairman of the state constitutional convention.
Warmoth had achieved recognition in 1865 as the unofficial and unrecog
nized "territorial delegate" from Louisiana.

Since then he had enlarged

his law practice, served as a judge, and presided over the Louisiana
9
chapter of the Grant Army of the Republic.
The election produced the ratification of the new constitution and
a win for Warmoth.

A concerted effort by Democrats in New Orleans

resulted in victory for the conservative candidate for mayor, John R.
Conway.

The tabulation revealed that 66,152 Louisiana men voted for the

constitution, 48,739 against it.
votes, 64,941 to 38,046.
standards.

Warmoth defeated Taliaferro by 26,895

The election had been a calm one by Louisiana

Buchanan called it "the most peaceful, quiet, and orderly of

any that had taken place in the State of Louisiana for a great many
years. . . . "

The authorities arrested only forty-seven people in New

^Wynona G. Mills, "James Govan Taliaferro: Louisiana Unionist and
Scalawag," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1968),
73-85. Henry Clay Warmoth was one of the most colorful figures in the
Reconstruction period and in Louisiana history. There is no complete
biography of this interesting man. The best treatment of his career is
F. Wayne Billing, "Henry Clay Warmoth and Louisiana Reconstruction,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1969).
See also Richard N. Current, Three Carpetbag Governors (Baton Rouge,
1967), 36-66; Charles L. Dufour, "The Age of Warmoth/' Louisiana
History, VI (Fall, 1965), 335-64; Francis B. Harris, "Henry Clay
Warmoth, Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, XXX (April, 1947), 523-653; and Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 156-252. Also useful are
Warmoth11s own memoirs: ~War, Politics, and Reconstruction: Stormy Days
in Louisiana (New York, 1930), though they are clouded by late years and
remembrances of the way it should have been.
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Orleans for "disorderly conduct."

There were no reports of riots or

other violence associated with the election, although Negroes reportedly
voted in large numbers.

Within a few days, Buchanan ordered the three

companies of soldiers on loan from the Third District to return to their
posts in Mississippi.
Despite the peaceful election, Buchanan had to keep his guard up,
and he prepared to use troops if the circumstances warranted.

He had to

dispatch a company of the 20th Infantry from Baton Rouge to St. Francisville to guard against a riot.

A St. Francisville judge had sentenced

two convicted Negro murderers to hang, and local blacks threatened to
prevent the execution and rescue the convicts.

The presence of the

troops in the small town prevented any disturbance, and the execution
took place as scheduled.

11

More serious than any real threats of violence were the charges of
violence made by Stephen B. Packard, a Republican serving as chairman of
the state board of voter registration.

A native of Maine and a former

Union Army captain, Packard established a law practice in New Orleans
after the Civil War, hoping to profit from the state's unsettled politi
cal and economic conditions.

Following the gubernatorial election,

10Buchanan's Departmental Report, in SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869,
p. 314; Buchanan to Grant, May 9, 1868, in Grant Papers; Baton Rouge
Tri-Weekly Advocate, April 29, 1868; New Orleans Times, May 14, 1868.
Buchanan appointed a board of three Army officers to examine the elec
tion returns and submit a report on the voting in each parish by race.
The result is examined by Donald W. Davis, "Ratification of the Consti
tution of 1868— Record of Votes," Louisiana History, VI (Summer, 1965),
301-305. See also F. Wayne Binning, “Carpetbaggers Triumph: The
Louisiana State Election of 1868," ibid., XIV (Winter, 1973), 21-39.
•^Buchanan1s Departmental Report, p. 314; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly
Advocate, May 1, 1868; AAG Baldey to CO, Baton Rouge, April 29, 1868, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 274, RG 393, NA.

142

Packard wrote General Grant a grim description of the situation in
Louisiana.

"Revenge and murders are rampant in our state," the board

chairman claimed and went on to accuse Buchanan of failure to investi
gate the crimes because of his mistaken assumption that the civilian
authorities were able to protect the citizens of Louisiana.

Such a

statement from a Radical Republican disturbed Grant, who demanded that
Buchanan forward as soon as possible a detailed report on "the state of
affairs" in the district.

Buchanan replied promptly.

He explained that

there had been only seventeen murders in the state in the month follow
ing Warmoth's election.

The civil authorities (who were usually

Republicans) had investigated all of these crimes vigorously, and most
of the murders had not been associated with politics.
satisfied Grant.

This report

12

Having failed to make good on his charges of disorder in Louisiana,
Packard next criticized Buchanan from a different angle.

(Obviously,

the old soldier was not radical enough for the registrar.) Packard
wanted Warmoth inaugurated quickly, but it appeared to him that Buchanan
was taking longer than necessary to promulgate the April election
results.

Buchanan had previously informed Grant that the new office

holders would be installed sometime after military officers tabulated
the results of the election.

They completed the count on June 2, and

Buchanan dutifully announced the winners.

He issued an order notifying

the public that the new officials would take their posts on the first
Monday in November, or whenever Congress approved the new state
^Stephen B. Packard to Grant, May 14, 1868? Grant to Buchanan,
May 15, 1868; Buchanan to Grant, May 16, 1868, all in Grant Papers;
Binning, "Henry Clay Whrmoth," 193.
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constitution, vhichever came first.

Most Republicans, led by the New

Orleans Republican, opposed such a long wait for Warmoth's inauguration
and did not want to keep the old officials in office any longer than
necessary.

Packard attempted to nullify Buchanan's order by issuing an

illegal proclamation which called for the inauguration of the new state
government before November.

13

Buchanan decided Packard's actions violated a provision of one of
his orders prohibiting anyone in the state from issuing orders contrary
to his own.

On June 6 a military detachment arrested Packard, and

Buchanan arranged for a speedy trial by military ooirenission.

Thai,

perhaps under pressure because of the comments of Packard and other
Republicans, Buchanan unexpectedly declared that all newly elected muni
cipal officials would be allowed to take office on June 8, except those
in New Orleans, who would be installed on June 10.

All state officials

had to wart investiture until Congress approved the state constitution.

14

Grant ordered Buchanan to drop the case against Packard on June 8.
Congress was considering a bill that would allow Louisiana and five
other Southern states to regain their representation in Congress pending
each state's approval of the Fourteenth Amendment.

With this important

step so close, Grant did not want divisive activities between Buchanan
and Packard to endanger the re-entry of Louisiana's representatives to
^Buchanan to Grant, May 22, 1868; Packard to Grant, May 21 and
June 4, 1868, all in Grant Papers; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate,
June 3, 1868; New Orleans Republican, June 7, 1868; SO NO. l21, 5 MD,
June 2, 1868, in New Orleans Times, June 3, 1868.
^Buchanan to Grant, June 6, 1868, in Grant Papers; SO No. 125, 5
MD, June 6, 1868, in New Orleans Times, June 7, 1868. Concerning Baton
Rouge municipal officials see I. B. Johnson to Col. George Sykes,
June 26, 1868, in 5 MD, Telegrams Sent, Civil Affairs, 1868, RG 393, NA.
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Congress.

Array Chief of Staff John Rawlins reprimanded Packard and

conmanded the registrar not to issue any more proclamations which
conflicted with the orders of the district commander.

15

Despite the knowledge that civilian control was only a few weeks
away, Packard disregarded Rawlins' directions and seized the first
opportunity after his release from jail to call for the installment of
all state civil officials by June 15.

He also declared that the legis

lature should meet on June 22 regardless of any orders from Buchanan.
State officials paid no heed to Packard, but waited instead for orders
from the military.

However, Radical Mayor Edward Heath of New Orleans

refused to allow Mayor-elect John R. Conway to move into the office.
Buchanan ordered Heath's removal, and the conservative Conway
established himself as the new mayor.3-6
lb quiet the carping Packard and his supporters and bolster his own
position, Buchanan released two letters to the New Orleans Times. The
author of the letters, Captain Bimey B. Keeler of the 39th Infantry,
was in Vfeshington temporarily and alertly had picked up information in
the adjutant general's office relating to the Louisiana situation.

In

Keeler's opinion, Johnson, Grant, and General Rawlins all "warmly"
approved of Buchanan's recent actions which prohibited inaugurating the
^Grant to Buchanan, June 8, 1868, in Grant Papers; Rawlins to
Packard, June 9, 1868, ibid.
^Buchanan to Grant, June 10, 1868, ibid.; Edward Heath to Grant,
June 10, 1868; ibid.; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, June 10, 1868; New
Orleans Times, June 11, 1868; New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 10, 11,
12, 1868.
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governor or calling the legislature until Congress had accepted
Iouisiana's new constitution.

17

On June 26 Buchanan learned that Congress had approved Iouisiana's
new constitution and that the state's representatives would be seated
when the legislature ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.
June 27 Wanroth was inaugurated as governor.

Accordingly, on

Oscar J. Dunn, a Negro who

had been a former Union Army officer and New Orleans councilman, took
the oath as lieutenant governor.

Simultaneously, using his powers as

district commander, Buchanan appointed the two man to their new posi
tions by military order, making it clear that the Amoy endorsed the
Republican administration.

Wanroth scheduled the opening of the state

legislature for Monday, June 29.

18

The convening of the legislature immediately created a crisis which
alarmed Buchanan.

Lieutenant Governor Dunn, presiding officer in the

senate, demanded that all the senators take a strict "test oath" before
they could be seated, although this extra oath was not a part of the new
constitution.

The test oath, like the old "iron clad" oath used during

the Civil War and earlier in Reconstruction, required the new senators
to swear that they had not fought against the United States or aided
those who did.

Robert H. Isabelle, temporary chairman of the house,

cooperated with Dunn and refused to seat representatives in the lower
chamber unless they also took the oath.

By 1868 all Democrats elected

^B. B. Keeler to Buchanan, June 13, 18, 1868, in New Orleans
Times, June 14, 19, 1868; Keeler to AAAG Thomas
Neill,
June 17, 1868,in
5 MD, Telegrams Reed, 1868, R3 393, NA.
^®Grant to Buchanan, June 26, 27, 1868, in
Grant Papers; AAAGNeill
to Joshua Baker, June 27, 1868, in 5 MD, Telegrams Sent, 1868, RG 393,
NA; New Orleans Times, June 27, 1868; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
June 28, 1868; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 203.
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to the legislature had received pardons or had been granted amnesty.
The standard oath required by the new constitution asked only that the
legislator swear to uphold the laws of the state.

The legislature

adjourned after an abbreviated first session, with most of the sixty-one
Democrats still unseated.

Fearing trouble because of this unexpected

turn of events, Buchanan wired Grant for instructions.

19

Shortly after daylight on the morning of June 30, Buchanan learned
of a Conservative plot to disrupt the legislature because the Democrats
had been denied their seats.

The general acted swiftly.

He asked the

mayor to dispatch a squad of city policemen to guard the entrances to
the legislature’s nesting hall at the Mechanic’s Institute, site of the
bloody riot in 1866.

In front of the building a motley crowd of 2,000

persons had gathered fcy ten o'clock.

About that tine a detachment of

the 1st Infantry arrived at the Institute and formed a cordon around the
building.

The soldiers permitted only legislators and reporters to pass

through the line.

Buchanan stationed a horse-drawn artillery battery

and Company G of the 6th Cavalry a few blocks away from the meeting site.
The crowd grew to an estimated three thousand persons, but it did not
become disorderly.

At noon the rap of the gavel brought the legislature

into session without interruption.

The crowd dispersed shortly after

twelve o'clock, leaving only a few hangers-on that always loitered near
the legislature.

Inside the building the representatives and senators

listened while a clerk read a letter from Grant to Buchanan.

Grant

decl ared that the only oath required of new legislators was the one in
19Buchanan to Grant, June 27, 1868, in Grant Papers; New Orleans
Times, June 30, 1868. The Republicans held an edge in each legislative
chamber: 20 to 16 in the senate, and 56 to 45 in the house.
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the Louisiana constitution.

This statement settled the controversy, and

the Republicans permitted the Democrats to occupy their seats.

However,

on Buchanan's order, troops remained near the institute for several
days.20
Buchanan's swift and decisive action prevented a civil disturbance
Which could have turned into a major riot.

The New Orleans Daily

Picayune complimented Buchanan on his decisiveness.

The editor said it

was a pleasant contrast to Absalom Baird's ineffective actions two years
before.

21

ait 1868 was a very different year from 1866.

Buchanan

commanded an established occupation force second in size only to the one
stationed in Texas, and he nanaged the state in a firm and capable
manner under the Congressional Reconstruction Acts.

This firmness

averted a repetition of the terrible events of July 30, 1866.

If

another riot had erupted in the summer of 1868, it probably would have
canceled Iouisiana's impending readmission to Congress, and military
government would have continued indefinitely.
Some areas of the state apparently still needed the firm hand of
military government.

Army detachments from Monroe and Shreveport had to

be sent into Claiborne, Bienville, and DeSoto parishes to investigate
reports of alleged intimidation and acts of violence against blacks.
Captain William W. Webb reported that the civil authorities in the town
of Homer in Claiborne Parish were capably handling their responsibilities.
20Buchanan' s Departmental Report, p. 315; New Orleans Times,
July 2, 1868; William E. Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1953), 237.
Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 203-294; Grant to Buchanan,
June 30, 1868, in Grant Papers.
21New Orleans Daily Picayune, July 2, 1868.
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Hie Freedmen’s Bureau agent in the area told Webb that most violence in
the parish involved personal quarrels and not political rivalries.
Several outrages against peaceful citizens had been ooranitted, but the
perpetrators were "desperate characters" who usually left the parish
after their crimes, perhaps returning just across the border into
Arkansas.

22

Lieutenant Charles 0. Bradley reported from Mansfield in

DeSoto Parish that "the presence of a small military force would give
the Agent of the Bureau the moral support which he needs."

In Bradley's

opinion, troops were needed in the parish because the whites appeared to
23
hold the Negroes in "a system of terrorism."
With such conflicting
reports in hand, Buchanan did not alter the arrangement of his soldiers,
who with few exceptions, remained stationed in the larger towns.

Fran

these centers troops could be dispatched to locations where violence
threatened.
On July 13, 1868, after being officially notified that the
Fourteenth Amendment had been passed by the state legislature, Buchanan
announced "to the people of the state, and to the troops under [thisj
command, that the provisions of the Reconstruction acts of Congress
cease[d] to operate in Louisiana."

Buchanan further stated that "mili

tary authority will no longer be exercised . . . unless upon a proper
application by the civil authorities to preserve the peace. . . . "
22Throughout the Reconstruction period, citizens in north Louisiana
complained about desperadoes from Arkansas crossing the border, commit
ting criitfcs, and then recrossing into Arkansas. See, for example,
Capt. W. W. Webb to AAAG, Dist La, July 1, 1868, in Dist La, Letters
Reed, 1868. See also AAG Baldey to Webb, June 12, 1868, and Baldey to
CO, Shreveport, June 27, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274. All of above in
RG 393, NA.
23Charles 0. Bradley to Capt. Charles E. Farrand, July 21, 1868, in
Dist La, Letters Reed, 1868, RG 393, NA.
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Concluding his remarks, Buchanan congratulated the people of Louisiana
for regaining their civil government, gave them good wishes for the
future, and ended by saying that "civil law was once more supreme."

24

In addition to Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, and the two Carolinas
regained their representation in Congress during the summer of 1868, and
since these states were again operating under civilian governments, the
adjutant general's office had to reorganize the military districts.
July 28 the Second and Third Districts were discontinued.

On

Georgia,

Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina were placed in the
new Department of the South with headquarters in Atlanta.
its designation as the First Military District.

Virginia kept

In the Southwest,

Mississippi continued to be called the Fourth District.

Texas retained

the title of Fifth District, and Joseph Reynolds retained in command.
Arkansas and Louisiana were joined to form the new Department of Loui
siana, and Brevet Major General Lovell H. Rousseau was assigned as the
commander.

Buchanan remained in charge until Rousseau transferred his
25
headquarters from Washington Territory to New Orleans.
Before the new commander arrived, Buchanan had to deal with several
problems growing out of the 1868 presidential campaign.

The Republicans

nominated Ulysses S. Grant, General in Chief of the Northern armies.
Opposing Grant was the Democratic war governor of New York, Horatio
24GO No . 154, 5 MD, July 13, 1868, in New Orleans Times, July 14,
1868; New York Times, July 15, 1868; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
July 11, 14, 1868; SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, p. 3l6.
25GO No . 55, HQ/USA, July 28, 1868, in SW, Annual Import, 18681869, p. 316; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, July 29, 1868;New
Orleans Times, August 4, 1868; GO No. 1, 5 MD, August 10, 1868, in
Andrew Johnson Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877
(Baton Rouge, 1967), 186, 256.
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Seymour.

To balance their ticket, the Democrats chose as their

vice-presidential candidate Francis P. Blair, a former Union general and
congressman from the border state of Missouri.

Most white Louisianians

favored Seymour and Blair, and organizations of former Confederate
soldiers paraded in the streets in support of the Democrats.

26

Governor Warmoth believed that the Democrats were not restricting
themselves to parades and rallies, but were also using violence to inti
midate Republicans.

In a letter to President Johnson on August 1,

Warmoth described acts of violence against Republicans and claimed that
secret white groups, such as the Knights of the White Camellia, were
well anted and drilling openly.

Warmoth criticized the Army for not

investigating some 150 murders supposedly committed in Louisiana during
June and July.

The governor demanded that additional troops be sent to

Louisiana to curb the mounting violence.

27

When Warmoth's reports reached the Northern press, Adjutant
General Edward Townsend in Washington directed Buchanan to keep the War
Department fully briefed on all violence or threats of insurrection in
Louisiana.

Townsend expected that Buchanan had already placed his

troops at important points within the state and that they were prepared
for any eventuality.

Despite Warmoth's pleas, Townsend made no plans to

send extra soldiers to Louisiana.

28

26
Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, August 5, 1868.
^Henry C. Warmoth to Johnson, August 1, 1868, in SW, Annual
Report, 1868-1869, p. xix; New Orleans Times, August 6, 1868; New York
Times, August 8, 1868.
^%ew York Times, August 7, 1868; AAG E. D. Townsend to Buchanan,
August 10, 1868, in SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, pp. xx-xxi.
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Two Democratic public officials wrote to President Johnson to deny
Warmoth's assertions of widespread violence in Louisiana.

A district

attorney in Opelousas blamed only "a few irresponsible desperadoes" for
the crimes in his area.

Baton Rouge state Senator Richard Day called

Warmoth's charge of statewide violence "a positive misrepresentation of
the facts." Day claimed that most Louisiana citizens were law abiding
and hoped that "law and order" could be maintained in the state without
additional troops.

29

Buchanan also criticized Warmoth's assertions and said that the
figure of 150 murders was exaggerated.

The general confirmed that there

had been twenty-five homicides in the state during June and July, with
no one parish being singled out as particularly troublesome.

Given

Louisiana's frontier-like conditions and the fact that men often carried
weapons as standard accouterments, twenty-five killings did not seem
excessive to Buchanan.

Furthermore, the Democrats had not prevented the

election of Warmoth and many other Republicans in April.

30

However, the conservative whites had become more active after the
nomination of Seymour and Blair.

By Buchanan's own figures, murders

were cansnitted in the state at the rate of almost one every other day,
and it seemed logical that some of these homicides must be politically
motivated.

Accordingly, Buchanan issued a proclamation which announced

that he and his troops would act decisively in the event of a major
disturbance anywhere in Louisiana.

He emphasized that the Army had not

29G. W. Hudspeth to Johnson, August 10, 1868; R. H. Day to Johnson,
August 10, 1868, both in Johnson Papers.
^Buchanan to Townsend, August 19, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 266,
RG 393, NA.
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relaxed its protective vigil over the state.

But a separate order

promised citizens that the military would no longer interfere in routine
legal cases or investigations.

All standard civilian law enforcement

efforts had to be exhausted before sheriffs or marshals could call on
the Army for assistance.

When it was obvious that a riot was imminent,

local commanders could, of course, go to the aid of local police forces.
Otherwise, troops could not be used without the approval of the department commander.

31

Buchanan was not trying to assist the Democrats or

hamstring the Republicans with these orders, but he did not want the
Army to be accused of interfering with the prerogatives of the new
civilian government.
Robert Buchanan had one more test at keeping the peace as commander
of the Department of Louisiana before Rousseau arrived.

Early in

September the Radicals scheduled a huge torchlight parade in New Orleans
for Saturday, September 12.

On September 11 Colonel Edward Hatch,

siperintendent of the Louisiana Freedman's Bureau, telegraphed Secretary
of War John M. Schofield requesting that Buchanan be specifically
ordered to protect the large number of Negro marchers expected on the
streets the next night.

Schofield complied with the request.

When

Buchanan received the order he replied that in his estimation the
Negroes might cause serious property damage if allowed to march unre
stricted through the city, so he planned to place guards along the
parade route.

John S. Walton, assistant treasurer at the New Orleans

mint, asked Buchanan to supply a squad of soldiers to guard the mint.
31G0 No . 3, Dept La, August 13, 1868, in GO, Dept La, 1868, RG 393,
NA; New Orleans Times, August 14, 1868; New York Times, September 8,
1868; AAG J. C. Kelton to Buchanan, August 25, 1868, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 41 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 16, Pt. 1, p. 32.
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On the evening of the parade the general dispersed troops from seven
ocnpani.es of the 1st Infantry to several locations within the city,
including the mint.

Mere than 6,500 Radicals and Negroes participated

in the rally, creating a carnival atmosphere lasting until late Saturday
32
night.
Buchanan was relieved to learn that no violence or property
damage occurred.

Once again his planning and ample use of troops had

kept a dangerous situation peaceful.
On Tuesday, September 15, General Rousseau arrived in New Orleans.
In a brief ceremony Buchanan relinquished the department to his new
ccffimander, for he retrained on and commanded the state of Louisiana under
Rousseau.

33

While Buchanan commanded Louisiana, the Army abandoned three minor
military posts, leaving the state with twelve.

This cutback followed

the trend in the South, 'where the number of military posts dropped from
141 to 100 during 1867 and 1868.

Although the total number of troops in

Louisiana decreased from 2,434 to 2,251 in 1868, the state still had
more soldiers within its borders than any other Southern state except
Texas, where Indian-fighting required additional men.

The troop

decrease in Louisiana was due mainly to deaths by disease, although
desertions and discharges also played their parts.

There were three

regiments and four auxiliary companies stationed in the state in both
32AAG Baldey to W. M. Graham, September 12, 1868, Dept Gulf, vol.
274A; John W. Walton to Buchanan, September 12, 1868, in Dept La,
Letters Reed, 1868; Buchanan to Walton, September 12, 1868, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 266, all above in RG 393, NA. Edward Hatch to John M.
Schofield, September 11, 1868; Schofield to Hatch, September 12, 1868;
AAG J. C. Kelton to Buchanan, September 12, 1868, and reply, all in SW,
Annual Report, 1868-1869, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. New Orleans Bee,
September'13, 1868; NSw Orleans Times, September 13, 1868.
33New Orleans Times, September 16, 1868.
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1867 and 1868.

Therefore, though the number of soldiers declined, the

number of companies remained stable.
Buchanan kept the peace in Louisiana during months filled with
potentially dangerous situations.

Heated political controversy was

commonplace, but the state had held a gubernatorial election, convened a
new legislature, and regained its congressional representation with only
minor violence.

Never waiting until a crisis exploded into violence,

Buchanan judiciously posted troops to key locations in New Orleans when
danger threatened.

Even the Picayune, a Democratic newspaper, called

Buchanan a "distinguished old soldier" who had "wisely and delicately
performed the novel and difficult duties inposed on him." in Louisiana.

35

His successors would find it difficult to do as well.

34SW, Annual Report, 1867-1868, pp. 460-73, in House Exec. Docs.,
40 Cong., 2"5essV; M57 T; SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, pp. 752-67;
Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 186, 261-62. These figures differ from
those in Sefton (pp. 261-62, above), who apparently did not combine the
totals of the three cavalry companies and one artillery company with
that of the three infantry regiments.
otr

New Orleans Daily Picayune, July 2, 1868.

CHAPTER VII
ROUSSEAU AND VIGILANTE VIOLENCE
On September 15, 1868, Brevet Major General Lovell Harrison
Rousseau replaced Buchanan as ocranander of the Department of Louisiana.
Buchanan had been a professional military man since he entered West
Point at the age of fifteen.

In contrast, Rousseau was a citizen-

soldier who had only recently entered the regular Army.

Rousseau was

b o m in 1818 near Stanford, Kentucky, and as a young man studied law in
the office of an attorney in Lexington.

Soon after his twenty-third

birthday, Rousseau moved to Indiana, where he was admitted to the bar.
Three years later he began his political career, serving a term in the
Indiana house of representatives.

In the Mexican War Rousseau raised

and commanded a volunteer infantry company.

Following this wartime ser

vice, he was elected to the Indiana senate.

Later Rousseau returned to

Kentucky, where he became one of the top criminal lawyers in the state,
and ran successfully in 1860 for a seat in the Kentucky senate
The election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860 aroused divided
feelings in many Kentuckians, but Rousseau had no doubts about his
loyalties.

He resigned his senate seat and recruited pro-Union Kentucky

volunteers on the Indiana side of the Ohio River.

Initially Rousseau

served as colonel, and after his participation in the battles of Shiloh
^■Allen Johnson (ed.), Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols.,
New York, 1929-1958), XVI, 194-95.
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and Perryville in 1862, he was promoted to major general of volunteers.
He held staff assignments and canmanded part of occupied Tennessee.

At

the end of the war and while still in uniform, Rousseau ran for the U.S.
Senate in Kentucky and suffered his first major political defeat.
Shortly after this setback, he resigned from the Army and won election
to the U.S. House as a congressman from his native state.

Radical

Republicans supported Rousseau in each of these elections.

To the

disappointment of his backers, the Kentuckian changed his allegiance
after only a few weeks in the House and voted against the Freedman's
Bureau Bill and other Radical legislation.

Rousseau's abrupt political

shift naturally led to a break with Republicans.

During a violent argu

ment in the Capitol corridors, Rousseau caned Radical Representative
Josiah B. Grinnel of Iowa.

As a point of honor, Rousseau resigned his

seat in Congress and returned to Kentucky to seek vindication.
Overwhelmingly re-elected, he served in the House until 1867.

while in

Congress, he became friends with President Andrew Johnson and consis
tently supported the President's Reconstruction policies. In March 1867
Johnson made Rousseau a brigadier general in the regular Army and gave
him a special mission.

The United States had recently purchased Alaska

from Russia, and Johnson picked Rousseau to lead the official delegation
that received the transfer of the large territory from the Russians.
After returning from Alaska, Rousseau unofficially inspected conditions
in Louisiana while Sheridan commanded the state, and then was assigned
to command in Washington Territory.

He was there when he received

orders in 1868 to take charge of the Louisiana department.
2

Ibid.; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue;
Companders (Baton Rouge, 1964), 412-13.

Lives of the Union
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Louisiana Republicans immediately recognized Rousseau's political
inclination.

One of Louisiana's U.S. Senators, William Pitt Kellogg,

warned Governor Warmoth that he would probably be "disappointed in
Rousseau." Warmoth described the general as "a fine fellow, and a bril
liant soldier in the Union Amy, but . . . also a Kentucky Democrat,
with all of the prejudices against Reconstruction, and a supporter of
3

President Johnson's policy."
As the 1868 presidential campaign mounted in intensity in Louisiana,
so also did threats of violence increase in frequency.
danger appeared to coma from the Dsmocrats.

The greatest

Voter registration was

reopened, which allowed many unsigned Democrats to register.

The Demo

crats not only began to gain in voter strength, but they also began to
use their powers of intimidation.

All over the state Democrats

organized many political clubs to support their nominee, and groups like
the "Cadets," "Southrons," "Sentinels," "Knights," and "Innocents"
paraded noisely for their ticket.

The demonstrators usually attended
4
rallies and other political events well armed.
On the night of September 22 two rival political processions, one

white and the other black, clashed in downtown New Orleans.

In a short

but deadly fight, three Negroes were killed, and an undetermined number
on both sides were wounded.

Before the incident could mushroom,

soldiers from the New Orleans garrison and city police restored order.
The following day the Democrats, as if celebrating a victory, held a
^William P. Kellogg to Henry Clay Warmoth, July
Clay Warmoth Papers (Southern Historical Collection,
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.); Henry C. Warmoth, War,
Reconstruction; Stormy Days in Louisiana (New York,

30, 1868, in Henry
University of North
Politics, and
1930), 78.

% e w Orleans Times, September 18 and October 23, 1868.
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large and enthusiastic political rally under the watchful eyes of
additional troops brought in from Jackson Barracks „
Rousseau penned a gloomy report on the situation to
President Johnson on September 26.

The "condition of affairs here . . .

could not be much worse/5 wrote the general in dismay.

Rousseau

expressed little faith in the strength of the civilian authorities alone
to maintain order.

Be believed that most citizens still looked to the

military to keep the peace.

Although it seemed premature to do so,

Rousseau predicted a Democratic victory for Seymour in November.

The

general premised Johnson that he would do his best to ensure law and
order, but he concluded that he could "compare the population t e e to
nothing so apt as a volcano ready for an explosion at any moment."6
Just two days later Rousseau's "volcano" erupted violently in
St. Landry Parish.

Three local Democrats assaulted and caned Emerson

Bentley, Radical editor of the Opelousas St. Landry Progress.

The

attackers smashed the newspaper presses and destroyed Bentley8s office.
Local Radicals, who had been organizing St. Landry Negroes into politi
cal clubs, sent out messengers to gather the clubs together and demanded
punishment for Bentley's attackers.

Responding to what they saw as a

black uprising, well armed whites quickly assembled, and gunfire was
5AAG George Baldey to 00, Jackson Barracks, September 23, 1868;
Baldey to Lt. Col. W. H. Wood, September 23, 1868, both in Dept Gulf,
vol. 274A; Lovell H. Rousseau to AGO, September 23, 1868, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 266; all of above in RG 393, NA. Rousseau's Report on the District
of Louisiana, 1868, in SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, p. 303, in House
Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 1. (Hereinafter cited as
“Rousseau^ District Report.11) See also New Orleans Times, September 23
and 24, 1868.
^Rousseau to Andrew Johnson, September 26, 1868, in Andrew Johnson
Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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exchanged between the rival groups.

The shots killed one Negro and

wounded three whites and several blacks.

The sheriff and white vigilan

tes arrested between ten and twenty-nine blacks, locked them in jail,
and charged them with disturbing the peace.

The next night all but a

few of the freedmen were removed from jail and murdered.

For the next

two weeks, armed whites rode through the parish terrorizing the Negro
population.

The vigilantes killed several dozen more blacks.

The New

Orleans Times reported that more than one hundred Negroes were killed in
St. Landry during the reign of terror.

When Rousseau finally dispatched

a squad of soldiers to Opelousas several days after the riot started,
the troops found that whites were patrolling the town and the surround
ing countryside.

The inspecting officers obtained little information on

the violence from the terror-stricken Negroes, who feared reprisals if
they cooperated with the Anty.

The violence accomplished its purpose—

the complete intimidation of all St. Landry Republicans on election day
in November.

Grant received no votes in that parish, which had given
. 7
more than 2,500 votes to Warmotli in April.
Rousseau made no concerted effort to curb the mounting wave of
violence, which ripped through several parishes, including St. Mary,
Caddo, Bossier, Carroll, and Rapides.

Rampaging Democrats destroyed two

New Orleans Times, October 6, 1868; New York Times, October 8,
1868; Opelousas Courier, October 3, 1868; "Rousseau's District Report,"
pp. 308-309; John R. Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana (through 1868)
(Baltimore, 1910), 227-28; Carolyn E. DeLatte, "The St. Landry Riot: A
Forgotten Incident of Reconstruction Violence," Louisiana^History, XVII
(Winter, 1976), 45-49; Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku KLux
Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (New York, 1971), 128-29;
AAIG Capt. A. E. Hooker to AAIG R. B. Ayres, October 16, 1868, in Dept
La, Letters Reed, 1868, RG 393, NA; House Misc. Docs., 41 Cong., 2
Sess., No. 154, p. 476; Lt. J. M. Lee to Capt. B. T. Hutchins, October 8,
1868, in Senate Exec. Docs., 40 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 15, p. 17; see also
ibid., pp. 1-6.
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Republican newspapers and killed several Republicans.

The need for the

use of troops was manifest, and eventually detachments did reach areas
troubled by violence, but Rousseau's response was not decisive.

The

camnanding general spoke before a gathering of Democratic clubs in New
Orleans and advised them not to riot because the Army would strictly
enforce all laws.

Privately, Rousseau wrote President Johnson that the

"ascendance of the negro [sic] in this state is approaching its
end . . . " and that "A Fair vote will give the state to the
O

democrats. . . . "

Rousseau probably based this prediction on the

increased registration of whites, but also on the effect of the terror
tactics of the Democrats.

Despite the general's opinion, the number of

votes cast for Warmoth six months before indicated that a "fair vote"
would be very close and might yield another Republican victory.
Continuing violence pnonpted Rousseau to request that two more
regiments be sent to Louisiana.

A request for so many troops was

unusual, and Rousseau knew that at most only a few companies could be
spared from other departments.

He also asked General Reynolds in Texas

to send him two "complete" Gatling guns, weapons that would be useful in
combating riotous mobs.

In response to these requests, Adjutant

General Townsend ordered Mississippi oanmander Major General Alvan C.
^Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, October 7, 1868; Ficklen,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 226; New York Times, October 6 and 29,
1868; Rousseau to Johnson, October 4, 1868, in Johnson Papers; Rousseau
to Ulysses S. Grant, October 20, 1868, in U. S. Grant Papers (Manu
script Division, Library of Congress); "Rousseau's District Report," p.
303; New Orleans Times, October 20, 1868. Capt. C. E. Farrand (Caddo &
Bossier Parishes) to AAAG George Baldey, November 27, 1868, in Dist La,
Letters Reed, 1868; Lt. Stanton Weaver (Iberia) to Baldey, October 7,
1868, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1868; Baldey to CO, Brashear City,
October 19, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274A; correspondence in RG 393, NA.
See also Joe G. Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge,
1974), 169.
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Gillesn to assign tenporarily as many soldiers as possible to aid
g
Rousseau in Louisiana.
Hie Louisiana commander needed the extra troops.

On October 23 a

white mob Jellied two Negroes accused of setting fire to a store in
Gretna, a town across the river from New Orleans, and fighting broke out
after the killings.

Rousseau canceled the ferry service to Gretna to

prevent more armed whites from crossing the river to join in the vio
lence, and he dispatched two companies of the 1st Infantry to quell the
disturbance.

One company remained on guard in the town until after the

November election
Governor Warmoth implored Rousseau to allow him to form a state
militia to control the violence in the vicinity of New Orleans, where
six Negroes had been killed in street fighting on October 24.

Rousseau

forwarded Warmoth* s letter to Secretary of War Schofield, asking for
specific instructions on Warmoth's request.

Schofield replied that

Rousseau should take whatever action was required to "preserve peace and
good order."

Rousseau decided not to approve Warmoth8s request for a

state militia, which undoubtedly would be composed mostly of blacks.
Prodded by the increasingly dangerous situation in New Orleans, he did,
however, order all unassigned troops into the Crescent City and
^Rousseau to SW John M. Schofield, October 20, 1868; AG E. D.
Townsend to Gen. Alvan C. Gillen, October 22, 1868, both in SW, Annual
Report, 1868-1869, p. xxxiv; Rousseau to (fen. Joseph J. Reynolds,
October 9, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 266, RG 393, N&.
^°New Orleans Times, October 24, 1868; SW, Annual Report, 18681869, p. 304; Trelease, White Tettfor, 134; Baldey to Capt. Placidus Qrd,
October 24 and 26, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274A, RG 393, NA; Rausseau
to Grant, October 24, 1868, in Grant Papers.
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beseeched General Gillem to hurry the reinforcements on to
Louisiana.^"
Another violent incident shewed the need for more troops.

On the

evening of October 26, whites leaving a Democratic rally killed a Negro
in St. Bernard Parish near New Orleans.

Blacks gathered later that

night and killed two white Democrats, one a policeman on his beat, the
other an Italian grocery owner named Pablo Fellio.

A company of the 1st

Infantry commanded by Captain Kinzie Bates marched into St. Bernard the
next day, but not before several other men on each side had been killed
or wounded.

White vigilantes arrested sixty freedmen who were suppos

edly implicated in Fellio’s murder, but they were later released.

An

inspecting officer, Lieutenant Jesse M. Lee, reported that there was "no
civil law in St. Bernard Parish."

Troops were needed in St. Bernard, he

declared, "to protect from outrage men loyal to the government, to
prevent the murder of freed people, and to preserve general peace. . . ."
But the damage had been done? St. Bernard also voted overwhelmingly
Democratic in the coming election.

12

Adding to the confusion in the New Orleans area was the fact that
rival police organizations might at any time challenge each other for
^Warmoth to Rousseau, October 25, 1868, in Warmoth, Politics and
Reconstruction, 76; Rousseau to Schofield, October 26, 1868, and
Schofield to Rousseau, October 27, 1868, both in SW, Annual Report,
1868-1869, p. xxxv; ibid., p. 304. AAAG Thomas Neill to Gen. Robert C.
Buchanan, October 26, 1868, in Dist La, Letters Redd, 1868, and Rousseau
to Gillem, October 24, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 266, both in EG 393, NA.
12New Orleans Times, October 27, 1868; New Orleans Republican,
October 26, 1868; "Rousseau's District Report," pp. 304, 306, 369; House
Exec. Docs., 44 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 30, p. 256; Lt. J. M. Lee to
Capt. B. T. Hutchins, November 27, 1868, in Senate Exec. Docs. , 40
Cong., 3 Sess., No. 15, pp. 18-28, 34; Rousseau to Grant, October 27,
1868, in Grant Papers; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 169-70.
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control of the southern parishes.

The state legislature, at

Governor Warmoth's direction, had passed a law establishing a special
375-man (two-thirds of whom were black) Metropolitan Police force to
operate in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard.
Responsibility for controlling this unusual organization was given to a
board of five legislators and Lieutenant Governor Dunn, the chairman.
However, Warmoth held the actual power over the Metropolitans, and he
employed them like a state militia.

The mayors of municipalities in the

parishes naturally had no control over the special force and therefore
maintained independent police departments.

Armed groups of white

citizens conducted their own unauthorized patrols of the streets.
Rousseau claimed that the majority of all citizens had no respect for
the Metropolitans, whom the general called "practically worthless"
because of poor organization, lack of training, and lew morale.

This

division of authority among the police underscored the alarming
situation in south Louisiana.

13

Rousseau could not abide the possibility of rival police
departments battling for supremacy.

To forestall trouble, he held

meetings with Mayor John Conway of New Orleans, the five members of the
Metropolitan Police Board, and James B. Steedman, a Democrat and former
Union general from Ohio now serving as collector of revenue for New
Orleans.

These conferences led to Steedman"s appointment as chief of

the Metropolitan Police on October 28 and an agreement fcy Conway not to
appoint a new chief for the city police until after the election.

The

^%ew Orleans Times, October 17, 18, 20, 1868; "Rousseau's District
Report," pp. 304-306. A concise description of the problem is in
James E. Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton
Rouge, 1967), 216"! See also Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 170, 177.
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appointment of Steedman calmed the several factions, especially when
Rousseau announced that the A m y would support him.

Rousseau issued a

special pre-election proclamation which prohibited large assemblies and
parades and forbade the carrying of firearms in public.
people to go about their "ordinary vocations."

14

He urged the

Such a proclamation,

issued two or three weeks earlier and backed by an appropriate shew of
force, might have prevented or curtailed the violence which had occurred
during October.
At this point Warmoth asked for a conference with Rousseau to
discuss the unstable situation.

The governor said that he fully

expected rioting in the streets on election day if violence continued to
build at its present rate.

Rousseau replied that Steedman's appointment

and the Army's support would discourage other disturbances.
Nevertheless, Rousseau asked Warmoth to issue a public statement telling
Negroes to remain away from the polls in the interest of peace and civil
order.

Rousseau must have thought that the situation was desperate to

request such a statement from the Republican governor, but the general
had made no secret of his support of Johnson's policy and the Democratic
party.

If black voters heeded Warmoth11s advice, the likelihood of a

Democratic victory in Louisiana would be increased.

Warmoth, of course,

knew that such a proclamation would severely damage the Republicans, but
concluded that the situation was dangerous enough to require a statement
discouraging blacks from voting.

If they voted, there might be riots?

•*^New Orleans Times, October 29, 1868? "Rousseau's District
Report," p. 306.
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if they abstained, the Democrats would probably win the election.
Warmoth was in an unenviable position.

15

A week before the election Rousseau received the extra troops he
had previously requested.
from Mississippi.

Five companies of the 34th Infantry arrived

The total number of troops within New Orleans was now

more than 550.16
Despite all the conferences, proclamations, and additional troops,
Rousseau doubted his ability to keep the peace.

Cn October 29, in two

telegrams to Secretary of War Schofield, Rousseau tried to explain the
tense situation which had developed because of the rival police fac
tions, and he asked whether it was his place to decide the legality of
the Metropolitan Police Law itself.

He also requested orders as to how

to "interpose" his forces between the rival factions in the event of
trouble, or whether he should "intermeddle" at all.

Rousseau reported

that Steedman disliked his job as Metropolitan Police chief and had
threatened to resign.

Rousseau also requested one or two "Men-of-War"

for service along the New Orleans riverfront during the election.
xs pressing," Rousseau concluded.

"Please send a prompt reply."

Schofield responded with three telegrams.

"Time

17

The secretary said that

it was "impossible to give instructions in detail from this distance in
the short time allowed," but that Rousseau already had ample authority
^"Rousseau's District Report," p. 307; Warmoth, Politics and
Reconstruction, 76-77.
16

"Rousseau's District Report," p. 304; Gillem to Buchanan,
October 27, 1868, in Dist La, Letters Reed, 1868, RG 393, NA.
■^Rousseau to Schofield, October 29, 1868, in SW, Annual Report,
1868-1869, pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Rousseau to Schofield, October 29, 1868,
filed with 5 MD, Telegrams Reed, 1868, RG 393, NA.
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to do what was "necessary to preserve the peace."

As the local

commander, Rousseau "must take the responsibility of action.11 A warship
was unavailable, but a revenue cutter had been ordered to New Orleans.
In an "unofficial," personal telegram Schofield was even more emphatic.
You must act decisively to protect all citizens, the war secretary told
Rousseau, and he added that if necessary " [y]our troops would be a good
tenporary substitute for both rival police forces, but of that you must
judge."18
Rousseau did not use his troops as a substitute for the police.
But he did fear that once the tenuous ccaipromise arranged for the
election ended, the New Orleans city police might cpenly challenge the
Metropolitans for supremacy.
the matter.

Once again he asked Schofield's advice on

This time Schofield referred Rousseau's message to Presi

dent Johnson, who wrote on October 31:

"You are expected and authorized

to take all legitimate steps necessary and proper to prevent breaches of
the peace or hostile collisions between citizens."

Johnson further

reminded Rousseau that strictly civil affairs were to be left "to the
proper civil authorities for [their] consideration and settlement."

19

The civil authorities, however, were divided on the issue of
multiple police departments.
Warmoth.

Steedman's administration displeased

The chief had initiated a program to enlarge the Metropolitan

force from 375 men to 500, but had also begun to alter its composition
from two-thirds Negro to all white.

Warmoth complained about Steedman's

18Schofield to Rousseau, October 29, 1868 (two communications), in
SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, p. xxxvi; Schofield to Rousseau,
October 30, 1868, filed with 5 MD, Telegrams Reed, 1868, RG 393, NA.
19Rousseau to Schofield, October 30, 1868, and Johnson to Rousseau,
October 31, 1868, in SW, Annual Report, 1868-1869, p. xxxvii.
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actions to Schofield, who cut off the complaint by simply referring
Warmoth to Johnson's telegram of October 31 to Rousseau.

Moreover, the

Louisiana courts had heard arguments on the legality of the Metropolitan
Police Law, and Rousseau informed Schofield that a decision was expected
soon.

20
Ch the afternoon of October 31 James Steedman abruptly resigned as

chief of the Metropolitan Police after serving only four days in the
position.

Steedman probably did not expect the job to be so difficult.

There had been problems with Steedman's proposed reorganization of the
force, for which Warmoth had criticized him.

Furthermore, there was the

possibility of anted conflict with other area police forces; and, to add
to the confusion, Mayor Conway had offered him the job of New Orleans
city police chief.

Steedman decided that resigning was the test way out

of a perplexing situation.

One of Steedman's assistants took command of

the Metropolitans during the election.

21

During the last few days before the election Rousseau made his
final preparations.

By now detachments had been placed in several towns

where troops normally were not stationed, such as Gretna and Brashear
City.

Rousseau also sent soldiers to the towns of St. Joseph in Tensas

Parish and Franklin in St. Mary Parish to fulfill requests to assist
local authorities, protect the polls, and arrest accused murderers of
Republicans.

22

20Rousseau to Schofield, October 31, 1868; Warmoth to Schofield,
October 29, 1868; Schofield to Warmoth, October 31, 1868, all in ibid.,
pp. xxxvi, xxxviii; New Orleans Times, October 28, 1868.
2% e w Orleans Times, October 30, 31, November 1, 1868.
22Warmoth to Rousseau, October 31, 1868, and M A G Thomas Neill, to
Buchanan, November 2, 1868 (two communications), in Dist La, Letters
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Election day, November 3, 1868, dawned cool and gray.
shops, and cafes were closed in New Orleans.
were stationed in prominent places.

Most stores,

Policemen and soldiers

The election proceeded very

quietly, almost with a "Sabbath-like stillness," according to the New
Orleans Times. Following the advice of Warmoth and other radical
leaders, few Negroes voted in Louisiana.

In spite of the low turnout,

marauding whites murdered three freedmen near Monroe.
from other parishes indicated a peaceful election.

However, reports

23

Grant won the national election handily with 3,013,421 popular
votes and 214 electoral votes to Seymour's 2,706,829 popular votes and
80 electoral votes.

The Democrats carried only eight states, including

two in the South, Georgia and Louisiana.
80,225 votes to Grant's 33,225.
received more than 69,000 votes.

Seymour won Louisiana with

In the April election Warmoth had
Thirty-two Louisiana parishes went

Democratic, including parishes which had been disturbed by pre-election
violence, such as Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, Caddo, Bossier,
St. Landry, and St. Mary.

Sixteen parishes recorded majorities for

^
24
Grant.
Reed, 1868, RG 393, NA.
23
Rousseau to Schofield, November 3 and 4, 1868, in SW, Annual
Report, 1868-1869, pp. xxxviii-xxxix; New Orleans Times, November 4,
1868. Capt. W. W. Webb (Monroe) to AAAG Baldey, November 10, 1868;
Lt. John S. Allanson (Carroll Parish) to Baldey, November 4, 1868;
Capt. A. A. Harback (Tensas Parish) to Capt. William Fletcher,
November 4, 1868, in Dist la, Letters Reed, 1868; Lt. W. O. Cory
(Madison Parish) to AAAG John Tyler, November 5, 1868, Lt. H. R.
Williams (Concordia Parish) to Tyler, November 5, 1868, both in Dept La,
Letters Reed, 1868; all above in RG 393, NA.

^New Orleans Times, November 25, 1868; Alexandria Louisiana
Democrat, November 11, 1868; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana-,
230-31; Trelease, White Tferror, 135-36; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,
172.
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Although Rousseau charged that Republicans had instigated the
pre-election violence, it is evident that the Democrats succeeded in
carrying Louisiana through intimidation of Republican voters, especially
Negroes.

Rousseau had encouraged Warmoth to warn blacks away from the

polls, instead of using the A m y to guarantee every man's right to vote
as Buchanan had done only a few months before.

In fairness to Rousseau,

it became clear during a subsequent congressional investigation of
election violence that the Democrats were better organized at this time
than they had been during Warmoth’s election.

25

But Rousseau responded

slowly to reports of riots in St. Landry and St. Bernard, waited until
the eve of the election to position troops in other parishes where
violence had already occurred, and did not enforce existing orders
against unauthorized armed patrols, even when such vigilantes rode
within the city of New Orleans itself.
Rousseau's allegiance to the Democratic party was well-known, but
this does not excuse his actions, or lack of them.

Rousseau faced

strengthened Democratic organizations which were determined to carry the
election by whatever means were necessary.

He wanted to avoid a violent

confrontation between the A m y and the Democrats, but in his effort to
prevent such a confrontation the general sometimes failed even to "show
the flag" in areas where intimidation was blatant.

The longer he

neglected to use his troops effectively, the bolder the vigilantes
became.
"^"Rousseau's District Report," pp. 304-308; Rousseau to Johnson,
October 4, 1868, in Johnson Papers; New Orleans Times, November 4, 1868.
The Congressional committee that investigated the Louisiana pre-election
violence took testimony during May, June, and July 1869. The resulting
transcripts filled 681 pages in House Misc. Docs., 41 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 154; see especially pp. 17-39, 177-79.
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At various times during Reconstruction the Democrats complained
loudly about the Army's "bayonet rule" and "military oppression," these
charges being heard especially under Sheridan and in the 1870s when they
were the Democratic rallying cries to overthrow the Republican state
government.

But such complaints could not be made against Rousseau.

On the contrary, Rousseau relaxed his supervision nearly to the point of
negligence and allowed the Democrats almost a free hand in several
parishes of the state.
After the tumult surrounding the election, the remainder of
November passed quietly in Louisiana.

Rousseau ordered the five

companies of the 34th Infantry to return to Mississippi on November 5,
and about the same time, he decided to close cbwn the posts at New
Iberia and Lake Providence.
Rouge and Alexandria.

Hie troops there were later sent to Baton

Social events, circuses, horse races, theatrical

productions, and commercial and agricultural affairs kept Louisianians
occupied until December.^
December too was a placid month filled mostly, but not totally,
with the usual social activities of the holiday season.

On December 25,

to coincide with Christmas, President Johnson issued a Proclamation of
General Amensty to all former Confederates who had not been pardoned.
General Rousseau testified in court as a character witness on Decem
ber 24 and 28 on behalf of an old Army friend fnomi Indiana, former
^Rousseau to Johnson, November 10, 1868, in Johnson Papers; New
Orleans Times, November 14, 15, 21, 1868; Shreveport South-Western,
November ll, 1868. Rousseau to Gillem, November 5, 1868, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 266, and Baldey to Col. George Sykes, November 17, 1868, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 274A, both in RG 393, NA.
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Brigadier General William G. Mank, who was later convicted of mail
fraud.
A comment by the editor of the Alexandria Louisiana Democrat
appears to typify Louisiana in Decarter of 1868 s
Our town# despite the bad weather# has been excessively
lively for the past ten days. We do not know whan we have
seen such solid signs of business and prosperity before. Our
streets are jammed with wagons# carts and otter transportation
tricks# filled with sugar# molasses# cotton# com# potatoes#
fodder and other produce for shipment and for sale. In the
country the planters have nearly all finished with their
various crops# are settling with their freedmen; [and] are
making ready for a big Christmas burst. . . ,28
On January 4# after visiting Governor Warmoth# Rousseau was
suddenly and inexplicably stricken with severe cramps and congestion of
the lower intestinal tract.

His condition worsened rapidly# and at

11:00 p.m. on the night of January 7 he died.

"We have to record# with

a regret heightened by the circumstances# a loss to the people of the
United States# and a graver loss to the people of Louisiana# in the
death of General Lovell H. Rousseau . . .#" intoned the editor of the
New Orleans Times. The Picayune called Rousseau a "distinguished
soldier and noble hearted gentleman. . . . "

The Crescent commented that

the general was an "honorable and worthy champion of liberty ate law"
whose "kind ate impartial rule" would be missed in Louisiana.

Robert

Buchanan# after sadly reporting Rousseau's death to President Johnson#
temporarily assumed command.

29

New Orleans Times# December 1, 2# 8# 25, 1868; tew Orleans Daily
Picayune# December 4# 25# 29# 1868; Francis B. Heitman# Historical
Register ate Dictionary of the United States Amy# 1789-1903 (2 vols. #
Washington# 1903)# I# 687.
28Alexandria Louisiana Democrat# December 23# 1868.
29
New Orleans Daily Picayune# January 6 ate 8, 1869; New Orleans
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According to the New Orleans Times, the sky of Saturday, January 9
"assumed a dark and lowering gloom" as Rousseau's long funeral cortege
assembled.

At 2:00 p.m. almost every store and shop in the city closed

its doors in honor of the departed general.

Thousands of New Orleaneans

lined the sidewalks, standing bareheaded in a slight drizzle, to watch
as the procession passed down Canal Street on its way to Lafayette
Cemetery.

Four companies of the 1st Infantry headed the long line,

followed by the regimental band with drummers tapping their sticks on
the drumrims.

Next in line was a horse-drawn artillery battery and a

cavalry company.

Rousseau's Masonic fraternity brothers and

General Buchanan with the departmental staff preceded the flag draped
casket.

Local Democratic dignitaries followed.

riderless horse led by an enlisted man.

Next walked Rousseau's

Following the horse was the

carriage of the general's wife and four children.

Governor Warmoth,

members of the legislature, foreign consuls, the mayor, and city offi
cials trailed behind.

A reporter for the New Orleans Tines believed

that perhaps it was one of the largest funerals ever held in the city.

30

During the next several days articles appeared in state newspapers
lauding Rousseau, detailing his career, and lamenting his death.

The

Alexandria Louisiana Democrat voiced the praise of many when it said
that Rousseau "respected the feelings and even the prejudices of our
people. . . . "

This comment underscored the reason behind such an

Times, January 6 and 9, 1869; Buchanan to Johnson, January 8, 1869, in
Johnson Papers.
30New Orleans Tines, New Orleans Crescent, New Orleans Daily
Picayune, New Orleans Republican, all dated January 10, 1869.

outpouring of sentiment for a Union general by Southerners,

31

unquestionably Rousseau had been extremely well liked by the white
citizens of the state, and his actions had catered to the white
majority.

To have acted otherwise would have required a complete

personal change for Rousseau.

Like his friend Andrew Johnson, he had

stayed with the Union in its crisis, but he did not support radical
changes after the shooting stopped.

^Shreveport South-Western, January 13, 1869? New Orleans Daily
Picayune, January 12 and 13, 1869? Alexandria Louisiana Democrat,
January 20, 1869? Thibodeaux Sentinel, January 16, 1869? Lake Providence
Carroll Record, January 16, 1869. sie also Sefton, Army and
Recx>nstruction, 216.

CHAPTER VIII
MOWER;

LAST OF THE RADICALS

On January 11, 1869, Robert C. Buchanan again took command of the
Department of Louisiana.

He had held

a temporary commandin 1868,and

he realized that his present position

was only temporary.When a

permanent commander might be selected

or who he would be,Buchanandid

not know.

Nevertheless, he correctly assumed that the duties of his

office required him to take full responsibility for the Army in
Louisiana rather than simply to wait for his replacement to arrive.'*'
Within a few days after taking command Buchanan became involved in
a bitter argument with Governor Henry Clay Warmoth, who alleged that the
general had shown favoritism to ex-Confederates during his former
assignment as commander.

In a letter to U.S. Senator William Pitt

Kellogg, Warmoth wrote that Louisiana Republicans "had no friend in
Genl. Buchanan, and that but little reliance was to be put in his active
cooperation."

The general, who had prided himself on his objectivity

toward all factions during the dangerous days before and after Warmoth's
election the previous year, was outraged at Warmoth's charges.
Defending his actions to Kellogg, Buchanan reminded the Senator that
Congress had "passed certain laws, and I . . . executed them . . . in
accordance with what I believed to be their intent and meaning— as a
■*"00 No. 1, Dept La, January 8, 1869, in GO, 1869, Dept La, RG 393,
NA; New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 9, 1869; New Orleans Crescent,
January 13, 1869.
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Soldier and not as a politician."

Several newspapers obtained and

printed Buchanan's reply to Warmoth's criticisms, which did nothing to
2
improve relations between the two men.
When Buchanan assumed the position of departmental commander, he
did not want to continue as state commander of Louisiana, and therefore
he had to designate someone to fill that vacancy.

Buchanan chose

General Joseph A. Mower, who had been acting commander of the state for
a few months in 1867.

Since that time, however, Mower had been in near

exile on Ship Island in the Gulf of Mexico, occupying himself with the
training of the recently created black regiment, the 39th infantry, and
supervising the military prison located on the island.

Buchanan ordered

Mower out of "that desolate place" and back to the civilized environs of
the Crescent City.

Mower arrived in New Orleans on January 25 and
3
assumed his new duties two days later.
Mower's appointment brought a warning blast from the New Orleans

Crescent, whose editor expressed the hope that "the civil power is in
the ascendency, and officials are no longer mere Jacks-in-the-box to be
shoved up or down at the bidding of a military dictator."

Although the

Crescent opposed "the present bastard State government in Louisiana," it
preferred that government to "the exercises of the caprice of a partisan
^Robert C. Buchanan to William P. Kellogg, January [15?], 1869, in
Robert C. Buchanan Papers (Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore).
See, for example, New Orleans Times, January 21, 1869, Lake Providence
Carroll Record, January 30, 1869, Shreveport Daily South-Western,
January 30, 1869, Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, February 3, 1559, New
York Times, January 21, 1869.
3SO No. 13, Dept La, January 19, 1869, in New Orleans Crescent,
January 21, 1869; ibid., January 27 and 28, 1869; John Nankivell (comp.
& ed.), History of the Twenty-fifth Regiment United States Infantry,
1869-1926 (Denver, 1927), 7. The derogatory description of Ship Island
is found in Shreveport South-Western, February 10, 1869.
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general commanding." Accordingly, the Crescent expected that Mower,
"who swept his scythe so unmercifully and with so little discrimination
in the latter part of 1867" had since "learned [the] wisdom" to leave
the civil government alone.^
One of the first important tasks Mower had as state commander was
to receive an inspection tour by the commanding general of the Army,
William T. Sherman.

Mower had served under Sherman during the Civil War

and was on gcod terms with him.

Sherman spent a couple of evenings in

the Crescent City, attending the opera and sightseeing.

On February 10

the visiting general and his aides inspected the river defenses at
Forts Jackson and St. Philip, once described by departmental
Adjutant George Baldey as "not fit for the occupation of human beings."
Although improvements had been made over the years, the forts were still
isolated from towns and cities and provided few comforts or diversions
for the soldiers of the 39th Infantry, who amused themselves fcy throwing
mess hall scraps to the alligators in the moats.

Sherman also went by

riverboat to Alexandria, where he visited the Louisiana State University
campus and talked with his old friend David F. Boyd, president of the
struggling college.

Before the Civil War Sherman had been superinten

dent of the school, and he maintained a fond attachment for the
institution throughout his life.5

Sherman's visit seemed to be a

% e w Orleans Crescent, January 22, 1869; similar tone taken by
Plaquemine Iberville South, January 23, 1869.
%ankivell, History of the TWanty-fifth Regiment, 7; Capt. George
Baldey to AAIG, Dist La, May 31, 1867, in Dept Gulf, vol. 273, AAG Luke
O'Reilly to CO, Fort Jackson, February 9, 1969, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274A,
both in RG 393, NA; Harry W. Pfanz, "Soldiering in the South During the
Reconstruction Period, 1865-1877," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University, 1958), 408-409; New Orleans Crescent, February 9 and
10, 1869; William T. Sherman to David F. Boyd, February 22, 1869, in
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pleasant one.

However, if Buchanan and Mower expected to learn from the

commanding general the identity of a permanent commander for the
Department of Louisiana they were disappointed.
Quite possibly Sherman knew of the bill in Congress, passed in
early March, which reduced the size of the A m y and consequently called
for the redisposition of troops throughout the nation.

Buchanan learned

from a friend in Washington that his regiment, the 1st Infantry, had
been assigned to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Unless he was ordered to

remain on detached assignment in Louisiana, Buchanan would be leaving
the state soon.

6

At about this same time, the War Department ordered

the transfer of the 20th Infantry from Louisiana to Minnesota.

This

meant that two regiments experienced in dealing with Reconstruction
7
problems in Louisiana were to be removed simultaneously.
Reducing the number of soldiers in the A m y necessitated combining
several infantry regiments.

The 19th and 28th joined to become the

19th, and the 39th and 40th united to form a single black regiment, the
25th.

The men of the 28th moved to Louisiana from Arkansas, and the

40th came to Louisiana from South Carolina.

The old 19th also shifted

William T. Sherman Letters/David F. Boyd Family Papers (Louisiana State
University Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Baton Rouge) j
Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, February 17, 1869.
^Major George Gibson to Buchanan, February 19, 1869, filed with 5
MD, Telegrams Reed, 1869, RG 393, NA. The regiment's orders were later
changed, and it was sent instead to the Great Lakes area. See New
Orleans Crescent, March 26, 1869.
7
Mower's Annual Report, 1869, (hereinafter cited as "Report of
Mower"), in House Exec. Docs., 41 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, SW, Annual
Report, 1869-1870, p. 97.
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some of its troops down from Arkansas, leaving Little Rock, garrisoned
O

by six companies, the only post in that state.
Adding to the confusion of these consolidations and troop movements
were Buchanan's orders to close down the military posts at Shreveport,
Alexandria, Monroe, and Amite.

Apparently Congress and the War Depart

ment ordered these closings and similar ones in other states to save
money.

Building maintenance or rent at these places cost thousands of

dollars each year, and the supplying of several posts in different areas
of the state added to the cost.

The soldiers of the 1st and 20th

regiments on duty in Shreveport, Alexandria, Monroe, and Amite moved to
either Jackson Barracks or Greenville Barracks and prepared to leave the
state.

These posts were closed despite Louisiana’s demonstrated need

for close supervision, but no contingency plans were made to reopen them
in the event of trouble.
some of them prematurely.

The Army soon learned that it had abandoned
9

The orders closing several posts pleased most white Louisianians,
but the War Department released another order which surprised many
people in the state.

President Grant asked Phil Sheridan to resume

command of Louisiana.

Announcement of the new orders disappointed

Sheridan as much as Louisiana's Democrats.

The little general

8Ibid.; Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of
the United States Army, 1789-1903 {2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, llVF
Nankxvell, History of the Twenty-fifth Regiment, 8-13.
^"Report of Mower," p. 96; AAAG Thomas Neill to Joseph A. Mower,
March 1 and 5, 1869, in Dept Gulf, vol. 266, AAG Luke O'Reilly to CO,
Amite, February 26, 1869, in Dept Gulf, vol. 274A, both in RG 393, NA;
Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, March 17, 1869. Apparently, Congress
applied pressure on the Army to close down posts to save money. See
William T. Sherman's endorsement on Montgomery Meigs to Sherman,
March 30, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG 393, NA.
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previously had told Grant that he wanted nothing moire to do with
Louisiana's Byzantine politics, and that he would serve there again only
on Grant's direct orders.
Within a few days the orders were changed.

Sheridan, recently

promoted to the rank of lieutaiant general, was given coranand of the
Indian-fighting A m y in the huge Division of the Missouri.

Major

General Oliver O. Howard, director of the Freedman's Bureau, drew the
Louisiana assignment.
, 10
command.

Until Howard arrived, Joe Mower assured temporary

As Mower prepared for Howard's arrival, ha learned that the
one-armed Civil War hero would remain in Washington as superintendent of
the Freedman's Bureau.

Comnand of the Department of Louisiana, rejected

by two of the Amy's senior generals, fell by default to Mower.11
During March, Mower and his subordinates processed more than one
hundred and fifty white recruits who had arrived in Mew Orleans from
depots in the North.

The replacements were assigned to posts at New

Orleans, Jackson Barracks, and Baton Rouge.
The rookie soldiers received uniforms dispensed by the
quartermaster from old stocks left over from the Civil War.

Hie

trousers and jackets rarely fitted properly, and the soldiers had to
have them altered by a company or civilian tailor.

The paymaster

•^GQ No. 10, AGO, March 5, 1869, in New Orleans Crescent, March 7,
1869; ibid., March 9 and 17, 1869; Philip H. Sheridan to Ulysses S.
Grant, February 19, 1869, in Philip H. Sheridan Papers (Autograph
Letters) (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress); GO No. 18, AGO,
March 16, 1869, in Edward McPherson, Hie Political History of the United
States of America During the Period of Reconstruction, 1865-1870 (2nd
ed. originally pub. 1875; reprinted New York, 1969), 424-25.
Report of Mower," p. 97; New Orleans Crescent, April 2, 1869;
New Orleans Times, April 2, 1869; New Orleans Bee, April 3, 1869.
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deducted the cost of any alterations from a private's beginning pay of
sixteen dollars per month.

Infrequently, individual commanders

outfitted their man with distinctive items of wearing apparel.

For

example, using his own money, Major Robert H. Offley purchased straw
hats for the men of his ccstpany, in place of the standard blue kepi
which most soldiers wore.
The troops were assigned to deteriorating old barracks and
consequently spent considerable amounts of time repairing their roofs,
walls, and windows.

Tbs buildings were sparsely furnished.

Rows of

wooden bunks lined the walls, with footlockers and wall pegs for
personal belongings and uniforms.

The soldiers followed the standard

training exercises: close order drill, manual of arms, guard mount, care
of weapons, and target practice.

Few of them were proficient with their

rifles.12
However, standard infantry units, such as those to which most of
the recruits were assigned, did not always meet the commander's needs.
Cavalry was more mobile and better suited than infantry to operate at
some distance from regular garrisons, especially in the interior of the
state, where Republicans ccaplained of a lack of protection from vigi
lantes and desperadoes.

Moreover, if called for by the civil

^% e w Orleans Bee, March 16, 1869? Inspector Thomas Neill to AAG,
Dept La, February 19, 1869, in Dept la, Letters Reed, 1869, RG 393, NA;
Pfanz, "Soldiering in the South," 262-65, 307-308, 369-74, 378-84?
Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between TWo wars: Army Life
and Reforms, 1865-1898 (New York, 1970), 15, 19. Examples of correspondence relating to uniforms are Capt. John B. Johnson to AAIG L. P.
Graham, March 23, 1868, in Dept Gulf, vol. 273; Capt, A. E. Hooker to
AAAG, 5 Md, June 30, 1868, in 5 MD, Letters Reed, 1868? Capt. Kinzie
Bates to AAAG, Dist La, July 10, 1868, in Dist La, Letters Reed, 1868,
RG 393, NA. Report of Quarterly Target Practice by Lt. Owen J. Sweet to
AAAG, Dept la, December 31, 1869, filed in Dept la, Letters Reed, 1870,
RG 393, NA.
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authorities, cavalry could reach the site of a riot more quickly than
infantry.

Three cavalry companies had been on duty in Louisiana, but in

order to fulfill the reorganization requirements, they had been sent to
the Texas frontier.

Therefore, Mower requested permission of the War

Department to purchase sate horses and mount some of his infantry
companies as cavalry.'*'3
General Sherman refused Mower’s request to buy horses, saying that
instead every effort should be made toward "a thorough and systematic
reduction in expenses" of the A m y in Louisiana.

Giving advice on the

use of troops, the commanding general told Mower to intervene in civil
affairs only whan "the Civil Authorities confess themselves powerless.
If Cavalry is needed in upper Louisiana and Arkansas," Sherman concluded,
"I may order a few companies from Texas."
disappointed Mower.

14

Undoubtedly Sherman’s reply

The lack of mounted troops reduced the speed with

which his orders could be carried out.

The decreasing number of

seasoned troops in Louisiana also reduced the Amy's effectiveness.
The 20th Infantry was the next veteran regiment to leave Louisiana.
On April 4 it followed the 1st Infantry to new duty stations in the
North.

Citizens from the Baton Rouge vicinity gathered at the mayor's

office to pay tribute to the officers and men of the 20th.
Colonel George Sykes, the regiment's commander, said he had learned
"with regret" that the 20th was moving to Minnesota.

A special citizens

committee tendered their "sincere thanks" to Sykes and the soldiers of
l%fcwer to AG Edward D. Townsend, April 2, 1869, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 266, RG 393, NA.
^Sherman to Mower, April 3, 1869, filed with 5 MD, Telegrams Reed,
1869, RG 393, NA.
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the regiment for their "kindness and courtesy on the discharge of their
official duties" while in Baton Rouge.

The committee also proclaimed

its "wannest wishes" for the regiment's "welfare and happiness" in its
future assignments.

The West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter noted that the

departure of the 20th would deprive local music lovers of concerts by
the regiment’s "excellent amateur minstrel band" which had performed
regularly on Friday and Saturday nights.

Within a few days, elements of

the 19th Infantry arrived to take over the garrison at Baton Rouge.

15

The reduced number of troops in the state prompted Mower to
continue Buchanan's consolidation program.

Mower ordered the closing of

the post in New Orleans and the transfer of the troops from their rented
billets in the city to the main post of Jackson Barracks.

Only head

quarters orderlies and staff officers would remain in New Orleans.

The

barracks at Greenville were to be closed by the end of April, after the
39th and 40th regiments were consolidated to form the 25th.
ordered troops withdrawn from Shreveport on April 12.

Mower

Upon their

departure, they took all the movable supplies with them to the post at
Jefferson, Texas.

All the military buildings in Shreveport, including

the officers quarters, adjutant's office, barracks, kitchen, ness hall,
hospital, and stable, were sold at auction on April 19.

16

Meanwhile, troubles in south Louisiana caused Republicans to call
for the Army's assistance.

Rowdies and brigands had set upon blacks and

l%aton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, April 5, 1869? West Baton Rouge
Sugar Planter, February 6, 1869; Capt. J. B. Mulligan to AAAG Baldey,
April 19, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG 393, NA.
■^Sherman to Mower, April 3, 1869, filed with 5 MD, Telegrams Reed,
1869, RG 393, NA; New Orleans Crescent, April 6 and 10, 1869? "Report of
Mower," p. 97; Shreveport South-Western, April 14, 1869.
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Republicans in St. Landry Parish.

Local authorities asked the governor

to send in the state militia, and in turn Warmoth asked Mower to dis
patch troops to Opelousas.

Ttoo years before Mower had unhesitatingly

ordered squads or even companies of soldiers to help Republican
officials.

In this case, however, he telegraphed General Sherman,

asking both for permission to give military help and for advice on how
to do it.
Mower.

Sherman approved sending the troops, leaving the details to

Sherman also wanted reports of murders in the parish

investigated without delay.

17

Accordingly, on April 27 Mower ordered Company H of the 25th
(Negro) Infantry to Opelousas, telling Captain Frank M. Coxe to keep his
men "entirely aloof from the citizens" and not to interfere in civil
affairs.

Mower believed that the soldiers' presence served "to quiet

the public mind and hold in check the lawless portion of the
inhabitants. . . . "

Company H remained in Opelousas for more than five

months.18
Captain Coxe found Opelousas citizens "laboring under great
political agitation. . . . The Democrats . . . evince[d] open hostility
to the reconstruction acts, both by incendiary language and by their
general deportment towards the civil officers of the Government."

The

local whites displayed "a temper (only suppressed fcy the presence of
troops) which if uncontrolled would jeopardize the life of any
•^Mower to Henry Clay Warmoth, April 17, 1869, in Dept Gulf, vol.
266; Sherman to Mower, April 21, 1869, filed with 5 MD, Telegrams Reed,
1869, both in RG 393, NA.
18,1Report of Mower," pp. 98-99; AAAG Baldey to Capt. Frank M. Coxe,
April 27, 1869, in Dept Gulf, vol. 266, RG 393, NA.
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Republican in his public expression of opinion."

The captain concluded
IQ

that loyal Union men lived "in hourly dread of our removal. . . .
Stationing black troops in the conservative stronghold of Opelousas
caused tempers to flare.

Several citizens ("noted debauchers and

outlaws," according to Coxe) threatened sate soldiers as they walked to
a dance in town.

The soldiers ran back to camp with gunshots and

catcalls ringing in their ears.

When Coxe persuaded a local judge to

hold a hearing on the incident, a fight almost broke out in the court”
roan between spectators and soldiers.

The captain quit trying to have

the rowdies arrested because the case would have teen "presented to a
jury of men pledged to save from punishment their own Confederates."

20

Having persuaded Mower to send troops to one town, Warmoth was
emboldened to ask for similar assistance in other places.

Mien Republi

cans in Franklin Parish wanted the Army to enforce the peace in
Winnsboro, Mower ordered Lieutenant Richard Vance a company of the 19th
Infantry from Baton Rouge to "protect, aid and sustain the civil
authorities. . . . "

But Mower, again unwilling to rely in his own

judgment, requested approval from Washington.

Adjutant General E. D.

Townsend replied that Sherman approved of the temporary garrison.

Mower

believed that Franklin Parish was in "the worst portion of the
State, . . . infested fcy a gang of desperadoes and thieves, who defy and
ignore the local civil authorities entirely."

Corroborating Mower's

^Coxe to Baldey, May 9 and 10, 1868, in Dept La, Letters Reod,
1869, RG 393, NA. Coxe's May 9 report is partially summarized in Senate
Exec. Docs., 41 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 16, Pt. 1, p. 15. See also
Opelousas Journal, May 15, 1869.
20Coxe to Baldey, June 28, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG
393, NA; Cpelousas Journal, July 10, 1869.
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opinion, Lieutenant Vance reported that vfaipping of black field hands
was commonplace, civil law appeared to have broken down completely, and
drunken citizens raced horses up and down the streets of Wirmsboro.
Vance's detachment remained in the town until October.

21

About two weeks after sending troops to Wirmsboro, Mower learned
that the state supreme court had declared the Metropolitan Police a
legal and proper law enforcement agency, a ruling that angered the local
police departments in the parishes surrounding New Orleans.

legally

empowered by the court to extend their authority, the Metropolitans
established a precinct station in Jefferson Parish.
On May 18 the Jefferson police fired on the Metropolitans,
threatening to bring on the full-scale inter-police battle that
General Rousseau had feared might occur the previous year.
demanded that the military intervene.

Warmoth

Without hesitating, Mower ordered

a company of the 25th Infantry to move into the troubled area.

In this

case, simply the foreknowledge of a quick military response dispersed
the rioters.

Troops bivouacked near the precinct station for several

days before returning to Jackson Barracks.

As he had done before, Mower

asked for and received approval of his conduct from the War Department.
However, the New Orleans Times condemned the interference in civil
affairs by the "hireling soldiery."

22

21Warmoth to Mower, April 30, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869;
Baldey to CO, detachment of the 19th Infantry, May 3, 1869, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 266; Mower to Townsend, May 4, 1869, and Townsend to Mower,
May 5, 1869, filed with 5 MD, Telegrams Reed, 1869, all in EG 393, NA.
"Report of Mower," p. 98. Richard Vance to Baldey, August 6, 1869, in
Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG 393, NA. A summary of Vance's report is
in Senate Exec. Docs., 41 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 16, Pt. 1, p. 16.
22"Report of Mower," p. 98; New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 20,
1869; New Orleans Times, May 20, 1869. Warmoth to Mower, May 18, 1869,
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But no sooner was one fire dampened than another broke out.

Former

Union A m y Major Ross Wilkinson, a prominent Republican in Caddo Parish,
reported a threat had been made against his life by unnamed
"desperadoes." Subsequently Mower received Warmoth8s familiar plea for
troops.

Cooperating with Mower, General Joseph Reynolds, connander of

Texas, temporarily provided Company F, 6th Cavalry, to patrol Caddo,
protect Wilkinson, and arrest seme men accused of horse stealing.
The use of troops for such domestic duties displeased
General Sherman in Washington.

He wanted Warmoth to certify in writing

that military assitance was necessary.

Nevertheless, the post at

Shreveport, so carefully dismantled only a few weeks before, was
temporarily reestablished.

Wilkinson later offered the use of his

plantation as a base for the cavalry.

23

Meanwhile, the embers flamed again in Jefferson.

Warmoth wanted

Mower to reassign a detachment to the town because a local judge had
created a crisis by issuing an injunction against the Metropolitan
Police, prohibiting "than from performing their duty in Jefferson City
and parish."
Mower sent two companies of the 25th Infantry and two Gatling guns
to the town, stationing than near the courthouse.

When Secretary of

War John A. Rawlins learned that troops had returned to Jefferson, he
in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869; Mower to Sherman, May 19, 1869, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 266; Townsend to Mower, May 19, 1869, filed with 5 MD,
Telegrams Reed, 1869, all in RG 393, NA.
23Warmoth to Mower, May 22, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869;
Townsend to Mower, May 31, 1869, Sherman to Mower, May 24, 1869, filed
with 5 MD, Telegrams Reed, 1869; Mower to Warmoth, June 5, 1869, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 266, all in RG 393, NA. Senate Exec. Does., 41Cong., 3
Sess., No. 16, Pt. 1, p. 5; "Report of Mower," p. 99.
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admonished Mower to use his forces "only to preserve the peace" in time
of dire need.

Upon receiving the secretary's oaiment, Mower withdrew

the troops, whose presence had possibly prevented another riot.

24

The New Orleans Picayune criticized Mower for ordering the recent
troop movements, calling him Warmoth's "willing lieutenant."
Picayune's editorialist lamented;
military?

The

"Are we never to have done with the

Must the gleam of the sabre and the glint of the bayonet meet

us which way so ever we turn?"
The newspaperman would have been pleased to read General Sherman's
latest letter to Mower.

The General in Chief wrote that henceforth

i

"troops must not be used to do the work of Police . . . and . . . sol
diers should only be called on when unlawful assemblages occur too large
to be controlled by the civil powers of the State."
to tell Governor Warmoth about these orders.

Sherman told Mower

25

The situation in Louisiana was more difficult than Sherman could
appreciate in Washington.

For example, at Shreveport the sheriff,

fearing a violent attempt to free his prisoners, asked Captain Joseph
Kerin for a squad of soldiers to guard the parish jail.

(In describing

the jail, a local physician said that "the notorious Black Hole of
Calcutta could possibly be no worse than . . . this shameful sink of
infection.")

The squad stood guard at the lockup for nine days in July.

24Mower to Townsend, June 14 and 17, 1869, Mower to Warmoth,
June 14, 1869, Baldey to Lt. Col. E. W. Hinks, June 14, 1869, all in
Dept Gulf, vol. 266; Warmoth to Mower, June 15, 1869, in Dept La,
Letters Reed, 1869; Townsend to Mower, June 17, 1869, filed with 5 MD,
Telegrams Recsd, 1869, all in RG 393, NA.
2% e w Orleans Daily Picayune, June 16 and 17, 1869; Townsend to
Mower, June 22, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA.
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At the sheriff's request, Kerin later ordered soldiers to act as
temporary jail guards in October and November.

26

The remainder of the summer passed quietly, and Warmoth advised
Mower in September that the troops could be withdrawn from Opelousas and
Winnsboro.

Coxe8s company returned to Jackson Barracks, against the

judgment of Captain Coxe, who reported that "loyal citizens . . . ear
nestly desire our retention at this statical. . . . "
probably pleased to leave Opelousas.

The soldiers were

They had been living in leaky

tents for five months and looked forward to the security and warmth of
their barracks.

Certainly, most of the town's white citizens expressed

"a sense of relief" when the troops inarched away.

27

Following the final

session of the district court at Winnsboro, Lieutenant Vance and his
detachment returned to Baton Rouge.

Warmoth told Mower that using the

troops had been necessary to quiet Franklin Parish and protect the
court.28
However, Warmoth1s requests for military assistance had not ended.
He soon asked for troops to protact prisoners in the Ouachita Parish
jail in Monroe.

Ranembering Sherman's past warnings, Mower doubted the

advisability of dispatching soldiers before violence had occurred.

His

reluctance represented quite a change in attitude by the general who,
26Joseph Kerin to Baldey, July 4 and 12, October 1, 1869, Kerin
to HQ, Dept La, November 30, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG
393, NA.
27Coxe to Baldey, September 23, 1869; Warmoth to Mower,
September 27, 1869, ibid, "Report of Mower," p. 99; Opelousas Journal,
October 23, 1869.
28"Report of Mower," p. 99; Warmoth to Mower, October 26, 1869, in
Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG 393, NA; Baton Rouge Tri-weekly
Advocate, October 29, 1869.
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next to Sheridan, was most closely associated with the Radical
Republicans.
Under these circumstances, Mower requested orders from Washington.
Replying through Adjutant General Townsend, General Sherman left to
Mower's "discretion the power to aid, or withhold aid from, the civil
power," but reminded him "that the State authorities should exhaust
their power first." No records have been found Indicating that Mower
sent any troops to Monroe at that time.

29

Mower thankfully welcomed the quietude of December, when, after
studying inspection reports, he recommended closing the distant and
uncomfortable post on Ship Island in the Gulf of Mexico.

Toward the end

of the month, the Secretary of War approved the abandonment of Ship
Island and suggested that the companies of troops there be relocated to
on

Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

Undoubtedly, Mower would have liked

personally to supervise the closing of Ship Island, the post where he
had spent several months separated from the mainland and the mainstream
of military and political affairs.

However, that was not to be.

In early January 1870, Mower contracted a severe case of pneumonia.
Army and civilian doctors tried, but could not effect a cure.
night of January 6 Mower died at the age of forty-seven.

On the

Unlike the

outpouring of grief for Rousseau the year before, Louisiana newspapers
and citizens took only perfunctory notice of Mower's death.

31

29Warmoth to Mower, October 15, 1869; Townsend bo Mower, (emphasis
in the original), November 9, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG
393, NA.
30Lt. Col. R. B. Ayres to AAAG, Dept La; Townsend to Mower, both
dated December 29, 1869, in Dept La, Letters Reed, 1869, RG 393, NA.
3*Baldey to Townsend, January 6, 1870, in Dept Gulf, vol. 266, RG
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Adjutant General Townsend appointed Colonel Charles H. Smith
temporary commander of the Louisiana department.

Smith, then commanding

troops at Little Bock, Arkansas, ordered the Louisiana headquarters
staff to expect his arrival at New Orleans within a week.
Meanwhile, the staff made the necessary arrangements for Mower's
funeral, which was held on January 8.

Governor Warmoth, military

officers, and local dignitaries attended the ceremonies.

32

Mower's postwar service drew respectful comments from the Army and
Nayy Journal, which noted that the general had twice been called upon to
command troops in Louisiana, "one of the worst States to manage" in the
South.

General Sherman remembered Mower as "an officer in whom I had

the utmost confidence and in whose future I had the most unbounded
faith."

33

Mower's two periods of command in Louisiana differed from each
other in several respects.

In 1869 Mower served for a year, whereas in

1867 he had commanded only for three months.

More importantly, in 1869

he had to take account of the authority of a civilian governor.

Warmoth

had been officially elected and was a capable and skillful executive.
He wielded many of the powers formerly held by the military commander
393, NA; Baldey to John Ludeling, January 7, 1870, in James G. Talia
ferro & Family Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge); New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 7,
1870; New Orleans Times, January 7, 1870; New Orleans Bee, January 8,
1870; Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, January 8, 1870; Monroe Ouachita
Telegraph, January 15, 1870.
^Gen. C. H. Smith to Baldey, January 8, 1870, filed with 5 MD,
Telegrams Reed, 1870; Baldey to Smith, January 8, 1870, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 266, RG 393, NA.
^Army and Navy Journal, January 15, 1870, vol. VII, No. 22, p.
333; Sherman to Baldey, January 7, 1870, filed with 5 MD, Telegrams
Reed, 1870, RG 393, NA.
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and at the same time courted the Army and knew its value to his
Republican administration.

Warmoth was much more powerful and influen

tial than Benjamin Flanders? who had been dominated by Mower in 1867.
Moreover, Mower felt restraints of protocol in 1869 that were
absent in 1867.

In 1869 Mower could not remove and appoint office

holders on his own.

New appointments were made by Warmoth, and the

military had little or no say in who was chosen.

In 1867 Mower could

(and did) send troops to any potential trouble spot in the state on his
own orders.

In 1869 Mower acted mostly in response to Warmoth's

requests for military assistance, and usually the general sought
retroactive approval of his actions from the War Department.
Another restraining influence on Mower was the attitude of
General Sherman.

Sherman shared the opinion of many white Louisianians

who believed that frequent military assistance to local Republicans was
uncalled for and more dangerous than helpful.

Mower, who lad not

completely shed his Radical heritage, soon realized that the tone of
Reconstruction had changed militarily and politically.

The Republicans

in Louisiana expected the Army's aid at any time, but officials in
Washington were more reluctant to condone the use of soldiers as local
policemen.

The sharp edge of the Reconstruction crusade had worn dull,

and Mower may have doubted the usefulness of the Army to affect or main
tain social change.

Mower, the acolyte who had served at Sheridan's

Radical altar, could no longer have counted on the unstinting support of
higher command.
With Mower gone and Smith temporarily in charge, Louisiana
Democrats wondered about the future of their state and their party under
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the altering conditions of Reconstruction and the apparent decreasing
military influence.

CHAPTER IX
REYNOLDS AND THE DECLINE OF WARMOTH
In January 1870 the Monroe Ouachita Telegraph ran an editorial
which reflected the hopes of many Democrats.

"The reconstruction of the

South is nearly finished up, and so too is the Radical party.

The two

have been fast friends and will espire together."^ At this tine only
one Southern state, Tennessee, had shaken off Radical control, but
Virginia and North Carolina Democrats were consolidating their power and
would elect Conservative governors and legislative majorities later in
1870.

Looking at these positive signs, Louisiana Democrats hoped that

the time of redemption was near at hand for the Pelican State.
Louisiana Republicans were on the verge of an open split in their party,
and the Army in the state appeared to be moribund.

However, obituaries

in either case would have been premature.
Colonel Charles H. smith, the acting commander of Louisiana, made
decisions concerning troop dispositions in the department from his
office in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Smith considered and recommended

approval of General Mower's proposal to close the post and prison on
Ship Island.

In late March, after communicating with his superiors at

the headquarters of the Military Division of the South at Louisville,
Kentucky, Smith ordered the transfer of soldiers from Ship Island to
other posts in Louisiana and reestablished the prison at Forts Jackson
^Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, January 22, 1870.
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and St. Philip.

The relocation was completed in April.

In the

meantime, Smith issued orders through two special aides in New Orleans,
Adjutants George Baldey and lake O'Reilly.

2

Before Smith's arrival in the Crescent City, Captain Baldey and
Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Hinks, commanding Jackson Barracks, faced a
minor crisis in the capital.

Prominent Democrats called for a public

meeting to protest Governor Warmoth's proposed bill in the legislature
designed to enable him to appoint his own election supervisors.

Similar

public convocations in the past had disintegrated into riots, and Baldey
and Hinks were determined to prevent that from happening again.

They

made no secret of the fact that two companies of the 25th (Negro)
Infantry, reinforced by two Gatling guns, were on alert in case of
violence in the streets.

However, the troops were kept outside the city.

At the meeting more than one thousand persons listened attentively
while former sheriff Harry T. Hays and other speakers railed against
Warmoth's political and economic policies, particularly the governor's
personal command of the Metropolitan Police.

Fortunately the crowd

dispersed quietly, and the troops resumed their routine duties at their
barracks.^
On March 31, 1870, the Adjutant General's Office in Washington
issued an order reshuffling the military ccnmands in the South and
% e w Orleans Daily Picayune, January 25, 1870. Charles H. Snith to
AG James B. Fry (MilDivSouth), January 24, February 4 and 16, 1870, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 266; AAAG George Baldey to Brig. Gen. Frederic Myers,
March 19, 1870, ibid.; Major Z. R. Bliss to Baldey, January 27 and
April 3, 1870, in Dept La, Letters Reed., 1870, RG 393, NA.
■^New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 30, 31, and February 1, 1870;
Baldey to Edward W. Hinks, January 31, February 2, 1870, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 266, RG 393, NA.
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separating Arkansas and Louisiana.

The orders shifted Arkansas to the

Department of Missouri and placed Louisiana in the newly designated
Department of Texas, comprised of Texas and Louisiana.

General Joseph J.

Reynolds, commander of troops in Texas, officially took ccstsnand of the
new department on April 16.

Rather than move to New Orleans, Reynolds,

who was involved in Texas politics, decided to keep his headquarters in
Austin.^
Accompanying this change in departmental structure, another order
directed the 25th Infantry to move from Louisiana to the Texas frontier
and required the 19th regiment to garrison Louisiana by itself.

By June

all of the troopers of the black regiment had been transferred to Texas.
During April and May Colonel smith redistributed the remaining six
companies of the 19th Infantry from Little Rock to posts at Jackson
5
Barracks, Baton Rouge, and Forts Jackson, St. Philip, and Pike.
Completing the redistribution, Company B of the 19th moved to Shreveport,
replacing Company F of the 6th Cavalry, which returned to its regular
duty station, Fort Griffin, Texas.6
4G0 No . 35, AGO, March 31, 1870, in House Exec. Docs., 41 Cong.,
3 Sess., No. 1 (SW, Annual Report, 1870-1871), p. 36; GO No. 1, Dept
Texas, April 16, 1870, in New Orleans Republican, April 26, 1870;
William L. Richter, "The Army in Texas-During Reconstruction, 1865-1870"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1970),
312-15.
^John Nankivell (ccmp. & ed.), History of the Twenty-fifth Regiment
of United States Infantry, 1869-1926 (Denver, 1927) , 15; AAAG H. Clay
Wood to Hinks, April 21, 1870, in Dept Texas, Letters Sent; C. H. Smith
to Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds, April 22 (two communications), in Dept
Texas, Letters Reed; Smith to AAG, Dept Texas, May 25 and 26, 1870,
ibid., RG 393, NA. Annual Report of the Dept Texas, 1870, (Microcopy
M^l9, reel 828), RG 94, NA.
^Capt. Joseph Kerin to AAG/Dept Texas, April 29, 1870, in Dept
Texas, Letters Reed; AAG Wood to Kerin, May 7, 1870, in Dept Texas,
Letters Sent, RG 393, NA.
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The decreasing strength of the A m y in Louisiana probably made
Governor Warmoth feel somewhat uneasy, but he had already taken steps to
provide his administration with its own armed support.

In April the

Louisiana legislature had passed a bill, sponsored by the governor,
creating the state's first postwar militia.

As governor, Warmoth

commanded the state troops, and he chose as adjutant general James
Longstreet, an important Confederate general who had become a
Republican.

Longstreet had resided in Louisiana since March 1869, when

President Grant had appointed him surveyor of customs for the port of
New Orleans.

During the simmer of 1870 Longstreet organized and trained
7
the militia, which was composed almost entirely of Negroes.
Warmoth realized that his unproven militia would be inadequate to

protect the polls in the state's November elections, and he wanted the
Army to strengthen Louisiana's garrisons.

An outbreak of yellow fever

had prompted General Smith to move three companies of soldiers from
their Louisiana posts to temporary quarters on Ship Island.

Warmoth

wanted these troops returned to the mainland by the time of the
election.

Moreover, the governor and other Republican officials asked

General Reynolds to send additional troops to aid the 19th Infantry
before the polls opened.

However, no reinforcements were sent.

President Grant believed that Louisiana was safe enough, but Florida was
7Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 (Gloucester,
Mass., 1967), 65; Donald B. Sanger and Thomas R. Hay, James Longstreet
(Baton Rouge, 1952), 345-49; Otis A. Singletary, Negro Militia ancT
Reconstruction (Austin, 1957), 13-14, 67; William L. Richter, ‘"Iongstreet; From Rebel to Scalawag," Louisiana History, XI (Sumner, 1970),
215-30.
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not.

Therefore, he directed Reynolds to send two companies of the 19th
O

regiment to Tallahassee for election duty there.
By election day, November 7, the three companies formerly on Ship
Island had returned to Louisiana and, along with three other companies,
were assigned to New Orleans.

According to warmoth, the Crescent City

and Shreveport were the nest likely spots for disturbances during the
voting, and the troops in those towns were especially watchful for
anything unusual.

Lieutenant Colonel Raneyn B. Ayres (carmanding troops

in New Orleans in the absence of Colonel Smith, who had been called to
serve on a special Army board in Washington) reported that election day
was quiet and orderly.

Ayres stationed troops near the Customs House,
9
in the city parks, and on the riverfront levee.
Republicans did very well in tie election.

Warmoth's handpicked

man, former governor Benjamin F. Flanders, won the race for mayor of New
Orleans.

Republicans captured all of Louisiana's congressional seats

and elected a majority of the next state legislature.^
Although November 7 passed quietly in New Orleans and Shreveport, a
riot unexpectedly erupted in Baton Rouge after the polls had closed.
O
AAG Wood to Reynolds, September 13, 1870,
in Dept
Texas, Letters
Sent; C. H. Smith to AAG, Dept Texas, September
13, 1870, in DeptTexas,
Letters Reed; Caddo Parish Sheriff John O'Connor and other Caddo Repub
licans to Reynolds, November 1, 1870, ibid.; Warmoth to Reynolds,
Novariber 3, 1870, in Dept Texas, ibid.; AG Janes Fry to Reynolds,
November 6, 1870, ibid.; all in RG 393, NA.
^ r y to Lt. Col. Rcmeyn B. Ayres, November 2, 1870; Fry to
Reynolds, November 3, 1870; Ayres to Fry, November 25, 1870, ibid.;
Reynolds to CO, Shreveport, Novariber 3, 1870; Reynolds to Henry Clay
Warmoth, Novariber 4, 1870, in Dept Texas, Letters Sent, RG 393, NA.
l°Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge,
1974), 185-86; John S. Kendall, History of New Orleans (3~vols.,
Chicago, 1922), I, 336-37, 340.
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The reasons for the fighting are unknown, but clashes between armed
blacks and whites left four Negroes dead and about twenty blacks and
whites wounded.

Troops from the local garrison went quickly to the

scene and arrested one Negro and fifty-nine whites, many of whan were
among the town's most prominent citizens.

After the soldiers restored

order, Colonel Ayres sent the U.S. revenue cutter Wilderness from New
Orleans to Baton Rouge with a company of troops commanded by
Captain Edward S. Meyer.

Upon his arrival, Meyer placed Baton Rouge

under martial law, and soldiers patrolled the town's streets for several

,

days.

11
On November 10, three days after the election, a confrontation

occurred between self-styled Negro "militiamen" and sane armed white
citizens in the town of Donaldsonville in Ascension Parish.

An argument

between the two groups developed over the possession of the town’s
ballot boxes and which side should protect than until state officials
took custody of the ballots.

The argument degenerated into fighting

punctuated by gunfire from both sides.

Among those killed were the

mayor and former mayor of Donaldsonville, both white men.

On Novem

ber 11 Colonel Ayres sent Captain William T. Gentry and two companies of
troops to Donaldsonville, and the soldiers soon pacified the town and
Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate, November 12 and December 10, 1870;
New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 11, 1870; Summary of Report of CO,
Baton Rouge, November 14, 1870, in Senate Exec. Docs., 41 Ceng., 3
Sess., No. 16, Pt. 1, p. 17; Ayres to Fry, November 25, 1870, in Dept
Texas, Letters Reed, R3 393, NA. In December the sixty arrested Baton
Rougeans were arraigned on charges of violating the Enforcement Act of
May 30, 1870. Specifically, the men were charged with rioting,
obstructing supervisors of voter registration, and using armed force to
intimidate voters. Because of "insufficient evidence" the charges were
dropped and all of the accused men were released. See Baton Rouge TriWeekly Advocate, December 5, 1870; Weekly Advocate, December 10, 1870;
New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 15, 1870.
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the surrounding area.

A month later one of the companies returned to

Jackson Barracks, but the other remained in Donaldsonville until early
February 1871.12
Despite the post-election disturbances in Baton Rouge and
Donaldsonville, Governor Warmoth viewed the results of the canvass
favorably.

He later called it "the quietest and fairest election ever

held in the State of Louisiana up to that tine."

The New Orleans

Republican echoed the governor's opinion, praising the A m y for
protecting the polls and saving "the city of Baton Rouge fron sack and
pillage. . . . "

The Republican proclaimed that the soldiers were "the

defenders of the weak, the rescuers of the oppressed, and terrible only
to evil-doers."

The newspaper's editorial concluded that "no honest man

can have any objection to the presence of United States troops."

13

In contrast, the New Orleans Times denounced the Army after the
election with the blazoned headline "Have We a Military Government?"
The Times claimed that Warmoth deserved "grave censure for inflicting
upon this city the insult and disgrace of such employment, in a time of
profound peace, of the military forces of the Federal Government." If
the Republicans called out troops for every election "under the pretext
of preserving the peace," the Times editorialist continued, "it would be
wiser to give up all elections and not preserve the forms of them in sad
12New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 10, 11, 12, 1870. Ayres to
Fry, November 25, 1870, Ayres to Wood, November 26, 1870, in Dept Texas,
Letters Reed; Wood to Ayres, December 27, 1870, in Dept Texas, Letters
Sent, RG 393, NA. Company C, 19th Infantry, remained in Donaldsonville
until February 7, 1871. See Dept Texas, Annual Report, 1871, Records of
the AGO (Microcopy M-666, reel 44), RG 94, NA.
^^Henry C. Warmoth, War, Politics, and Reconstruction; Stomy Days
in Louisiana (New York, 1930), 101; New Orleans Republican, November 10,
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mockery of a right we once enjoyed." The writer concluded with the
forlorn hope that this display of military power for partisan political
purposes would be "the last exhibition of the sort ever made in this

city."^
Colonel Smith did not return from his official business in
Washington until January 1871, and therefore missed all the exciting
activities after the election and the subsequent newspaper debate on the
role of the Anry.

To reacquaint himself with his catmand, Smith

inspected the posts and troops in Louisiana during February.

A few

weeks later Smith made use of the information gained on the inspection
when he conferred with General William T. Sherman in New Orleans.

15

After questioning smith and reviewing his own notes, Sherman
recommended several changes in troop dispositions and posts in
Louisiana.

First of all, for reasons that are not clear, Sherman wanted

the main post in the state located at Baton Rouge instead of Jackson
Barracks, near the capital city of New Orleans, where political confron
tations were common.

Furthermore, Sherman recomended closing all posts

in Louisiana except Baton Rouge and Jackson Barracks.

Forts Jackson and

St. Philip (which Sherman called "invested by mosquitoes and otherwise
unfit for the habitations of man . . . ") and Fort Pike (which he called
"utterly useless") deserved to be manned by only small caretaker squads.
Sherman convinced General Reynolds of the economy of his plan.
Accordingly, Reynolds sought Governor Warmoth1s permission to transfer
^N e w Orleans Times, November 8, 1870.
^AAG Wood to Ayres, January 3, 1871, in Dept Texas, Letters Reed,
RG 393, NA; SO No. 30, Dept Texas, February 13, 1871, ibid.
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the military convicts at Forts Jackson and St. Philip to the Louisiana
State Penitentiary.
Daring the summer Reynolds implemented Sherman's plan.

He closed

the post at Shreveport and moved its garrison to Baton Rouge— once again
leaving northern Louisiana without an Army post.

As expected* Warmoth

approved the transfer of military prisoners to the state penitentiary.
The transfer completed, the garrison of the twin forts was ordered to
Baton Rouge.

Colonel Smith ocnmanded that post, which included the

headquarters and six companies (378 men) of the 19th Infantry and a
small detachment at the arsenal.

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Sully

commanded the remaining four companies (238 soldiers) of the regiment at
Jackson Barracks.

17

Thus consolidated by the late summer of 1871, the

Army in Louisiana prepared to face the state's next political crisis.
In 1871 Henry Clay Warmoth still held substantial power in
Louisiana, but he was losing his domination over the state's Republican
party.

Various men had opposed Warmoth from the beginning of his term

as governor in 1868, and now the anti-Warmoth forces had coalesced into
a formidable group that included some of Louisiana's most important
Negro leaders.

Many black politicians had teen angered by Warmoth8s

veto in 1868 of a state civil rights bill.

Warmoth had vetoed the bill

on the practical grounds that its promises of additional rights were
^•^William T. Sherman to Edward D. Townsend, April 21, 1871, ibid. ;
Reynolds to Warmoth, May 3, 1871, Reynolds to C. H. Smith, May 8,~T871,
in Dept Texas, Letters Sent, RG 393, NA.
17SW, Annual Report, 1871-1872, in House Exec. Does., 42 Cong., 2
Sess., No. 1, pp. 96-97. Lt. Charles B. Hallto AAG, Dept Texas, May 25
and June 4, 1871; C. H. Smith to AAG, Dept Texas, June 5, 1871, Warmoth
to Board of Control, Louisiana State Penitentiary, June 6, 1871, in Dept
Texas, Letters Reed; AAG Wbod to Smith, June 16, 1871, in Dept Texas,
Letters Sent, RG 393, NA. Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Advocate, July 12, 1871.
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unrealizable at that time.

Sane black leaders insisted that the law be

on the books whether or not a majority of whites would abide by it.
Moreover, Janes F. Casey, Republican collector of customs for New
Orleans and brother-in-law of President Grant, led a biracial personal
following of his own against the governor.

The ultimate split came in

1871 when Warmoth opposed Casey’s elevation to the U.S. Senate and
persuaded the legislature to elect one of his own supporters, Joseph R.
West, a former Union A m y officer from Louisiana.

After this victory

Warmoth tried to oust Casey from power and called for his resignation as
collector of customs.

Casey refused to resign and thereafter was

titular leader of the anti-Warmoth Republicans, called the Custom House
Ring.

Other anti-Warmoth leaders were U.S. Marshal Stephen B. Packard,

a former Union Army officer from Maine who displaced Casey as the actual
boss of the Ring,* Oscar J. Dunn, black lieutenant governor who sought
increased powers for himself and disdained Warmoth’s lack of support for
Negro rights and education? and U.S. Senator William Pitt Kellogg, a
former Vermont lawyer and Warmoth supporter who had decided his future
was with the pro-Grant Custom House Ring.

18

Warmoth created enemies easily ty his high-handed operation of the
state government and personal control of the state voting supervisors,
®On the Warmoth-Casey feud and the split in the Republican party,
see Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 201, 209-14, 250-51? F. Wayne
Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth and Louisiana Reconstruction," (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1969), 171-72,
180-83, 196-98? Francis B. Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth, Reconstruction
Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXX (April,
1947), 610? Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 76-77? Richard N.
Current, Three Carpetbag Governors (Baton Rouge, 1967), 49-50, 62-63?
Charles Vincent, Black Legislators in Louisiana During Reconstruction
(Baton Rouge, 1976), 133. For the background of Joseph R. West, see
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton
Rouge, 1964), 552-53.
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the Metropolitan Police, and the state militia.

However, many of his

opponents, whether Democrats or Republicans, wanted Warmoth out so that
their own faction could have more influence in filling state jobs,
getting state public works contracts, and grabbing other spoils of
office.

No doubt Warmoth and his cronies were corrupt, but Louisianians

needed no lessons in political pettifoggery from a young Missouri lawyer
(or anyone else). Warmoth himself appropriately described the situation
in his oft-quoted statement:
down here.

"Why damn it, everybody is demoralized

19
Corruption is the fashion."

In July 1871 Packard, Casey, Dunn, and other anti-Warmoth
Republicans decided to force a test of strength at the party's state
convention, scheduled to begin on August 9.

At stake was the selection

of the new Republican state central committee, which Packard was
determined to control.

However, the Custom House leaders knew that

Warmoth controlled a majority of the convention delegates.

Therefore,

Packard appointed several extra deputy marshals and pulled frcm his
sleeve the trump card in any game of Reconstruction politics— the
Amy.

20
Hoping to prevent violence between the Republican factions,

Colonel Smith ordered two conpanies of troops from Jackson Barracks into
New Orleans one week before the convention began, and observers
19Roger W. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana (Baton
Rouge, 1939), 227.
70

Stephen B. Packard to James F. Casey, July 28, 1871; William P.
Kellogg to U.S. Attorney General A. T. Ackerman, July 29, 1871; Oscar J.
Dunn to Ulysses S. Grant, July 29, 1871, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (1871-1884) (Microcopy M-940, reel 1), RG 60,
NA. For an excellent discussion of the activities of the convention,
see Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth," 238-53.
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speculated openly about which Republican faction the troops would
support.

The New Orleans Times predicted that in the event of a show

down the Army would aid the Custom Bouse Ring.

Speaking for Warmoth,

Senator Joseph West protested against the use of troops to oppose the
governor or upset the internal operation of the convention.

Replying

for the Ring, Senator Kellogg cited the " [djeplorafole condition [ofj
affairs in tor Orleans" and hoped that the authorities would "protect
lawful assemblies of Republicans."

21

Marshal Packard used his official position to bring pressure on
General Reynolds to send in troops.

In a telegram, Packard charged that

"thugs and bruisers" would try to disrupt the convention and requested
"a guard of soldiers . . . to protect the custom-house and other public
property."

This was simply a pretense on Packard’s part to obtain the

Army's support and deny Warmoth his rightful role in the convention.
Packard asked Reynolds for the troops in his position as U.S. marshal
without explaining that the anticipated "thugs and bruisers" were other
Republicans and that the Custom House, rather than the state capitol or
some other building, was the location of the convention.

Reynolds,

either woefully ignorant of the complex situation, or more likely
prompted by his own pro-Grant Republicanism, ordered Colonel Sully to
place "a guard" at the Custom House, leaving Sully to decide how many
troops to send.

22

^New Orleans Times, August 5, 1871; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
August 5, 1871. Joseph R. West to A. T. Ackerman, August 5, 1871;
Kellogg to Ackerman, August 7, 1871, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice
Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy Mr-940, reel 1), RG 60, NA.
^^Packard to Reynolds, August 8, 1871, in House Misc. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 127; AAG Wood to Alfred Sully, August 8,
1871, in Dept Texas, Letters Sent, RG 393, NA; Harris, "Henry Clay
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A special detachment of three companies of the 19th Infantry,
supported fcy two Gatling guns, under the ocranand of Captain Jacob H„
Smith inarched up to the Custom House at about 8:30 a.m. on August 9.
Smith later said that he occupied the building on orders from
Colonel Sully only "to protect United States property" and disclaimed
any intention of assisting one side or the other at the convention.

The

troops stacked their unloaded, bayoneted rifles in the hallway near the
main stairway inside the Custom House and put the Gatling guns in the
basement.

Although the Gatlings were not used, their presence gave the

name "Gatling Gun Convention" to the meeting that was about to take
.
23
place.
About 11:00 a.m. Warmoth entered the building, followed fcy thirty
delegates and well-wishers.

Once inside, the governor recognized

several of the special deputy marshals, all of whom were armed.

Warmoth

then happened to glance through a door that was temporarily ajar and saw
Custom House leaders and delegates holding a caucus in an obvious
attempt to organize the convention and elect the state central ccranittee
while the Warmoth faction was absent.

According to Captain Smith,

Warmoth sunmaned his followers and "got up in . . . [a] chair and made a
speech to the soldiers and friends around him. . . .
same remarks not very ocnplimentary to the Army."

[H]e . . . made

Apparently some of

Warmoth," 617; Warmoth, Politics and Reconstruction, 115; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 216; Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth," 239-40.
23sully to Capt. Jacob H. Smith, August 9, 1871, in House Reports,
42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 92, p. 10; New Orleans Times, August 10 and 12,
1871; New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 10, 1871; Testimony of
Capt. Jacob H. Smith, in House Misc. Dcr’s., 42 Ceng., 2 Sess., No. 211,
pp. 100-101; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 216-17; Agnes s. Grosz,
"The Political Career of P. B. S. Pinchback/' Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, XXVII (April, 1944), 545.
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his remarks were also not very complimentary to Packard.

Fearing an

altercation between the marshals and Warmoth' s men, Captain Smith told
the governor that he would have to stop his speech and leave the
building.

Without dissenting, Warmoth and his friends walked out of

the Custom House and across the street to Turner's Hall and waited for
the rest of their delegates.

Subsequently the Warmoth faction held

their own ineffectual nesting, but the national Republican party
recognized the Custom House8s state central committee.

24

Packard had successfully maneuvered the A m y into a position where
soldiers forced Warmoth out of the convention on the grounds of prevent
ing a disturbance that would damage government property.

Warmoth

claimed that the Army had disrupted the legal activities of the conven
tion and prevented his delegates from participating in the meeting.
However, Mayor Benjamin Flanders believed that the presence of the
soldiers in Hew Orleans and at the Custom House had "prevented a scene
of bloodshed which wculd again have disgraced this city. . . . "

25

Hew Orleans newspapers roundly condemned Packard and his minions.
For example, Warmoth's Republican flatly accused Packard of obtaining
military assistance "under false representations" and concluded that the
ultimate responsibility of the party's split rested on President Grant
himself for condoning the Custom House Ring.

The Hew Orleans Times, no

^^New Orleans Times, August 10, 1871; Hew Orleans Republican,
Avgust 10, 1871; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 102-104; Harris,
"Henry Clay Warmoth," 618-19; Warnbth, Politics and Reconstruction,
116-17; Testimony of Warmoth, in House Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 211, pp. 300, 305; Testimony of J. H. Smith, ibid., 100.
^^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 217-18; Testimony of Warmoth, in
House Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 357; Benjamin F.
Flanders to Packard, November 27, 1871, ibid., p. 200.
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friend of Warmoth, let go with the following editorial barrage:
Irrespective of the merits of the quarrel, the
unwarranted and uncalled for interposition of federal
bayonets to stifle free speech and overawe civil authority
has certainly given the Warmoth party the test position in
public estimation. People are not used to the employment of
the bayonet in party disputes, and the Custanhouse [sic]
faction, by involving this terrible power, have secured their
triumph at a fearful cost of popularity and credit.
The New Orleans Bee contented that " [w]ho, a year ago, could have
imagined that Gov. Warmoth would he prevented by an officer of the
United States army . . . fran making in public a speech to his friends
and followers?"
Only the Picayune dissented from the chorus of criticism, saying
that it would prefer military government instead of "the corrupt,
degraded, meretricious, ignorant, rapacious, remorseless, and Wholly
unscrupulous rule" of the Republicans.

"Louisiana, as a military divi

sion under martial law, with a Hancock, a Canby or a Sherman for its
chief, would be quiet, prosperous and progressive, and far better off
than now," concluded the Picayune.

27

Despite his recent difficulties, Warmoth still nurtured hopes for
a second term.

Lieutenant Governor Dunn died unexpectedly in November,

and Warmoth's political fortunes seemed brighter when he persuaded the
state senate to elect as Dunn's replacement P. B. S. Pinchback, an
important black leader and a Warmoth supporter.

Naturally, the governor

26New Orleans Republican, New Orleans Times, New Orleans Bee, all
August 10, 1871.
^New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 17, 1871.
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looked ahead with some optimism to the next test of political strength,
OO

the meeting of the state legislature in January 1872.
Meanwhile, the War Department made another series of alterations in
the Military Division of the South.

On November 1 Louisiana was joined

with Arkansas and Mississippi to form the new Department of the Gulf
under the caimand of Brevet Major General William H. Emory, who established his headquarters in New Orleans on November 28.

29

During

Eimory's tenure, Army troops experienced some of the most dangerous
events during Reconstruction— events so disturbing that General Sheridan
eventually had to return to Louisiana.

2®Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 218-21; Warmoth, Politics and
Reconstruction, 118-20.
2^William H. Emory to Gen. Henry W. Halleek, November 29, 1871, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 139/Dept South-Late, RG 393, NA. (When RG 393 was
organized, some material formerly filed with the Department of the South
records was judged to properly belong with the Department of the Gulf.
Therefore, the manuscripts are in the Department of the Gulf records,
but the volumes still carry a Department of the South number.
Hereinafter, citations to the materials will be given with the appro
priate volume number, followed by DSL.) New Orleans Republican,
November 30, 1871; SW, Annual Report, 1871-1872, in House Exec. Docs.,
42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 1, p. 82; The Department of the Gulf also
included three forts in Florida: Fort Barrancas in Pensacola,
Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, and Key West.

CHAPTER X
EMORY AND THE BEGINNINGS OF DUAL GOVERNMENT
Brevet Major General William Hensley Emory chose as his
headquarters a house at the corner of Camp and St. Joseph Streets, some
ten blocks distant from the Custom House, and prepared to fulfill his
new assignment as oorrmander of the Department of the Gulf, just as he
had capably fulfilled a variety of military duties during a long career.
In 1871 Emory was in his thirty-eighth year of military service and had
recently celebrated his sixtieth birthday, making him the oldest officer
to command Louisiana during Reconstruction.

He had been appointed to

West Point from his hate state of Maryland and was graduated in 1831,
standing fourteenth in a class of thirty-three.

He had then served as a

second lieutenant in the 4th Artillery for five years and resigned from
the Army in 1836.

After working as a civil engineer for twenty-one

months, he was reinstated in the Topographical Engineers with the rank
of first lieutenant and was second in command of the Army survey detach
ment that completed marking the boundary between the United States and
Canada from 1844 to 1846.

At the outbreak of hostilities with Mexico,

ESnory was appointed chief engineer in General Stephen W. Kearny's A m y
of the West, and he won brevets of captain and major in the California
fighting.

Following the Mexican War, Bmory transferred to the 2nd

Cavalry Regiment, but actually spent most of his time in making maps,
carmanding the survey parties which established the boundary of the
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Gadsden Purchase and the Califomia-Mexicso border, and writing reports,
most notably his Notes of a Military Reoonnaisanoe from Fort Leavenworth
in Missouri to San Diego in California (1847).1
At the start of the Civil War, Lieutenant Colonel Emory commanded
all U.S. troops in the Indian Territory.

Threatened by Texas state

troops, Qnory managed to extricate himself and his soldiers, taking then
from Indian Territory to Fort Leavenworth without losing a man.

Ordered

to report to the East, Emory took over a brigade in the Army of the
Potomac and served in General George B. McClellan's Peninsula Campaign,
receiving a brevet of colonel for gallantry at the battle of Hanover
Court House in May 1862.

Six months later he was transferred to the

Department of the Gulf.
From December 1862 to July 1864 Emory held various assignments in
Louisiana, under the command of General Nathaniel P. Banks, but neither
he nor his superior achieved much success or recognition in the field.
Emory commanded a division in the Port Hudson and Red River campaigns
and for a time supervised the defenses of New Orleans.

In May 1864 he

took command of the XIX A m y Corps, and in July Emory and his corps were
sent to the Eastern Theater.
In Phil Sheridan1s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Emory and the XIX
Corps fumbled their opportunity to acquit themselves well, and instead
were handled roughly by General Jubal Early's Confederate forces.
I

Donaldsonville Chief, December 16, 1871; George W. Cullum,
Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States
Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1802-1867 (2 vols., New York,
1868), I, 386-88; Allen Johnson (ed.), Dictionary of American Biography
(22 vols., New York, 1929-1958), VI, 153-54; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in
Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge, 1964), 142-43;
Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United
States Army, 1789-1903 (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 405-406.
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Sheridan and Emory got along well enough, despite the older man's lack
of flair and his difficulties on the battlefield.

In fact, Sheridan

recorcnended Emory for a brevet of major general of volunteers for meri
torious service at the decisive battle of Cedar Creek.

The two men

remained on cordial terms after the war, but they did not serve together
in the same department.

Sheridan commanded troops in the Southwest and

on the Great Plains; Emory served in West Virginia, Washington D.C., and
the Pacific Northwest.

While in the last coimand, Emory received orders
2
to proceed to the Department of the Gulf.
Upon his arrival in New Orleans, Emory learned about the unsettling
events of the past few months, especially the intra-party struggle at
the Republican convention in August.

Emory's senior officers probably

warned him about the possibility of trouble at the upcoming session of
the legislature, scheduled to open on January 1, 1872.

However, ESmory

ordered no extraordinary military preparations for the new year.
To leam more about his new post, Emory read the New Orleans
newspapers, which frequently directed acerbic and derisive comments
toward the state Republican party and President Ulysses S. Grant.

The

Democratic papers, when they were not calling for curtailing
Governor Warmoth's powers, supported plans to impeach him.

One Picayune

editorialist concluded that if Louisiana's rival political factions
attempted to gain or maintain control of the government by violent
2in addition to sources cited above in note 1, see also T. Harry
Williams, Hayes of the Twenty-third; The Civil War Volunteer Officer
(New York, 1965), 233, 256-57, 297, 299-300; Philip H. Sheridan to
Edwin M. Stanton, April 18, 1866, in Philip H. Sheridan Papers
(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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means, the state would "be handed back to its condition of military
dependency."
Unsure of exactly what the Amy's role was if the political parties
in Louisiana did turn to violence, Emory applied for scare operational
guidelines from General Henry W. Halleek, commander of the Military
Division of the South at Louisville.

Assistant Adjutant

General Robert N. Scott of Halleck’s staff sent the following reply:
You will use the troops of your orarmand to preserve order
as in your judgment may be proper without referring to these
headquarters . . . but reporting such action [that you take].
No further instructions [are] deemed necessary.
By order of Major General Halleck4
Halleck's nonocmmital orders typified the ones sent out try division
headquarters and the War Department to Southern commanders desperate for
seme concrete instructions to direct than through the unusual situations
5
of Reconstruction.
The Southern commanders wanted orders to cover
peculiar, even unique, relations between state governments and tie Army.
However, the military hierarchy left as many of the difficult decisions
as possible to the ocrananders on the spot, letting than take the credit
(or the blame) for whatever happened.

Such nebulous orders hurt Emory

more than any other Southern commander because Louisiana was consis
tently the most troublesome Southern state to the national
administration in Washington.
% e w Orleans Daily Picayune, December 15 and 20, 1871. See also
Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974),
222.
4Robert N. Scott to William H. Emory, December 2, 1871 (emphasis
added), in House Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 93.
5See James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction,
1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 213-14, 216-17.
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On January 1, 1872, the Louisiana legislature opened amid
conditions designed to prevent the assembling of a quorum in the
senate— conditions which led to the tension-filled days for the remain
der of the month.

Stephen Packard had schemed with the aid of most of

the Democrats in the legislature to inpeach Governor Warmoth.

Cnee

inpeached, Warmoth would be suspended from office while awaiting trial
in the senate.

Packard, however, knew that he could not muster two-

thirds of the senators to vote for conviction.

Therefore, he arranged

for eleven Custom House Republican senators and three of their
Democratic colleagues to leave New Orleans aboard the U.S. revenue
cutter Wilderness. Their absence would prevent obtaining a quorum in
the senate, and when the house inpeached the governor, he would be
effectively if temporarily, removed from office.

This part of Packard's

plan was successful; the senate did not have a quorum for the first
nineteen days of the legislative session.

,

Moreover, the Packard forces

succeeded in obtaining the necessary cooperation of the House speaker,
George W. Carter, a former crony of Warmoth's.

However, Carter was not

acting solely out of any spirit of revenge or simple antagonism to an
old political ally:

if Packard's scheme worked completely, Carter might

become acting governor of the state.

The Custom House faction chal

lenged the legality of Lieutenant Governor Pinchback's election by the
state senate the month before.

If Packard's nan nullified Pinchback's

election and then inpeached Warmoth, Carter, as speaker of the house,
would assume the governorship.^
6See Taylor's excellent discussion of Packard's machinations in
Louisiana Reconstructed, 222-23. On the relationship between Warmoth and
Carter, see F. Wayne Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth and Louisiana Recon
struction" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina,
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The legislature met as scheduled, and the plot began to unfold:
there was no quorum in the senate, and the house adjourned out of
respect for the memory of the late lieutenant governor, Oscar J. Dunn.
On January 2, in a close vote (49 to 45), the house voted to continue
Speaker Carter in his influential position, but transacted no substan
tive business.

However, the next day the Warmoth forces called for an

election of a new speaker, and when Carter declined to acknowledge the
notion, the Warmothites moved toward the podium, threatening to force
Carter to relinquish his seat.

Carter had prepared for such a threat,

and several well-armed hired thugs surrounded the speaker and prevented
the coup. The house adjourned in disarray.

7

On the evening of January 3, after being apprised of the situation
at the capitol, ESnory decided to use his troops to prevent civil
disorder.

He ordered Colonel Charles Smith in Baton Rouge to prepare

four of his six companies to move to New Orleans.

All four companies

from Jackson Barracks marched into the city, taking up positions down
town to prevent a collision between Packard's men and Warmoth8s militia,
which the governor had mobilized under the field (or street) command of
o
James Longstreet.
1969), 217-20. See also Francis B. Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth,
Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XXX (April, 1947), 625-27; Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana after
1868 (Gloucester, Mass., 1967), 105-106.
7
A detailed presentation of the legislature's turmoil is Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 223. See also Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 113-16; New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 2, 3, 4, 1872;
New Orleans Bee, January 4, 1872.
8AAAG William T. Gentry to Charles H. Smith, January 3, 1872, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA; Henry Clay- Warmoth, War, Politics,
and Reconstruction: Stormy Days in Louisiana (New York, 1930), 134;
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The next morning, Packard attempted to regain control of the
legislature and remove the opposition1s leadership.

Producing seme

trumped-up charges, Packard dispatched deputy U.S. marshals with orders
to arrest Warmoth, Lieutenant Governor P. B. S. Pinchback, twenty-two
legislators, and Algernon S. Badger, chief of the Metropolitan Police.
With the arrest of the legislators, the Custom House-Democratic
coalition would have a working majority in the house; and with Warmoth,
Pinchback, and Badger behind bars, what was left of the governor's
faction would be leaderless.

The deputies arrested everyone on

Packard's list, but the marshal's gambit to control the house was foiled
when several other pro-Warmoth representatives walked out of the
capitol, leaving the house without a quorum.

Warmoth's supporters soon

posted bail for the governor and his friends, and by 1:00 p.m. the kings
and the pawns were back on their original squares.
move.

It was Warmoth's

9
The governor called for the legislature to meet in the capitol at

4:30 p.m., but very few Democrats or Custcm House Republicans were
notified of the meeting; or if they heard of it, they failed to attend.
The senate, of course, did not have a quorum, but one was present in the
house.

Promptly, the Warmoth men elected their own house speaker,

Warmoth to Joseph R. West, January 4, 1872, in House Exec. Docs.,
42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 268, pp. 48-50; Lonn, Reconstruction in'
Louisiana, 116; Donald B. Sanger and Thomas R. Hay, James Longstreet
(Baton Rouge, 1952), 356.
9New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 5, 1872; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 223-24; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 117-18.
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O. H. Brewster.

The militia guarded the State House, and by nightfall

Warmoth clearly held the advantage after the day's turmoil.10
General Emory was now more convinced than ever that the Army must
keep the peace between the political factions.
companies in Baton Rouge to rush to New Orleans.

He ordered two of the
Despite the earlier

advice from Adjutant General Scott to use his own judgment in such
matters, Emory telegraphed Washington, described the circumstances, and
asked for official authorization to intervene in the political struggle.
Secretary of War William W. Belknap approved Emory's request to use his
troops to maintain order in Louisiana.11
Meanwhile, the authorities in Washington fretted over the arrest of
Warmoth and the other state officials.

Adjutant General of the

Army Edward D. Townsend wanted to know whether or not United States
soldiers had participated in making the arrests.

No troops had assisted

the deputies in their duties, Emory replied, but he left undescribed
Packard's role in the affair.

However, Governor Warmoth condemned the

meddling marshal and pressed Senator Joseph West to tell President Grant
that " [t]his revolutionary movement will involve the destruction of the
state government, unless the President takes immediate action and stops
his officials."

Upon hearing of the day's events from West, Grant pro

claimed that the action of the "United States marshal is of such an
extraordinary character that I will have the matter investigated at
10Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 224; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 119.
11-AAG Gentry to C. H. Smith, January 4, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 1 3 9 /DSL, RG 393, NA; William W. Belknap to William T. Sherman,
January 4, 1872, and AG William D. Whipple to Emory, January 4, 1872,
in AGO File 4882 of 1872 (Microcopy 666, reel 93), RG 94, NA.
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once.” Nevertheless, to the Warmoth faction Grant's actions seemed
anything but impartial.

"No thinking man can contemplate this bastard

coup d'etat of the United States officials, except with indignation,
mingled with painful forebodings of worse things to come," wrote an
12
editorialist in the New Orleans Republican.
Short of armed revolt, the most disturbing eventuality in Louisiana
politics would have been the establishment of a second state government
laying claim to rightful recognition over Warmoth, and George Carter set
out to do just that.

He called for Custom House and Democratic members

of the legislature to convene as a rival legislature.

Carter chose as

his legislative hall the meeting room over the Gan Saloon on Royal
Street, just off Canal.

Hie Gem was known as one of "the oldest

drinking Saloons in New Orleans," boasting "excellent liquor, and oozy
places for confidential chat, dominoes, and chess."

Carter quickly

realized that he did not have a quorum and sent out some of his
sergeants-at-arms to escort to the Gan any legislators they could find.
A few days later seme of Carter's men shot and killed
Representative Walter Wheyland of Sabine Parish for refusing to
accompany them to the Gan.

13

12Edward D. Townsend to Emory, January 4, 1872, in House Exec.
Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 1; Bnory to Townsend, January 5,
1872, ibid.; Warmoth to West, January 4, 1872 (emphasis in the
original), in House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 268, pp. 49-50;
Ulysses S. Grant to West, January 4, 1872, ibid., p. 50; New Orleans
Republican, January 5, 1872.
1^
The description of the Gan Saloon is in New Orleans Republican,
March 20, 1870. On the Wheyland killing, see ibid., January 1(5, T872,
and Warmoth, Politics and Reconstruction, 135. See also Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 224-25; New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 6,
1872.
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It appeared that a riot as bad as the one of July 30, 1866, might
break out at any moment.

Federal marshals, Metropolitan policemen, and

black militiamen patrolled the streets, and many civilians probably were
armed as they walked downtown.

At the request of Longstreet and

Warmoth, Emory stationed troops at the State House, which manor had
pegged as the target of an attack by Conservatives.

Soldiers also

guarded the Custom House.
On the afternoon of January 5 two demonstrations took place which
might have ignited riots in the city.

First a large crowd, estimated by

Emory at about 2,000 persons, assembled near the State House, but no
shots were fired by either side, and after a while the crowd dispersed.
In the meantime, on Royal Street a large detachment of Metropolitan
policemen accompanied by other Warmoth supporters demonstrated in front
of the Gan Saloon, "causing the greatest excitement" among the legisla
tors inside.

This incident, boo, ended without violence, but Emory

severely criticized Warmoth for letting his policemen participate in a
demonstration which might have turned the city into a battleground.

14

Later that afternoon Emory ordered the troops stationed near the
Mechanic's Institute to move to billets on Magazine Street, near his
headquarters.

The movement of the soldiers away from his capitol

disturbed Warmoth, who thought that the general had sent the troops back
to Jackson Barracks.

The governor, anxious about his own safety and

that of his administration, wanted a round-the-clock guard at the State
House, but Emory reassured him, saying that the soldiers were close
14New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 6, 1872; James Longstreet to
Emory, January 5, 1872, in House Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No.
211, p. 80; Testimony of Emory before a congressional committee, ibid.,
p. 61; Emory to Warmoth, January 5, 1872, ibid., p. 86.
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enough to reach the scene quickly if violence occurred.

Nevertheless,

as a precaution Emory ordered Colonel Smith in Baton Rouge to bring
three more companies to New Orleans, leaving only one company at
regimental headquarters.

15

At the end of their harrowing day, Emory and Warmoth separately
addressed messages to officials in Washington.

Emory told Adjutant

General Townsend that " [n]©thing but the free display of the U.S. forces
at hand and the acquiescence which each of the contending factions and
citizens generally yield to the U.S. authorities has prevented a serious
fight here today."
not finished.

Emory warned that the political confrontation was

He concluded that "a very bloody riot" might occur, and

" [i]t might be well to send me another Regiment at once though I do not
demand it as necessary to preserve the peace."

In Warmoth"s opinion

" [d]anger of a riot and tumult [was] imminent." He asked Grant to order
Emory to work closely with state officials "in preserving the peace, and
protecting the government from attack and overthrow."

Secretary of

War Belknap read Warmoth's plea and forwarded it to the President, who
was in Philadelphia.

Belknap added a personal postscript to the mes

sage, saying that it was "best to let General Emory act in accordance
with his own judgment."

16

15Warmoth to Emory, January 5, 1872 (two communications), in SW,
Annual Report, 1872-1873, in House Exec. Docs., 42 Gong., 3 Sess.,
No. 1, p. 97. Emory to Warmoth, January 5, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol.
1 1 4 /DSL; Emory to C. H. Smith, January 5, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/
DSL, RG 393, NA. Smith's troops arrived in New Orleans on January 7,
but the colonel remained in Baton Rouge.
l^Emory to Townsend, January 5, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 2; Warmoth to Grant, January 5, 1872, SW,
Annual Report, 1872-1873, p. 96; Belknap to Grant, January 5, 1872, in
House Exec. Docs., 42 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 268, p. 50.
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Meanwhile, the leaders of both Louisiana factions sought Emory's
support.

Warmoth wanted soldiers to escort his sergeants-at-arms while

they sought out and arrested members of the Carter legislature.

Carter

wanted Emory to place a cordon of Federal troops around the Gam Saloon
to protect the meeting hall and its occupants.

But the general refused

to provide a military escort for Warmoth's deputies, telling the
governor not to let his officers initiate any violent acts, lest the
whole situation "get beyond our joint efforts to control."

And he

denied Carter's request for A m y protection, adding that in his opinion
as an A m y officer "any interference [by] the military with legislative
bodies or . . . [their] members [was] not a part of the duties devolving
17
upon United States troops."
The next day, January 7, passed without incident until after
nightfall, when several anti-Warmoth men raided the state armory near
Jackson Square and made off with five dozen muskets.

Emory informed

Townsend of the incident, Garmenting that "things look very threatening.
I have brought additional troops into the city [Smith's Baton Rouge
companies, which had arrived earlier in the day] and collected around me
ny most efficient officers."

1fl

Nonetheless, scare of the New Orleans newspapers interpreted Emory's
failure to move against the Carter legislature as an indication of his
^Ehory to Warmoth, January 6, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL,
RG 393, NA. George W. Carter to Emory, January 6, 1872, in House Misc.
Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 76; Emory to Warmoth, January 6,”
1872, ibid., p. 88, Emory to Carter, January 6, 1872 (two
oonrnumcations), ibid., pp. 86-87.
•^Emory to Townsend, January 8, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 3; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 122.
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support for the Custom House-Conservative coalition.

In large measure

this was wishful thinking on their part because they were so entirely
apposed to Wanroth that they wanted him out of office at almost any
cost.

19

In fact, Emory had made every reasonable effort to remain

impartial in the crisis, displaying his troops to overawe both sides.
Moreover, he supplemented these displays with public announcements of
l
his orders to the troops to keep the citizenry aware of the troop move20
ments within the city.
For all practical purposes, New Orleans was
under martial law, although Emory had not officially declared it.
Rather than take sides in the dispute, the general desperately wanted
the civilians to reach a satisfactory agreement among themselves.

But

the opposing forces were so evenly matched that he believed they could
not settle the matter on their own and that eventually the Amy, acting
on orders from Washington, would have to force them to accept a
compromise.

Neither Washington nor the Military Division of the South

had given Emory much guidance or assistance.

The division commander,

General Henry Halleck, had been ill and unable to devote his attention
to the Louisiana problems.

When he died on January 9, Major

General Alfred Terry assumed ccsttnand.

Emory then told Warmoth that he

was going to ask Terry for additional troops.

21

l%ee the perceptive comment by Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,
222. See also New Orleans Times, January 6, 1872, and New Orleans Bee,
January 6 and 7, 1872.
on
SO No. 4, Dept Gulf, January 8, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, pp. 33-34; New Orleans Times, January 8,~ 1872.
^^Emory to Warmoth, January 9, 1872, in House Misc. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 89; Townsend to Emory, January 8, 1872, in
House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 4; Emory to AGO,
January 9, 1872, ibid., p. 3; Townsend to Emory, January 8, 1872, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 14975SL, RG 393, NA; AAG Robert N. Scott to Emory,
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Both sides wanted the A m y or the President to declare martial law,
but only if the declaration resulted in the military suppression of
their rivals.

Carter claimed that the absent senators (on board the

Wilderness by his arrangement with Packard) feared for their lives and
would return only if the Army proclaimed martial law.

Black legislator

J. Henri Burch and several other state representatives appealed to Grant
to oust Warmoth and institute martial law until the "Carter legislature"
assumed its full powers.

Janes Casey, Grant's brother-in-law, wanted an

end to Warmoth's "usurpation," and Mayor Benjamin Flanders, who had
switched his allegiance to the Custom House Ring, called for martial law
as "the only solution of the difficulty."

22

However, Emory preferred not to declare martial law just yet,
believing that such action would be interpreted as "in the interest of
the Governor's faction of the Legislature."

Furthermore, the general

had been approached fcy a special group of fifty-one New Orleans bankers
and businessmen which had sent envoys to both political factions, plead
ing with them to end the crisis without martial law.

Until these

citizens had time to negotiate with the politicians, the A m y planned to
remain neutral.

In the meantime, Emory wanted the adjutant general to

. .
23
consider ordering more troops to Louisiana.
January 9, 1872, ibid.; Emory to Warmoth, January 9, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 114/DSL, RG 3537 NA.
22J. Henri Burch and others to Grant, January 9, 1872, in House
Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., NO. 268, pp. 54-55. Carter to Grant,
January 9, 1872, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana
(Microcopy M-940, reel 6), RG 60, NA. James Casey to Grant, January 9,
1872, ibid.; Benjamin F. Flanders to Grant, January 9, 1872, ibid.
23Emory to Townsend, January 9, 1872 (four communications), in
House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, pp. 4-5.
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An editorial in the Daily Picayune on January 10 opposed martial
law, calling it "the substitution [of] mere physical force for law. . . .
The mechanism of military routine is in government a Frankenstein's
monster, human in form, but soulless. . . . The condition of a State or
city must be altogether desperate when it seeks safety behind a file of
soldiers."

Despite this plea, Collector Casey and Mayor Flanders

reiterate! their calls for military supervision, and Casey specifically
requested that Eknory order troops to guard the Gan Saloon and "clear the
approaches to the Hall."

24

The reason for Casey's request was soon apparent, for Warmoth
decided to break up the bogus legislature at the Gam and arrest Carter
and some of his henchmen for the murder of Representative Wheyland, who
had been shot by Carter's sergeants-at-arms for refusing to attend a
meeting on January 9.

Getting wind of Warmoth's design, Carter informed

Emory that his followers would resist any attacks.

A short time later

two companies of Metropolitan policemen "armed with Winchester rifles"
marched to Royal Street.

Carter sent a note to Emory, complaining that

the police were blocking the normal entry and exit fran the Gem.
Warmoth then asked Emory to send troops to Canal Street "to assist me in
suppressing any riotous demonstrations that may be made," meaning,
naturally, any armed resistance by the Carter forces.

Before Efcory

could act, the police moved in, but they met no resistance:
legislators had abandoned their meeting place.

most of the

The police immediately

2%ew Orleans Daily Picayune, January 10, 1872; Casey to Grant,
January 10, 1872, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice Dept from
Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 6), RG 60, NA; Flanders to U.S.
Attorney General George H. Williams, January 10, 1872, in House Exec.
Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 268, p. 60.
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instituted a city-wide manhunt for Carter.

Later in the day Carter

notified Emory that he might turn himself in to the Army, but would not
allow Warmoth's "thugs" and "cut-throats" to arrest him.

Carter also

asked Emory to help him regain possession of the Gen Saloon, but the
general "positively refused."

25

The martial activities of Warmoth's police spurred Emory to ask
General Terry for reinforcements, specifically for two companies of
cavalry.

The additional troops were needed, said Emory, because a

"great riot [was] threatened."

Terry replied that no cavalry was

available, but that two companies of infantry in Mobile could march to
New Orleans if the Louisiana commander wanted them.

26

The next day (January 11), a confident Governor Warmoth prematurely
decided that "the danger of riot or tumult [had] about passed."

He

informed Emory that "by to-morrow at 12 o'clock you can safely withdraw
your troops to the barracks."

Thus assured, Emory canceled his request

to Terry for the cavalry, ordered sate of the troops to Jackson
Barracks, and placed his hopes in the businessmen's "Committee of Fiftyone" to arbitrate the natters still unsettled between the political
rivals.

27

25New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 11, 1872; New Orleans Bee,
January 11, 1872; Carter to Emory, January 10, 1872 (two communica
tions) , and undated, 1872, in House Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 211, pp. 74-75; Warmoth to Emory, January 10, 1872, in SW, Annual
Report, 1872-1873, p. 98; Emory to Townsend, January 10, 1872, in House
Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 6. Carter was later
arrested, but was released for lack of evidence.
26Enory to Alfred H. Terry, January 10, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 133/DSL; Terry to Emory, January 10, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 149/
DSL, RG 393, NA.
2^Warmoth to Emory, January 11, 1872, in House Misc. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, pp. 71-72; Testimony of Emory before a
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However, the businessmen failed in their effort.

They told Emory

that they had teen unable "to make any cxmpramj.se between the two
factions . . . " and recommended that the general declare martial law.
Despite their reccranendation, Emory believed that the danger of riot was
not imminent and returned all the troops to Jackson Barracks.

28

In Washington, Grant sifted through the reports of the Louisiana
situation and issued an unusually strong statement.

The President

informed Mayor Flanders that " [m]artial law will rot be proclaimed in
New Orleans, under existing circumstances, and no assistance will be
given by Federal authorities to persons or parties unlawfully resisting
the constitutional authorities of the State."

29

Grant’s statanent did

not reduce the pressure against Warmoth as might have been expected.
The Custom House bosses realized that it was difficult, if not inpossi
ble, for the President to give than overt assistance.

But they thought

that if he did not order Emory to give full military support to Warmoth,
they might force the governor from office by threats, intimidation, or
legal trickery.

Throughout the crisis, Grant never gave his outright

support to either faction.
Early on the morning of January 13 Warmoth learned that an armed
mob intended to attack the Mechanic's Institute, and he called on Emory
to order troops back into the city to prevent the overthrow of his
congressional committee, ibid., p. 61? Emory to Terry, January 11, 1872,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL, RG 393, NA; Emory to AG/USA, January 11,
1872, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy
M-940, reel 6), RG 60, NA.
28New Orleans Bee, January 12, 1872; Emory to Townsend, January 12,
1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 8.
29Grant to Flanders, January 12, 1872, in Warmoth, Politics and
Reconstruction, 138.
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government.

" [T]hreats are made," the governor wailed, "that not a

stone of the State capitol shall be left upon another after they are
through with their work."

Emory immediately ordered Colonel Alfred

Sully at Jackson Barracks to put his "troops under arms and move towards
this city, with your Gatling guns of the largest size."

Simultaneously,

the general dispatched one of his aides, Captain William W. Sanders, to
find the assembling mob and "to notify the ring leaders . . . that if
any violence is used, it will be ray duty to disperse than with
grapeshot."^
While the troops were on their way to the city, a large crowd of
about 2,000 persons approached Emory's headquarters.

Some leaders of

the crowd came forward, demanding that the Array not interfere in civil
affairs unless absolutely necessary.

Eimory assured than that the Array

would not act hastily, but that he could not condone violence by either
._ 31
side.
Emory's problems multiplied.

At least two large crowds of New

Orleanians were in the streets, and a confrontation between members of
the two factions appeared likely.

The "Committee of Fifty-one," which

at one time had seemed on the verge of negotiating a settlement between
the political rivals, had broken ip in despair.

Now it was learned that

the Carter legislature planned to resume separate meetings.
decided to ask again for cavalry.

Emory

This time he addressed his request to

General Townsend:
3oAAG Gentry to Alfred Sully, January 13, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA; Warmoth to Emory, January 13, 1872, in House
Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 72; Emory to Warmoth,
January 13, 1872, ibid., p. 90.
31New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 14, 1872.
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The hostility here is not against the United States, but
against the State government, which is odious beyond expres
sion, and I fear justly so, and to suppress a riot it is only
necessary to make a stow of United States forces, however
small, which cannot be done by the use of infantry with that
facility necessary to stay an impending r i o t . 32
Emory basically had described the formula to use when a riot threatened:
call out the troops, move them into public view, and remind the news
papers and civic leaders that the A m y was determined to enforce the
peace.

But Emory was finding it difficult to work with Warmoth and his

administration.

In most of his official correspondence and public

statements, Emory tried to maintain a facade of objectivity, no matter
what his personal opinions, bait in this note to Townsend it was obvious
what Emory thought about the governor of Louisiana.
By 11:00 a.m. the troops had taken up positions near the State
House and remained there for several hours.

Carter assembled a mob of

several thousand men (some observers estimated it to he as many as six
thousand), but they did not attack the legislative hall as Warmoth had
predicted; Emory's troops blocked their way.

Later the troops returned

to their barracks, and another day in the crisis had passed.

33

On the morning of January 14 Emory, tiring of the continuous
pressure upon him and his soldiers, informed Warmoth, Carter, and
Adjutant General Townsend that he would not send troops into the city
again without direct orders from Washington.

Up until that time, the

presence of Emory's troops at the State House had prevented a collision
^Emory to Townsend, January 13, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, pp. 9-10.
33Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 128; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, January 14, 1872; Testimony of Emory before a congressional
committee, in House Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 62.
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of the armed forces representing the rival politicians.

Apparently,

ESnory had changed his attitude about military intercession after reading
a newspaper story in which U.S. Attorney General George H. Williams
reportedly declared that troops should not be used unless martial law
was proclaimed.

Undoubtedly, Emory was leery about continuously placing

his soldiers in positions where they might be badly mauled if a riot did
occur.

34

Emory had made a bad error in notifying Carter and Warmoth of his
decision.

Carter immediately had handbills printed and distributed

informing the populace of the general's decision to withhold the troops,
and sure now of a free hand, he planned another attmpt to capture the
capitol.

Warmoth, on the other hand, dispatched a frantic letter to

Grant, describing Carter's preparations to overthrow the government and
concluded that the city was "in imminent danger of [a] riot . . . that
may possibly be as fatal to New Orleans as was the late disaster in
Chicago [i.e., the great Chicago fire of 1871].
troops will prevent domestic violence."

The simple presence of

Warmoth also informed Emory of

Carter's plan and asked the general to provide military protection for
his government.35
Emory promptly advised Carter that distribution of the handbills
was, in the general's opinion, designed to inflame the populace.
^Brory to Warmoth, January 14, 1872, in House Misc. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 91? Emory to Carter, January 14, 1872,
ibid., p. 92; Hnory bo Townsend, January 14, 1872, in House Exec. Docs.,
42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 10; Emory to Townsend, January 14, 1872,
ibid., p. 11.
35warmoth to Grant, January 14, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 268, p. 76? Warmoth to Qnory, January 14, 1872, SW,
Annual Report, 1872-1873, p. 99.
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Therefore, despite what he had written earlier, he was sending troops
into the city to prevent a riot, even though he had not received
instructions from Washington.
neutral.

But the general was careful to remain

A m y protection for the Warmoth legislature, he said, was not

to be interpreted as official recognition by the national government.
Carter, foiled onoe again, called off his plans.

36

That evening Warmoth warned Emory that Carter might yet rally his
mob and attack the legislature.

Accordingly, Emory told Mayor Flanders

that troops would remain downtown to preserve the peace, but would aid
neither faction.

However, later that night Emory apparently had second

thoughts about the attorney general's ideas on martial law.
Townsend pleading for help.

Emory wired

"I respectfully request to he instructed

under this new phase of affairs how to act in the matter.

I shall have

the troops in readiness and bring then to a point where they can act on
any telegram you may send me."

37

Townsend's reply arrived at the telegraph office on Camp Street at
10:00 a.m. on January 15.

Townsend told Emory that the "Attorney

General has given no opinion whatever."

The adjutant general concluded

with a sentence -typical of instructions from higher headquarters to
Southern commanders:

"Exercise your own discretion as to the course to

be pursued, but do not bring the United States troops to the city
without orders from here."

Townsend's instructions reinforced Emory's

-^^Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 128; Emory to Carter,
January 14, 1872, in House Misc. Docs., 42 Ceng., 2 Sess., No. 211,
p. 92; Emory to Warmoth, January 14, ibid., p. 90.
Warmoth to Emory, January 14, 1872, in SW, Annual Report, 18721873, p. 99; Emory to Flanders, January 14, 1872, in House Misc. Docs.,
42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 91; Emory to Townsend, January 14, 1872,
in House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 11.
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notion about keeping his troops out of dangerous situations, but Emory's
earlier decisions to intercede had kept the two factions from craning to
blows over the control of the state government,,

Nevertheless, Emory

informed Warmoth "that under instructions just received I cannot bring
the U.S. troops into this city without orders from higher authority."

38

Emory had been consistently badgered by both sides, and the lack of
precise instructions from his superiors might ruin the Republican
government in Louisiana.

Letting out all his fears and frustrations,

Emory sent off a long telegram to Townsend.
city is hourly increasing," Emory wrote.

"The excitement in this

Hie Federal government needed

to make scare show of support for Warmoth or else opposition forces were
going to topple the young carpetbagger's administration.

"If the troops

are withdrawn, [as, in effect, Townsend had just decided, Emory pre
dicted that] an armed force of from four to eight thousand men with
artillery, is ready to march against the capitol of the State, take
possession, . . . and overthrow the governor. . . . "

Emory concluded it

was "essential that I be more positively instructed, with authority to
show my instructions."

39

Unmoved by Emory's amotion-charged telegram, Townsend calmly wired
that there was no change in the instructions given earlier:

the troops

were to stay out of the city unless sent there "by orders from
Washington."

The ultimate decision to save Warmoth rested, as it always

had, with President Grant.

When the New Orleans Bee learned about the

^^Townsend to Emory, January 15, 1872 (emphasis added), in House
Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 13; Emory to Warmoth,
January 15, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
"^^Emory to Townsend, January 15, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 12.
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Townsend-Emory exchanges, it jubilantly printed a large headline:
Federal Government Abandons Warmoth."

"The

40

Despite the Bee's report, Warmoth tirelessly continued to plead his
case to Washington, but received little encouragement frcm the national
administration.

At one point, the governor asked for personal command

of all U.S. troops in New Orleans.

Another time he petitioned Emory to

cooperate with the state police and militia, but criticized the gener
al's reluctance to provide aid to the beleaguered government.

Attorney

General Williams told Warmoth that the President was "unwilling to
interfere in State matters with the military power of the Government,
except in a clear case of legal right and overruling necessity."
(Warmoth must have felt insulted by this remark; after all, he was the
legal governor of the state.)

President Grant tried to maintain an

outwardly objective face toward the Louisiana muddle, but he supported
his brother-in-law, James Casey, and favored Warmoth's eventual removal,
so long as that step would not threaten to end Republican control of
T . .
41
Louisiana.
In self-defense, Warmoth instructed his legislators to repeal
certain state laws pertaining to the governor's control over elections,
voter registration, and the police— laws which particularly had irritat
ed the Democrats.

The repeals mollified the Conservatives to some

^^Townsend to Emory, January 15, 1872, Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL,
RG 393, NA; New Orleans Bee, January 16, 1872.
^Iwarmoth to Joseph R. West, January 15, 1872, in House Misc.
Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 314; Warmoth, P. B. S. Pinchback,
and O. H. Brewster to Grant, January 15, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 14; George H. Williams to Warmoth,
January 15, 1872, ibid., pp. 15-16; Grant to William W. Belknap,
January 15, 1872, ibid., p. 15. The jist of these messages was reported
to the public by the New Orleans Bee, January 17, 1872.
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extent, momentarily taking off sane of the pressure for the governor's
removal.
desk.

However, Warmoth cannily let the bills repose unsigned on his

He thereby reap®! the political benefits of their passage without

signing than into law.4^
Warmoth's shell game with the laws worked temporarily, for on
January 16 Emory informed Townsend that he saw "nothing in the situation
to require the aid or intervention of United States troops."

Warmoth

had convened the legislature, and several of the Custom House
representatives and senators had attended the sessions.

43

The situation remained quiet and calm for the next three days, but
there was a noticeable .increase in tension on Saturday, January 20.

On

that day the state senate finally net with a quonm present, and in an
important test vote the members of the upper chamber confirmed the nomi
nation of Warmoth's lieutenant governor, P. B. S. Pinchback.

Carter had

not expected Warmoth to have enough votes to confirm Pinchback, and the
governor's victory on this issue frustrated Carter's hopes to control
either house of the legislature, at least for the time being.

In

desperation, Carter issued a call for his followers to assemble on
Monday, January 22, at 10:00 a.m. and to endeavor to carry the State
House by force of arms.

44

to Townsend, January 15, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 14; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 227.
42E m o r y

^2Emory to Townsend, January 16, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 16; Emory to Townsend, January 16, 1872,
ibid., p. 15.
44Qiory to AGO, January 17, 19, and 20 (two communications), ibid.,
pp. 16-17; New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 21, 1872.
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Emory, learning from informants that nine hundred well-armed men
would answer Carter's call on Monday and that two artillery pieces might
be brought out of hiding for the occasion, informed Townsend of the
seriousness of this new situation.

Townsend thereupon ordered Emory to

place a guard around the U.S. mint and to put all his troops on alert.45
On Monday morning the city girded for open warfare, and the Army
prepared to prevent it.

Downtown store owners and French Quarter shop

keepers kept their businesses closed.

Dozens of men began gathering

near their assembly point, the statue of Henry Clay on Canal Street.
Warmoth ordered his men to form a cordon around the Mechanic's Institute;
seven hundred policemen and militiaman stood ready to defend the state
government.

Learning that more men were arriving at the Clay Statue,

Emory at 10:00 a.m. ordered Colonel Sully to bring all the companies and
two Gatling guns from Jackson Barracks to Jackson Square.

Next, Emory

handed two identical despatches to a waiting aide, telling him to
deliver one to Warmoth and the other to Carter.

The messages informed

them that President Grant had directed Emory "to suppress a conflict of
armed bodies of men should such occur, and to guard public property from
pillage and destruction."
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45Emory to Townsend, January 21, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 18; Townsend to Emory, January 21, 1872, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL, RG 393, NA.
46Bnory to Sully, January 22, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, and
Sully to AAG Gentry, January 22, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL, RG
393, NA; Townsend to Emory, January 22, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 2 Sess., Kb. 209, p. 19; Emory to Townsend, January 22, ibid.
It is interesting to note the manner in which Grant phrased his
instructions in the January 22 message sent through Townsend: "to
suppress a conflict . . . should such occur. . . . " Emory interpreted
the orders in such a way that he sent the troops before a fight
developed.
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At 11:15 a.m., holding Emory's despatch in his hand, Carter
addressed the crowd of several hundred persons gathered around the Clay
statue.

He told the throng that Emory5s troops were coming into the

city to prevent the overthrow of the Warnoth regime.
said that he would not attack the State House.
remonstrated.

Therefore, Carter

Several men in the crowd

lead and they would follow, they shouted.

adamant and told everyone to disperse.

But Carter was

At this time a lone mounted Army

officer rode toward the assemblage, trying to ascertain the mood of the
crowd.

The arrival of the officer convinced the doubters that Carter's

appraisal of the situation was accurate, and the gathering began to
break up.
In a short time the troops marched through the downtown streets,
and by 12:30 p.m. most of the shops and stores had opened for business.
The populace gradually returned to their routine pursuits.
immediate crisis had ended.

The
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Emory had successfully averted a great catastrophe.

The factional

strife in the state legislature was the worst threat to the peace and
stability of Louisiana since the tragic riot of July 1866 when Phil
Sheridan commanded the department.

From his Chicago headquarters,

General Sheridan wrote approvingly to Emory offering his "congratula48
tions on getting through with the New Orleans . . . troubles so well.”
47New Orleans Times, January 23, 1872; Nov Orleans Daily Picayune,
January 23, 1872; New Orleans Bee, January 23, 1872; Emory to Townsend,
January 22, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209,
pp. 19-20; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 132.
4®Emory to Townsend, January 23, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL,
RG 393, NA; Emory to AGO, January 24 and 25, 1872, ibid.; Philip H.
Sheridan to Emory, January 25, 1872, in William H. Emory Papers (ihe
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn.).
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On January 31 Story testified in New Orleans before a special
congressional committee that had been sent to investigate the recent
unusual events in Louisiana.

Story remarked that he "knew . . . the

presence of the United States troops would be sufficient [to prevent an
insurrection]"— a confident comment, doubtless intended for the leaders
and members of the political factions who had nearly plunged the state
into civil disorder.

But whan the crisis had been at its height, Story

had had no assurances that his six hundred troops could forestall blood
shed in the streets.

Each day difficult and unfamiliar problems had

plagued the general, who had commanded the department for only a month
at the time the crisis began.

A remarkable combination of luck and

oool-headedness on Emory's part had resolved the crisis peacefully.

49

The struggle over the control of the legislature permanently
soured the relationship between Emory and Warmoth.

In his official

departmental report some months later, Emory blamed the governor for
precipitating the crisis.

In a letter to Adjutant General Townsend,

Emory frankly gave his opinion of Warmoth and the others involved in the
state's political struggle.
On the one side was the Governor and his party, men of
unparrallelled [sic] audacity and venality, and on the other
the custom House Clique with the right on their side, but in
the minority, without a leader having any knowledge of affairs
and so blinded by passion and revenge, as to be willing at any
moment to sink Genl Grant and his administration, to gain an
insignificant point in Louisiana!.] Behind both factions,
stood the great democratic party of Louisiana, comprising all
the wealth and intelligence of the State and most of the white
muscle, urging both parties in turn to acts of violence &
^^Testimony of Emory before a congressional committee, in House
Misc. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 64.
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folly and aiding than by turns with money to compass their
ends.50
But the state had to have a government.

During the crisis

General William T. Sherman wrote Louisiana State University
President David F. Boyd, doubting if either faction was "the one really
sought for by the best people, , . . [and] unhappily we must recognize
sane one State Govt. . . . "
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Sherman, who sided with the Custom House-

Conservative coalition, had assumed that Etaory was not going to allow
Warmoth to disperse the Carter legislature and that perhaps after a
proper interval, Grant might recognize the anti-Warmoth faction.
However, Emory did not post troops to guard the Gem Saloon, and
Warmoth8s police occupied the building and wrecked Carter's plan to
preside over the legislature.
The disappointed editor of the New Orleans Bee commented that
"Warmoth's strength at Washington was evidently underrated by Carter and
his followers."
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On the contrary, Carter and Packard overestimated

their own ability to carry off the legislative chicanery that they had
planned so carefully.

Emory's prudent use of troops and Warmoth's

tenacity nullified the Packard-Carter scheme to gain control of the
house, and therefore the governor was saved, temporarily, from
impeachment.

By not assisting the Packard-Carter forces and by not

■^Emory's Departmental Report, October 4, 1872, in SW, Annual
Report, 1872-1873, p. 94; Emory to Townsend, January 29, 1872
(capitalization in the original), Emory Papers.
5^William T. Sherman to David F. Boyd, January 6, 1872, William T.
Sherman Letters/David F. Boyd Family Papers (Louisiana State University
Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge).
5^New Orleans Bee, January 23, 1872.
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leaving the governor unprotected, Emory foiled the Custom House Ring's
attempt to dethrone Warmoth.
Warmoth might have prevented the confrontation by meekly resigning
in early January, but it was not in his nature to give up easily, and he
never once indicated that he considered this course.

Instead, he used

all of his authority as the elected chief magistrate to keep himself in
power.

Unlike Carter and the Custom House Ring, Warmoth held a distinct

advantage— he did not have to mount an armed attack to take office.
Ultimately this was the decisive factor in the entire affair.

Packard

and Carter never overcame Warmoth's claim to legitimacy.
The war of the factions did not aid in January 1872.

Rather than

capitulate, the Custom House Ring redoubled its efforts to unhorse
Warmoth by the time of the next election, if not before.
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CHAPTER XI
INTERVENTION IN "A CIVIL CONTEST"
In February 1872 Governor Warmoth was beginning the final year of
his term.

The Democrats organized public protests against Warmoth's

blemished authority, criticizing him for failing to sign into law
several bills designed to decrease his powers.

General Emory noticed

that a residual feeling of discomfort and tension remained among the
populace after the showdown over control of the legislature, which had
been resolved in Warmoth's favor the previous month.1

For their part,

Republican party leaders alleged that the Democrats had committed
several acts of violence against Negroes in the hinterland parishes of
Grant and Rapides, prompting Emory to send Lieutenant William M. Bandy
to investigate the charges.

Hearing of these allegations, General Long-

street, Warmoth's militia commander, urged Emory to establish an A m y
post in central Louisiana to protect the Republicans there.

2

Bandy's report must have substantiated seme of the Republican
claims, for on March 30 Emory ordered a detachment of one officer and
twenty enlisted men to Colfax in Grant Parish to safeguard the civil
rights of citizens under the so-called Enforcement Acts.

In 1870 and

^■William H. Emory to Edward D. Townsend, February 16 and 25, 1872,
in House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, pp. 25-26; Ella Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 (Gloucester, Mass., 1967), 140.
2
Emory to James Longstreet, March 15, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/
DSL, RG 393, NA; AAAG W. T. Gentry to Lt. W. M. Bandy, March 19, 1872,
ibid.
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1871 Congress passed three acts directed particularly, but not
exclusively, at organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan which conspired
to prevent black and white Republicans from voting, serving on juries,
and holding office.

Persons convicted of these crimes in Federal courts

were subject to loth fines and prison sentences.

Furthermore, the

Enforcement Acts forbade state officials to inhibit any persons exer
cising their political and civil rights under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

Moreover, Federal judges and

the President were authorized to order the Army to help U.S. marshals
arrest violators of the acts and to protect persons whose rights had
been threatened or abused.

In emergencies, the President could suspend

habeas corpus and order the Army and the Navy to govern selected areas
by martial law until proper civil officials were capable of resuming
control.

(Grant declared such an emergency in several South Carolina

counties in 1871.)

The detachment Emory sent to Colfax remained in the

town about two weeks, investigating the Republican's oorplaints, and
. 3
returned to its garrison at Baton Rouge in April.
In May Emory made an inspection tour of the Florida forts on the
periphery of his department.

The trip was perfunctory and could have

%AAG Gentry to CO, Baton Rouge, March 30, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 139/DSL, and Col. Charles H. Smith to AAG, Dept Gulf, April 16,
1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL, K3 393, NA; Alexandria Louisiana
Democrat, April 17, 1872; Circular, Dept Gulf, December 4, 1871, in
House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 209, p. 33. The three
Enforcement Acts were passed on May 31, 1870, February 28, 1871, and
April 20, 1871. See Rambert W. Patrick, The Reconstruction of the
Nation (New York, 1967), 156-57; Jamas G. Randall and David H. Donald,
The Civil War and Reconstruction (2nd ed., rev., Lexington, Mass.,
1969), 683-84; Janes E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruc
tion, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 222-23; Everette Swinney,
''Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-77," Journal of Southern
History, XXVIII (May, 1962), 202-203.
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been handled by a member of his staff.

Although it might not have been

intended as such, this little Florida sojourn allowed the general to
take a two-week vacation from the pressures of his New Orleans
4
headquarters before the fall political campaign began.
By May 1872 there were five political factions in Louisiana, and
several meetings already had been held to consider nominations for
governor and delegates to the national party conventions.

The Custom

House Ring, led by Marshal Stephen Packard, Collector Janes Casey, and
Senator William Pitt Kellogg, remained staunchly loyal to Grant and
contained Republicans who were, of course, diametrically opposed to
Governor Warmoth.

The governor assembled a variety of Republicans who

supported him and, for one reason or another, opposed Grant.

Following

the lead of dozens of prominent Republicans in other states, they called
themselves "liberals."

In May Warmoth led a Louisiana delegation to a

national convention at Cincinnati, where eccentric newspaper editor and
activist gadfly Horace Greeley was nominated for president on the
Liberal Republican ticket.
Lieutenant Governor P. B. S. Pinchback organized a third Republican
faction in Louisiana, oonprised mostly of blacks.

As an ultimate goal,

Pinchback hoped to heal the divisions in his party, but his iirsnediate
goals were to secure more state offices for Negroes and, not
surprisingly, an important position for himself.
A fourth group, the Reform faction, was a small collection of
wealthy whites, mostly former Whigs, who were dissatisfied with both
Grant and the Custom House Ring.

The Reformers wanted a more honest and

^Emory to AGO, May 16, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL, RG 393,
NA.
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efficient Louisiana government, but they soon realized that they were
not strong enough to bring about such a drastic change by themselves.
The divisions in the Republican party naturally nurtured Democratic
hopes of winning control of the state government for the first tine
since the Civil War.

They planned to field a complete slate of candi

dates and counted on the support of many former Confederates.

But

political necessities being what they were, each faction began seeking
an alliance with one or more of the other groups to ensure victory in
5
November.
In late May the Pinchback Republicans held a convention in New
Orleans and surprisingly endorsed the Warmoth adninistration for another
term.

An amendment to the state constitution legally allowed Warmoth to

run for a second term, but he was firmly committed to the Liberals and
declined the nomination.

Nevertheless, Pinchback still vowed to unite

the state's Republicans and bring Warmoth back into the fold.
Therefore, Pinchback scheduled another meeting for his followers in June
to coincide with the Custom House convention. ^
In early June the Democrats and Reformers held separate
convocations in the Crescent City.

For governor, the Democrats picked

John McEnery, a rabid anti-Republican conservative from Ouachita Parish
whose hatred for Henry Clay Warmoth was well known.

True to their plan,

the Democrats selected a full roster of candidates for the other state
^Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 141-49, 159; Joe Gray Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 227-31; James A.
Rawley, "The General Amnesty Act of 1872; A Note," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XLVII (December, 1960), 480-82; William A. Russ,
"Disfranchisement in Louisiana (1862-1870)," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, XVIII (July 1935), 557-80.
^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 231.
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offices.

The Reform party likewise chose its own candidates, but made

overtures to the Democrats about a possible merger of their two slates
into one.

At first the Conservatives refusal to cooperate, but after

some negotiations, they accepted two Reformers on their ticket and
absorbed the smaller splinter group.

7

On June 19 the Custom House faction opened its convention in Baton
Rouge, and in a nearby hall Pinchback reassembled his supporters.

The

lieutenant governor lobbied at the other meeting for party unity,
advocating an important office for Warmoth, but the Ring bosses rejected
these proposals.

The delegates selected Senator Kellogg and Caesar C.

Antoine, a black leader from Caddo Parish, for governor and lieutenant
governor, respectively.

Naturally disappointed that his ideas for

unification had been quashed, Pinchback nevertheless forlornly held onto
g

his topes for seme sort of combined Republican ticket.
Throughout these political developments, Emory and his soldiers
waited patiently, watching the maneuvers, speeches, and meetings of the
different groups.

Before the Litorals met in August, Warmoth requested

that Grant send additional troops to Louisiana to guard the polls during
the election.

However, the President was reluctant to order any more

soldiers to a Southern state until seme crisis arose.

Consequently, no

troops were sent.9
^Ibid., 232; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 152-54.
8
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 233; John Edmund Gonzales,
"William Pitt Kellogg: Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana, 18731877," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIX (April, 1946), 401-403.

%illiam Pitt Kellogg to Stephen B. Packard, July 23, 1872, in
Henry Clay Warmoth Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; microfilm copy, at Louisiana State
University Library, Baton Rouge).

243
On August 5 the Louisiana Liberals convened their state convention
in New Orleans.

Some delegates talked about nominating Warmoth, but the

governor shrewdly figured that the best chance of defeating the Custom
House gang lay in choosing a candidate who was acceptable to sate of the
other factions.

Persuade! by his reasoning, the delegates nominated

former Confederate Colonel David B. Pern for governor.

The Liberals

selected other candidates, including Warmoth" s close friend George A.
Sheridan as the nominee for U.S. congressman-at-large and Warmoth him
self for U.S. senator.

In an unusual twist, Penn's nomination presaged

a direct alliance with Warmoth" s bitter enemies of long-standing, the
Conservative Democrats
In fact, the national Democratic party blazed the pathway to such
an alliance when it nominated Horace Greeley for president in July.

It

remained for Liberal Republicans and Democrats in the North and South to
bury old and bloody political hatchets and fuse their state tickets in
order to defeat Grantism.
In Louisiana, the movement toward this political wedding of
necessity was aided by the Liberals' choice of D. B. Penn for governor.
Unexpectedly, Penn gained in popularity throughout the state; and the
Louisiana Democrats, who expected that the Liberals would have to beg
subserviently for alliance, realized that concessions on their own part
were in order.
their slates.

Accordingly, the two groups arranged for the "fusion" of
Warmoth wisely advised that Penn head the ticket, but a

few Liberals and many Danocrats favored McEnery, who thus retained his
•*-®Henry Clay Warmoth, War, Politics, and Reconstruction: Stormy
Days in Louisiana (New York, 1930), 197-98; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 233-34; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 157-58.
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nomination for governor; Penn became the Fusionist's choice for
lieutenant governor.

Several other Literals found places on the

combined ticket, including George Sheridan for congressman-at-large.^^
The Liberal-Dsiocratic-Reform fusion made it natural for the
Pinchback and Custom House Republicans to unite.

Several of Warmoth's

old allies, including Janes Longstreet, abandoned the governor's unholy
alliance with the Dsnocrats and scurried across town to the Kellogg
camp, where preparations were already underway to merge the PinchbackCustcm House tickets.

Kellogg and Antoine remained the party's nominees

for governor and lieutenant governor, but Pinchback secured the slots of
secretary of state and superintendent of education for two of his men,
and the nomination of congressman-at-large for himself.

12

Thus, in August when General Emory returned from another inspection
trip to Florida, he found the political battlelines drawn between two
coalitions.

On one side, Kellogg led the Custom House Ring, Pinchback's

Republicans, plus Longstreet and a few disaffected Warmothites.

On the

other side, the Democrats, the Reformers, and Warmoth's Liberal Republi
cans supported McEnery.

After considering the political situation in

Louisiana and the rest of his department, EJnory decided that consulta
tion with his superiors was in order and requested permission to go to
Washington.

The War Department granted his request, and he spent most

of the month of September in the East.

13

11Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 235-36; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 161-62.
19

•

Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 235; Lonn, Reconstruction m
Louisiana, 163-64.
l^Lt. Charles King bo John W. Forney, August 6, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 139/IDSL; AAAG Gentry to Emory, September 3, 1872, ibid.; AG Thomas
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Meanwhile, during September and October, the Louisiana registrar's
office opened the registration books to prospective voters.

Hundreds of

Democrats, heretofore unregistered, came forward to sign the rolls.

The

large number of men registering to vote was an encouraging sign to the
editor of the Alexandria Louisiana Danocrat, who wrote that Conserva
tives hoped this election would be different from those in the past when
"they were perfectly certain that the Radical managers would cheat than
out of the fruit of their labors."

14

Despite whatever tricks the Republicans had up their sleeves, the
Democrats knew that the Amy's role in the fall election was still
important.

The department commander no longer appointed the registrars

or sent officers to supervise registration.
these responsibilities.

The governor had assumed

The A m y was not supposed to interfere in the

free, open, and honest democratic political process.

However, the cam

paigns and elections of the 1870s were no more free, open, and honest
than those of the 1860s had been, and Louisiana politicians of all
factions were quite aware of this.

Under the Enforcement Acts, the A m y

could be just as influential as it had been in the 1860s.

The Democrats

harbored justifiable fears that the Custom House Ring might purposely
involve the A m y in the election to aid the Republican party.
In fact, soon after returning from his conferences in Washington,
Bnory began a concerted program designed to put an A m y unit in every
important Louisiana town by election day on November 4.
Scott to Emory, August 31, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL; Capt. W. W.
Sanders to Gentry, September 23, 1872, ibid.; all in KG 393, NA.
-^Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 167; Rawley, "The General
Amensty Act," 480-82; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, September 25, 1872.
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General William T. Sherman's adjutant, Colonel William D. Whipple,
authorized Emory to use his soldiers to protect the rights of voters
under the Enforcement Acts.

Believing that this program operated in his

favor, Kellogg advised Emory that troops were needed in Shreveport,
Alexandria, and Opelousas.

15

But the general first ordered troops to Monroe.

On October 19

Company I of the 16th Infantry, Captain William H. Bartholomew command
ing, arrived in Monroe from Jackson, Mississippi.

The Ouachita

Telegraph complimented Bartholomew on the good discipline of his men,
but denounced the use of soldiers in an election "to rescue the Radical
ticket" from defeat.

"This is a civil contest, and any attempt bo make

the military an auxiliary to the success of either side is as degrading
to the soldier as it will be subversive of liberty/’ the Telegraph's
editorialist concluded.

He hoped that the soldiers' "sense of duty"

prevented them from interfering in the election.

16

During the remainder of October, Emory sent detachments to eleven
other Louisiana bcwns which normally did not have garrisons.
Captain Charles B. Hall took Company B of the 19th Infantry from Baton
Rouge and established a temporary post at Alexandria.

Emory also

ordered Hall to send squads to Colfax and Cheneyville if he believed
that his entire company was not needed to protect the polls in
l^col. William D. Whipple to Emory, October 23, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 149/DSL; [Whipple received his authority to give these orders from
the Secretary of War]; AAAG Gentry to CO, Baton Rouge, October 23, 1872,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL; Kellogg to Emory, September 15, 1872, in
Dept Gulf, Letters Reed; all in RG 393, NA.
■^Capt. W. H. Bartholomew to AG, Dept Gulf, October 19, 1872, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL, RG 393, NA; Monroe Ouachita Telegraph,
October 26, 1872.
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Alexandria.

Emory dispatched two companies to Opelousas, one from Baton

Rouge and the other from Jackson Barracks.

Presumably, Opelousas got

such a strong garrison because of the violence that had occurred there
in the past.

The commander at Opelousas then detailed a squad to over

see the election in nearby St. Martinsville, and Emory sent a squad from
Jackson Barracks to the town of Point-a-la-Hache in Plaquemines Parish
for the same purpose.

17

Emory also ordered troops to towns in north Louisiana, blanketing
that section of the state more thoroughly than at any time since 1865.
Captain Arthur W. Allyn and Company B, 16th Infantry, set up a post at
Shreveport.

A strong detachment of one officer and twenty enlisted men

was sent to Harrisonburg in Catahoula Parish.

Emory stationed other

squads at Winnsbono in Franklin Parish, Vienna in Jackson Parish, and
Homer in Claiborne Parish.

18

Emory's main concern was to keep the peace in New Orleans.

He

ordered Colonel Smith in Baton Rouge to bring two companies under his
personal command to the Crescent City.

Emory made Smith acting

commander of all troops in the New Orleans area because Colonel Alfred
Sully was out of the state on leave.

On October 29 two companies of the

■^Emory to CO, Baton Rouge, October 24, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol.
139/DSL; AAAG Gentry to CO, Opelousas, October 24, 1872, ibid.; Gentry
to CO, Alexandria, October 24, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL; Gentry
to CO, Jackson Barracks, October 24, 1872, ibid.; Gentry to Col. Smith,
October 30, 1872, ibid.; all in RG 393, NA. Alexandria Louisiana
Democrat, October 30, 1872.
^Gentry to CO, Shreveport, October 24, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol.
114/DSL; Gentry to 00, Baton Rouge, October 25, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol.
139/DSL; Gentry to Capt. Bartholomew, October 28, 1872, ibid., Gentry to
CO, Monroe, October 31, 1872, ibid.; Bartholomew to AG, Dept Gulf,
November 1, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL; Capt. A. W. Allyn to
Gentry, November 2, 1872, ibid.; all in RG 393, NA.
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3rd Artillery arrived in New Orleans from Fort Barrancas in Pensacola,
bringing the city's garrison to a strength of seven companies totaling
19
317 men present for duty.
According to most contemporary accounts, and by Louisiana
standards, the 1872 campaign was surprisingly calm.

Sane Partocrats

believed that they had a legitimate chance to win the election.

But not

content to rely solely on legitimate methods, they also resorted to
using physical and economic threats against black voters.

A favorite

tactic employed by the Conservatives was threatening to fire blacks from
their jobs if they voted for the Republican ticket.

However, the Demo

crats perpetrated few incidents of outright violence against Republicans
of either color,
_

. .

across Louisiana.

perhaps

because of the wide distribution of A m y troops

20

Although it was relatively peaceful, contemporary observers and
historians agree that the election of 1872 was one of the most fraudulent in Louisiana history.

21

Both sides freely stuffed ballot boxes and

used such tine honored picys as relocating polling places or shortening
the hours that the polls were open.

Several parishes eventually

l^Emory to Townsend, October 13, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL;
Gentry to Col. Smith, October 29, 1872, ibid.; Smith to Gentry,
October 26, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 149/hSL; Lt. J. B. Burbank to
Gentry, October 28, 1872, ibid.; SO No. 164, October 28, 1872, in Dept
Gulf, filed with Letters
Reed; all in
RG 393,NA. Post Returns, Jackson
Barracks, October 1872, in Records of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel
524), RG 94, NA.
^^William E. Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1953),
269-70; F. Wayne Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth and Louisiana Reconstruc
tion" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina,
1969), 294-322.
2-4?aylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 239-41.
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submitted two sets of voting returns, or the contending parties objected
to the returns from various precincts.
On election day, November 4, Emory informed Washington that the
"day passed quietly in the [Crescent] City.
from the interior."

No trouble [was] reported

On November 5 Emory began ordering soma of the

scattered detachments back to their regular duty stations.

However,

having second thoughts, he rescinded the orders, deciding instead to
leave the detachments in place until local officials completed counting
the votes.

Exceptions to this holding action were the two artillery

companies from Florida.

With the election over and everything

apparently quiet in New Orleans, Emory ordered the artillerymen to
return to Fort Barrancas.

22

While the state's citizens waited expectantly for the announcement
of the election results, the Fusionists and Democrats began clamoring
that soldiers in the interior parishes had interfered in the election.
William Hunter, a supporter of the Fusion ticket in Concordia Parish,
told Governor Warmoth that "many of our most quiet colored friends felt
so hurt at such a wanton display of Military Despotism they quietly
preferred staying Home and this is Doubtless one Great cause of our
short vote."

The Ouachita Telegraph editorialist critically described

the Army's effect in his parish:
The whites were considerably intimidated by the presence
of United States troops, and were prevented from using the
^Efriory to Ttownsend, November 4, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL,
RG 393, NA; Gentry to Lt. G. B. Pickett (Homer), November 5, 1872,
ibid.; Gentry to Capt. A. W. Allyn (Shreveport), November 5, 1872,
ibid.; M A G W. W. Sanders to Lt. Oliver Witmore (St. Martinsville),
November 6, 1872, ibid.; Gentry to Capt. W. H. Bartholomew (Monroe),
November 8, 1872, ibid.; Gentry to CO, Jackson Barracks, November 8,
1872, ibid. New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 5, 1872.
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ordinary means usually resorted to in order to solicit votes.
There was no actual participation in the election by the sol
diers, but their presence here unquestionably kept many from
the polls, and those who did attend, from using energetic
means to carry the Fusion ticket. It was the moral power
produced by the sinple presence of the soldiers, and the fact
that the colored voters were informed it was their duty to
vote the Radical ticket, that prevented a free choice among
the negroes.
Despite these protestations, both sides eventually conceded Ouachita
Parish to the Republicans.

23

While the Democrats complained about military interference during
the election, the Republicans asked for additional Army supervision and
protection after the balloting.

General James Longstreet called for

military officers to help election supervisors count the ballots in New
Orleans.

Republicans in the town of Covington requested that the Army

guard the ballot boxes and election supervisors there.

Bnory did send

one officer and ten soldiers to Covington, but he left the election
officials in New Orleans to their own devices.

24

Moreover, within a few days Bnory saw no need to leave the
detachments scattered at their temporary posts across the state.
Therefore, most of the units which had been given special election duty
had returned to their regular garrisons by the end of November.
Meanwhile another political crisis had developed.

25

23
William Hunter to Henry Clay Warmoth, November 9, 1872
(capitalization in the original), in Warmoth Papers, Southern Historical
Collection. Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, November 9, 1872.
24
New Orleans Parly Picayune, November 11, 1872; Gentry to CO,
Jackson Barracks, November 9, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL, RG 393,
NA.
■^see, for example, Major Samuel A. Wainwright to Gentry, Novem
ber 11, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL; Gentry to Capt. J. H.
Bradford, November 12, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL; Gentry to
Lt. Oliver Witmore, November 12, 1872, ibid.; Gentry to Capt. A. W.
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The crisis centered around the state agency known as the Returning
Board/ which was responsible for deciding if voting returns were legal
or fraudulent.

At Warmoth's insistence,, the legislature had passed a

law establishing the Returning Board in 1870, and by controlling this
board the governor virtually had the power to declare who was elected.
State law fixed the Returning Board5s membership, including the
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and two state
senators.

State senators John Lynch and T. C. Anderson occupied chairs

on the board and so did Warmoth's recently-appointed secretary of state,
Francis J. Herron.

As a Custom House Republican, Lynch was predisposed

to disagree with Warmoth about the validity of the voting returns.
Accordingly, the Returning Board split into two parts, with Warmoth
presiding over one and Lynch the other.

Each appointed different men to

fill the vacancies on his board and procured different judges to swear
in the new panel members.
skill of a Machiavelli.

The situation would have tested the political
Both tried to obtain the parish returns and

have their board declare the winners of the election, including the
prize plum, the governorship.

Of course, Warmoth favored McEnery, Lynch

supported Kellogg, and each board was expected to declare a sufficient
number of Fusionists or Republicans elected to give its man control of
27
the legislature.
Allyn, November 14, 1872, ibid.; Gentry to Bartholomew, November 16 and
22, 1872, ibid.; Gentry to CO, Covington, November 26, 1872, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 114/DSL; all above in RG 393, NA.
^Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth," 172.
2^Du e to a complicated technicality, both Warmoth and Lynch
recognized each other as members of the other's board. The best account
of the incredibly tangled web is Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 241-44.
See also Binning, "Henry Clay Warmoth," 323-34; Highsmith, "Louisiana
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General Etaory realized that either side might use violence to
uphold the findings of its returning board, and he ordered the troops at
Jackson Barracks to be prepared to move into New Orleans "at a moment8s
notice."

Marshal Stephen Packard asked Emory's assistance in obtaining

the complete election returns for Lynch8s board.

Shewing his continuing

personal dislike for Warmoth, Emory advised Adjutant General Townsend
that the governor had "displaced the legally constituted Board for
Election returns and replaced than by his partisans." Hie general
requested authority to procure the returns for lynch.

However, after a

conference with President Grant, General Sherman ordered Emory not to
interfere, "except in case of riot," thus temporarily preventing him
from acting on behalf of Lynch and Kellogg.

28

Ctti November 20, using provisions of a recently passed state law,
Warmoth dissolved both boards and appointed a new panel, chaired by
Gabriel DeFeriet, a Fusionist.

Lynch naturally refused to recognize

Warmoth's authority to dissolve his board, confidently expecting Packard
29
and Emory to obtain the elusive returns.
Meanwhile, William Kellogg was apprehensive about Grant's attitude
toward the Louisiana imbroglio.

Be wrote to Republican leader

William E. Chandler, begging him to learn "the real feeling of the
Administration towards us, and towards our amplications. . . . "
During Reconstruction," 271-73; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana,
181-87; New Orleans Republican, November 14, 1872.
9 ft

Gentry to 00, Jackson Barracks, November 13 and 14, 1872, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 139/DSL; Emory to AGO, November 15, 1872 (capitalization in
the original), ibid.; Sherman to Emory, November 16, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 149/DSL; all above in RG 393, NA.
29
Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 188-89; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 243-44.
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Would the A m y support his claim to the governorship, if the Federal
court and the U.S. marshal requested such support?

He continued:

I know that we labor under the embarrassments growing out
of the use of U.S. troops, perhaps improperly, heretofore, and
the destiny of the party as well as the well-being of the
community may depend upon the action of the military
department of the Government,
In a strangely revealing passage, Kellogg added;
God knows I never have desired this office of Governor;
I do rot want it new. If I consulted my own feelings simply
I would abandon this whole thing. . . . The whole thing is
distasteful to me and if I can put the responsibility upon the
Federal government you may be sure I shall do it. . . .^0
Kellogg did not reveal these self-doubts in his official
correspondence.

On the contrary, he assumed that 1® was the governor-

elect and called upon the Federal government to take his side.

He

warned U.S. Attorney General George H. Williams that the Fusionists were
planning to eject Louisiana's supreme court justices from their seats.
Furthermore, Kellogg claimed that the Warmoth-Danocratic alliance was
threatening "to destroy the Republican party in the State . . . and to
inaugurate a condition of things that will jeopardize the peace of the
community. . . . "

31

Anticipating trouble, Emory decided on November 27 to bring in
reinforcements.

He ordered two companies of the 1st Artillery at Fort

Barrancas to board a steamer bound for Louisiana.

The general also

sought information about two companies of the 7th Cavalry which
30Kellogg to William E. Chandler, November 23, 1872 (emphasis in
the original), in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice
Dept from Louisiana
(Microcopy M-940, reel 6), RG 60, NA.
^^Kellogg to George H. Williams, November 27,
Docs., 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 7.

1872,in Bouse Exec.
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General Irvin McDowell, the new commander of the Military Division of
the South, had recently ordered to the Department of the Gulf.

32

While Emory strengthened his garrison, Collector James Casev had
been working behind the scenes to bring about Kellogg3s election.

Casey

went to the nation's capital and personally explained the political
situation in Louisiana to President Grant.

Soon thereafter the

Washington authorities acted to support the candidate of the Custom
33
House Ring.
Attorney General Williams directed Marshal Packard "to enforce the
decrees and mandates of the United States courts, no matter by whom
resisted," adding that "General Emory will furnish you with all neces
sary troops for that purpose."

Adjutant General Townsend sent these

same orders to Emory and added that the orders came from the President.
In acknowledging Townsend's telegram, Emory said that "[n]o requisition
has yet been made but the troops are in hand and ready to act promptly."
All that remained was for a cooperative Federal judge to issue a ruling
favorable to Kellogg's candidacy.

34

In the meantime, on December 4 the two returning boards met
separately and announced their findings.

Warmoth8s board, chaired by

32Major J. M. Brannon (Fort Barrancas) to AAG/Dept Gulf,
November 27, 1872, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 149/DSL; Emory to AAG J. H.
Taylor
(MilDivSouth), December 3, 1872,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL; both
inFG
393, NA. The two companies of the 7th Cavalry eventually arrived
in
late December, and one was stationed at New Orleans and the other at
Oxford, Mississippi.
33Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 244.
3^Williams to Packard, December 3, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 13. Townsend to Emory, December 3, 1672, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 149/DSL; Emory to Townsend, December 3, 1872, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 139/DSL; both in RG 393, NA.
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DeFeriet, named McEnery Louisiana's next governor and confirmed that a
majority of Fusionists had been elected to the legislature.
awarded the state's electoral votes to Greeley.

DeFeriet

The fact that Lynch's

board had never teen given access to the returns did not prevent him
from proclaiming that Grant deserved the state's electoral votes.

But

Lynch temporarily refrained from declaring that Kellogg had been
elected. ^
On December 5 the Custom House bosses persuaded Federal Circuit
Judge Edward H. Durell to declare that Warmoth's returning board had
violated a court order restraining either board from announcing the
election results.

Durell authorized Marshal Packard to occupy the State

House and prevent any "unlawful assemblage" there.

In other words,

Federal authorities could stop the Fusionist legislature from meeting.
Basing their actions on Durell's decree, the Custom House Republicans
now prepared to capitalize on the orders issued two days before by
Attorney General Williams and Adjutant General Townsend.

36

At 2:00 a.m. on Decanter 6 Packard executed Durell's mandate.
Loosely interpreting the judge's order, Packard asked for and received
troops from Emory under the Enforcement Acts.

Companies F and L of the

1st Artillery commanded by Captain Richard H. Jackson went with Packard
and same of his deputies to occupy the capital.

Emory also ordered four

companies of the 19th Infantry to ccme into the city from Jackson
Barracks, quartering them near department headquarters on Magazine
Street.

Reinforcements were therefore close by in case Warmoth's forces

•^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 244.
^Ibid., 244-45; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 194.
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resisted Packard's occupation of the Mechanic's Institute.

The next

morning the New Orleans Tiros lambasted Judge Durell for using "flimsy
and audacious pretences" to bring the A m y into the dispute.37
Once the A m y had acted on behalf of the Republicans, Warmoth's
days as governor were numbered.

His opponents quickly took steps to

remove him from office.
On December 9 Lynch's returning board declared that Kellogg had
been elected governor.

According to Lynch's count, Republicans heavily

dominated the next legislature:

77 Republicans to 32 Fusionists in the

house; 28 Republicans to 8 Fusionists in the senate.

These results did

not satisfy the Fusionists, who later established yet another returning
board— the fourth empaneled during the crisis.
The Fusionist board upheld the election of 66 legislators approved
by the Lynch board, but counted in many other candidates not acknow
ledged by Lynch.

Consequently, in several cases two men claimed to have

been elected to the same seat in the legislature; and during the next
few months two legislatures existed, one composed predominantly of
Republicans and the other comprised of men loyal to McEnery.

Fran time

to time, men vha had been endorsed by both returning boards attended
sessions of each legislature.

38

37
Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 195; New Orleans Republican,
December 7, 1872; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 245; New Orleans
Times, December 7, 1872; Althea D. Pitre, ‘'The Collapse of the Warmoth
Regime, 1870-1872," Louisiana History, VI (Spring, 1965), 182-85; Post
Returns, New Orleans, December 1872, in Records of the AGO (Microcopy
M-617, reel 844), RG 94, NA; Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, December
1872, ibid. (reel 524).
38Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 200-205; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 246.
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On December 9 the Kellogg legislature assembled and elected
Charles W. Lowell speaker of the house.

He promptly entertained a

notion to inpeach Governor Warmoth, which just as prcnptly passed the
house by a vote of 57 to 6, suspending Warmoth from office until the
senate could hold a trial and reach a verdict.

Until then, Lieutenant

Governor Pinchback was to be acting governor of Louisiana.

39

Pinchback notified Grant of Warmoth8s inpeachment and requested the
"protection of the United States government" for the new administration.
Following Pinchback's suggestion, the legislature passed a resolution
calling on the President to order Federal troops to defend the state
government from dotestic violence, though the acting governor admitted
that New Orleans was calm and quiet.

40

Warmoth never acknowledged Pinchback's authority.

He told Grant

that Pinchback, aided by seme U.S. soldiers, had broken into the execu
tive offices and usurped the governorship.

During the next two months

each man claimed to be governor of the state.

Nevertheless, Warmoth no

doubt realized that he was effectively out of office; his term expired
in January 1873, and though the Republicans made a pretense of holding a
trial in the senate, no verdict was ever reached.

41

3%inning, "Henry Clay Warmoth," 334-36; Warmoth, Politics and
Reconstruction, 211-12; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 247-48; Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 206-208; New Orleans Tines, December 10,
1872.
^®P. B. S. Pinchback to Grant, December 9, 1872, in House Exec.
Docs., 40 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 16; Resolution of the Louisiana
Legislature, December 9, 1872, ibid. Pinchback and his legislature
wanted the President to officially recognize Pinchback's legal
succession to the governorship. Emory's troops continued to occupy
the State House, thus effectively discouraging the Fusionists frcm
attacking the capitol as George Carter had threatened to do in January.
^Warmoth to Grant, December 11, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42

258
On December 10 McEnery and Wanooth called a ness neeting at the
New Orleans City Hall.

Hundreds of persons gathered and listened to

speeches by the Fusionist leaders, who castigated Grant, the Amy, and
the Republicans in equal measure.^

Because troops still occupied the

Mechanic's Institute, the Fusionists chose City Hall for their meeting.
After the Fusionists net, Pinchback reiterated his request for the
assistance of Federal troops, saying that their "moral effect would be
great," especially if Pinchback himself was allowed to direct their
maneuvers.

Collector James Casey, who had returned to New Orleans after

his neeting in Washington with the President, agreed with Pinchback's
request; he declared that "all difficulty will be dissipated, [and] the
[Republican] party saved" if Grant placed the troops at the acting
governor's disposal.

Attorney General Williams replied to the Louisiana

leaders on Grant's behalf:

"Whenever it becomes necessary in the

judgment of the President, the State will be protected from domestic
violence.
During early December both sides in the Louisiana dispute continued
to press Grant with their demands.

Pinchback argued that because

Warmoth denied the fact that he had been inpeached, the carpetbagger's
followers might resort to violence to keep him in office.

Putting aside

the ludicrous request for the acting governor's personal command of U.S.
Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 18; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana,
224-25.
^^New Orleans Daily Picayune (afternoon edition), December 10,
1872.
^^Pinchback to Williams, December 11, 1872, in House Exec. Docs.,
42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, pp. 18-19; Casey to Grant, December 11, 1872,
ibid., p. 19; Williams to Pinchback, December 11, 1872, in Senate
Reports, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 457, p. 843.
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troops, Pinchback and Casey demanded outright Federal ''recognition" of
theirs as the "legal State government."

In their opinion, the best form

of recognition would be an announcement by Grant saying that the A m y
would defend Pinchback and his legislature if they were attacked.
McEnery, on the other hand, still claimed that
but he did not apply for presidential recognition.

was governor-elect,
Instead, he asked

Grant "to suspend recognition of either of the dual governments now in
operation here until there can be laid before you all facts . . . touching the legitimacy of either government."

44

However logical McEnery's

appeal seemed to him, it had no chance of success, as Louisianians soon
learned.
On December 12 Attorney General Williams informed Pinchback that
President Grant had officially recognized him "as the lawful executive
of Louisiana, and that tody assenbled at Mechanic's Institute [as] the
lawful legislature of the state. . . . "

Williams added that the Army

had been ordered to give Pinchback and his government full protection
"from disorder and violence."
McEnery of Grant's decision.

45

The Attorney General also informed

Using blunt language, Williams told

McEnery that Grant's resolve would "not be changed, and the sooner it
[was] acquiesced in the sooner good order and peace will be restored."

46

44Pinchback to Grant, Decanter 12, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, pp. 20-21; Casey to Grant, December 12, 1872,
ibid., p. 20; John McEnery to Grant, December 12, 1872, ibid., p. 24.
45Williams to Pinchback, December 12, 1872, ibid., p. 23; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 248-49. Pinchback was the only black to act as
governor of any Southern state during Reconstruction. He served for
forty-three days.
4^Williams to McEnery, December 13, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 23.
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For General Emory, Grant's recognition of Pinchback had come none
too soon. In Emory's opinion* a riot had teen averted by having troops
escort Packard's deputies to the State House on December 6.

But helping

the marshal occupy the capital had only slightly iirpnoved a "deplorable"
situation.

The loyalty of the city's papulation was divided between two

governors and two legislatures* and, until Grant's decision* the courts
had failed to decide uniformly in favor of one government or the other.
Making the situation mare tense, Pinchback had reappointed Janes
Longstreet to his job of state militia commander* replacing Hugh
Campbell* Warmoth's appointee* who reluctantly resigned.47
Longstreet's appointment tested Emory' s support of the Pinchback
regime.

George G. Waggaman* one of Campbell's officers, refused to

surrender the state arsenal on Canondolet Street to Pinchback's militia*
and Emory feared that the two groups would fight over the building.
Pinchback called on Emory to expel Waggaman and his men.

The general

responded by asking Pinchback not to take any "aggressive steps" against
the arsenal until the national authorities had teen told about the
confrontation.

Emory fired off a telegram to Adjutant General Townsend,

informing him that the "parties are face to face with arms in their
hands.

I beg an immediate answer."

48

On December 14 Townsend replied succinctly:

"You may use all

necessary force to preserve the peace, and will recognize the authority
of Governor Pinchback."

Bolstered by these orders* Emory sent

47Ettt>ry to AGO* December 11 and 12* 1872* in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/
DSL, RG 393* NA.
48Emory to Pinchback, December 14, 1872, ibid.; Emory to AGO,
December 13, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42 Gong., 3 Sess., No. 91,
p. 25.
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Colonel Charles Smith and Captain Charles King to the arsenal.

The

officers relayed Townsend's orders to Waggaman, who immediately turned
over the arsenal to the Army,

within a short time, Colonel Smith

allowed Pinchback's militia to occupy the building, and Emory's latest
. .
49
crisis had ended without bloodshed.
However, all the signs pointed to future upheaval.

Barring seme

unforeseen cataclysm, Pinchback would serve out the two months remaining
of Warmoth's term.

But McEnery claimed the title of governor-elect,

despite the fact that Grant had unequivocally recognized Pinchback and
obviously intended Kellogg to be Louisiana's next governor.
White resentment against the Custom House and the Army was
smoldering and was well expressed in a long Picayune editorial in
mid-December:
If the small force here under his ocmnand [about 700
troops] was all that prevented the overthrow of the Pinchback
assumption, Gen. Emory should know that men enough could soon
be got in the city, from a population of 200,000 to make very
short work of it, even if it numbered 10,000. He should be
aware the people perfectly understand the power he represents,
and that . . . [in the event of insurrection, an] . . . over
whelming force . . . oould soon be concentrated here by the
Government at Washington. He is singularly ignorant of public
opinion if he supposes there is new or has been any intention
to resist the military authority of the United States. . . .
[Such] resistance would be folly. 5®
49Townsend to Emory, December 14, 1872, in House Exec. Docs., 42
Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 25; Emory to Townsend, December 14, 1872,
ibid., p. 26; New Orleans Daily Picayune (afternoon edition),
December 14, 1872; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 213; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 249.
50New Orleans Daily Picayune, December 14, 1872.
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On Christmas Day, 1872, Company L, 7th Cavalry, reinforced the New
Orleans garrison.

51

Unory and his soldiers were preparing to guard

against the "folly" of resistance to Kellogg's inauguration on
January 13, 1873.

51Enory to AAG, MilDivSouth, December 25, 1872, in Dept Gulf, vol.
114/DSL, KG 393, NA.

CHAPTER XII
"THE FLASHING OF BAYONETS IN CUR STREETS"
In January 1873 John McEnery and William Pitt Kellogg both prepared
to take the oath as governor of Louisiana.

President Grant already had

indicated his support of Kellogg, but McEnery was determined to hold his
own bogus inauguration, hoping that it might later enable him to assume
the governorship.

Moreover, dozens of Fusionist candidates claimed

election to seats in the legislature, but Kellogg never intended to
adnit them to the State House.

Consequently, McEnery and the Democrats

planned to organize a shadow government.
General Emory felt trapped between the two contending political
forces.

He believed that McEnery9s claim to office was invalid.

Although President Grant and the A m y high command had ordered him to
sustain the administration of Acting Governor P. B. S. Pinchback, Emory
doubted his own authority to transfer this support to Kellogg.'*'
The Democratic and Republican legislatures scheduled their opening
ceremonies on January 6, one week before the dual inaugurations of
McEnery and Kellogg on January 13.

Under these circumstances, Emory

feared that the simplest barroom brawl or street fight could incite open
warfare in New Orleans.^
^William H. Emory to P. B. S. Pinchback, January 3, 1873, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
2Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, January 1 and 2, 1873, ibid; Emory to
AAG, MilDivSouth, January 3, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL, RG 393,
NA.
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Grant and General William T. Shaman understood the gravity of the
Louisiana situation.

In an effort to strengthen Emory's hand, Sherman

ordered Emory "to use your troops to preserve peace* should a contin
gency arise which in your judgement calls for it."

Emory released this

statement to the New Orleans newspapers, hoping that it might convince
McEnery to cancel his inauguration, but the latter was unmoved by the
3
general's orders.
McEnery8s intractability pointed to the possibility of a
confrontation between Democrats and Republican®, and therefore on
January 4 Emory decided to shew that the A m y intended to preserve the
peace.

Initially, he ordered the garrison at Baton Rouge to prepare for

duty in New Orleans if necessary.
Crescent City on full alert.

Next he placed the troops in the

Following the pattern he had adopted the

previous year, Emory informed the newspapers of his orders, and they
4
dutifully reported these military preparations.
Meanwhile, Grant, Sherman, and Attorney General Williams matte two
important decisions concerning the Kellogg-McEnery rivalry.

First, the

Washington authorities ordered Emory not to interfere with the meeting
of McEnery's legislature, so long as it did not obstruct or disrupt "the
administration of the recognized government of the state."

Furthermore,

Emory was instructed not to prevent McEnery's inauguration.

Grant and

3Sherman's orders, sent by AAG William D. Whipple to Emory,
January 4, 1873, in House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 31;
New Orleans Republican, January 7, 1873.
4
AAG W. T. Gentry to 00, Baton Rouge, January 4, 1873, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 139/DSL; Emory to AGO, January 5, 1873, ibid; Gentry to CO,
New Orleans, January 5, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL; all in RG 393,
NA. New Orleans Republican, January 5, 1873; New Orleans Times,
January 5, 1873.
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his advisors did not want to spark a riot between the A m y and McEnery9s
defenders.

Perhaps once McEnery was inaugurated, he would realize his

own ineffectiveness and "resign" gracefully, and his government would
5
collapse of its own dead weight.
On January 6, the day picked for the opening of the legislatures,
businesses closed and crowds gathered in downtown New Orleans.

A

carnival atmosphere prevailed despite the military preparations openly
displayed in the city.

The Metropolitan Police, ocnsnanded by Algernon S.

Badger, assembled near the arsenal on Carondolet Street.

Each policanan

was well armed, and four brass cannon, hitched to horse teams, were
parked in the street.

Story had mustered a force of nine catpanies.

Six companies of the 19th Infantry (A, C, D, E, H, and I) were quartered
in the Magazine Street Barracks, near departmental headquarters.
Company L, 7th Cavalry, dismounted and picketed their horses in Tivoli
Circle.

Companies F and L, 1st Artillery, had teen stationed in the

city for several days without their cannon, but they did have two
Gatling guns.

The whole force totaled 438 men, which was only about

fifty men less than the entire 19th Regiment at

that time.6

Across town, more than fair thousand persons had gathered to watch
the arrival of the Democratic legislators and perhaps catch a glimpse of
McEnery himself.

Knots of armed lookouts posted themselves around the

^William T. Sherman to Emory, January 5, 1873, in House Exec.
Docs., 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 32; George H. Williams to
Stephen B. Packard, January 4, 1873, ibid., p. 31; ESnory toSherman,
January 5, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL, RG
393, NA.
% e w Orleans Times, January 7, 1873; SW, Annual Report, 1872-1873,
pp. 118-19; Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, January 1872, in Records of
the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA; Post Returns, New
Orleans, December 1872, ibid. (reel 844).
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Odd Fellows Hall, the designated meeting site of the shadow government.
Both legislatures met in their respective halls with much fanfare and
speech-making.
adjourned.

McEnery9s legislature did not have a quorum and

At the state capital, mere than two thousand Kellogg

supporters applauded the opening of the de jure legislature, which had a
quorun, but transacted no important business.

Much to Emory9s relief,

the afternoon passed with the air of a holiday," no violence occurred,
and the troops were not sent to either legislature.

Emory believed that

the massive display of military force had prevented a riot.
Within a week’s time, however, Emory faced a similar peace-keeping
test during the dual inaugurations. He specifically asked Sherman if
Kellogg should be automatically recognized upon his inauguration simply
because Pinchback had been recognized previously.

Apparently, Sherman
i

did not send a reply to Eknory's question, and the Louisiana commander
logically assumed that he should recognize Kellogg until receiving
orders to the contrary.

However, Emory concluded that "the situation is

becoming more complicated, and in my opinion, the use of troops simply
to keep the peace cannot lead to a satisfactory or permanent solution of
the difficulties here."

8

January 13 dawned a "fair and lovely" day in New Orleans, and the
political factions prepared themselves for the spectacle of two
^New Orleans Times, January 7, 1873; Emory to Sherman, January 6,
1873, in House Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 33; Ella Lorn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 (Gloucester, Mass., 1967), 222;
Emory to Sherman, January 8, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393,
NA.
®Emory to Sherman, January 9, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL,
RG 393, NA; Emory to William D. Whipple, January 11, 1873, in House
Exec. Docs., 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, p. 33.
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inaugurations.

Apparently believing that the previous week's show of

force was warning enough, Etoory posted only one company of soldiers at
the State House and did not bring in the Jackson Barracks garrison as he
had the week before.

McEnery and Kellogg were inaugurated separately at

the seats of their respective governments amid laid ovations, but
without violence.

Observers speculated on the possibility that rowdies

might disrupt one or both of the ceremonies.

The New Orleans Republican

concluded that the presence of Federal troops near the Mechanic's
Institute prevented the assenfoled Democratic clubs and riff-raff from
9
attempting to topple the Republican government.
Following the inaugurations, Emory was careful not to antagonize
McEnery's "government."

The New Orleans Republican advised the general

not to send even one soldier to Odd Fellows Hall, or else the McEnery
faction would cry "suppression."

Emory had no intention of providing

the Democrats with a cause for complaint against the Amy.

In fact, the

city was calm enough by January 25 that Emory ordered the two artillery
companies to return to their garrison at Fort Barrancas in Florida.
After the unusual events of recent weeks, President Grant took it
upon himself to issue a special executive message on the Louisiana
situation.

The President summarized the conflict between the contending

factions and remarked that he was "anxious to avoid any appearance of
^Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 223; New Orleans Times,
January 14, 1873; New Orleans Republican, January 14, 1873; John E.
Gonzales, "William Pitt Kellogg: Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana,
1873-1877," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIX (April, 1946), 413-15.
l%ew Orleans Republican, January 25, 1873; SO No. 14, January 25,
1873, in Dept Gulf, 1873, &G 393, NA; New Orleans Times, January 28,
1873.
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undue interference in State affairs. . . . ” Grant acknowledged that the
Array had been employed in the emergency, and he concluded that unless
Congress offered a better solution, the administration would continue to
recognize Kellogg's "de facto government" which thus far had been
"upheld by the courts of the State.
A week after Grant's message to Congress, there was a clash between
the political factions in Louisiana.

On February 27, acting in his

capacity as "governor," John McEnery appointed a former Confederate
officer, Fred N. Ogden, as brigadier general and commander of the
Louisiana "militia."

Ogden let it be knows that he planned to take over

all of the stations of the Metropolitan Police, which Kellogg recently
had integrated into the official state militia, commanded by James
Longstreet. ‘L2
Inevitably, rumors of Ogden's intentions circulated throughout New
Orleans.

On March 5 General Sherman ordered Emory "to prevent any

violent interference with the State government of Louisiana."

Eknory

moved three companies of troops from the Magazine Street barracks to the
Custom House, but he made no effort to protect the police stations.

At

dusk on that day, members of Ogden's Democratic militia brandished their
weapons as they walked through the streets of New Orleans and assembled
at designated locations in the city.

At about 9:30 p.m. Ogden's pickets

cordoned off a portion of the French Quarter, and several "militiamen"
^Presidential Message to Congress, February 25, 1873, in James D.
Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1789-1897 (10 vols., Washington, 1896-1899), VII, 212-13.
l2Donald B. Sanger and Thomas R. Hay, Jaimes Longstreet (Baton
FOuge, 1952), 366; Gonzales, "Kellogg," 418; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
April 2, 1873.
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further armed themselves by breaking into firearms and hardware stores.
With five hundred men following him, Ogden led an attack against the
Jackson Square police station.

13

While the Conservatives fired their guns at the station house,
Republican reinforcements marched to the rescue, and Kellogg requested
the Army's help in putting down the disorder.

Algernon Badger, former

police chief and newly designated caranander of the Metropolitan Brigade
of former policemen, brought three militia companies (about 180 men) and
an artillery piece to the scene of the skirmish.

The sounds of fighting

drifted over Jackson Square, and the boon of the Metropolitan's cannon
added to the din.

14

Meanwhile, Emory ordered the entire Jackson

Barracks garrison into the city and directed Colonel Charles Smith to
send a squad to guard the U.S. mint.

Kellogg received a note that

troops were on their way to stop the fighting.

Emory also telegraphed

General Sherman and informed him of the situation.

15

About an hour after the fighting began, the first Army troops
arrived near the besieged police station.

An officer on Emory's staff,

Captain Charles King, detached himself from the column and made his way
cautiously to Ogden; at the same time Colonel Smith sought out "general"
George Waggaman of the Democratic forces.

The Army officers brought

orders from Emory telling the Democrats to abandon their attack on the
•^sherman to Emory, March 5, 1873, in AGO File 4882-1872 (Microcopy
M-666, reel 93), RG 94, NA; New Orleans Times, March 6, 1873; Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 228.
l^Jew Orleans Times, March 6, 1873.
^Gentry to CO, Jackson Barracks, March 5, 1873, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 114/DSL; Gentry to Charles Smith, March 5, 1873, ibid.; Bnory to
Kellogg, March 5, 1873, ibid.; Emory to Sherman, March 5, 1873, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 139/DSL; all I n R 3 393, NA.

270
police station and disperse.

Faced with the possibility of clashing

with the 19th Infantry, Ogden and Waggaman promptly complied with
Emory's orders; and within an hour the streets of the Quarter were quiet
and empty, disturbed only by the sounds of an occassional squad of
infantrymen on patrol.

But the contest was not finished.16

At 2:30 a.m. on the morning of March 6 Badger led eighty
Metropolitans, armed with Winchester rifles, across the Mississippi
River to Jefferson City to recapture the Seventh Precinct police station,
which had been occupied earlier in the evening by McEnery's militia.
After a brief exchange of shots, Badger and his men rushed the station,
capturing it and taking seven prisoners.

Seizure of the Seventh

Precinct station effectively ended Ogden's attempt to supplant the
Metropolitans with his own Democratic militia.

17

Knowing that he had Story's support and with the Metropolitan
Brigade controlling the city's streets, Governor Kellogg decided to act
against the Democratic legislature.

He ordered Longstreet and Badger to

occupy Odd Fellows Hall and disperse the opposition legislators.
However, Kellogg made his decision without notifying Emory.
About noon on March 7 a force of 125 Metropolitans surrounded Odd
Fellows Hall.

Several Democratic legislators scarpered out the rear

door before the circle was closed.

led once again by Badger, the

militia occupied the building without a fight.

Badger arrested a few

Conservatives, but they were not charged with any crimes and were later
1% e w Orleans Times, March 6, 1873; New Orleans Republican,
March 6, 1873.
17New Orleans Times, March 6, 1873.
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released.

The Metropolitans had disrupted McEnery's legislature, but

their action did not force it out of existence.
Kellogg decided to strike a final blew against the McEnery forces,
ordering another detachment of Metropolitans to capture a building on
Magazine Street used by the Dsnocrats as a "police headquarters.15
Inside the building, twenty of McEnery's "policemen" offered no
resistance to the Metropolitans, who dispersed their opponents and left
a squad on guard.18
In a note to Emory, McEnery protested Kellogg's actions against his
legislature and "police headquarters."

The general replied that the

Metropolitans had acted without his knowledge and that their orders had
come from Kellogg, who was recognized as the legal governor of the
state.

Furthermore, Emory warned McEnery that 1© would "use the whole

force of the United States . . . to prevent . . . [any] violent
interference" with the Kellogg government.

McESiery's claims to the
19
governorship had received a temporary setback.
The outcome of the recent altercations pleased Kellogg and made him
feel more secure in office.

He was gratified that Emory had promptly

sent troops to the French Quarter and congratulated the general on his
readiness "to meet any emergency."

20

respite Kellogg's vote of

confidence, Emory had to reassure his superiors in Washington that the
^%ew Orleans Republican, March 7, 1873; New Orleans Times,
March 7, 1873; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877
(Baton Rouge, 1974), 255.
19New Orleans Times, March 7, 1873; Lonn, Louisiana Reconstructed,
228-29.
^^Kellogg to Emory, March 14, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed,
RG 393, NA.
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Army had not participated in the occupation of Odd Fellows Hall.

New

Orleans was quiet again, and the troops which had been on duty in the
French Quarter and at the City Hall and Customs House were withdrawn to
their quarters on Magazine Street.

21

The frequent shifting of troops from point to point during recent
months caused Emory and Colonel Smith to reconsider the disposition of
forces in Louisiana.

In fact, Smith had suggested in early February

that the headquarters of his regiment should be relocated to Jackson
Barracks.

Smith reasoned that because of the increased need for the

Army's intervention in political affairs in New Orleans, the majority of
the 19th Infantry ought to be stationed at Jackson Barracks or in New
Orleans itself, instead of continuing the arrangement devised by
General Sherman in 1871, which had placed most of the regiment in Baton
Rouge.

On March 21 Emory reestablished the regiment's headquarters at

Jackson Barracks and assigned companies B, F, G, and I to reinforce the
four companies already on duty there, doubling the size of the garrison.
However, Emory had to relinquish control of Company L, 7th Cavalry,
which was reassigned to the Department of Dakota under
General Sheridan.

22

While Emory shifted his troops to the southern part of the state,
travellers and newspapers transmitted ominous reports about the chaotic
^Enory to Sherman, March 6, 1873, in New York Times, March 7,
1873; Emory to Whipple, March 7, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL,
EG 393, NA.
^^Col. C. H. Smith to Emory, February 3, 1873, in Dept Gulf,
Letters Reed; SO No. 45, March 21, 1873, in Dept Gulf, SO; Emory to
Philip H. Sheridan, April 2, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL; all in
RG 393, NA.

273
situation in Grant Parish in central Louisiana.

23

Following his

inauguration, Kellogg had ousted two Fusionists who claimed to have been
elected parish judge and sheriff and replaced than with two Republicans.
Once in office, the Republicans formed a local black militia unit and
ordered it to patrol the streets of Colfax, the parish seat.

The

militiamen dug earthworks in the courthouse yard and extended their
patrols to include the main roads in the parish.

Several altercations

occurred between blacks and whites, and the militia pickets allowed only
selected persons to enter Colfax.

Finally, the local whites were so

irritated, outraged, and insulted by the behavior of the Republican
sheriff, judge, and militia that they planned to attack the courthouse
and regain control of the parish.24
Meanwhile, the reports from Colfax had disturbed Kellogg to such an
extent that on April 10 he considered sending General Longstreet to
investigate the situation.

The governor invited Emory to order one of

his staff officers to accompany Longstreet, but Emory declined the
invitation, apparently believing that the situation was not serious
enough to warrant sending an official observer.

25

23New Orleans Times, April 2 and 7, 1873; New Orleans Republican,
April 8-12, 1873; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, April 9, 1873; New
Orleans Daily Picayune, April 7 and 8, 1873.
24Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 240-44; Gonzales, "Kellogg,"
419; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 268-69. Governor Warmoth created
Grant Parish by taking land from neighboring parishes, and he named the
parish seat "Colfax" for the President's vice president,
Schuyler Colfax.
25
New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 11, 1873; New Orleans Times,
April 10 and 12, 1873; Enory to Kellogg, April 10, 1873, enclosed with
Lt. E. M. Hayes to Drory, April 10, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed,
RG 393, NA.
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On Easter Sunday, April 13, the Fusionist sheriff, Christopher C.
Nash, and several hundred men attacked the Colfax courthouse.

The

fighting lasted for several hours, but Nash and his followers were
unable to dislodge the blades from the building.

Consequently, the

attackers set fire to the courthouse and shot several of the defenders
as they tried to escape.

Thirty seven blacks were taken prisoner, and

that night most of them were killed without the formality of a trial.

A

few militiaman survived and subsequently described the events to the
state and Federal authorities.

One white Democrat was killed in the

fighting and eight or nine others were wounded, one of whan later died.
It was impossible to determine the number of Negro casualties, but
probably more than one hundred were killed and many others were wounded.
Daniel Shaw, Kellogg's sheriff, was killed in the battle.

26

The New Orleans Republican described the Colfax riot as a
"massacre," but the state’s Democratic press praised the decisive action
of Nash and his cohorts.

The Democratic sheets claimed that the blacks

started the fight by firing on Nash's followers, forcing the whites to
defend themselves.

The Democrats, some of whan were Confederate

veterans, then proceeded to finish what the Republicans had started and
did not rest until the offending blacks had been killed or driven out of
Colfax.

Reflecting the emotion and excitement of many Conservatives,

the New Orleans Times printed details of the battle under the headline
"War at Last!!"27
^^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 269-70; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 242-43; Manie White Johnson, "The Colfax Riot of April,
1873," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XIII (July, 1930), 391-427.
27
New Orleans Republican, April 16, 1873; Shreveport Times,
April 16 and 19, 1873; Alexandria Rapides Gazette, April 26, 1873;
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Emory and Kellogg were stunned by the dimensions of the Colfax
riot, and both men were determined to have order restored in Grant
Parish.

Kellogg told Emory that the parish was "in a State of insurrec

tion" and wanted Federal troops sent there immediately.

Emory agreed

with the governor's conclusion and ordered Company K, 19th Infantry,
from Baton Rouge to Colfax "to preserve the peace."

However, all of the

steamship captains at Baton Rouge refused to allow the Array to use their
vessels, claiming that it would ruin their business relations with white
citizens.

Irritated at their recalcitrance, Emory ordered two infantry

companies at Jackson Barracks to make the trip up river as soon as a
boat could he chartered in New Orleans.

28

Kellogg, realizing that it would take several days for the Array to
reach Colfax, feared that if his authority was not reestablished
quickly, the whole of northern Louisiana might rise in a rebellion
patterned after the Colfax riot.

Therefore, he ordered seme units of

the Metropolitan Brigade to Colfax.

Furthermore, he begged Emory to

send Array detachments to Caddo, Ouachita, Richland, and Jackson
Parishes.

Marshal Packard supported the governor's request, adding that

Lincoln Parish also needed military supervision.

29

Emory responded by

Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, April 16, 1873; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, April 18, 1873; New Orleans Times, April 16, 1873.
2%ellogg to Emory, April 15, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Gentry to CO, Baton Rouge, April 15, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL;
Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, April 17, 1873, ibid.; Gentry to 00, Jackson
Barracks, April 17 and 18, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL; all above
in RG 393, NA. William E. Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1953), 287.
2Kellogg to Emory, April 18, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Packard to Emory, April 18, 1873, ibid.; both in RG 393, NA. Monroe
Ouachita Telegraph, April 26, 1873.
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ordering Captain Clayton Hale to take a company of the 16th Infantry
from Jackson, Mississippi, to Monroe, but temporarily withheld action on
the other requests.

Actually, Rnory was very concerned about the

situation in Colfax, and he wanted approval from his superiors before
sending troops to all of the northern parishes.30
Before a reply came from Louisville or Washington, Emory located a
steamer captain in New Orleans who agreed to take some troops to Colfax.
Companies C and D, 19th Infantry— 97 officers and men comprising onefourth of the Jackson Barracks garrison— embarked on April 19.
Captain Jacob H. Smith commanded the detachment.

He was ordered to

leam all that he could about the riot and to "give all the aid
within . . . [his] power to bury the dead and take care of the wounded."
Story wanted Smith's complete report on the condition of Colfax and the
surrounding countryside as soon as possible.

31

The troops arrived at Colfax at 6:00 p.m. on the evening of
April 21, eight days after the riot ended.

Captain Smith and his men

inspected the area and spoke with a U.S. deputy marshal who had located
a shallow grave in which sixty-nine blacks were buried.

After a few

days the soldiers, who had bivouaced near Colfax, moved to the vicinity
of Pineville, where they established a temporary garrison in the old
buildings formerly used by the Louisiana State University.

32

^Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, April 18, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol.
139/DSL; Emory to Col. William D. Whipple, April 18, 1873, ibid.; SO
No. 61, April 18, 1873, in Dept Gulf, SO; all in RG 393, NA.
■^Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, April 1873, in Records of the AGO
(Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA; Gentry to J. H. Smith, April 19,
1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
32Shreveport Times, April 25, 1873; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
April 25, 1873; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, May 14, 1873; Taylor,
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Emory concluded that the "Colfax massacre would probably never have
occurred if United States troops had been in the neighborhood, and they
were not in that vicinity . . . [because of] * . . the unexpected recall
of the Cavalry in this Department to the frontier where sudden emergen33
cies required their presence."
Emory was correct in his supposition
that if troops had been rear Mexandria or Colfax the battle might not
have occurred.

However, according to General Sherman's reorganization

of the troops in Louisiana in 1871, there were no soldiers assigned to
posts north of Baton Rouge, and it was unlikely that Emory would have
sent any without extraordinary justification.

In fact, Emory had the

opportunity to send troops to central Louisiana after he received
reports of violence there in early April.

Instead, he refused even to

order a staff officer to accompany General Longstreet to Grant Parish
before the battle took place.

Therefore, Emory's excuse about the

cavalry being ordered out of the state can only be seen as a weak
attempt at self-protection.
It was evident that Emory did not fully comprehend the threat posed
by that white resistance to Republican rule.

Colfax was a Democratic

warning shot across the bows of Kellogg's ship of state.

The New

Orleans Times boasted that " [s]uch conflicts may be prevented try the
Federal soldiery, but not by the Metropolitan brigade or any State
Louisiana Reconstructed, 270. SO No. 66, April 29, 1873, in Dept Gulf,
SO; Kellogg to Lt. Thomas M. Wenie, May 12, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters
Reed, both in RG 393, NA.
^Emory's Departmental Report, September 25, 1873, in Records of
the AGO, Annual Reports (Microcopy M-666, reel 138), RG 94, NA.
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militxa that can be raised."

34

It was inpossible for the Army to

protect every Republican officeholder or every black voter.

After the

Colfax battle, the Democrats used violence against Republicans whenever
and wherever possible, avoiding contact with U.S. soldiers and disdaining the power of Kellogg's militia.

35

The Democrats could jeopardize

the existence of civil order throughout Louisiana and throw the state
into chaos unless Emory was reinforced and allowed to use his troops to
guard Kellogg's parish officials.

If Democrats were allowed to

terrorize the hinterland parishes, New Orleans and the state government
itself were vulnerable.
But Emory was not alone in failing to recognize the full importance
of the Colfax riot.

The authorities in Washington had no intention of

allowing the Democrats to overthrow the Republicans, but they had no
clear idea of how to counteract the violence of the McEnery forces, nor
oould they decide how the A m y should aid Kellogg.

Grant wanted the

A m y to differentiate between "local disturbances" and "direct violent
attacks on the central organization of the state government. . . . ”
Assistant Secretary of War George M. Robeson concluded that " [i]f the
State government needs and desires the aid of United States troops to
maintain the public peace or prevent rebellion, the Legislature, or the
Governor, if it be not in session, should apply to the President
directly . . . for such aid" rather than simply issuing requests to
Emory.

In fact, Emory already had reminded Kellogg of this legal

34New Orleans Times, April 16, 1873.
35Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 271-72.
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procedure.

Accordingly, Kellogg asked Grant to send troops to
*j/ -

Shreveport, a center of Conservative strength in Caddo Parish.
Replying for Grant, Secretary Robeson contradicted his earlier
statement, informing Kellogg that Emory could move the troops in his
department anywhere he wanted and that the governor should apply to
Enory for military support.

Therefore, Kellogg and Marshal Packard

again petitioned Enory for troops.

The general reluctantly ordered

Captain William J. Lyster to take Conpanies G and I, 19th Infantry, to
Shreveport and preserve the "peace and order of the coranunity." Enory
warned Lyster to "refrain from entanglements in the [local] political
discussions" and, when time permitted, to contact department
headquarters before furnishing troops as a posse for the U.S. marshal.

37

Cautious as Erory was about providing troops to assist U.S.
marshals, Enory was not reluctant to send troops into New Orleans when
violence threatened.

He learned that a potentially violent mob of

McEnery's supporters was parading in the streets.

Responding to Enory's

orders, four conpanies promptly marched into New Orleans.

Mien the

Democrats heard that the soldiers were on their way, the "pillage and
disorder" ceased and the mob dispersed.

38

36Acting SW George M. Robeson to Sherman, April 19, 1873, in New
Orleans Republican, April 20, 1873; Enory to Kellogg, April 19, 1873, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA; Kellogg to Ulysses S. Grant,
April 25, 1873, in AGO File 4882-1872 (Microcopy M-666, reel 93), RG 94,
NA.
"^Robeson to Kellogg, May 5, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Packard to Enory, May 1, 1873, ibid.; Kellogg to Enory, May 13, ibid.;
Enory to AG, MilDivSouth, May 12, 1.873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL;
AG E. R. Platt to Capt. W. J. Lyster, May 13, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol.
114/DSL; all in RG 393, NA. Shreveport Times, May 17 and 19, 1873.
3®Kellogg to Enory, May 6, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
AG Platt to Col. C. H. smith, May 6, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL;
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Meanwhile, a more serious crisis was developing in St. Martin
Parish.

Former Confederate Colonel Alcibiades DeBlanc had been

encouraging local Democrats to refuse to pay their state taxes.
Moreover, he had organized a local militia outfit which had been
intimidating Republicans and preventing them from exercising the duties
of their elected offices.

Qi May 4 Kellogg dispatched Algernon Badger

and 125 state militiamen to St. Martinville to seat the Republicans and
collect the taxes.

After they arrived near the town, Badger's men

exchanged gunshots with DeBlanc5s forces, and reports of the fighting
were exaggerated by the Democratic press.

Assuming that the tardy

taxpayers might have violated seme Federal laws, Marshal Packard asked
Emory for a company of U.S. soldiers to assist him in making arrests in
the rebellious parish.

At first Enory was unwilling to send in his

troops without permission from higher authority, but on second thought
he ordered Colonel Charles Smith and Company H, 19th Infantry, to
St. Martinville.

39

After traveling by rail to Brashear City, the troops were delayed
there by uncooperative steamboat captains who refused to take them on to
"the seat of war."

Packard offered to loan the A m y some horses so that

the infantrymen could ride to St. Martinville, but Emory declined to
Emory to AAG Taylor, MilDivSouth, May 7, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/
DSL, all in EG 393, NA. Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, May 1873,
Records of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA. New Orleans
Republican, May 7, 1873.
^Emory to AAG Taylor, MilDivSouth, May 6, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol.
139/DSL; Packard to Emory, May 6, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
AG Platt to Col. C. H. Smith, May 6, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL;
all in RG 393, NA. Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, May 1873, weoords of
the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA. New Iberia Louisiana
Sugar Bowl, May 8, 1873; New Orleans Times, May 5 and 6, 1873.
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offer.

Meanwhile, Smith and his men were stranded for a few days in

D
u
40
Brashear.
Evidently the violence in St. Martin and the complaints of
Republicans from several parts of the state finally convinced Emory that
the whale Louisiana situation was more dangerous than he had realized
before.

He wrote a grim description of circumstances to General Sherman:

In ny judgement a Regiment or half regiment of Infantry,
and if possible a squadron of Cavalry, in addition to the
present force is necessary to keep the peace in this city and
state, and prevent actual violence . . . which is threatened
in nearly every Parish of the state.41
To guard against another violent danonstration in New Orleans,
Emory strengthened the Crescent City's garrison.

On May 8 two more

infantry companies moved into the city, and Emory ordered two additional
artillery conpanies from Fort Barrancas to his Louisiana headquarters.
Finally, he warned General McDowell at Louisville that a "general
insurrection" was possible in Louisiana unless more troops were ordered
to the Department of the Gulf.

McDowell replied that he had no extra

cavalry available tut that he would send additional infantry if Emory5s
need for it became evident.

42

Emory wanted reinforcements from

McDowell, but already the troop movements in and around Louisiana
presaged a major military campaign.
^Oomory to AAG Taylor, May 7, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL;
AG Platt to Packard, May 8, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, both in
RG 393, NA. New Iberia Louisiana Sugar Bowl, May 8, 1873; New Orleans
Republican, May 8, 1873; New Orleans Times, May 8, 1873.
41Enory to Sherman, May 8, 1873 (capitalization in the original),
in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL, RG 393, NA.
4^Bnory to AG Taylor, May 8, 1873, ibid. Post Returns, Jackson
Barracks, May 1873, Records of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524);
McDowell to Enory, May 9, 1873, in AGO File 4882-1872 (Microcopy M-666,
reel 93); both in RG 94, NA.
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Lack of txansportation still delayed Smith's lone company at
Brashear, and Emory feared that it might be too weak to protect itself
in the event of an attack.

Therefore,

ordered three other companies

to join Smith and advised him to inarch overland to St. Martinville after
the reinforcements arrived.

Emory correctly believed that the Democrats

would not attack a contingent of four conpanies.

43

Finally, on May 10 Colonel Smith hired a steamer to transport his
soldiers up Bayou Teche, but they arrived too late to participate in the
fighting, which actually had involved only occasional skirmishing.
Learning that the troops were approaching, the white "militia"
dispersed; and Badger and his Metropolitans arrested the feisty DeBlanc,
who later boasted that if the Federals had not arrived, the
Metropolitans "would have been driven from the parish of St. Martin."44
U.S. Marshal T. W. DeKlyne took custody of DeBlanc and eight of his
lieutenants and returned with them to New Orleans.

When DeBlanc stepped

off of the steamboat at the New Orleans riverfront, a sympathetic crowd,
led by John McEnery, accorded him "a hero's welcome."

45

Despite the fact that the Army had been used on several occasions
to suppress Louisiana Democrats, the Rayville Richland Beacon reported
43Emory to Col. C. H. Smith, May 9, 1873 (two communications), in
Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL, RG 393, NA; Enory to AAG Taylor, May 9, 1873,
ibid.; Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, May 1873, Records of the AGO
(Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA; New Orleans Times, May 10, 1873.
44Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, May 10, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/
DSL, RG 393, NA; Alcibiades DeBlanc to John McEnery, May 14, 1873, in
Lafavette Advertiser. Mav 24, 1873; New Iberia Louisiana Suqar Bowl,
May 15, 1873:------45Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 274-75; New Orleans Times,
May 17, 1873; New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 17, 1873.
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that DeBlanc's arrest had not shaken "the firm resolve of the people to
resist the Kellogg usurpation." Moreover, the Beacon denied that the
McEnery government was moribund.
warning to Emory and Kelloggs

In fact, the Beacon boldly issued a

"Chly those of our citizens around whan

the Federal bayonets are stacked can be subjugated . . ., and it is to
be hoped that before the military have succeeded in capturing the entire
46
State, the tide may yet be turned and our people restored to liberty."
The restoration of order in St. Martin pleased Kellogg, but he had
little time bo feel satisfied.

Soon violence threatened to erupt in

other parts of Louisiana, especially in the northern parishes.

The

governor admitted to President Grant that domestic violence existed in
"several parishes of this state which the State authorities are unable
to suppress. . . . "

Federal troops were needed to protect Republican

officeholders, he insisted.

State Auditor Charles Clinton expressed the

feelings of many Republicans when he exclaimed that it was "inpossible
to collect taxes or for any officer of the State to perform his duties."
Two Republicans at Minden in Webster Parish begged Kellogg to obtain
U.S. troops to unseat McEnery officials who had usurped sate local
offices.

Dutifully, Kellogg asked Bnory to send sane soldiers to

Minden, and the general replied that they would be sent as soon as the
U.S. marshal requested than through proper channels.

Packard soon

applied for military aid, and apparently Kellogg's officials were
reinstated fcy the military.
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4®Rayville Richland Beacon, May 17, 1873.
4^Kellogg to Grant, May 13, 1873, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 6), RG 60, NA; R. B.
Taylor to Kellogg, May 13, 1873, ibid.; T. E. Heath to Kellogg, May ?,
1873, ibid.; Packard to U.S. Attorney General George Williams, May 31,
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Kellogg also conplained that Democrats had threatened or
intimidated several state judges and that squads of soldiers might be
needed to guard courtrooms across the state.
larly having a difficult tine in Grant Parish.

Officials were particu
J. Ernest Breda,

district attorney for the Ninth Judicial District, reported that local
citizens had resisted the Republican sheriff when he tried to serve
arrest warrants.

Breda informed U.S. District Attorney John R. Beckwith

that it was "useless for the State Court in this Dist. to attempt
anything towards . . . [those accused of participating in the Colfax
riot,] for it would only lead to trouble & bloodshed."

Moreover, Breda

believed that the rioters would never be brought to trial "in Grant
[Parish] without the military" guarding the courthouse.

Breda based his

conclusion on the fact that seventy-five armed men had ridden into
Colfax and "openly & violently threatened to break up the court if any
thing was done against" the accused rioters.

Furthermore, unknown

assailants had fired on a parish judge near his hot®.

These acts

occurred while "U.S. troops were at Pineville 30 miles from Colfax, &
40

with the greatest facility could have been on hand. . . .
Angered by the Army's inactivity and Kellogg's refusal to send a
strong militia detachment, Breda left Colfax and returned to his office
at Natchitoches.

Obviously disappointed by the Army's inadequate

1873, ibid.; Charles Clinton to Kellogg, May 16, 1873, ibid. (reel 1).
Kellogg to Enory, May 22, 1873, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed; Emory to
Kellogg, May 22, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, both in EG 393, NA.
^^Kellogg to Williams, May 20, 1873, in Letters Reed
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 6), RG
J. Ernest Breda to J. R. Beckwith, August 11, 1873, in J.
Letters, Tulane Archives, IIoward-Tilton Memorial Library,
University; Breda to Williams, August 11, 1873, ibid.

by the U.S.
60, NA.
Ernest Breda
Tulane
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protection, Breda asked Attorney General Williams "What is to be done by
those who have only a Kellogg Orarsnission for authority & no U.S. troops
to protect them[?]"

Breda asked Marshal Packard to station "nan among

us who will not retain idle in Pineville or elsewhere, when Danger of
murder & bloodshed is threatening in all directions but there."

Breda

concluded that " [n]o courts can be laid in Colfax without military
49
aid."
Breda's conplaints highlighted the quandary facing many Republicans
in Louisiana and elsewhere in the South during the Reconstruction
period:

just how effective was their government without the direct aid

of the Am y ?

Breda's examples effectively demonstrated that when local

Whites wanted to intimidate Republicans or violate their rights, they
would do so with impunity even with soldiers located only a few miles
away.
Responding to the advice of Attorney General Williams and other
advisors, on May 22 President Grant felt constrained to issue an
executive proclamation regarding Louisiana's troubled condition.

Grant

commanded the "turbulent and disorderly persons" who were challenging
Kellogg's government "to disperse and return peaceably to their
respective abodes within twenty days from this date. . . . "

Although

this was hardly a drastic ultimatum, the President warned the "disor
derly persons" that Kellogg had properly applied for the Amy's support
under Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution; and that in the event
of further disorders and violence, the military would intervene.

50

49Breda to Williams, August 11, 1873, ibid,; Breda to Packard,
August 11, 1873, ibid.
^Grant's Presidential Proclamation, May 22, 1873, in Richardson,
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A few days later Story reported that Grant's proclamation had
produced the desired "tranquilizing effect" on New Orleans, and that he
was probably going to return the troops to Jackson Barracks soon.
However, he did not "think it advisable to move . . . [the] companies"
located in Shreveport, Alexandria, St. Martinville, or Monroe.

Those

soldiers were "having an excellent effect in giving peace and a feeling
of security in the neighborhoods where [they were] stationed, . . .
[and] they should remain where they are until the disturbances in this
state have entirely disappeared."

However, Emory advised the Military

Division of the South that because of the prediction of a bad yellow
fever season, he planned to move his department's headquarters and
several companies of troops out of Louisiana scmetime in July to a more
healthy location in Mississippi.

51

On July 2 Emory began shifting the troops out of Louisiana, moving
some that he had earlier recosimended be left in place.

Emory ordered

Captain Hale at Monroe to return to Jackson, Mississippi, because of the
"unhealthy character" of the summer season.

However, Emory reminded

Hale that he might have to neoocupy Monroe in the event of trouble
there.

On July 5 Emory ordered Companies A and L of the 1st Artillery

back to their regular duty station at Fort Barrancas.

On that same day

the headquarters of the Department of the Gulf and Companies B, F, and
H, 19th Infantry prepared to leave Jackson Barracks.

Their destination

was the town of Mississippi City, located on the Gulf coast near Biloxi.
Messages and Papers, VII, 223-24.
^Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, June 9 and 12, 1873, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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Emory directed the Jackson Barracks commander to leave six enlisted men
as watchmen while the regimental forces were gone for the summer.
This corporal3s guard was ordered not to make any iraprovonsnts or
repairs on the barracks buildings during the surrmer without orders from
headquarters because a slaughterhouse had recently been built near the
post and "when the wind is from the east, the stench fran their estab
lishments is overpowering." Perhaps the Jackson Barracks garrison would
be relocated when they returned from Mississippi in the fall.

52

On

July 10 Emory and his troops left by train for the "summer encampment."
Emory apparently anticipated that his withdrawal of seme of his
forces from Louisiana would be thought reckless.

He defended his action

to General McDowell, writing that the "chief agitators" who had inspired
most of the "political disturbances in both city and state" had also
I
left Louisiana.

Emory anticipated "no disturbances whatever either in

city or country until along in the fall as the time approaches for the
meeting of Congress, when . . . [agitators may try] to influence the
action of that body."
Louisiana:

Meanwhile, he left the following troops in

one company in New Orleans, one company at St. Martinville,

two companies at Alexandria, two companies at Shreveport, and one
company at Baton Rouge.

Emory planned to visit his family in New York

during the summer, but he promised to "return at a moments warning" if
any trouble developed on the department.
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52SO No. 109, July 5, 1873, Dept Gulf, SO; AAG Platt to CO, Monroe,
July 2, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL; Platt to 00, Jackson Barracks,
July 5, 1873, ibid.; Emory to W. T. Sherman, July 7, 1873, ibid.; all in
RG 393, NA.
53post Returns, Jackson Barracks, July 1873, in Records of the AGO
(Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA; Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth,
July 11, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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Finishing the disposition of his forces before he went on leave, on
July 24 finory relocated the departmental headquarters staff, aides, and
clerks to the town of Holly Springs in northern Mississippi, near the
Tennessee border.
City on the coast.

The Jackson Barracks garrison remained in Mississippi
(Emory gave no explanation of this change in his

headquarters location, but of course as oonmander of the department he
was free to locate it anywhere he thought best.) On August 11 Emory
left Mississippi to visit his family in New York.
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While in the North, Story consulted with his superiors in
Washington.

The New York Herald reported that Emory recommended to the

War Department that most of the troops in Louisiana be "removed to the
more congenial fields of the [Western] border where they can attend to
the red devils who . . . are uneasy along the [frontier] line . . . ."
The Herald concluded that Americans (and particularly Southerners) were
tired of being "blinded by the flashing of bayonets In our streets,
startled by the rumble of Gatlin [sic] guns, and the trump, tramp, of
the regulars." Hie editor of the Lafayette Advertiser printed the
Herald*s editorial with a note of approval.
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On returning from his leave on September 7 Emory learned that
1873* s yellow fever season was worse than usual.

Eventually the number

of deaths due to the disease exceeded the total reported in the epidemic
of 1870.

Consequently, Emory believed that his idea of a "summer

encampment" on the healthier ground in Mississippi had saved the lives
of some of his soldiers.

However, once back in the Gulf Department,

^Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, July 22 and August 11, 1873, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
^^Lafayette Advertiser, September 13, 1873.
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Emory had to put aside thoughts of the danger of disease and concentrate
on the use of his troops.

56

During September Marshal Packard made two requests for military
aid.

His deputies needed the Army's assistants (actually, its protec

tion) while arresting men accused of Federal crimes.

Acting in response

to one of Packard's requests, Emory ordered Lieutenant Thomas B.
Robinson to take a detachment of twenty men from Baton Rouge to
Harrisonburg in Catahoula Parish.

On September 21 Company B, 16th

Infantry, Captain Arthur W. Allyn commanding, was sent to the town of
Delta, Louisiana, near Vicksburg, Mississippi.

Allyn assisted a deputy

U.S. marshal until October 3, but Robinson's detachment remained in
Harrisonburg for several months.
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In October Packard again requested the Army's help.

Two deputy

marshals, T. W. DeKlyne and J. B. Stockton, had been assigned to the
Colfax riot case, and they had drawn up a list of several men who
allegedly had participated in the fight.

Packard wanted a military

posse to accompany DeKlyne and Stockton into Grant Parish.

Previously,

Emory had been reluctant to send soldiers into Grant Parish, apparently
fearing that if violence occurred they might be caught between the fires
of local Democrats and the Federal marshals.

Nevertheless, Emory

56Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 7, 1873, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA. New Orleans Republican, December 1, 1872;
Shreveport Times, September 1-November 1, 1873. Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 433.
^Bmory to Packard, September 11, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL;
AAG Platt to CD, Baton Rouge, September 12, 1873, ibid.; Emory to
Lt. Gov. C. C. Antoine, September 20, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 139/DSL;
Platt to CO, Jackson, Miss., September 20, 1873, ibid.; Platt to CO,
Delta, October 3, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL; Dept Gulf "Journal
of Events," pp. 23-24; all in RG 393, NA.
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acceded to Packard's request, ordering Company C, 19th Infantry, to
Colfax.

Six of the accusal men surrendered peaceably to the marshals

and their military escorts.
stood trial in New Orleans.

The six men, along with three others, later
58

Unlike Marshal Packard, General McDowell in Louisville seldom made
specific requests for Emory's troops.

But after sate political diffi

culties took place in Comith, Mississippi, McDowell asked Emory to
station seme of his men from Mississippi City in the northern part of
the state.

However, Emory reminded McDowell that these soldiers were

actually part of the New Orleans garrison, and at any moment they might
be needed in the Crescent City.

Therefore, Emory recommended that

McDowell use troops from elsewhere in the division, and eventually seme
from Alabama were transferred into Mississippi.
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Emory made this unusual recommendation because he knew that the
troops under his command, particularly the 19th Infantry, had been
"actively used during the year," and he indicated that perhaps it was
time for McDowell to consider exchanging the regiments in the Department
of the Gulf with those stationed elsewhere.

"The duty which the Army is

called upon to perform in this Department is of such a character and so
^®Bnory to AGO, September 17, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL,
RG 393, NA. Shreveport Tines, November 2, 1873. In February 1874 nine
men were brought to trial on murder charges stemming from the Colfax
riot. One was acquitted, and after a mistrial, the others stood trial
again in May 1874. Four more were then acquitted and four convicted of
conspiracy against a peaceful assemblage. Their lawyers appealed the
case to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and then later to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which, in 1876, nullified the convictions. See the
explanations in Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 272-73, and John Hope
Franklin, Reconstruction after the Civil War (Chicago, 1961), 206-208.
~^Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, October 1, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol.
114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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closely interwoven with political natters that it has been rot only a
very delicate one but embarrassing to those charged with its execution/'
wrote Emory with sane disgust.

He continued:

"Without any power to

correct abuses or originate measures . . . [the Army has teen] called
upon to sustain the law and keep the peace, against machinations skill
fully devised by adroit men to perpetuate fraud and foment violence."
Furthermore, Bnory inplied that service against the Plains Indians was
better and more honorable than trying to prevent "conflicts between
armed bodies of men, both claiming to be acting by authority of the
Executive of Louisiana. . . . "

McDowell agreed to consider Emory's

suggestion about transferring sane of his troops.
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Emory did not know how soon McDowell might act on his request, hit
until then he made several decisions concerning the disposition of
troops in Louisiana.

First of all, on October 29 Emory decided to

return to New Orleans, and his headquarters staff followed him a few
days later.

On November 18 the troops at Mississippi City boarded a

train and six hours later arrived in New Orleans and prepared to resume
their places at Jackson Barracks.

One hundred and twenty recruits

arrived in New Orleans for duty in the Department of the Gulf.

Ekmory

kept seme of the recruits at Jackson Barracks and distributed the rest
among the posts at St. Martinville, Baton Rouge, Colfax, and Shreveport.
The arrival of these recruits brought the total number of troops in
Louisiana to 643 serving in ten acmpam.es.
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^^Emory's Departmental Report, September 25, 1873, in Records of
the AGO, Annual Reports (Microcopy M-666, reel 138), RG 94, NA.
^AAG Sanders to Emory, October 26, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/
DSL; Emory to AGO, October 29, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL;
AAG Platt to CO, Mississippi City, November 5, 1873, ibid.; Platt to CO,
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In another decision regarding troop assignments, Emory ordered the
closing of the post at Alexandria and moved Company C, 19th Infantry, to
Colfax.

Company D, which had also been at Alexandria, was ordered to

return to Baton Rouge.

Judging from sane of the reports from Grant

Parish, Emory might have been better advised to station both companies
at Colfax.

The Rapides Gazette described "a perfect reign of terror” in

Grant Parish, where self-appointed white militiamen patrolled the roads.
Despite the reassignment of the troops to Colfax, local Democrats
apparently entertained no thoughts of reducing their anti-Republican
activities.

In a letter filled with tortured spelling, J. M. McKinney,

a local Democratic leader, informed his brother that it was "very cannon
to here [sic] of a negro being shot or found hanging here[.]"

McKinney

indicated that the Democrats were thinking of "taking the law in ower
[our] own hands . . . and the sooner the better."

McKinney9s feelings

apparently typified those of many white Conservatives in Louisiana.
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With the support of mai like McKinney, "Governor" McEnery was
preparing to make another attempt at achieving recognition for his
government.

The Democrats planned to hold a legislative session on

January 5, 1874, and McEhery wanted to know if Bnory would prevent the
meeting or aid the Metropolitans if they acted to disperse the
Jackson Barracks, December 18, 1873, ibid.; Monthly Return, Dept Gulf,
October 1873; all in RG 393, NA. Post Returns, Jackson Barracks,
November 1873, in Records of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94,
NA.
^Platt to 00, Alexandria, November 14, 1873, in Dept Gulf, vol.
114/DSL, RG 393, NA. Alexandria Rapides Gazette, December 13, 1873.
J. M. McKinney to Jeptha McKinney, December 14, 1873, in Jeptha McKinney
Papers/Merrit M. Shilg Memorial Collection (Louisiana State University
Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Baton Rouge).
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Democrats? McEnery stressed that he and his followers wanted no
conflict with Federal authorities.
Emory replied that the A m y would not interfere with the Democratic
legislature, so long as its meeting was peaceful.

However, Emory

reminded McEnery that Kellogg was the recognized governor of Louisiana;
go
and in the event of any violence, U.S. forces would support Kellogg.
Keeping Emory's warning in mind, McEnery completed his plans for the
meeting on January 5.
Emory realized that 1874 would be another potentially dangerous
year.

General McDowell also anticipated trouble.

He told a committee

of Congress that "Louisiana is in a very disturbed condition.

It was so

last year and is so still, and I fear it is likely to remain so for seme
time to come. . . ."64

6%lcEnery to Emory, December 25, 1873, in AGO File 4882-1872
(Microcopy M-666, reel 93), RG 94, NA; Emory to McEnery, December 26,
1873, in Dept Gulf, vol. 114/DSL, RG 393, NA.
6testimony of General Irvin McDowell before a congressional
committee, concerning the reduction of the military establishment,
January 24, 1874, in House Report, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 384, p. 257.

CHAPTER XIII
"THE D»y OF DELIVERANCE IS DRAWING NIGH”
In January 1874 General ESnory confronted a familiar and dangerous
problem:

the rival Republican and Democratic legislatures were slated

to convene on January 5.

Emory had to decide whether to station troops

in New Orleans for the occasion as he had done the previous year.
However, the turn of political events saved Emory from having to make
the thankless decision.
By January 5 the Democratic legislature no longer presented a
challenge to the official state legislature.

Emory probably learned

from his sources in the city that some of the Democrats had dropped
their claims to house or senate seats, and that others, recognized as
officially elected by the Republican Returning Board, would be allowed
to take their seats if they cane to the State House.

Consequently,

McEnery's Fusionist-Democratic alliance was unable to muster a quorum in
either house of their shadow government.

Emory apparently decided that

he did not need to order a show of military might such as the one which
had overawed the two political factions in January 1873.
On January 5 the two legislatures mat as scheduled.

The

Republicans and a few maverick Democrats assembled at the capitol, and a
quorum was present in each house.

In contrast, the McEnery Democrats

gathered in their leader's private offices at No. 35 Corondelet Street,
but they lacked a quorum in both houses.
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In fact, several of the men
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who crowded into McEnery's offices were simply sen© of the "governor's"
supporters who had attached themselves to his "legislature."

Trying to

put a brave front on the meeting, the New Orleans Titties regarded the
lack of a quorum as "immaterial" and concluded that the McEnery camp was
fulfilling its "chief object," offering "a continued resistance to the
existing state government."^
But McEnery knew that the meeting had been a failure.

Consequently,

the Democrats and Fusionists who had been officially elected went to the
State House and took their seats the next day.

On January 9 the McEnery

caucus passed a resolution excusing the remaining "legislators" from
"the seat of government . . . until such time as the Legislature shall
not be prevented by Federal authority from proceeding with its
legitimate business." Thereupon the McEnery legislature adjourned,
2
losing any claims it had to legitimacy.
Outside of New Orleans, Louisiana was unusually calm, but ESnory
feared that any reduction in the number of troops in the state might
encourage acts of violence by the Democrats.

ESnory advised

General McDowell in Louisville that "no post [in Louisiana] . . . can be
weakened or broken up without injury to the order and good government
of the vicinity [in which the troops are located]."

In essence, ESnory

was expressing concern over Kellogg's capability to govern areas of the
^New Orleans Times, January 1-6, 1874; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
January 1-6, 1874. There were no orders for troop movements on the
Dept Gulf records or in the "remarks" section on the Post Returns for
Jackson Barracks.
^ e w Orleans Times, January 7 and 10, 1874.
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state that were not within easy reach of either the A m y or the
3
Metropolitans.
McDowell agreed with Emory's judgment, but as ocnmander of a
military division comprising several states, McDowell was subject to a
variety of political pressures and at times had to overrule the opinions
of his department commanders.
A case in point was McDowell's belief that an A m y detachment was
needed at Corinth, Mississippi, in Emory's department.

Local Republi

cans wanted some soldiers stationed at Corinth to overawe the Democrats
in the area, but Emory did not want to detach troops from Louisiana or
to weaken the garrison at Jackson, Mississippi.

Eventually, however,

Emory sent Company I, 16th Infantry, from Jackson Barracks (near New
Orleans) to Corinth.

Knowing that it was important to keep the Jackson

Barracks contingent strong, Emory ordered Company G, 19th Infantry, to
4
leave its post near Shreveport and join the capital's garrison.
Reshuffling these troops appeared to have no ill effects on north
Louisiana, and, with only one exception, there were no outbreaks of
violence in the state during the early months of 1874.
about weakening the Amy's posts seamed unjustified.

Emory's concern

When a series of

fights occurred between blacks and whites in Terrebonne Parish in
William H. Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, January 2, 1874, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA. See also Joe Gray Taylor, "New Orleans
and Reconstruction," Louisiana History, IX (Summer, 1968), 204.
^AAG E. R. Platt to 00, Company I, 16th Infantry, January 14, 1874,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL; Platt to CO, Greenwood, January 14, 1874,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL; RG 393, NA. Once the area around Corinth
had been pacified, Company I was ordered to Little Rock, Arkansas, due
to the likelihood of trouble there. As a result, Emory lost one company
of troops from the total Louisiana garrison.
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January, Emory considered sending Federal troops to the scene, but
U.S. Marshal T. W. DeKlyne, assisted by Governor Kellogg's Metropolitans,
quieted the disturbance easily.

5

Subsequently, in contrast to his earlier misgivings about altering
troop dispositions, Emory decided to close the post at Shreveport and
contemplated abandoning the post at Harrisonburg in Catahoula Parish.
Company I, 19th Infantry, left Greenwood (near Shreveport) and joined
the garrison at Baton Rouge Barracks.

However, Marshal DeKlyne

requested that the detachment of eleven soldiers remain in Harrisonburg
until the U.S. attorney arranged for the trial of "certain anted
parties" who had been arrested earlier.

Emory acceded to the marshal's

request.^
Although Louisiana was unusually peaceful, Emory had to contend
with an outbreak of violence between Republican factions in Arkansas,
the third state in his department.

For the most part, there had been

little violence associated with ^construction in Arkansas, and there
fore garrisoning the state had not been a demanding task.

However, in

the 1872 state election two Republicans, Joseph Brooks and Elisha
Baxter, both claimed to have been elected governor.

Baxter and some of

his supporters had occupied the Arkansas capitol in Little Rock and
appeared to have established claim to the executive office, but in April
^New Orleans Tines, January 14-16, and 20, 1874; Emory to
Charles D. Leverich, January 14, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL;
393, NA.

eg

6AAG Platt to CO, Greenwood, March 16, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol.
115/DSL; Platt to T. W. Deklyne, March 30, 1874, ibid.; Platt to CO,
Greenwood, March 19, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL; Platt to CO,
Baton Rouge, March 17, 1874, ibid.; RG 393, NA.

298
1874 fighting broke out between the militias of the two governors,
7
initiating the so-called "Brooks-Baxter War."
On April 15 Brooks, aided by sane of his militiamen, ousted Baxter
from the capitol.

If past experience in Louisiana was any guide, it

appeared logical that the Army would intervene, prevent a battle between
the factions, and either reinstate Baxter or keep the peace until the
authorities in Washington decided whom to recognize.

However,

President Grant was reluctant to choose sides immediately between the
two contestants.

He directed Secretary of War Belknap to order the

commanding officer at Little Rode, Captain Thomas Bose, "to take no part
in the political controversy . . . unless it should be necessary to
prevent bloodshed or collision of armed bodies.” Meanwhile, the
President would watch hew the Arkansas situation developed before
issuing any specific orders.

Apparently, no one (the President, Secre

tary of War, Adjutant General Townsend, or General McDowell) ordered
Story to go to Little Pock.

8

Nor did Emory decide to go to Arkansas on his own initiative.
Instead, he ordered Captain Rose "to observe the strictest neutrality in
regard to the question of the State Government," and sent Lieutenant
Colonel William H. Lewis of the 19th Infantry to Little Rock, with
orders to investigate the situation and "assume temporary command" if he
believed it was necessary to replace Rose.

(But when the colonel

7Otis A. Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction (Austin,
1957), 50-53; Earl F. Woodward, "The Brooks and Baxter War in Arkansas,
1872-1874," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, XXX (Winter, 1971), 315-36.
8(Grant's personal secretary] Orville Babcock to W. W. Belknap,
April 16, 1874, in Grant Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
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arrived he did not wish to become involved and left Rose in charge.)
Emory did not send any reinforcements to Little Rock because Rose
g
considered his fores "sufficient to keep the peace."
During the next few days, however, Rose found out that his two
infantry companies were not adequate to prevent civil disorder.
Initially, Rose moved his troops from their barracks to important loca
tions in Little Rock.

Later he learned that Brooks' man had been

reading all incoming and outgoing telegrams.

Consequently,

President Grant ordered Rose to "see that all official dispatches of the
government . . . [were] transmitted without molestation. . . . "
sent a squad of soldiers to occupy the telegraph office.

Rose

However,

despite all that Rose had done to forestall violence, on April 21 a
brief fight occurred between supporters of Brooks and those of Baxter. ^
The longer the crisis lasted the morecomplicated it became,
especially to Emory, because Rose neglected to

send reports of his

activities to New Orleans.

information second hand

Emory obtained

his

from Adjutant General Townsend or from theNew Orleans newspapers.

On

April 22 a company of the 16th Infantry arrived in Little Rock from
Humbolt, Tennessee.

These reinforcements had been sent by

General McDowell, but General Emory also offered to send additional
troops bo Rose.

Despite the arrival of the reinforcements and the

^Enory to AAG, MilDivSouth, April 16, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol.
115/DSL; Emory to AGO, April 16, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL?
RG 393, NA.
^^Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, April 17, 18, 21, 1874; Grant to
Capt. Thomas Rose, April 18, 1874, ibid., April 24, 1874.
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premise of others# Rose was unable to prevent additional clashes between
the rival Arkansas militias on April 30 and May 7.

11

On May 11 Captain Rose disregarded the normal chain of command,
bypassed Emory's headquarters, and directly telegraphed the War Depart
ment, asking for reinforcements.

Upon reading Rose's request,

General William T. Sherman scribbled a note on the flap of the captain's
telegram:
I have seen no orders of any kind relieving him [Rose]
fran the supervision of his Department Ccmnander and until he
recognizes him I have not one word to say, Except [sic] that
in my judgment it is tine for General Emory to go in person
to Little Rock and exercise ocnmand in his own Department, or
be relieved.12
Emory probably never learned of Sherman's critical Garment on his
leadership, the first official indication that his military superiors
were not satisfied with his conduct.
On May 15 President Grant resolved the Arkansas dispute,
recognizing Baxter's claim to the governorship and demanding that armed
supporters of both men disperse.

Within a few days the rival militias

disbanded, and Baxter reoccupied the State House.

13

What had kept Emory in New Orleans during the height of the
Brooks-Baxter controversy?

First of all, the rivalry between the

Republican claimants in Arkansas had been going on since 1872 and
^Eknory to AGO, April 20 and 22, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL,
RG 393, NA; New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 19, 23, 30, 1874;
Singletary, Negro Militia, 54-64.
12
Sherman's comment written on Thomas Rose to A3 E. D. Townsend,
May 11, 1874, quoted in James E. Sefton, The United States Army and
Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 238.

13
Singletary, Negro Militia, 64-65; Sefton, Army and Reconstruction,
237-38.
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previously had involved little more than verbal jousting.

Hie outbreak

of hostilities had surprised everyone except Brooks and his associates,
who had planned the coup. Apparently, Emory hoped that, if left alone,
the Republican politicians would resolve the conflict themselves, but
Brooks and Baxter did not reach an accommodation.

Furthermore, except

for General Sherman's derogatory comment, it appeared that no one in the
War Department ever suggested that ESnory should go to Arkansas if he was
not faced with seme overriding crisis in Louisiana.
But during April heavy rains caused some of the worst flooding in
Louisiana history, and the state's rivers and bayous were overflowing.
Hie high water obstructed travel by road or railroad fran New Orleans to
Little Rock.

Therefore, it was a four-day trip by steamboat to the

Arkansas capital.

ESnory remained in New Orleans, making plans with

civilian officials to distribute food and other supplies to persons
dislocated by the floods.

Nevertheless, ESnory failed to explain fully

these circumstances which he evidently considered were important enough
14
to hold him in New Orleans.
Moreover, Rose did not help the situation by communicating
infrequently with ESnory, who, as the crisis wore on, seemed satisfied to
let Rose fend for himself.

Fortunately, the President stepped in and

resolved the matter, saving Rose from an embarrasing and dangerous
situation.

Had Grant not acted, and judging from Sherman's displeasure,

Emory might have been relieved of his command.

Meanwhile, Louisiana

14New Orleans Times, April-May, 1874. Platt to 00, Jackson
Barracks, April 21, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 1 5 /DSL, pg 393, NA; Emory
to AGO, April 28, 1874, ibid.; New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 2, 1874.
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Democrats began to organize forces which were definitely Emory's
responsibility.
On April 27, 1874, several prominent St. Landry Parish Democrats
met in Opelousas and formed Louisiana's first White League, an organiza
tion designed to intimidate Negroes and Republicans and pledged to use
force if necessary to remove Radical officials.

Emboldened by the fact

that only a few of the Colfax rioters had teen arrested and prosecuted,
Conservative leaders throughout Louisiana believed that the concerted
use of violence against Republican parish officeholders would cripple
Kellogg's state government.

During 1874 Democrats in the neighboring

state of Mississippi were successfully carrying out just such a
campaign, and the example was not lost on McEnery's supporters.

A newly

founded Conservative newspaper, the Alexandria Caucasian, trumpeted a
warning to Republicans:

"we [the Democrats], having grown weary of the

tame submission to this most desolating war of the negro [sic] upon us,
propose to take a bold stand to assert the dignity of our manhood, to
say in tones of thunder . . . STOP!

THIS FAR SHALT THOU GO, AND NO

FURJHER!"15
This warning went unheeded by Emory, who, since his arrival in
Louisiana, had often heard such Democratic remonstrances. In fact, the
initial stirrings of the White League failed even to disturb Emory's
plans to transfer most of the troops in Louisiana to the healthy
15
H. Oscar Lestage, "The White League in Louisiana and its
Participation in Reconstruction Riots," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XVIII (July, 1935), 637-40; Alexandria Caucasian, May 23, 1874. An
excellent summary of League activities is found in Joe Gray Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 280-81.
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encampments in Mississippi during the upcoming yellow fever season, just
as he had the year before, ^
While ESnory concerned himself with these routine matters,
Conservative leaders became more outspoken.

On June 9, upon returning

from a trip to Washington, D.C., John McEnery gave an impassioned speech
to a crowd of about 700 persons in New Orleans, encouraging them to
establish "an organization so strong that their votes will have to be
counted, their candidates elected and seated. . . . You must fight for
the white people now; the civilization of a thousand years is not to be
swept away."

McEnery concluded cryptically;

you from Washington, not as a conqueror.
nothing but hopes.

"Gentlemen, I cone back to

I have brought you back

You have 1874 to conquer in; in 1876 you are bound

to succeed, for the Democrats will then hold the Federal government."

17

After McEnery stepped aside, E. John Ellis, a staunch Democrat and
one of the local White League organizers, addressed the throng.
"Louisiana has suffered for all the Union, hut in that suffering she has
conquered.

When the day of liberty comes, there will then be no blue

coats to interfere with us."

18

Ellis' prediction appeared to come true almost immediately.

In

early June the War Department reassigned the 19th Infantry to the Indian
frontier in Kansas.

These orders removed from ESnory's command a

regiment that had more than four years of Reconstruction experience in
l^Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, May 23, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/
DSL, RG 393, NA. The news of ESnory's plan to remove the troops, which
soon became public, might have unintentionally encouraged the growth of
the White League.
-*-7New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 10, 1874.
18Ibid.
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Louisiana and Arkansas and whose officers were familiar with state
politics and problems.

On June 9, the same day that McEnery and Ellis

were inspiring the Canal Street crowd with their oratory, Emory's
adjutant ordered Colonel Charles H. Smith to prepare his regiment for
19
the move to Fort Leavenworth.
News of the 19th Regiment's impending departure no doubt delighted
the Democratic party's leaders, who had been busy recruiting White
League forces throughout Louisiana.

During May, June, and July indepen

dent White League companies were organized in at least eighteen parishes
in Louisiana, including Orleans, Caddo, Rapides, Grant, Red River,
Natchitoches, and Terrebonne, all of which had been locations of antiRepublican violence of one kind or another in past months.

The New

Orleans Picayune explained that whites felt "threatened with a race
conflict in this state. . . . Hence the organization of the White
League leaders communicated with one another, they lacked a unified

20
"high command" or state headquarters.
Despite the ominous activities of the White League, General ESnory
initially planned to close down most of the posts where units of the
19th Infantry had been stationed because their replacements, the men of
the 3rd Infantry from Indian Territory and Kansas, were not scheduled to
arrive in the Department of the Gulf until the fall.

The posts at

St. Martinville and Harrisonburg were closed, but ESnory decided to
station small garrisons at Baton Rouge and at Colfax, where he feared a
19
AAAG W. W. Sanders to Ool. C. H. Smith, June 9, 1874, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA.
90

Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 280-83; Lestage, "The White
League," 256; Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868
(Gloucester, Mass., 1967), 256; New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 9, 1874.
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"war of races" might erupt again in Grant Parish,

Therefore, the

general reduced the garrison at Jackson, Mississippi, to only a care
taker squad and sent Company B, 16th Infantry, to Colfax and Company H
of the same regiment to Baton Rouge,

A small detachment (only nineteen

men) was stationed at Jackson Barracks outside New Orleans.

Emory

concluded that there was little chance "of the possible renewal of
political disturbances here [in New Orleans]. . . ."

21

On June 18 and 19, all but one company (Company C) of the 19th
Regiment boarded steamers transporting them from the bayou country to
the Great Plains.

Company C left Colfax on June 30.

In an editorial,

the New Orleans Times wished the 19th luck in their new assignment and
proclaimed that there was supposedly a feeling of "universal regret at
. . . the departure of the gallant Nineteenth. . . . "

Notwithstanding

"the gentlemanly and courteous manner of the officers and the uniform
excellent behavior of the men" the Tines recalled that "their blue
clothes were perpetual reminders of their being the soldiers of a
victorious army."

Apparently, the principal regret expressed by the

Times was the fact that the 19th was leaving simply "to make way for
22
others. . . . "
McEnery and the Democrats must have observed these military
maneuvers with hopeful interest.

The New Orleans Republican and the

21AAAG Sanders to CO, St. Martinville, June 9, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 140/DSL; Sanders to CO, Jackson, Mississippi, June 9 and 12, 1874,
ibid.; Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, June 4 and 9, 1874, ibid.; Enory to
AAG, MilDivSouth, June 25, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL; all in
RG 393, NA.
22Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, June 18, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol.
140/DSL; Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, p. 28; both in RG 393, NA. New
Orleans Times, June 14, 1874.
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Times provided than with reliable reports.

Particularly gratifying to

than was the report in the Republican that " [s]even companies of the
Third Infantry, which will relieve the Nineteenth, will encamp at Holly
Springs, Mississippi, for the summer,"

The account was true— very few

troops would be left in Louisiana during the simmer.

23

Following the departure of the 19th Regiment, the White League
increased its activities.

The New Orleans White League completed its

organization during June, and the Picayune openly advocated military
training and drills for a white militia brigade.

"If we are refused the

privilege of arming and mustering in the cause of our beloved State,"
the Picayune remarked, "it will be the best possible evidence that we
ought to arm and muster some other way at the earliest possible moment."
Accordingly, the New Orleans White League held public drills during the
summer, but usually without weapons.

24

Although the White League was becoming more active in New Orleans,
ESmory had no intention of preventing their drills and meetings, nor
apparently did he believe that the League presented a threat to the
peace of the state.

ESmory seemed to have no fears about the League's

purposes, and he prepared to put his summer encampment policy into
effect.
On June 22 ESmory and a few of his staff officers arrived at Holly
Springs, Mississippi.

While awaiting the arrival of the 3rd Infantry

from Kansas, the general decided to leave the garrisons at Baton Rouge
23New Orleans Republican, June 17, 1874; New Orleans Times,
June 18, 1874.
^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 283-84; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 259; New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 21, 1874.
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and Colfax for the summer.

Including the detachment of nineteen men at

Jackson Barracks, there were 130 officers and soldiers in Louisiana.
General Sherman ordered Story to hold the 3rd Regiment in Mississippi
for several weeks, which coincided with Emory’s sunmer encampment plan.
This would allow the soldiers to acclimate themselves to the heat of the
South and let the worst of the fever season pass.

25

The threat of fever did not deter the White Leagues from mounting
campaigns of intimidation against Republicans in several parishes.

In

late June and early July the Natchitoches League opened the campaign,
threatening bodily injury to four matters of the Natchitoches Parish
police jury.

Heeding the warning, the four men hastily resigned, and

two state tax collectors packed up and left town along with them.

26

In the following weeks, White Leagues in other parishes applied
f

,

similar techniques against both Republican officeholders and Negroes,
forcing out many officials and scaring blacks into a subservient role.
The Opelousas Courier expressed the opinion, widely held by Conserva
tives, that the "object of the White League is to put the control of the
state government into the hands of the white people of the state."

For

exanple, four prominent Republicans in Iberia Parish, fearing for their
lives after being threatened by White Leaguers, escaped to the safe
haven of New Orleans.

Alcibiades DeBlanc and his White League company,

2^Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, June 1874, in Records of the AGO
(Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94,
NA; Post Returns, Baton Rouge,
June 1874, ibid. (reel 86). AAG Platt to Story, June 22, 1874, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 14d/DSL; GO No. 18, June
22, 1874, in Dept Gulf, GO; Storyto
AAG, MilDivSouth, June 27, 1874, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL; all in
RG 393, NA.
26Tayior, Louisiana Reconstructed, 285; Lestage, "The White
League," 652-56.
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acting with impunity since the removal in June of the Array garrison from
St. Martinville, forced several Republicans to leave St. Martin Parish.
White Leagues intimidated and threatened the lives of Republicans in
other parishes, including Bossier, Avoyelles, and Caddo.

Armed riders

disrupted a Republican neeting at Homer in Claiborne Parish, and other
Leaguers threatened to kill Allen Green, an important Republican leader
in Lincoln Parish.

Many white Republicans moved to New Orleans, and a

few left the state.

The newspapers reported that several blacks had

been lynched in the Red River parishes.

27

In most parishes the Conservative newspapers brazenly publicized
their aims and objectives.

In Shreveport, the Times supported the White

League, promising a war "to the death upon carpetbaggers and
scalawags. . . . "

In Natchitoches the People's Vindicator printed an

editorial proclaiming that "the hour is not far distant when actions
without warrant of law in our State, even if they are backed by Federal
bayonets, will meet with prompt and undieing [sic] resistance."

While

the Democrats in DeSoto Parish prepared for the fall election campaign,
a correspondent for the Picayune noticed that "a sentiment"— the desire
for victory?— was "deeper, stronger and more determined than has been
apparent for many years past on like occasions."

The reporter concluded

that there was "always a turning point in every tide— have we reached it
now?"

In other places, such as Coushatta in Red River Parish, the

Conservatives held mass meetings and political candidates delivered
27qpeiousas Courier, July 4, 1874, quoted in Singletary, Negro
Militia, 135; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 284-86; Lestage, The
White League," 670; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 264; Allen Green
to Stephen B. Packard, July 17, 1874 (forwarded by Packard to Emory,
July 22, 1874), in House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 30, p. 262.
New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 12, 21, 22, 26, 1874.
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fiery speeches.

All of this activity demonstrated that outside of New

Orleans and the garrison towns of Baton Rouge and Colfax, Governor Kel
logg's power was steadily eroding, and by the end of the summer the
Republicans had no authority at all in sate parishes.

28

Cognizant that Kellogg's government was losing power almost daily,
the New Orleans Republican pleaded for calm and order and issued a
warning to the White Leagues:

29

We recommend to all parties in Louisiana prudence and
peace. We do not desire to see the tents of the Federal army
pitched in our villages and their field pieces turned upon the
public squares. . . . But we warn violent and intolerant men
of all parties, our own included, . . . that if organized
bodies of armed men shall confront each other . . . the armed
occupation of the State will be a very probably consequence.
Let all unite their counsels to avoid it.
However, the New Orleans Picayune, did not agree with the
Republican's words of caution.

Instead, the Picayune mentioned an

altercation which had taken place in Kentucky and applied its "lessons"
to Louisiana:3^
Apparently our neighbors of Kentucky do not hold the
average United States soldier in the breathless veneration he
has excited here. When the Government troops went down to
meddle in . . . Lancaster . . . the other evening, they were
fired into with a promptness and cordiality quite
instructive. . . . The most abject spectacle we can imagine
is that of a regiment of able-bodied human beings crouching
and whimpering before the effigy of the United States Army.
2%hreveport Times, July 9 and August 14, 1874; Natchitoches
People's Vindicator, July 4, 1874. The observations about DeSoto Parish
are in New Orleans Daily Picayune, July 7, 1874. fee also Taylor's
Garments about Kellogg's failing powers in Louisiana Reconstructed, 286.
29

New Orleans Republican, August 2, 1874.

30New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 27, 1874.
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Under these disconcerting circumstances, Republican leaders
realized that only the Army was capable of restoring order, but the
detachment of nineteen men at Jackson Barracks was an ineffective force,
and the commanders at Baton Rouge and Colfax would not act without
orders from department headquarters.

Complicating matters further,

General Emory had gone North (as he had the previous sunnier) to consult
with his superiors in Washington and visit his family in New York.
did not intend to return until the fever season had ended.

He

31

In Emory's absence, the senior officer at Holly Springs was
Colonel DeLancey Floyd-Jones, commander of the 3rd Infantry which had
recently arrived in Mississippi.

A native of New York, Floyd-Jones was

a West Point graduate (class of 1846) and a veteran of both the Mexican
and Civil Wars.

But he had no experience in dealing with Reconstruction,

and he must have been horrified at the complexities of Southern
politics.

32

In an effort to acquaint himself with the populace around Holly
Springs, FloydrJones invited the residents of the area to the A m y camp
to listen to the regiment's "magnificent brass band.”

If the 3rd

Regiment's band lived up to its reputation, the New Orleans Times knew
of no reason why it would not replace "the splendid band of the 19th
Infantry" which had marched "at the head of the splendid body guard of
[Rex], his Majesty the King of Carnival" in the Mardi Gras parades.
31piatt to Bnory, July 10, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL, RG
393, NA.
■^Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, p. 28, RG 393, NA. George W.
Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the
United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1802-186/
(2 vols., New York, 1868), II, 171-72.

311
However, as the Tings observed, New Orleans residents would have to wait
to hear the band because Colonel Floyd-Jones was "acclimating the men"
of his regiment at Holly Springs, "where they will in all probability
remain for the next three months, when they will be assigned to tig
posts vacated by the Nineteenth Infantry."

Therefore, until the 3rd

Regiment finished its "acclimation," it was unavailable for duty in
_ . .
33
Louisiana.
This arrangement was not helping the Republicans, and Kellogg and
Packard both believed that several Louisiana parishes needed iirmediate
military protection.
to the state.

They formally requested that more troops be sent

Adjutant General E. R. Platt forwarded the Republican

requests for troops to Bnory and informed the Republican leaders "that
troops can be sent as [you have] requested . . . only by the orders of
the President of the United States." Platt referred the Republican's
pleas "to the higher authorities."

34

Without the Army's support, Kellogg's government was precipitously
close to collapse.

In several parishes the Democrats had taken control

of local offices.

By the end of August, about 14,000 men, many of than

former Confederates, had been recruited into the various White League
companies in Louisiana.

White League leader John Ellis informed his

brother that the Democrats would be "in control of the Gov't within six
months.

N[ew] 0[rleans] is full of Carpetbaggers from the Country and

. . . Kellogg & Packard [are] . . . alarmed. . . . "

Ellis claimed to

3%ew Orleans Tings, July 12 and 14, 1874.
^^Platt to Packard, July 31, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL;
Platt to Kellogg, July 31, 1874, ibid.; Platt to Bnory, July 30, 1874, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL; Platt to Kellogg, August 4, 1874, ibid.; all in
RG 393, NA.
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have reliable information that "5000 armed & equipped men from the
Country [were ready to fight] at one weeks notice."

Ellis concluded

that "the days of that accursed [Republican] party in Louisiana are
numbered. . . ,"35
Confirming Ellis8 opinion, White Leaguers broke into the offices of
Morgan City9s Republican newspaper, the Attakapas Register, damaged the
press, and destroyed printing supplies.

Elsewhere, unidentified night

riders patrolled the main roads in DeSoto Parish and reportedly killed
three Negroes during the month of August.

A harassed Republican in

DeSoto begged the editor of the New Orleans Republican to "try every
means to get United States troops here, for we can81 do without them."

36

In St. Martin Parish 500 anted and mounted White Leaguers forced
the resignation of all Republican officeholders.

Hie New York Times

reported that the officials "resigned under protest," but they were out
of office, which was all that mattered to the Democrats.

The officials

implored Governor Kellogg to restore them to their positions, and
advised using the Metropolitans to counteract the White League.

The

governor vetoed the idea, apparently believing that such an action would
ignite civil conflict.

37

By now, Kellogg was desperate enough to make

his case directly to the authorities in Washington.
35Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 257-58. E. John Ellis to
Tern Ellis, August 3, 1874 (capitalization in the original), in E. John
Ellis Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State
University Library, Baton Rouge).
3^SJew Orleans Republican, August 14 and 20, September 2, 1874.
37
New York Times, August 18, 2.874; New Orleans Times, August 25 and
29, 1874; Lestage, "The White League," 670; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 285.
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Having received no help from Captain Platt in Holly Springs, Kellogg
petitioned U.S. Attorney General George Williams and President Grant for
Federal aid.

Kellogg reminded Attorney General Williams that Louisiana

was "the only Southern State that is practically without the presence of
U.S. troops."

The governor claimed that his administration had

"enforced and executed the laws and maintained order in this City and in
all but the remote border Parishes of the State," but that now it was
necessary for the stability of his government to have the 3rd Infantry
occupy the various posts in Louisiana vacated by the 19th Infantry.

38

Kellogg began his letter to Grant by saying "I regret to trouble
you again about our affairs . . .," and he went on to describe some of
the White League activities in Louisiana.

Moreover, the governor

believed that the violence would increase as the November election
neared.

Kellogg "respectfully and earnestly" asked the President to

order the 3rd Infantry into Louisiana's vacant posts and suggested other
locations where their presence "would have a most salutary effect and
would prevent much bloodshed. . . . "

Military force was needed to end

"the outrages and violence new prevailing" across the state.

Kellogg

assured Grant that "the heated term here has apparently passed and the
state is healthier than it has been for many years."

In other words,

there had been no yellow fever epidemic in 1874, and the fresh troops of
the 3rd Infantry were not in danger of infection if they moved into the
Bayou State.

Finally, Kellogg told the President that if the troops

came into Louisiana now, they would assure a "quiet and fair election"
■^Kellogg to George Williams, August 26, 1874, in Letters Heed by
the U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 2), RG 60,
NA.
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and might prevent "a formal call" for than at a later time.

Despite

Kellogg's logic and the desperate tone of his letter, his argument
failed to convince the President to act at that time.

Subsequently,

after the White League's murderous acts in Red River Parish, the
President changed his mind.

39

One of the strongest White League units was in Red River Parish,
near Shreveport.

The Conservatives opposed the parish's Republican

bosses, the brothers Marshall and Hater Itoitchell, two Vermont carpet
baggers who controlled local offices in the town of Coushatta, the
parish seat.

Following the familiar example of their colleagues in

other parishes, the Red River White league threatened, shot, wounded,
and killed several Republicans.

On August 28 a thousand anted White

Leaguers assembled in Coushatta and arrested Homier Twitchsll and several
other prominent Republicans, including U.S. Marshal Henry A. Scott.

On

August 29 Homer Twitchell and five other officials agreed to resign from
office.

The next day, after releasing Scott, a few League members

escorted the Republicans out of the Parish, supposedly taking then to
Shreveport for their own safety.

About forty or fifty miles outside of

Coushatta a group of armed riders stopped the travellers.

Immediately

gunshots rang out and within a few moments all of the defenseless
Republican officials had been killed.

The "Coushatta Massacre" rocked

the foundations of Republicanism in Louisiana.

The killings

conclusively proved the power of the White Leagues and demonstrated its
intentions.40
OQ

Kellogg to Grant, August 19, 1874, ibid.
40Lestage, "The White League," 661-82; Shreveport Times, August 30,
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Following the Coushatta murders, both Marshal Packard and
Governor Kellogg begged Attorney General Williams to convince
President Grant that the Army was needed in Louisiana.

Kellogg told

Williams that only the arrival of the 3rd Infantry would calm the unrest
in the state.

Supporting the requests by Kellogg and Packard,

Louisiana's Attorney General, A. P. Field, concluded that "[u]nless
protected by Military force every white republican in Louisiana will be
either murdered or driven from the state before November."
The Conservative press exulted in their victory.

41

The rabid

Shreveport Times explained that the "white people of this State have
been driven to desperation" to throw off the "damnable bondage" of the
Radical Republicans, a few of whom had received "justice" near
Coushatta.

"The eagles have struck down their foe and swept away,"

concluded the frenzied Tines editorialist.

"Now let the buzzards of
42
Radicalism squat upon the carcasses and scream. . . . "
The New Orleans Bulletin joined the Conservative chorus, warning
that Louisianians would refuse to be humiliated by persons who happened
to wear a "Federal uniform."

In the future "[i]f the soldiers choose to

get mixed up in broils with which they have no concern, they must expect
September 1 and 2, 1874; New Orleans Republican, August 30 and Septem
ber 1, 1874; New Orleans Daily Picayune, Septenter 1-3, 1874; Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 265; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,
287-91; Ida W. Pope, "The Coushatta Massacre" (unpublished M.A. thesis,
McNeese State College, 1968), 64-86.
^^Packard to Williams, August 30, 1874, Senate Exec. Docs., 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, p. 10; Kellogg to Williams, August 30, 1874,
ibid., p. 11; A. P. Field to Williams, September 1, 1874, in Letters
Reed by the U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 2),
RG 60, NA.
^Shreveport Times, September 3, 1874.
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to come out with punched heads and t o m uniforms.

The time has passed

when a blue coat stuck up on a pole can make us bow in abject
submission. . . ."43
Another newspaper supporting the White League, the Rayville
Richland Beacon, had previously proclaimed that the "day of deliverance
is drawing nigh, when Louisiana will be freed from the manacles of
military despots, and her people allowed to enjoy liberty and the
pursuit of happiness."

44

If the President or the A m y did not act soon,

the White Leagues were ready to strike the deciding blow against the
Republicans:

the removal of Governor Kellogg himself.

4% e w Orleans Bulletin, August 28, 1874.
44
Rayville Richland Beacon, February 1, 1873.

CHAPTER XIV
EMORY AND TOE INSURRECTION OF 1874
On September 5, 1874, in Washington, D.C., a messenger handed
General Emory a letter from General of the Army William T. Sherman.
Bnory scanned the brief notes

"Matters of importance in your Department

demands [sic] your presence at your Headquarters and I regret the neces
sity which compels me to ask you to proceed thither at once [,] stopping
in Louisville to confer with Genl. McDowell. . . . ”

Sherman gave no

details about the "matters of importance,” but Bnory could imagine that
the Democrats and Republicans were at each others' throats again.
Bnory immediately packed his trunks and took the next train to
Louisville, where he met with McDowell on September 8.

His superior

ordered Emory to distribute the 3rd Infantry among several towns in
Louisiana, apparently in the hope that the reappearance of the troops
would neutralize the White League's activities in the state.

Following

the conference with McDowell, Emory proceeded to Holly Springs,
Mississippi.

Neither Sherman nor McDowell ordered him to go to

Louisiana, although Governor Kellogg and his Custom House Republicans
were facing their gravest crisis.'*'
^William T. Sherman to William H. Emory, September 5, 1874, in
William H. Bnory Papers (Bienecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale
University); Irvin McDowell to Sherman, September 8, 1874, in AGO File
3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 169), RG 94, NA.

317

318
After the successful purge of the Red River Republicans at
Coushatta, the leaders of the White Leagues knew that they were capable
of overthrowing Kellogg's government.

Sensing that the moment of

victory was at hand, they intensified the recruiting and training of
their forces and purchased rifles and aranunition outside Louisiana.
early September these purchases began to arrive.

In

A climactic

confrontation between Louisiana's political rivals was at hand.

2

Prompted by the Coushatta massacre and other "recent atrocities in
the South," on September 2 President Grant had ordered Secretary of
War William W. Belknap to have "troops available in cases of emergency."
But the President failed to give the War Secretary any specific
instructions regarding the dispatch of reinforcements to Louisiana, one
of the states Grant condemned for shewing "a disregard for the law . . .
that ought not to he tolerated in any civilized government."
On September 3 Attorney General Williams sent a circular to all
U.S. marshals and attorneys in the South ordering than to "detect,
expose, arrest, and punish the perpetrators" of the recent violent acts
in the Southern states.

Williams indicated that Federal troops would

give the marshals and attorneys "all needful aid" in making these
investigations and arrests, but, like the President, the Attorney
General failed to supply any details about the premised military aid.
Several Louisiana newspapers printed Grant's letter to Belknap and
Williams' circular to his subordinates.

The Conservative press chose to

2Frank L. Richardson, "My Recollections of the Battle of Fourteenth
of September, 1874, in New Orleans," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, III
(October, 1920), 498; William A. Dunning, Reconstruction, Political and
Economic, 1865-1877 (New York, 1907), 249; Stuart O. Landry, The Battle
of Liberty Place~~(New Orleans, 1955), 65.
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interpret the absence of any specific military orders as a sign that the
national administration was not going to support Kellogg.

Jubilantly,

the New Orleans Bulletin announced that "No Troops [would be sent] for
Moral Effect." The Shreveport Tines mistakenly reported that the 3rd
Infantry had not been ordered to Louisiana, but that if it was, the day
had passed when Louisianians could be intimidated "by the phantom of the
Federal army in the person of a regiment or so of soldiers." The Times
warned that Kellogg's "infamous government cannot longer misgovern here,
and in the next sixty days Louisiana must be a free State or a military
camp."3
On September 5 Grant finally publicized the orders sending the 3rd
Infantry to Louisiana.

The troops were to establish or reinforce posts

at New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, Alexandria, Monroe, Harrison
burg, and St. Martinville.
saved— or so it seemed.

Apparently the Kellogg government lad been

The New Orleans Republican claimed that, in

addition to the 3rd Infantry, the 9th Cavalry (a black regiment) had
ordered "to the Red River country" where it "will do good service,"
although no official orders had stated that the buffalo soldiers were
. .
4
returning to Louisiana.
% e w Orleans Daily Picayune, September 4, 1874; Shreveport Times
(emphasis in the original), September 4 and 5, 1874; New Orleans
Bulletin, September 3, 1874; New Orleans Times, September 4, 1874.
4SW, Annual Report, 1874-1875 (House Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2
Sess., No. 1), p. 51. Shreveport Times, September 6, 1874; New York
Times, September 4 and 6, 1874; Donaldsonville Chief, September 5, 1874;
New Orleans Republican, September 5, 1874. The Republican concluded
that relocating the troops to the state was "more disgraceful to
Louisiana than were secession and the . . . rebellion."
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The Shreveport Tiroes, undoubtedly speaking for roost whits
Louisianians, reiterated that the state's citizens were not cowed by
these military preparations. "Trunpets are sounding in the gloom," the
Tiroes blared, implying clearly that the trunpets were not those of the
U.S. Army.^
It was the White League bugles that were blowing "assembly," as the
Conservatives knar as they waited expectantly for the delivery of their
weapons.

Kellogg's Metropolitans made every effort to intercept the

arms shipments.

On September 8 the police stopped "a furniture wagon"

loaded with cases containing seventy-two rifles, impounded the weapons,
and arrested the driver.

However, the state authorities failed to

detect other arms shipments.
Soon the sight of well armed civilians became cranmonplaoe on the
streets of New Orleans, and city police detained several persons and
confiscated their firearms.

Acting on an informant's tip, the Metro

politans boarded the steamship City of Dallas on September 11 and seized
six cases of rifles.

Ch September 12 Republican constables confiscated

ten cases of Belgian rifles with bayonets from a train which had just
arrived in the Crescent City from Jackson, Mississippi.

The New York

Times reported that almost 300 rifles had been seized by the police
since the beginning of the month. ^
5
Shreveport Times (emphasis in the original), September 8, 1874.
Similar editorials are in the Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, September 11,
1874, and Alexandria Caucasian, September 12, 1874.
6New Orleans Bulletin, S e p t e m b e r 9, 1874; New Orleans Republican,
September 11 and 13, 1874; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,
1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 291-92; New Orleans Times, September 11
and 13, 1874; New York Times, September 2 and 12, 1874.
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Meanwhile, outside New Orleans, Republicans reported that the White
League had stepped up its activities.

For example, state Senator Mar

shal H. IWitchell, brother of one of the men slain near Coushatta,
described a "reign of terror" in Red River Parish, claiming that it had
turned into an anted carp of the White League.

Sheriff B. F. O ’Neal of

Bossier Parish called conditions in his jurisdiction "horrible," saying
that it was "impossible to execute a criminal proceeding against a white
man. . . . "

The New Orleans Republican reported that the White League

in St. Martin Parish was "on a war footing" and that the Democrats were
casting solid shot at a local foundry for two brass Napoleons.
According to the Republican, the Conservatives had taken "possession of
Northern Louisiana and [were] killing and running out all
7
Republicans. . . . ”
In view of the success of these actions, the White
League had reason to believe that it could overthrow Kellogg before Army
troops occupied their posts throughout the state.
On September 11 General Bnory finally arrived at Holly Springs, to
find his staff busily preparing to transport the 3rd Infantry to
Louisiana.

The "troops . . . [were] ready to move," but the staff had

not arranged for trains to take the soldiers to New Orleans until
September 14 or 15.

The staff had neither attarpted to assemble a

special train nor commandeered the necessary locomotive and coaches.
Furthermore, the unit selected to garrison Monroe had been needlessly
detained because a medical officer was unavailable to accompany it.
7
M. H. Twitchell and E. W. Dewees to U.S. Attorney General George
Williams, September 10, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 13, p. 12; B. F. O'Neal to Stephen B. Packard, September 10, 1874,
in House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 30, p. 395; New Orleans
Republican, September 10, 1874.
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Although the staff had been working for several days to effect the 3rd
Regiment's change of station, there was no sense of urgency at depart
ment headquarters.

McDowell had not given him a deadline for relocating

the troops, and Bnory saw no reason to change or improve upon the
existing arrangements.

However, he did order the commanding officer at

Fort Barrancas in Pensacola to send two companies of artillery to Baton
Rouge as soon as possible and directed the commissary officer in New
Q

Orleans to have supplies on hand for the 3rd Infantry.
Bnory's own lack of urgency can be attributed to his ignorance of
the situation in Louisiana.

Adjutant General Edward R. Platt of Emory's

staff conferred with the general and gave him a stack of letters and
telegrams pertaining to recent events in Louisiana.

After reading them,

Emory became aware of the full extent of the problem— he faced the
possibility of an insurrection on a scale unknown since the Civil War.
In one of the letters, Captain Arthur W. Allyn, coimanding the company
at Colfax, described in detail the Coushatta massacre and the activities
of the White League in central Louisiana.

Emory later said " [a]t that

time the name of the White League was not familiar [to] me," and appa
rently Platt had to apprise him of the facts concerning the organization.
Thus informed, Emory wrote Marshal Stephen Packard, telling him that he
feared the Amy's forces were "inadequate" to suppress the League, a
comment which surely did not cheer Packard.

Nevertheless, Emory ordered

®SW, Annual Report, 1874-1875, p. 51; AAG E. R. Platt to Packard,
September 10, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA; Platt to
Chief Oanmissary of Subsistence, September 11, 1874, ibid.; Platt to 00,
Fort Barrancas, September 11, 1874, ibid.; Emory to McDowell,
September 11, 1874, forwarded by McDowell to William
T. Sherman,
September 11, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy666, reel 169),
RG 94, NA.
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Platt to send instructions, in accordance with the attorney general's
circular of September 3, to all detachment commanders of the 3rd
Infantry reminding them to furnish assistance to U.S. marshals in
Louisiana.

Excluding his orders to the Barrancas garrison, the orders

Emory had given since his arrival at headquarters were routine, and he
had done nothing to hasten the departure of any of the units from Holly
Springs.

9

This routine attitude changed abruptly on Sunday, September 13,
when a telegram arrived from Packard.

Emory was struck by the unmis-

takeable sense of urgency— or panic— conveyed by the message.

The

marshal stressed that a violent encounter between the White League and
the state militia was likely to occur in New Orleans within the next few
hours unless the A m y intervened.

The crisis had teen precipitated over

the arrival of a substantial arms shipment aboard the steamer
Mississippi. State authorities meant to block delivery of the rifles to
the White League, which was just as determined to receive the
consignment.

David B. Penn, McEnery's "lieutenant governor," and

"Colonel" Fred N. Ogden, McEnery's "militia commander," issued a summons
for citizens to assemble at the Clay statue, at the intersection of
Canal and St. Charles streets at 11:00 a.m. on Monday, September 14.
Broadsides and posters announcing the assembly had been distributed
throughout New Orleans.

q

The New Orleans Bulletin advised all

Capt. Arthur W. Allyn to Platt, September 3, 1874, endorsed by
Emory, September 12, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 17, pp. 16-17; Emory's comment on the White League in New Orleans
Times, January 1, 1875. Emory to Packard, September 11, 1874, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA; Platt to designated COs of St. Martinville, Baton Rouge, Jackson Barracks, Harrisonburg, Monroe, Shreveport,
September 13, 1874, ibid.
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businessmen to close their stores and shops on Monday morning.
begged Emory to send troops to New Orleans immediately.

Packard

10

The crisis generated by the arrival of the Mississippi conveniently
coincided with Democratic plans.

The New Orleans Times later reported

that Penn had net with White League officers on Friday, September 11,
and outlined a plan to overthrow the Kellogg government on Monday,
September 14.

Penn called for all available White league units to

gather on Monday, when they would attempt to entice Longstreet' s state
militia into a general engagement.
would place Penn in the State House.

Once victorious, the White League
McEnery, who was purposely out of

the city to avoid being arrested if the plan failed, would then return
and assume the governorship.

If such a plan was prepared, Packard

obviously did not knew about it, or he would have told Emory about it in
his telegram.

Such information would have demonstrated even more need

for the Army's help.

11

"From ordinary sources this [Packard* s] telegram would not have
received much attention," Emory later wrote, but Packard's desperate
tone and his important position as U.S. marshal spurred Emory to action.
He planned to hire a special train to take four companies of soldiers to
New Orleans.

He expected that the train would arrive between 11:00 a.m.

l^Packard to Emory, September 13, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL,
RG 393, NA; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 292; SW, Annual Report,
1874-1875, pp. 55-56; New Orleans Bulletin, September 13, 1874; Ella
Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868 (Gloucester, Mass., 1967),
269.
■^ew Orleans Times, September 23, 1874. Neither Taylor nor Lonn
mention this meeting, but the existence of such a plan seems logical in
light of the subsequent coordinated activities of the White League.
Landry quotes the Times in Liberty Place, 87-88.
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and noon*

As if not quite convinced of the impending clash, Bnory

warned Packard that it was very important "the emergency should not have
been overstated."

Packard immediately relied that the emergency was

genuine and to hurry the troops on their way.

12

Convinced, Bnory decided to order two additional detachments to New
Orleans.

The first was the company of troops on duty at Jackson,

Mississippi.

The second was the caretaker squad at Jackson Barracks.

Bnory ordered both detachments to guard the New Orleans Custom Bouse.
He also considered sending Lieutenant Colonel John R. Brooke, second in
oamnand of the 3rd Infantry and a distinguished combat officer in the
Civil War, with a special detachment on an express train; but he had to
discard this idea, apparently because no trains were available.
Instead, he placed Brooke in oaranand of the main force of four
companies, which finally left Holly Springs at 9:00 p.m. on Sunday.
Bnory gave no indication that he would take command himself at New
Orleans.13
Bnory notified McDowell of Brooke's departure and requested that
the division ootmander send reinforcements to Louisiana from Mount
Vernon Barracks, Alabama.

In reply, McDowell reminded Bnory of

General Sherman's advice "not to call for force from without unless in
case of manifest necessity*"

McDowell therefore withheld the Alabama

■^Emory's quotes in SW, Annual Report, 1874-1875, pp. 55-56. Bnory
to Packard, September 13, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA;
Packard to Bnory, September 13, 1874, ibid.
13Platt to CO, Jackson Barracks, September 13, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA; Emory to CO, Jackson, Mississippi, Septem
ber 13, 1874, ibid.; Platt to Packard, September 13, 1874, ibid.; Platt
to Col. DeLancey Floyd-Jones, September 13, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol.
115/DSL, RG 393, NA; Platt to John R. Brooke, September 13, 1874, ibid.
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troops, but within a few hours he agreed that they were needed in New
Orleans.

14

Early on the morning of September 14 dozens of groups of armed men
made their way through the streets of New Orleans, moving to designated
locations according to Penn's and Ogden's plans.

White League officers

assembled at 58 Camp Street, the headquarters of the Democratic forces.
Several businessmen and shopkeepers opened their stores temporarily, but
by noon all had bolted their doors.

Responding to Penn's summons, more

than five thousand men had gathered at the Clay statue before noon.

15

At the meeting several speakers criticized the Kellogg government
and demanded the governor's "abdication."

The assembled men promptly

adopted a resolution to that effect, and at 1 o'clock a delegation
went to the State House seeking Kellogg's resignation.
to meet with the "delegates."

Kellogg refused

One of his aides told then that the

governor declined to consider their proposal while armed mobs roamed the
streets of the city.

The delegates returned to the Clay statue and

reported Kellogg's response, which was net by a derisive roar from the
crowd.

The leaders then instructed the men to return to their hemes,

collect their weapons, and return at 2:30 p.m.

By 3 o'clock hundreds of

armed men had returned to the streets; in the interim White League units
had been busy building street barricades composed of street cars, boxes,
mattresses, iron gates, and other handy objects.

There was no longer

■^EJnory to AAG, MilDivSouth, Septeriber 13, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA; McDowell to Sherman, September 13, 1874, in
AGO File, 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 169), RG 94, NA.
■^ew Orleans Daily Picayune, September 15, 1874; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 292-93.
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any pretense simply to obtain the arms aboard the steamer Mississippi;
the objective new was to overthrow the Kellogg government.16
While these preparations had been occurring, the Republicans were
nervously wondering hew to protect themselves.

The train bearing the

company of troops frcm Jackson arrived, and rather than asking than to
go to the State House, Packard directed than to the Custom House, where
Governor Kellogg had gone for self-protection.

The other troop train

from Holly Springs had been expected around noon, but it had teen
unaccountably detained.

(later it was reported that the railroad

company, cooperating with the Democrats, had delayed the train en route
to New Orleans.)

Unable to explain the train's tardiness, Bnory

predicted that "conflict seems inevitable now."

17

The White League moved to its task with the confident route step of
campaign veterans.

Methodically they "occupied the city hall and . . .

cut the wires of the fire alarm and police telegraph" just after Kellogg
sent cut a final desperate plea for troops "to put down the domestic
violence and insurrection new prevailing." The troops in the Custom
House, outnumbered and outgunned, could only stand and protect
government property.

18

l%tis A. Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction (Austin,
1957), 75-77; New Orleans Daily Picayune, September 22, 1874.
17
Packard to Williams, September 14, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, pp. 13-14. On the delay of the train, see
Landry, Liberty Place, 162. Bnory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 14,
1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 4 0 /DSL, eg 393, NA.
"^Packard to Williams, September 14, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, p. 13; William P. Kellogg to U.S. Grant,
September 14, 1874, ibid.
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Kellogg's state forces were also outnumbered.

James Longstreet and

Algernon S. Badger led a total of about 3*500 men* most of them Negroes,
including more than 500 Metropolitans, Badger's former policeman.
Supporting the militia were two small cannon aid a Gatling gun.
Opposing the state forces were more than 5,000 White Leaguers and
associated hangers-on, commanded by Fred N. Ogden.

The leaguers were

mostly from the New Orleans area, but others were from outlying
19
parishes.
The rival forces clashed around 4 o'clock on the afternoon of
September 14 in an encounter that became known as the "Battle of Liberty
Place."

The cannons and the Gatling gun manned by the state forces were

ineffectively used.

For a while the Metropolitans matched the White

League shot for shot, but the numbers, experience, and enthusiasm of the
Leaguers proved to be overpowering.
his men retreated.

Badger fell seriously wounded and

Longstreet's militia broke ranks after exchanging

volleys with the White League, leaving the streets, littered with their
dead and wounded, in the hands of the Democratic forces.
sixty minutes the Kellogg government had fallen.

In less than

Total casualties on

both sides amounted to more than 100 wounded and 25 killed.

The

insurgents made no attempt to attack the Custom House; in fact, they
scrupulously avoided coming into contact with the Army or any Federal
authorities.

However, the victorious Leaguers systematically plundered

19
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 293; Singletary, Negro Militia,
78.
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the state arsenals and picked up dozens of rifles discarded by the state
militia.2^
"Adjutant General" John Ellis of the White League posted a "General
Order" of the McEnery-Penn government congratulating "the troops in the
field" for their acaanplishments.

"Lieutenant Governor" Penn issued a

call for the "militia of the State [meaning the White Leagues], to arm
and assemble under their respective officers for the purpose of driving
the usurpers from power." Seeking to justify the League5s action to the
national government, Penn wrote to President Grant to explain that "the
people of this State . . . [had acted] to maintain the legal authority
of the persons elected by than to the government of the State against
. . . usurpers. . . . "

He added that Louisianians maintained "their

unswerving loyalty and respect for the United States Government and its
officers."21'
About the time that Penn issued his proclamation, Lieutenant
Colonel John R. Brooke and his four companies of the 3rd Infantry
arrived in New Orleans.

Some spectators cheered and applauded the

troops as they marched through the city.

It was impossible to determine

whether the cheers came from Republicans who were glad to see the
soldiers, or cane from Democrats who were pleased at the soldiers'
^Singletary, Negro Militia, 78; Taylor, LouisianaReconstructed,
294; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 271-72; Donald B. Sanger and
Thomas R. Hay, James Longstreet (Baton Rouge, 1952), 370-74; Landry,
Liberty Place, 99; New Orleans Daily Picayune, September 15, 1874.
^Ellis' order, September 14, 1874, in House Reports, 43 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2, p. 821; Penn's proclamation, September 14, 1874
(enphasis in the original), ibid.; Penn to Grant, September 14, 1874,
in Senate Exec. Docs., 67 Gong., 2 Sess. ("Federal Aid in Domestic
Disturbances"), No. 263, p. 131.
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tardiness.

Brooke found a telegram containing orders from Emory

awaiting him.

The Secretary of War and Bnory ordered Brooke "to protect

at its seat the Government . . . of the State of Louisiana as repre
sented by Governor Kellogg and protect it from being overthrown . . . by
violence."

Obviously, Brooke had arrived too late to obey these orders,

which would have taken him into battle against the White League.

22

Additional orders from Emory soon arrived, advising Brooke to
consolidate his forces with those already in the city, to retain all
troops passing through the city, and to learn the intentions of the
insurgent forces.

Approach their leaders directly, Emory ordered

Brooke, and find out if they intended to engage U.S. forces.

If he

concluded that a fight was probable, Brooke was to bring in the Gatling
guns from Jackson Barracks, defend all Federal property, hut not to fire
unless fired upon.

Brooke hastened to carry out these orders, hoping

that the civilians were prudent enough not to challenge the U.S. Army.

23

It is unclear whether Brooke met personally with any of the
Democratic leaders, but the colonel described the situation as "very
critical" and estimated that the White League intended "to fight even
U.S. troops if necessary to gain their ends."

The colonel requested

that Emory send massive reinforcements at once.
Emory relayed Brooke's ominous message to General McDowell, ending
with a warning that the forces in New Orleans were "utterly inadequate
22Paokarc to Williams, September 14, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, p. 14; AAG Platt to Brooke, September 14,
1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, September 15, 1874.
23Platt to Brooke, September 14, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL,
RG 393, NA; Emory to Brooke, September 14, 1874, ibid.
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to quell a city in anns. . . ."

Shocked by the news of the battle,

Emory had hoped "that the display of United States forces would prove as
it has heretofore sufficient to achieve a peace. . . . "

But now Emory

believed that it was impossible to sustain Kellogg "without a bloody
conflict except by ordering a larger force than I have at my command in
the City of New Orleans." Despite his use of the phrase "at my
command," Emory gave no intention of assuming personal command in New
24
Orleans.
In the meantime, the Conservatives acted quickly to consolidate
their position.

On September 15 Longstreet abandoned the State Bouse,

vhich was immediately occupied by the White League.

By the end of the

day the Conservative forces had occupied all the city's police stations
and state arsenals, confiscating more than 1,600 rifles, 46,000 rounds of
ammunition, and four cannon.

They controlled all state facilities.

Accordingly, Penn sent word to McEnery, asking him to ocme to New
Orleans and assure the governorship.

Tie New Orleans Bulletin

proclaimed that "Kellogg's Hessians" had been routed, and the New Iberia
Sugar Bowl hailed the "People's Triumph."25
Tie national authorities, when they realized what had happened in
New Orleans, took steps bo help Kellogg, who was still besieged in the
24Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 14, 1874 (two communica
tions) , ibid.
^^Fred Ogden to Penn, September 15, 1874, in House Reports, 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2, p. 821? Penn to Ogden, September 15,
1874, ibid., p. 822; Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, in Dept Gulf, vol.
140/DSL, R3 393, NA; testimony of Kellogg before a congressional
committee, in House Reports, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 100, Pt. 2, p. 199.
New Iberia Sugar Bowl, September 17, 1874; New Orleans Bulletin,
September 15, 1874; Shreveport Times, September 14, 1874; New Orleans
Times, September 16, 1874.
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Custom House.

Responding to the governor's official request for

assistance, President Grant issued a special proclamation on
September 15, ordering all "turbulent and disorderly persons [who] have
combined together with force and arms to overthrew the State government
of Louisiana . . . to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective
abodes within five days from this date," or face the military power of
the United States.

General Sherman ordered McDowell to move his troops

"as your judgment may dictate, so as to bast sustain the proclamation."

26

For scare reason Emory failed to learn of Kellogg's official request
for the Federal government's help.

Apparently Brooke thought that

Kellogg would notify the general, or he assumed that someone in
Washington would relay the message back to Emory.

In any case, for

several hours on September 15 Emory was unaware that the Grant admini
stration was planning to support Kellogg.

(Had the general gone to New

Orleans the day before, he would have avoided this needless
embarrassment.)
In fact, during the early hours of September 15 Bnory seamed
reluctant to help Kellogg at all.

Perhaps this reluctance signified his

complete disgust with Reconstruction; or perhaps Bnory realized that no
matter how favorably he concluded the dreadful situation in Louisiana,
2^Kellogg to Grant, Septanber 15, 1874, in William Pitt Kellogg
Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State
University Library, Baton Rouge); Grant's Proclamation, September 15,
1874, in James D. Richardson, A Canpilation of the messages and Papers
of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols., Washington, 1896-1899), VII,
216-11. ite proclamation appeared in several Louisiana newspapers.
See, for example, New Orleans Times, September 16, 1874, and New Orleans
Daily Picayune of the sane date. Sherman's Aide-de-camp Joseph C.
Audenried to McDowell, September 15, 1874, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 6), RG 60, NA.
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he could be held responsible for the tardy arrival of the troops to New
Orleans0 Indeed, at this point (the rooming of September 15) he
exhibited no desire to take ccranand of the troops in New Orleans.

On

the contrary, he remained closeted in Holly Springs, making plans to
send more troops to Louisiana and preparing for the arrival of
reinforcements from outside his department, all of which could have been
handled capably by one of his subordinates.
Now that Kellogg had been turned out of office, Emory suspected
that the War Secretary's orders of the previous day ("to protect [the
Kellogg government] at its seat") were invalid.

Consequently, Emory

asked McDowell and Adjutant General Townsend if the Array should "aid in
suppressing [the] insurrection or in keeping Governor Kellogg in his
seat. ...[?]"

Emory emphasized that he had heard "no call on the
27
President for troops by the Governor."
At this point Brooke informed Emory that Kellogg had petitioned for
troop support, but Emory reminded the colonel that such a request was
not "an application for troops within the meaning of the Constitution"—
in other words Kellogg had to make his request directly to the President
before it was valid.

Technically, Emory was correct, but this was

hardly a time to be technical.

With obvious reluctance the general

relayed Kellogg's request to McDowell.

28

Emory then issued an inexplicable order.

He reversed his orders of

the previous day, telling Brooke not to detain all troops passing
^Emory to AGO, September 15, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 4 0 /DSL,
RG 393, NA; Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 15, 1874, ibid.
28Bmory to Brooke, September 15, 1874, ibid.; Emory to AAG,
MilDivSouth, September 15, 1874, ibid.
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through New Orleans, but to allow than to continue on to other posts as
outlined in the plan devised by McDowell before the "Battle of Liberty
Place."

Under pressure fran the events of what one historian has called

"possibly the largest military insurrection that has ever occurred
against the government of a state of the United States," Btsory seared to
have temporarily lost his equilibrium.

29

General McDowell and General Townsend were determined to end this
insurrection, and finally, on the afternoon of September 15, they
ordered Emory to take charge of the troops in New Orleans.

Furthermore,

Townsend ordered Emory to "use all the means at your command to give
protection [to Kellogg] until you receive final instructions."
Responding to these orders, Emory reminded Townsend that the state
forces had been "utterly routed" and that the "insurgents" held the
"state Capitol and state arsenal and all of the city except public
buildings occupied by United States force[s]."

Emory doubted his

"ability to put the thing down," especially if the White league planned
"to resist United States force," and concluded that " [i] f they do
resist, my force is so dispro-portionate that the fight must go against
30
us." He ended with a forlorn premise to "do the test we can."
Until Emory arrived, the responsibility for preventing open warfare
in Louisiana rested with Colonel Brooke.

For the third time in two days

the colonel received an order fran Emory reversing a previous order:
^Emory to Brooke, September 15, 1874, ibid.; Joe Gray Taylor,
"New Orleans and Reconstruction," Louisiana History, IX (Summer, 1968),
203.
^Townsend to Emory, September 15, 1874, in AGO File, 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-666, reel 169), RG 94, NA; Emory to AGO, September 15,
1874, ibid. (reel 172).
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"Detain all troops, artillery oonpanies included, reaching the city
until the orders of the President [are] received."

Bypassing ESnory,

General Townsend directed Brooke to "preserve the peace and order to the
lest of your ability."

However, he added a proviso— Brooke must submit

all "orders for the suppression of violence . . . to the Secretary of
War for approval."

These orders restricted Brooke's initiative in the

event of an emergency.

Considering the speed with which the White

league had defeated the state militia, orders fran Washington might
arrive too late to benefit Brooke.

Thus, the colonel was caught in the

classic dilemma of the Army officer in Reconstruction:

do not act

unless you most and only then on directions from higher authority.

31

In this case, however, the massive reinforcements that Brooke had
requested earlier were on their way to Louisiana.

McDowell ordered six

infantry companies to New Orleans from posts in Alabama, Tennessee,
Georgia, and South Carolina.

It would take several days for these

soldiers to arrive, but once on the scene there would be more troops in
New Orleans than at any other location in the United States.

The New

Orleans Republican gratefully reported the news about these
• .
32
reinforcements.
Disregarding the meaning of these reinforcements and the
President's proclamation, an enthusiastic crowd of more than 10,000
persons cheered the "inauguration" of D. B. Penn on September 16.

Penn

3lQiory to Brooke, September 15, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL,
EG 393, NA; Townsend to Brooke, September 15, 1874, in AGO File
3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 169), RG 94, NA.
^McDowell to AGO, September 15, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-666, reel 169), RG 94, NA; New Orleans Republican,
September 17, 1874.
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assumed the duties of "acting governor" until McEnery arrived,
appointing a new police chief and drawing funds from the state treasury*
Both the Shreveport Times and the New Orleans Bulletin claimed that
"Louisiana [was] Redeemed," and the Times hoped that, with Penn now in
office, Grant would not attempt to reinstate Kellogg*

In contrast, the

New Orleans Republican promised that " [a]s soon as the boys in blue
shall have arrived bloody work may be expected, unless the Pennites
throw down their arms.

The result is awaited with confidence and

without fear.""^
The Army's actions justified the Republican1s confidence.

McDowell

personally relayed the substance of Grant's proclamation to Emory and
informed him to expect reinforcements soon.

Townsend ordered Emory to

prevent Penn from withdrawing any more money from the Louisiana
treasury.

Moreover# Townsend emphatically stressed that " [u]nder no

circumstances can the insurgent gov't of Louisiana be recognized.
Within [the] five days given by [Grant's] proclamation for the dispersal
of the insurgents, such action will be taken as the emergency may
34
require."
Apparently inspired by the decisiveness displayed by Townsend and
McDowell, Emory prepared to take charge in Louisiana.

He ordered a

company of infantry, initially bound for Shreveport but delayed in
33
Shreveport Times, September 17, 1874; New Orleans Republican,
September 17, 1874; New Orleans Bulletin, September 16 and 17, 1874;
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed. 295.
■^Enory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 16, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA; Townsend to Emory, September 16, 1874 (two
communications), in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 169),
RG 94, NA; New Orleans Times, September 17, 1874.
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Jackson, Mississippi, to head for New Orleans.

Amending a previous

order, he instructed the caimanding officer at Port Barrancas to send
all available soldiers to the Crescent City as soon as transportation
was available.

Before leaving for New Orleans himself, Emory wired

ahead to Brooke and Colonel Floyd-Jones, directing them to meet him at
the St. Charles Hotel that night.
train in Holly Springs.

Finally, Emory boarded the evening

35

At a stop along the way, probably in Vicksburg, John McEnery and a
small retinue coincidently boarded the same coach in which Emory rode.
(It would be interesting to know if the two man spoke to one another,
and if they did, what their topics of conversation were.) The train
arrived at the New Orleans depot at 10;00 p.m. on September 16.
According to the reporter for the New Orleans Republican, McEnery
stepped "majestically out of the car at the . . . depot, amid the
plaudits of . . . friends, . . . and the blare of brass
instruments. . . . "

Only a few feet away on the same platform, "there

stepped from the other end of the same car a quiet elderly gentleman":
36
General William H. Emory had at last arrived to take conmand.
Brooke and Floyd-Jones briefed their commander, who then arranged
a conference with McEnery and Penn.

Emory read Grant's proclamation

to the two politicians, who acknowledged their familiarity with the
document.

Then the general bluntly told than to abide by the

35
Aide-de-camp Luke O'Reilly to Major Samuel A. Wamwright,
September 16, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 4 0 / D S L , RG 393, NA; O’Reilly
to Major J. M. Brannan, September 16, 1874, ibid.; O'Reilly to Brooke,
September 16, 1874, ibid.
36

The arrival of the two leaders was test described in the New
Orleans Republican, September 18, 1874.
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President's directions, end the insurgency, and order the dispersal of
their forces.

In reply, the Democrats denied that there had been an

"insurrection," and claimed that they were the legal state executives.
However, McEnery and Penn both said that they had neither "the power nor
the inclination to resist" the Federal Array.

They made no immediate

concessions to finery's demands, but the general gave them till morning
to think the situation over.

37

They responded just as Emory wanted.

On September 17 McEnery and

Penn issued a joint proclamation announcing that General finory "was not
permitted to recognize our government in any way, and that immediate
submission and a surrender of the property of the State to the United
States would be the only means of avoiding the employment of the mili
tary and naval force of the United States to carpel obedience."
Protesting that Federal forces were improperly intervening in state
affairs, the Democrats ordered their "state troops" to turn in all
"captured arms" and return to their hones.

However, the Democrats

plainly stated that they would surrender the occupied state buildings
only to the Army and not to Kellogg's representatives.

38

Accordingly, finory designated Colonel Brooke officer in charge of
the detachment that would receive the surrender of the State House fran
the White League.

Furthermore, he appointed Brooke temporary military

governor of New Orleans until Kellogg resulted office.

Lending

37

McEnery to finory, September 17, 1874, in House Reports, 43 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2, p. 825.
•^Ibid.; Proclamation by McEnery and Penn, September 17, 1874,
ibid., p. 827; "GO No. 4" [McEnery forces], September 17, 1874, ibid.,
p. 824. New Orleans Republican, September 18, 1874; New Orleans Times,
September 15 and 18, 1874; New Orleans Daily Picayune, September 18, 1874.
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additional weight to his orders, Emory directed that a U.S. Navy monitor
anchor off the New Orleans river front with its guns pointed toward the
city. 39
■ * .

Preparing for the unusual ceremony, a company of soldiers "inarched
down Canal Street to the lively music of their fifes and drums," turned
into the French Quarter and stopped near the St. Louis Hotel, which
served as the state capitol.

Thousands of persons quietly watched the

troops form ranks outside the building.

At about 4 o'clock McEnery

officially relinquished control of the State House.

John Ellis,

adjutant general of the White League, described the "very sad scene":
McEnery & his officers clustered about him all in
civilian garb? Gen. [sic] Brooke and staff [were] brilliantly
uniformed; then cane the formal demand [for surrender] in the
name of the U.S. Govt: McEnery[,] with husky broken voice all
trembling with emotion read his reply. . . . The soldier
[Brooke] was then seated in the Governor's chair and we all
quietly withdrew and proceeded up Royal Street to Canal. Men
stood by with stem faces & Women wept— the decline of our
brief day of liberty.
Ellis suspected that he, McEnery, Penn, and Ogden would be arrested by
the Amy, or worse, taken into custody by Kellogg's police.^
3^Special Circular, Dept Gulf, September 17, 1874, in GO, Dept
Gulf, RG 393, NA; Emory to AGO, September 17, 1874, in Letters Reed by
the U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 6), RG 60,
NA.
^John Ellis to Tom Ellis, September 21, 1874, in E. John Ellis
Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State
University Library, Baton Rouge); New York Times, September 18, 1874;
Emory to AGO, September 17, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL, RG 393,
NA; McEnery to Brooke [September 17, 1874], in Senate Exec. Docs., 67
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 263, p. 133. Even as McEnery and Penn were
abdicating and acknowledging defeat, Adjutant General Townsend was
ordering eight companies of the 22nd Infantry to New Orleans from
Winfield Scott Hancock's Military Division of the Atlantic. Townsend to
W. S. Hancock, September 17, 1874, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice
Dept from Louisiana (Microoopy M-940, reel 6), RG 60, NA.
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However/ Qnory did not favor such arrests.

He took "the liberty"

of advising Grant " [als a friend of . . . [his] administration" and as
an officer familiar with "this unfortunate and disturbed portion of the
Country," reocMtiending an executive pardon for the men who had recently
"engaged in the insurrection against the State authorities of
Louisiana. . . . "

The "outburst embraced nearly every white man in the

oomnunity," he explained, and although they were "laboring under the
most maddening impulse" they promptly had "yielded to the mandates" of
Grant's proclamation.

Therefore, Emory believed that avoiding civil

prosecution would yield "the best results."

41

In truth, Emory had

little time to devote to those men out of power; he still had to
reestablish Kellogg in office.
Certainly it was unusual— if not unique— in American history for an
Army officer to reseat a state governor who had been removed from office
by an armed ooqp.

Taking Townsend's advice, on September 18 Etnory sent

an official dispatch to Kellogg informing him of McEnery's surrender and
offering "the necessary military support to re-establish the State
Government."

Kellogg was not very enthusiastic about resuming office

inmediately, appearing quite content to let the A m y maintain control.
Nevertheless, he agreed to take office again the next day.
^Emory
RG 393, NA.
Justifiably,
trouble than

42

to Grant, September 17, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL,
McEnery and his lieutenants were never brought to trial.
Grant probably reckoned that such trials would cause more
they were worth.

^Emory to AGO, September 18, 1874 (two ocaronunications), in Dept
Gulf, vol. 140/DSL; Emory to Kellogg, September 18, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 115/DSL; Kellogg to Story, September 18, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
Letters Reed; RG 393, NA.
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Kellogg's lack of enthusiasm was understandable.

He had less power

or authority outside of New Orleans than he did before September 14,
which had been little enough.

Emory acknowledged that "[n] early every

parish in the State, following the example of New Orleans, is more or
less in a State of insurrection. . . . "

For example, Captain Arthur W.

Allyn at Alexandria reported that "the country was on fire," and it
appeared that his "little force" (about 50 men) was a "tempting morsel"
for the White league.

Wisely, the Leaguers did not attack the soldiers,

but they repeatedly threatened Kellogg's officials.

43

The White League's enthusiasm had bounded as the news of "Liberty
Place" reached various towns.
violence.

44

In one case enthusiasm turned into

A riot occurred in the town of Bayou Sara, near Baton Rouge,

and Bnory immediately ordered a detachment of troops from the nearby
barracks to put down the disturbance and protect Kellogg's officials.
The arrival of the troops quickly quieted the town.

Elsewhere in the

Baton Rouge vicinity, soldiers protected "unoffending Republicans" from
"murderous White Leaguers" at Bayou Goula and St. Francisville.

45

%mory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 18, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol.
140/DSL, RG 393, NA; testimony of Capt. A. W. Allyn before a congres
sional committee, in House Reports, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., NO. 261, Pt. 3,
p. 156; Allyn to E. R. Platt, October 2, 1874, ibid., 43 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 101, Pt. 2, p. 63.
44
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 295; Alexandria Caucasian,
September 19, 1874; Opelousas Courier, September 19, 1874; Bossier
Banner, September 19, 1874; Natchitoches People's Vindicator,
September 19, 1874; Rayville Richland Beaoon, September 19, 1874;
Landry, Liberty Place, 177-78.
^^Erory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 18 and 20, 1874, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 140/DSL; Luke O'Reilly to CO, Bayou Sara, September 18, 1874,
ibid.; Citizens of Bayou Goula to Emory, September 21, 1874, in Dept
Gulf, Letters Reed; RG 393, NA. Mayor Robert Hewlitt (St. Francisville)
to Attorney General Williams, September 19, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
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The Array's assistance was gratifying to Governor Kellogg, who
resumed the duties of his office on September 19, "relieving
Brooke of responsibilities which he was glad to be rid of," according to
the New Orleans Republican. To his relief Kellogg learned that in
several parishes where Republicans "had been ousted the old Incumbents
[were] going back peaceably." Kellogg wrote Attorney General Williams
that according to recent reports the country was "quieter than expected"
and that New Orleans had settled down remarkably well.
added a note of caution:

However, Kellogg

"No reports yet received from [the] Red River

country." General Emory was prepared to send reinforcements to the
garrisons in the Red River parishes as soon as he consolidated his
forces in New Orleans and determined how many soldiers he wanted to
station outside the city.

46

Fresh troops began to arrive in Louisiana from several states.
Advance units of the 2nd Infantry from Alabama arrived at Jackson
Barracks on September 18.

The remainder of the 3rd Infantry from

Mississippi joined Brooke's four companies in New Orleans.

On

September 20 four companies of the 22nd Infantry came in from Michigan
and were posted at the State House.

Three companies of the 1st

Artillery from Fort Barrancas were quartered in the city by September 21.
Three other companies of the 22nd Regiment detrained at the city depot
on September 22.

Emory had to rent makeshift quarters for these new

43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, pp. 14-15.
^^Kellogg to Williams, September 22, 1874, in Letters Reed by U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 2), RG 60, NA; New
Orleans Republican, September 20, 1874.
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arrivals, creating windfall profits for owners of empty warehouses which
were turned into temporary barracks.

47

Louisiana newspapers devoted considerable space to the arrival of
the massive reinforcements, while simultaneously interjecting stinging
criticisms of Grant and Kellogg.

For example, the Shreveport Times

remarked that Grant "could have as well set a toad in the gubernatorial
chair, surrounded it with soldiers and proclaimed it Governor; it would
have received the same obedience that Mr. Kellogg will receive. . . . "
The Shreveport newspaper concluded that Louisiana was "a military
province of the United States."

The New Orleans Times remarked that if

the state government was "one of force and bayonets, it might as well
assume the military title at once." The Times listed the men who had
served as governor during 1874:

Kellogg, Penn, McEnery, and Brooke,

concluding that " [tjhese [were] all the Acting Governors we have had
this year— but it's not our fault that we haven't had more.
hard, and we can't afford as much style as Costa Rica."

Times are

The New Orleans

Bulletin warned that "it will take a regiment of Federal soldiers in
each parish to sustain . . . the officials and appointees of the Kellogg
usurpation. . . .

Is the Government prepared to quarter that number of

soldiers in Louisiana to maintain in power a fraudulent and infamous
government?"

The Thibodeaux Sentinel accused the A m y of supporting an

administration of "robbers, usurpers and thieves."

The Natchitoches

People's Vindicator boldly called on north Louisianians for a
4^Bnory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 19,
vol. 140/DSL; Emory to AGO, September 20, 1874,
Journal of Events, pp. 30-31; RG 393, NA. Post
Barracks, September 1874, in Records of the AGO
524), RG 94, NA.

1874, in Dept Gulf,
ibid.; Dept Gulf,
Returns, Jackson
(Microcopy M-617, reel
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"daronstration of force" to show Grant that they were "unterrified . . .
[by the] anted displays [of the] swaggering soldiery."

48

Marshal Packard confirmed that north Louisiana needed troops
stationed there "at once,'* citing especially "the critical condition of
affairs at . . . Monroe."

Having by this time received adequate rein

forcements, with more on the way, Emory not only sent troops to Monroe,
but ordered others to Harrisonburg, Coushatta, and Shreveport.

49

No sooner had Emory started to distribute his fresh troops than
McDowell asked for seme of than to be returned to their original
stations.

Specifically, McDowell wanted two companies of the 2nd

Infantry sent back to Alabama.

Anticipating that other companies would

be leaving Louisiana soon, McDowell8 s adjutant advised Emory to sign
only one month leases for extra quarters.

Emory agreed to relinquish

the units of the 2nd Infantry, but recommended that "no more be taken
away for the present" because it appeared that "the [ill] feeling on
both sides is reopening and rekindling."

Upon reading Emory's comments,

President Grant ordered General 'Townsend to see that all "troops in New
50
Orleans remain there for the present."
48Shreveport Times, September 22, 1874; New Orleans Times,
September 20, 1874; New Orleans Bulletin, September 22, 1874; Thibodeaux
Sentinel, September 26, 1874; Natchitoches People8s Vindicator,
September 26, 1874; See also Nov Orleans Daily Picayune, September 19,
1874; Alexandria Caucasian, September 26, 1874; Alexandria Louisiana
Democrat, September 30, 1874; Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, September 25,
1874.
49
Packard to Emory, September 20, 1874, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, September 25, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/
DSL; EG 393, NA.
^^McDcfwell to Col. W. D. Whipple, September 21, 1874, in AGO File
3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 172), RG 94, NA; AAG Chaunoey McKeever
to Emory, September 21, 1874, ibid. (reel 169); McKeever to Emory,
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In Emory's opinion, New Orleans was secure, guarded by nineteen
companies of infantry and artillery, but the reports of continuing White
League activity in north Louisiana worried him.

He informed McDowell

that the "Red River Parishes west of Alexandria are in such a condition
that I do not think order can be maintained without the use of cavalry."
Therefore Emory requested that McDowell arrange for a squadron of
cavalry to be sent from the Department of Texas.

Emory believed that

only mounted troops were capable of providing "peace and order" in the
"disturbed districts. "

51

The cavalry Emory requested was stationed in Texas, one of the
states and territories in the Military Division of the Missouri,
commanded by Philip H. Sheridan.

Initially, Secretary of War Belknap

had asked Sheridan to consider annexing Louisiana into his division
(which extended from Canada to the Rio Grande and from the Mississippi
River to the Rocky Mountains) or simply to take personal command of the
troublesome state.

Sheridan replied that he had "no desire to ever have

any control over Louisiana," but that he was always "ready to do
anything within [his] power to help . . . the President in his
embarrassing duties, . . . [no matter] how unpleasant it may be. . . . "
September 24, 1874, ibid. (reel 170); Townsend to McDowell,
September 23, 1874, ibid. (reel 172); Emory to AAG, tdlDivScuth,
September 21 and 22 (two communications), 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/
DSL, RG 393, NA.
5^McDowell to Col. Whipple, September 25, 1874, in Letters Reed by
U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 6 ), RG 60, NA.
52Philip H. Sheridan to W. W. Belknap, September 22, 1874, in
Sheridan Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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Subsequently General Townsend asked Sheridan if he could spare an
entire cavalry regiment for service in Louisiana.

Sheridan responded

that six companies of the 7th Cavalry and a full regiment of infantry
were available to assist Emory.

At first Belknap ordered Sheridan to

send all the troops ha offered, but, after giving the matter additional
thought, he directed that Sheridan send only the cavalry, without its
flamboyant commander, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, whose
Democratic proclivities were well known.

Cn September 28, following his

inspection of troops in and around New Orleans, finory returned to his
headquarters to find Townsend's telegram informing him that the 7th
Cavalry was on its way to Louisiana.

53

On his inspection tour finory found that the troops at Jackson
Barracks were comfortable in their standard quarters, and the men of the
22nd Infantry were refurbishing the old Sedwick Barracks, but that
several companies of soldiers were bivouaced in tents in the city.
New Orleans City Park had become a muddy military camp.

The

The frequent

afternoon rain showers prompted one officer to ask a newspaper reporter
"if it rained this way all the tine here?"

The officer declared that he

and his men "had been living in the water and drilling in canoes ever
since their arrival [in Louisiana]."

Aware of the troops' discomfort,

53Townsend to Sheridan, September 25 and 27, 1874, in Letters Reed
by U.S. Justice Dqpt from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 6 ), R3 60,
NA; Townsend to Belknap, September 26, 1874, ibid.; Sheridan to
Townsend, September 28, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 ,
reel 169), RG 94, NA; Whipple to Sheridan, September 28, 1874, ibid.;
Belknap to Townsend, September 28, 1874, ibid. (reel 170); Townsend to
Emory, September 28, 1874, ibid. (reel 169). New Orleans Republican,
September 30, 1874. Custer, of course, was not the 7th Regiment's
colonel, hut he had been the actual field ccmmander for several years.
The 7th's commanding officer, Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis, had been
serving on detached duty for many months.
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Bnory asked permission to hire additional temporary quarters.

By posing

this question, Elnory was not putting off a minor decision on a senior
ocaimander; the cost of quarters was an important part of the Amy's
budget.

In past emergencies, the A m y had paid

building for thirty days.

$666

to rent one

More than one or two months of such bills

undoubtedly would engender criticism from budget-conscious congressmen
and General Sherman.

54

McDowell reminded Bnory of Sherman's "orders . . . to incur as
little expense as possible" and suggested that Bnory leave the troops in
camps outside New Orleans.

Elnory stressed that the troops were more

effective in the city; it took two or three hours for them to reach the
scene of a riot.
General Townsend.

McDowell referred the matter to Adjutant
Explaining his case to Ttownsend, Elnory wrote that

"the effect of the presence of the troops is lost by their being
encamped [outside the city], and when [the] rainy season ooimences in
November the roads are impassable." Townsend discussed the problem with
the Secretary of War, who finally authorized Elnory to hire tenporary
quarters "in the best strategic position."

55

54New Orleans Bulletin, September 30, 1874. Elnory to AAG,
MilDivSouth, September 29, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 ,
reel 170), R3 94, NA. Expanses for temporarily renting buildings for
military use in 1870 in Louisiana are listed in Senate Exec. Docs., 41
Gong., 2 Sess., No. 38, p. 4. On the need of renting quarters gsierally
in the South, see Harry W. Pfanz, "Soldiering in the South During the
Reconstruction Period, 1865-1877" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio
State Ikiiversity, 1958), 260-62.
55Eknory to McDowell, October 6 , 1874, and McDowell's endorsement,
in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA; Emory to
AGO, October 7, 1874, ibid.; Townsend to Emory, October 8 , 1874, ibid.
(reel 172).
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The need for rented quarters decreased as Emory gradually funneled
units into the country parishes.

By the end of September he ocrrmanded

twenty-six companies belonging to six regiments.

Nineteen companies

(846 men) were in New Orleans or at nearby barracks.

The seven other

companies (less than 50 men each) were stationed in Baton Rouge, Colfax,
St. Martinville, Pineville, Monroe, Shreveport, and Coushatta.

Emory

oostrmanded a total of 1,182 men in Louisiana and an additional 172
soldiers in Arkansas and Mississippi.

He had the aid of seven U.S. Navy

ships, carrying 51 guns, docked along the New Orleans waterfront or
anchored in the Mississippi River.

The soldiers under Emory's command

comprised about one-third of all the troops stationed in the South,
excluding Texas.^
Emory now had to look ahead to the mid-term elections scheduled for
November 2.

Republican politicians would doubtlessly call for the A m y

to protect voters and guard polling places.

Already the rival political

leaders had met to resolve their differences over reopening voter
registration.

According to Emory, the Democrats had extracted conces

sions from the Republicans allowing complete "recognition of the legal
rights of [the] insurgent parties."

(Emory's tone indicated that he

thought the concessions were inappropriate, coming only two weeks after
the unsuccessful coup.) NO matter how distasteful the job was to him,

✓

5 6 SW, Annual Report, 1874-1875, in House Exec. Docs., 43 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 1, pp. 84-85; New Orleans Republican, September 29, 1874;
James E„ Sefton, United States A m y and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton
Rouge, 1967), 262.
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Elnory knew that his forces were going to be called upon to uphold "the
helpless and dependent" Kellogg government.

57

The specific limits of the Array's authority were really less clear
in 1874 than they had been under the Military Reconstruction Acts seven
years before— and even then the range of military authority had been
difficult to define.

At least Sheridan and his lieutenants operated

under the legal umbrella of laws passed by Congress, and for the most
part the officers who enforced those laws expected (and received) the
support of the War Department and Congress; if the military needed
additional powers, Congress passed supplementary Reconstruction Acts,
and in most cases allowed the generals free rein to interpret those
acts.
In 1874 Elnory asked McDowell to give him exact military duties
along with guidelines on military power that could be used effectively
and with assurance during the political campaign.

Elnory wanted these

guidelines so that the soldiers "performing such duties [would be]
protected by law in the execution of them."

Without saying so specifi

cally, he probably was hoping for the same sort of protection that
Sheridan's men had enjoyed under the Military Reconstruction Acts.
Elnory believed that this protection was essential so long as the Array's
"presence [was] necessary to the continuance of peace in the southern
country and, . . . to [ensure] the existence of the [state] Government
•*. ,r . . . ..58
itself.
57Elnory to AGO, September 30, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 60.
^®Enory's "Report on the Condition of Affairs in Louisiana;"
complete report in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA; partial version
printed in SW, Annual Report, 1874-1875, p. 56.
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In reply, McDowell told Emory "to aid the U.S. civil officers, and
not to take any initial action of . . . [his] own."

Perceptively,

McDowell asked Sherman, " [i]f more than this is lawful and is desired, I
beg to be informed what it is."
desired by most Americans.

By 1874 nothing more was lawful or

The Army's power and its influence in

Southern Reconstruction had declined to the point where it had a limited
number of choices.

Only a politically dedicated or a foolhardy

ootrmander would do more than higher authorities specifically allowed.

59

Under these circumstances, Emory did not see any "prospect of these
[Southern] governments improving or beaming more stable so long as they
are based upon universal suffrage or until the suffragists become better
educated."

60

Emory obviously referred to black voters, and his opinion

was probably shared by most of the Army officers in the Southern states.
The Amy's top command was split on the matter of how (or even if)
to continue enforcing a policy of equal rights for blacks.

For several

years General Sherman had wanted the Army to divest itself of its police
duties in the South.

In contrast, General Sheridan still believed that

old Rebels had no place in government.

Furthermore, Sheridan contended

that Southern Republicans, if they were to survive in office, had to
rely on the votes of unintimidated Negroes.

Both of these groups

depended upon the A m y to protect them.
By 1874 the national government did not have enough soldiers in the
South to protect all Republicans (either black or white), or even to
ensure the existence of their state governments.

By the end of 1874 the

59McDowell to Sherman, September 28, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA.
^Emory's "Report on the Condition of Affairs in Louisiana."

351
Democrats had carefully used a skillful combination of court suits (as
in the case of the Golfax rioters), intimidation, voter registration,
measured applications of violence, and ballot box stuffing to regain
control of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, and
Texaso

(Tennessee had bean "redeemed" in 1866 after approving the

Fourteenth Amendment.) Thus, only Mississippi, South Carolina, Florida,
and Louisiana had Republican governments at the end of the year.
General Etaory faced the prospect that the Democrats were going to
continue to use all of the tactics mentioned above to regain control of
Louisiana and Mississippi as well.
The Conservatives had tried to overthrew Kellogg's government, but
now that such a strong force had been assembled in New Orleans it was
unlikely that they would attempt to do so again.

Undaunted, John

McEnery did not "resign," and the White Leagues did not disband.

In

fact, they remained watchful and hopeful, prepared to rise to the call
again if the opportunity presented itself, especially if the next
Democratic gubernatorial candidate received a substantial number of
votes and presented a legitimate claim to the governorship.
election was only two years away.)

(That

Significantly, the White Leagues

returned less than half of the weapons taken from state arsenals while
Penn briefly held office. ^
During the next few weeks same Republican officials were able to
resume their offices in various Louisiana parishes.

They knew that the

White League almost had succeeded in its coup attempt.

After the

^House Reports, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., NO. 100, Pt. 2, pp. 199-200.
Of 2,865 rifles and four cannon taken by the Democrats, they returned
1,183 rifles and two cannon.
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horrors of September, there would never be enough troops in the state to
make than feel safe.

Hie dispirited Republicans looked ahead to the

fall elections with trepidation, while the Danocrats viewed their own
prospects with anticipation.
with

apprehension.

Elnory and the Army regarded both factions

CHAPTER XV
EMORY AND THE "SMOLDERING REBELLION"
The mid-term election of November 2 beckoned to General Bnory like
a talisman:

if he reached it without renewed outbreaks of violence in

his department, he would count himself a lucky man.

The Democrats were

full of confidence, and according to Bnory, they expected "to carry
enough of the legislature to be masters of the situation.

Should they

do so, order may rule; but if they are defeated, conflict and violence
will be the inevitable consequences, unless suppressed by the presence
of a strong military force."

Clearly Bnory*s respect for the Louisiana

Republican party had reached such a low point that he did not seem to
care if any of their candidates won or not.

On the contrary, he

indicated that it might be best for all concerned if the Democrats won
most of the offices.^Regardless of his personal feelings, Bnory planned to do all within
his power to ensure that the election was peaceful.

Neither he nor his

soldiers would dictate the outcome; in fact, Bnory had no desire to
plunge the Army deeper into Louisiana's political morass.

However, the

only way to guarantee a quiet election was for the Army to station a
detachment of troops near every polling place.

This was inpossible, but

Governor Kellogg wanted the soldiers distributed as widely as possible
^William H. Bnory to AGO, October 1, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
43 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 61.
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throughout the state.

The Grant adninistration— especially Attorney

General Williams— supported Kellogg's wishes, and during October the
Washington authorities encouraged Emory to comply with most of Kellogg's
requests for troops.
Having received no orders to the contrary and considering New
Orleans pacified, Bnory took steps to implement the old orders McDowell
had given him on September
Louisiana.

8

concerning the distribution of troops in

To comply with these old orders, which had been originally

drafted by Attorney General Williams, Bnory had to reduce the number of
troops serving in and around New Orleans.

He expected that these reduc

tions would be offset by additional reinforcements.

Consequently, he

sent one company of the 16th Infantry to Jackson, Mississippi (where it
reestablished the post vacated during the crisis on September 14), and
another company of the same regiment returned to its regular duty
station in Nashville, Tennessee.

Company E, 3rd Infantry, which had

been previously ordered to Coushatta, arrived there on October 4.
Gompany D, 3rd Infantry, took station at St. Martinville, and its
commander dispatched an officer to the town of Breaux Bridge to investi
gate reports of violence there.

On October 11 Company I, of the same

regiment, reopened the old post at Alexandria.

Accordingly, troops now

garrisoned six of the nine towns in the Department of the Gulf that
2
Williams and McDowell had earmarked for occupation.
Based on his understanding of orders issued by the War Department
in September, Emory expected at least six companies of the 7th Cavalry
^Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, p. 33; AAG E. R. Platt to CO,
St. Martinville, October 7, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL; RG 393,
NA. Irvin McDowell to William T. Sherman, September 8 , 1874, in AGO
File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 169), EG 94, NA.
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to arrive in New Orleans soon, and he planned to use some of these
soldiers to garrison two of the remaining towns on Williams' list.

He

was disappointed to learn that McDowell had diverted two of these
cavalry companies to posts in Alabama.

When the other four companies

arrived in Louisiana, Elnory sent two of then to Shreveport and held the
other two in New Orleans.

Therefore, after these troop movements had

been completed, five companies had left New Orleans, and two new
companies had taken station there.

3

When President Grant learned that Emory had sent several companies
out of New Orleans, he directed Adjutant General Townsend to learn the
reasons for the transfers.

Answering Townsend's inquiry concerning the

troop movements, General McDowell denied giving any encouragement to
Elnory to relocate any soldiers.

Furthermore, McDowell disavowed any

prior knowledge of Emory’s orders moving troops to Alexandria,
St. Martinville, or Coushatta.

Elnory defended his actions, saying that

he was trying to abide by orders he had been given earlier.

He conclud

ed that the "points of which . . . troops were . . . sent were under my
ccmnand as much as New Orleans and . . . the peace and quiet of the
state demanded the action . . . taken in sending troops bo them."
Despite Elnory's explanation, Grant was concerned about the troop
4

strength in the Division of the South.
%mory to AAG, MilDivSouth, October 5, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol.
140/DSL; Elnory to AGO, October 6 , 1874, ibid.; Dept Gulf, Journal of
Events, p. 33; all in RG 393, NA.
^E. D. Townsend to McDowell, October 7, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA; McDowell to Townsend,
October 7, 1874, ibid.; Emory to AAG, MilDivSouth, October 7, 1874,
ibid.
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Reflecting the President's concern, Secretary of War Belknap
ordered General Sheridan to send a regiment of infantry to McDowell.
(Although McDowell had the authority to assign the troops wherever he
wanted, the President obviously wanted most of than sent to Emory.)
Sheridan picked the 13th Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Henry Morrow, to reinforce the Southern division, and McDowell
5
ordered the regiment to report to Bnory in New Orleans.
Although more infantry was on its way to Louisiana, the Republicans
there wanted cavalry reinforcements.

Governor Kellogg complained to

Attorney General Williams about the loss of the two cavalry companies
that McDowell had diverted to Alabama.

Marshal Packard and U.S.

Attorney Janes R. Beckwith requested that Bnory station a cavalry
company at Colfax in order to help the U.S. deputy marshal to serve his
warrants.

Emory replied that he had tried to garrison the state

according to the directions of Williams and McDowell, and that if
McDowell had not reduced the number of cavalry units sent to Louisiana,
a company would have been available for duty at Golfax.

Meanwhile,

Bnory said that he wanted to keep two cavalry companies in New Orleans

g
to deal with any emergencies.
Undeterred by Emory's refusal, Packard and Beckwith petitioned
Attorney General Williams to use his influence on their behalf.
% . W. Belknap to Philip H. Sheridan, October 7, 1874, ibid.;
Sheridan bo Belknap, October 7, 1874, ibid.; New Orleans Republican,
October 9, 1874.
^William P. Kellogg to George H. Williams, October 8 , 1874, in
Letters Reed by U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940,
reel 2), RG 60, NA; Stephen Packard and James R. Beckwith to Bnory,
October 8 , 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170),
RG 94, NA; Bnory to Packard, October 9, 1874, ibid.
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Subsequently, Williams asked Secretary of War Belknap to order Emory "to
furnish . . . Marshal [Packard] with one company of cavalry . . . to
assist the Marshal in making . . . arrests."

Eventually, the War

Department ordered Emory to assign a cavalry company for duty at Golfax,
but the general oonplained that their torses . . . [were] unserviceable
until they . . . [were] shod."

Mjutant General Townsend ordered Elnory

to " [p]urchase [the] necessary horseshoes" and to requisition any
additional cavalry supplies he needed from Rock Island Arsenal in
Illinois.

Finally, on October 15, Company K, 7th Cavalry, left New

Orleans for Colfax.

Company K would join two otter companies of the 7th

Regiment at Shreveport to form a squadron operating along the Red
River.^
TO command this cavalry contingent, as well as all other troops in
north Louisiana, Elnory chose Major Lewis Merrill of the 7th Cavalry.
Merrill's command was designated "the District of the Upper Red River,"
and he established his headquarters at Shreveport.

Merrill was

graduated fran West Point in 1855, and he had a competent but undistin
guished record in the Civil War.

Unlike Colonel Floyd-Janes ate most of

the officers in the 3rd Infantry, Merrill was an experienced Reconstruc
tion commander, having served in South Carolina in 1871 when
President Grant had declared martial law in several counties in that
state.

Merrill, who was a staunch Republican, had strictly interpreted

the Enforcement Acts and supervised the arrest of several members of the
^Packard and Beckwith to Williams, October 10, 1874, in AGO File
3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA; Williams to Belknap,
October 10, 1874, ibid.; Elnory to AGO, October 10, 1874, ibid.; Townsend
to Elnory, October 12, 1874, ibid.; Townsend to McDowell, October 12,
1874, ibid. Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, p. 33, RG 393, NA.
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Ku Klux Klan.

Consequently, South Carolina's Danocratic newspapers had

commonly referred to the major as "Dog Merrill."

Although the Army's

usefulness as a police force apparently was declining in the South,
Merrill still believed that the military should play an important
supervisory role in state politics, aiding Republicans whenever
possible.®
Obviously, Merrill's views coincided with those held by Louisiana's
Republicans, who wanted the Army to protect black voters, reseat ousted
Republican officeholders, and arrest troublesome Democrats.

For

example, Deputy U.S. Marshal Edgar Selye asked Captain George E. Head,
commanding the garrison at Monroe, for a detachment of troops to help
him serve warrants in the town of Vienna in Lincoln Parish.

Head had

been given no orders prohibiting such aid, and at the time he discerned
nothing improper in Selye’s request.

The captain, therefore, personally

led the detachment to Vienna, stationing a squad of soldiers in Farmerville (in Union Parish) along the way.

However, after spending two days

in Lincoln Parish, Selye had made no arrests, and Head concluded that
the marshal was using the Army as a counter-intimidation force against
^Eknory to AGO, October 8 , 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy
M-6 6 6 , reel 173), RG 94, NA. Platt to Lewis Merrill, October 15, 1874,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA. Francis B. Simkins and
Robert H. Woody, South Carolina During Reconstruction (Chapel Hill,
1932), 463; Harry W. Pfanz, "Soldiering in the South During the
Reconstruction Period, 1865-1877" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University, 1958)* 593; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of
the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West
Point, New York, 1802-1867 (2 vols., New York, 1868), II, 406-407;
Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United
States Army, 1789-1903 (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 705.
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the Democrats.

Consequently, Head took his soldiers back to Monroe, but

he did leave the squad in Farmerville to protect blacks in the town.

9

Meanwhile, even before Merrill arrived in the Red River District,
General Emory had ordered the post commanders at Shreveport and
Coushatta to carry out another Republican objective, reseating office
holders who had been ousted by the White league in Caddo and Red River
parishes.

Furthermore, Governor Kellogg wanted soldiers to reinstate

judges, clerks of court, court recorders, and sheriffs in Avoyelles and
Rapides parishes.

Rather than acceding wholeheartedly to Kellogg's

request, Emory informed him that " [i]f no contrary orders . . . [were]
received the troops enroute for Colfax [Company K, 7th Cavalry] will be
directed to take the Parishes of Avoyelles and Rapides on the way and
seat the parish officers. . . . "

10

Although Emory had recently helped sane Republicans regain their
offices, for seme unexplained reason he had doubts about acceding to
Kellogg's latest request for help.

The general informed General Town

send that he "fear[ed] . . . [Kellogg's request] will be followed by
many requisitions of the same kind . . . of very doubtful propriety."
Creating a rather lame excuse, Emory concluded that he did not have
"sufficient transportation" to continue providing such assistance in the
9Edgar Selye to George E. Head, October 14, 1874, in House Reports,
44 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 816, p. 235; SO No. 7, Monroe garrison,
October 15, 1874, ibid., p. 236; Head's testimony before a congressional
oarmittee, ibid., p. 238; Lt. F. M. Roe to CO, Dist of Upper Red River,
October 19, 1874, ibid.
■^Platt to CO, Shreveport, October 12, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol.
115/DSL, RG 393, NA; Platt to 00, Coushatta, October 12, 1874, ibid.;
Emory to Kellogg, October 14, 1874, ibid. Kellogg to Emory, October 14,
1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA.
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future.

Townsend's reply was apparently just what Emory wanted to hear.

"appropriations are so small," Townsend wrote, that "movements of troops
must necessarily be curtailed.

Therefore, make none such as you

describe without . . . reporting here [the] detailed object [of any
military assistance] and receiving authority [to carry it out] . "

11

Emory promptly utilized Townsend's new instructions, ordering
Major Merrill and Captain Head to reinstate "in their offices such
[Republican] officials as may have been deposed," but not to take their
troops outside their present posts "for that purpose without . . .
reporting to . . . [Department] Headquarters and receiving authority to
12
make . . . [such movements]."
Just as Emory had predicted, on October 16 Kellogg asked for more
military assistance.

The governor wanted the A m y to install officials

in Natchitoches, Bossier, DeSoto, and Lincoln parishes.

Emory informed

Townsend that he had "troops enough in position to seat most of the
Kellogg officials" if Townsend issued the necessary orders.

13

When Townsend appeared reluctant to issue the orders, Kellogg and
his Custom House cohorts again sought the help of Attorney General Wil
liams, claiming that the troops were also needed to protect the voters
in those parishes on election day.

Williams dutifully informed

11Emory to AGO, October 14, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy
M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA; Townsend to Emory, October 15, 1874, ibid.
12
AAG Platt to CO, Upper Red River Dist [Merrill], October 15,
1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA;
Platt to Head, October 16, 1874, in House Reports, 44 Cong., 1 Sess.,
No. 816, p. 233.
1 "^Kellogg to Emory, October 15, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-6 6 6 , reel 170), RG 94, NA; Emory to AGO, October 16, 1874,
ibid.
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Secretary of War Belknap of Kellogg's request, urging him to order Emory
to send troops into several parishes.

If the Army needed additional

transportation, Kellogg premised to provide it.

14

In St. Martin Parish, where the Army was already active, there was
considerable evidence to support Kellogg's requests.

IWo lieutenants,

Lorenzo Cooke of the 3rd Infantry and Charles DeRudio of the 7th
Cavalry, reported "that white men, known to belong to the White League,
have [been] . . . intimidating colored man . . . , preventing them frcm
registering [to vote]. . . ."

Furthermore, blacks had been told that

they would lose their jobs if they voted the Republican ticket.

Cooke

concluded that blacks would have been unable to register if his
detachment had not camped in Breaux Bridge.

15

The White League had been terrorizing blacks in Vermillion,
St. Tammany, and DeSoto parishes, and the Republicans needed the Army's
protection.

J. A. Brookshier in Abbeville claimed that Democrats in his

town had threatened all their Negro employees with "immediate discharge"
from their jobs, unless they voted for the Democratic candidates.
W. H. Yates reported that " [vj iolence and intimidation are the order of
the day" in Covington and predicted that the polls would be unsafe,
unless the A m y patrolled the town on election day.

J. J. Johnson in

14Williams to Belknap, October 20, 1874, ibid.; Kellogg, Packard,
and others to Williams, October 19, 1874, in Letters Reed by U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 2), K3 60, NA;
Kellogg to Williams, October 19, 1874, ibid.
1 5 Lt. L. W. Cooke to 00, St. Martinville, October 11, 1874, in
House Reports, 43 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 101, Pt. 2, p. 64; testimony of
Lt. Charles DeRudio and Lt. Cooke before a congressional oonmittee,
ibid., 43 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2, pp. 165-66, 343-44.
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Mansfield informed Marshal Packard that troops were needed in DeSoto
Parish to offset the nefarious activities of the White League.

16

Although it painstakingly avoided any confrontations with Emory's
troops, the White League continued to to active in New Orleans itself.
Emory learned that "bodies of armed men" had been marching in the
streets at several places in the Crescent City.

Kellogg's administra

tion seemed powerless to prevent these drills, despite the actions taken
by the newly appointed police chief, George Baldey, a former Army
officer who had served as assistant adjutant general to General Mower.
Baldey submitted frequent reports to Kellogg concerning the New Orleans
White League, but the police chief was reluctant to use his patrolmen
against the well-armed and high spirited Leaguers.

However, Emory

responded to Baldey's reports, ordering some extra troops into New
Orleans to quiet the "unsettled and violent feeling which . . . exists
.,17
in this city.
Emory was under pressure from the White League and the Democrats,
and the Kellogg administration and the Republicans, and now higher
authorities seemed to believe that Emory had too many soldiers in his
department.

As units of the 13th Infantry arrived in Louisiana,

Secretary of War Belknap ordered Emory to transfer sate companies of the
2nd and 18th regiments to Alabama.

In the meantime, Emory had to make

16J. a . Brookshier to Packard, October 20, 1874, in House Exec.
Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 30, pp. 302-303; W. H. Yates to Packard,
October 19, 1874, ibid., p. 302; J. J. Johnson to Packard, October 22,
1874, ibid., pp. 366-67.
l^Bnory to AGO, October 5, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 17, p. 61; George Baldey to Kellogg, October 8 , 13, 18, 25,
28, 1874, in House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 30, pp. 356-57;
Emory to Rear Admiral J. R. M. Mullany, October 10, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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his own plans to distribute enough troops to all of the potential danger
spots in Louisiana by the time of the election on November 2.
Consequently, while fresh troops arrived in New Orleans, needing
quarters and food, other soldiers were traveling to the interior or
leaving the state.

To be successful, these operations called for

oonpetent staff work, adequate logistics, and good coordination.

X8

Emory's staff was equal to the task, and during the last two weeks
of October, New Orleans bustled with the activity of troop trains and
marching soldiers.

By the end of the month all ten companies of the

13th Infantry had arrived in New Orleans fron the Department of the
Platte, replacing three companies of the 18th Infantry and one company
of the 2nd Regiment which were transferred to Alabama.

Making light of

the removal of troops from the Indian frontier to the South, the Monroe
Ouachita Telegraph rhetorically asked if there were "not a few valiant
souls in Louisiana who will tender their services to the helpless
pioneers of the West?"

19

Obeying the orders of the War Department, Emory sent out
detachments to three towns which usually did not have garrisons.

TWo of

the towns, Franklin in St. Mary Parish and Napoleonville in Assumption
Parish, received detachments of the 3rd Infantry from Jackson Barracks.
•^^Belknap to Townsend, October 15, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-666, reel 170), RG 94, NA; AAG Chauncey McKeever to Emory,
October 20, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 151/DSL, RG 393, NA.
19
Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, October 1874, in Records of the
AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA. AAAG W. W. Sanders to
Brooke, October 21, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL; Emory to AAG,
MilDivSouth, October 23, 1874 (two communications), in Dept Gulf,
vol. 140/DSL; all in RG 393, NA. Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, October 23,
1874.
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The third town, Moreauville in Avoyelles Parish, near Alexandria, was
under the supervision of Major Merrill, who had teen having a difficult
time in his new command.20
Merrill had arrived in Shreveport on October 19, and inmediately
began a personal campaign to control the "fools and unreasoning hot
heads" who had teen creating "considerable bad feeling & excitement"
throughout northern Louisiana.

He opened his campaign by ordering an

Army detachment to assist U.S. Deputy Marshal J. B. Stockton by
arresting James H. Cosgrove, the conservative editor of the Natchitoches
People's Vindicator, a leading White League publication.

After taking

Cosgrove into custody, Stockton and his escort arrested thirteen
prominent citizens in Coushatta, charging them with either violating the
Enforcement Acts or participating in the "Coushatta Massacre."

The

Vindicator, still operating without its editor, labeled the Coushatta
arrests a "raid” and accused the A m y of allowing itself to be "used for
political purposes."

The Shreveport Times called the arrests "as vile a

piece of business as men wearing the uniform of a great nation were ever
guilty of performing."

21

During the next few days Merrill's troopers assisted in the arrest
of five other men who had signed a proclamation announcing that they
^McDowell's Annual Report, in SW, Annual Report, 1875-1876 (House
Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1), p. 54. AAG W. W. Sanders to
Merrill, October 24, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA.
^Merrill to AG, Dept Gulf, October 24, 1874, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 151/DSL, RG 393, NA; Natchitoches People's Vindicator, October 24,
1874; Shreveport Times, October 22, 1874. See also ibid., October 19
and 27, 1874; Alexandria Caucasian, October 31, 1874; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, October 20 and 21,1874.
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would not renew work contracts with blacks who voted for the Republicans
in November.

Merrill informed Briery that "it would be certain death to

any native here to initiate proceedings" against these men, and there
fore he had issued the warrants for their arrest.

Merrill concluded

that the arrest of these men would have a beneficial effect on other
Conservatives in his district.

22

Louisiana's Democratic press bitterly denounced Merrill's "scurvy
actions."

The New Orleans Bulletin dubbed Merrill a "political bummer

with shoulder straps" who did the bidding of "political blacklegs."

The

Shreveport Times accused the major of "bedraggling his uniform in the
filth of partisan politics and using the troops under his command to
persecute . . . a peaceable community. . . . "

Furthermore, the Times

reminded its readers of Merrill's experiences in South Carolina, and
likened Merrill and the Army to vultures feeding off of the "defense
less" states of South Carolina and Louisiana.

The New Orleans Picayune

added its voice to the chorus of criticism, saying that Merrill's
actions deserved "the reproach of the nation and the wrath of his
,,23
superiors. . . .
Merrill's unusual actions and the public notice they commanded led
Emory to write General Townsend to explain that Merrill had not been
given any authorization to issue arrest warrants and asking if the War
Department approved Merrill's conduct.

Although Merrill's actions were

^Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf, October 25, 1874, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 43 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 17, pp. 407. Shreveport Times,
October 25, 1874.
23New Orleans Bulletin, October 27, 1874; Shreveport Times,
October 27, 1874; New Orleans Daily Picayune, October 25, 1874.
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"exciting much discussion and comment, and . . , [were] mischievious in
their effect . . .

Emory wrote that he desired only a full explana

tion of the unusual occurrences in Merrill's district and had no
intention of removing him at that time.

24

Reporting as Bnory ordered, Merrill explained that by the time he
arrived in the "disturbed country" along the Red River, Kellogg's
officeholders had been "violently ousted" and McBnery's supporters had
replaced them.

The White League controlled the countryside and exerted

strong influence in the towns.

On his own initiative Merrill began

reseating Republican officials and arresting men who, in his opinion,
had violated the Enforcement Acts.

He believed that such arrests were

absolutely necessary if the Army was to maintain order.

Despite seme

reports that had appeared in the press, Merrill denied that he had acted
as prosecutor against the arrested men.
district was becoming quiet and orderly.

Merrill concluded that the
These explanations satisfied

Emory, who offered Merrill additional troops if he needed them.
25
now turned his attention to specific plans for the election.

Bnory

Adjutant General Townsend, writing for President Grant, asked Bnory
his "views as to stationing troops in New Orleans on [the] day of [the]
election."

Townsend reminded Bnory that the Amy's objective was "to

confirm every individual in his legal right to vote."

However, Townsend

24
Bnory to AGO, October 25, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy
M-666, Reel 171), RG 94, NA. Emory to AGO, October 26 and 27, 1874, in
Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 17, pp. 2-4.
25
Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf, October 27, 1874, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 43 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 17, pp. 7-11; Bnory to McDowell,
October 29, 1874, ibid., p. 7; AAG W. W. Sanders to Merrill, October 29,
1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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cautioned Bnory to avoid "all appearance of military
interference. . . .
Emory replied that the "whole city and [the] river front [were]
completely conmanded" by eleven infantry companies and several Navy
warships.

Three other companies guarded the state capitol, and ten

companies were at Jackson Barracks, ready to move to any location.
Moreover, during the last several days different units had teen "taking
exercise" in the streets of the city, parading to demonstrate the Army's
intention to keep the peace on election day.

However, there were more

than one hundred polling places in New Orleans, and it could be diffi
cult to supervise every one.

And the Democrats had not been idle; Bnory

pointed out that many Conservatives had registered and were legally
entitled to vote.

This could lead to a close election, but Bnory did

not expect an armed "conflict" unless one side challenged the other for
"the custody of the ballot boxes," or disputed the election results
after they were tabulated.

To discourage either of these eventualities,

Bnory informed Townsend that he planned to bring all the troops at
Jackson Barracks into the city on election day.

27

By election day, November 2, Emory had stationed his soldiers at
fourteen towns in thirteen parishes.

He hoped that these preparations

26
Townsend to Emory, October 27, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 62.
27Emory to AGO, October 28 and 31, 1874, ibid., pp. 62-63. Monthly
Returns, Dept Gulf, October 1874, RG 393, NA. New Orleans Republican,
October 24 and 27, 1874. Apparently Townsend believed that Emory* s
preparations were satisfactory because he ordered an infantry company
from New Orleans to Savannah, Georgia. The company left New Orleans on
October 29 and returned on November 17. Townsend to Bnory, October 28,
1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 171), RG 94, NA; Dept
Gulf, Journal of Events, pp. 35-36, RG 393, NA.
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would effectively dampen what the Natchitoches People's Vindicator
OQ

called the "smoldering of the rebellion."

2Natchitoches People's Vindicator/ October 31, 1874.

CHAPTER XVI
"BENEATH A SOLDIER'S VOCATION"
On November 1, 1874, General Emory prepared for the elections
scheduled for the following day, ordering his troops to occupy several
important locations in New Orleans, including five police stations.
Other soldiers, who had not been given specific guard duties, paraded
through the city's streets.

All troops of the New Orleans garrison and

at barracks outside the city were on full alert.
Emory later claimed that he had no intention of impressing "the
people with . . . the force in this city."

However, the parade, the

alert, and the evidence of soldiers near public buildings were correctly
judged by the Democrats as a reminder that the Army would not tolerate
any violent demonstrations.

Elsewhere around Louisiana, A m y companies

and squads patrolled more than twenty towns and cities.

They were ready

for the voting to begin. ^
In New Orleans itself Emory termed election day " [p]erfectly
quiet."

The reports from post and detachment commanders around the

state generally echoed Emory's own— there was little violence on
November 2.

For example, Lieutenant Edward A. Belger of the 3rd

Infantry reported that his detachments in Alexandria, Leocmpte, and
^New Orleans Times, January 1, 1875; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
November 1, 1874.
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Cheneyville had maintained "peace and good order during the election
. . . without any trouble."

2

However, peace and quiet did not necessarily mean free and open
elections.

Considerable evidence indicates that many Louisiana voters—

especially blacks— were unable to freely cast their ballots.

Methodical

intimidation by the Democrats had convinced many blacks that voting
Republican was not worth their jobs or perhaps their lives.
Captain Arthur W. Allyn, commanding Company B, 16th Infantry at Colfax,
said that by November 2 the blacks in Grant Parish were so fearful that
" [a]ny man can go out and fire a shot-gun off half a dozen times and the
negroes all . . . take to the canebreak or woods."

Allyn concluded that

no "colored man could vote as he wished in the larger portion of the
parish."

Agreeing with Allyn's

that Conservatives in Caddo and

conclusions, Major Lewis Merrill related
DeSoto parishes often threatened to

discharge their black employees if they supported the Republican party.
Merrill said that these threats "had the effect to a very great extent
to deter the negroes from voting, or to make them vote the democratic
ticket."

Lieutenant William Gerlach, leading a detachment of the 7th

Cavalry to the Campo Bello precinct in Caddo Parish, looked on aghast as
blacks "threw themselves on the ground shouting with joy" as he and his
troopers rode through the village.

After guarding the polls during the

election, Gerlach said he was "fully convinced that the colored popula
tion in Caddo Parish . . . [was] terror stricken."

Captain James H.

Gageby, oonmanding at St. Martinville, testified that "armed parties"
2
Testimony of Emory before
a congressional ccamattee, in House
" Sess., No. 101, Pt. 2, p. 60; testimony of Lt. E. A.
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had terrorized blacks in St. Martin Parish before the election, but that
November 2 had passed quietly.

Based on this kind of testimony by A m y

officers, it appeared that the Conservatives successfully intimidated
many blacks, who consequently either decided not to vote or voted
Democratic.3
Nevertheless, the A m y positively influenced the outcome of the
election in favor of the Republicans.

The generally quiet election,

marred only by the boisterous, non-political altercations expected on
election day, worked in the Republican's favor.

In fact, the New

Orleans Times, claimed that "a More Peaceful Election has Never Been
Known."4

In some cases, the mere presence of A m y detachments probably
5
encouraged some blacks to vote who otherwise would not have tried.
In
some parishes these votesmeant the difference between winning or
losing, or at least helping the
Republican victory, which

Returning Board to substantiate a

would have been difficult to do without those

votes.
Pour of the thirteen parishes where troops had been stationed went
Democratic, but the results might have been worse— even catastrophic— for
3joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge,
1974), 299. Testimony of Capt. A. W. Allyn before a congressional
oanmittee, in House Reports, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 261, Pt. 3, pp. 157,
159; Merrill's testimony, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 183; William Gerlach to AAG,
Dist of Upper Red River, November 4, 1874, ibid., p. 952; testimony of
Capt. J. H. Gageby, ibid., pp. 705, 707, 711.
^ e w Orleans Times, November 3, 1874. See also House Exec. Docs.,
42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, pp. 112-28, for some complaints by
Republicans against the Democrats on election day.
Baylor concludes (Louisiana Reconstructed, 302) that "the sight of
blue uniforms gave sate blacks the courage to go to the polls on
election day. . . . "

372
the Republicans had the soldiers not been present.

The Alexandria

Louisiana Democrat complimented Caddo Parish on the prospect of electing
several Democrats to office, despite the fact that the parish had been
"overridden by bayonets, U.S. Marshals and the arch-vulture Merrill, who
disgraces his uniform. . . . "

The Democrat, of course, was delighted

when it appeared that Rapides Parish would also be reported for the
Democracy.

The election in Caddo and Rapides probably would have been

quite close in a fair contest.

The Democrats were understandably

distraught when the Returning Board declared that Republicans had been
elected to the state house of representatives, but Conservatives were
victorious in many local contests.^
The Army ultimately saved the election for the Republicans by
protecting the state Returning Board during its deliberations.

The

Board, of course, acted as the final arbiter of Louisiana's elections,
and it was ccnposed of four Republicans and only one Democrat.

The

chairman of the Board was none other than former governor Janes Madison
Wells, who called himself a "conservative," but who usually cooperated
with the Republicans.

Once the Board finally got down to business, its

deliberations lasted until late December.

Before Wells officially

announced the returns, both parties claimed victories in races for
7
legislative seats, Congress, and local offices.
^Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, November 11, 1874; New Orleans
Daily Picayune, December 23, 24, 25, 1874; New Orleans Republican,
December 23, 25, 1874.
7Walter M. Lowrey, "The Political Career of James Madison Wells,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXXI (October, 1948), 1094; New Orleans
Times, November 11, 1874; New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 3, 6,
1874.
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Meanwhile, with the election itself peacefully concluded,
General McDowell granted Emory permission to withdraw two detachments
from temporary stations to their regular garrisons.

Emory ordered the

detachment at Napoleonville to return to New Orleans.

The squad at

Breaux Bridge marched back to St. Martinville, where Captain Gageby was
"engaged in executing writs" for the U.S. deputy marshal.

8

Assisting Marshal Packard and his deputies had become a commonplace
duty for several troop oortmanders in Louisiana.

Usually, the assistance

involved nothing more than traveling a few miles and arresting some
fugitives or other persons who the deputy did not want to confront
alone.

Sometimes the soldiers helped to escort the accused individuals

to a local jail.

The longer the deputies relied on the A m y to provide

their posses, the more bitter Louisianians became.

The Conservatives

invariably avoided any confrontation with marshals who had Army escorts.
But in late 1874 an extraordinary series of incidents occurred in
northern Louisiana demonstrating the Democrats' audacity and disrespect
for the representatives of the Federal government.
On October 25, 1874, Lieutenant Benjamin H. Hodgson led a
detachment of fourteen soldiers of the 7th Cavalry to assist U.S. Deputy
Marshal Edgar Selye, who held arrest warrants for three men in the town
of Homer in Claiborne Parish and one man in the town of Vienna in
Lincoln Parish.
o

All of the men were charged with violating the

Irwin McDowell to E. D. Townsend, November 4, 5, 6, 1874, in AGO
File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 171), RG 94, NA; J. H. Gageby to
AAG, Dept Gulf, November 7, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 151/DSL, RG 393,
NA; New Orleans Times, November 10, 1874. Later the detachment at
Farmerville was withdrawn to Monroe. E. R. Platt to George E. Head,
November 16, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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Enforcement Acts.

Hodgson and Selye proceeded to Homer, where they

arrested Mayor S. R. Richardson, Recorder J. B. Ramsay, and parish
Judge N. J. Soott.

Several townspeople gathered around the wagon

carrying the arrested men, shouting threats and curses at the soldiers
and promising to free the prisoners.
Making their way out of Homer, Hodgson, Selye, and their entourage
went to Vienna and arrested J. G. Huey, the fourth man on the marshal's
wanted list.

Rumors abounded in Vienna that the "people were rising"

throughout Claiborne, Lincoln, and Jackson parishes, and that they were
planning to intercept the detachment and free the prisoners.

The

lieutenant and the marshal hustled their prisoners out of Vienna.

About

a mile outside of town Hodgson and Selye halted their men and paused to
discuss the situation.

Selye reoorrmended that they cut the telegraph

wires, thus preventing armed riders and White Leaguers from learning
their whereabouts and movements.

Hodgson believed that he and his

troops "were in inminent danger," and when Selye ordered him to cut the
telegraph lines, the lieutenant clipped the cables and, with help from
his soldiers, wrapped the strands around seme nearby tree stuirps.
9
party then proceeded to Monroe without incident.

The

Within a few days, William Orton, president of WesternUnion
Telegraph Coirpany, wrote a letter protesting Hodgson's wire cutting, but
more importantly, Judge J. E. Trimble at Vienna issued arrest warrants
for Selye and Hodgson.

The Lincoln Parish sheriff assembled a posse of

9
New Orleans Daily Picayune, October 29, 1874. Statement of Edgar
Selye, filed with AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 171), RG 94,
NA; B. H. Hodgson to Col. Henry A. Morrow, November 14,1874, ibid.;
Morrow to AAG, Dept Gulf, November 17, 1874, ibid.
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twenty men and went to Monroe, planning to arrest the marshal and the
lieutenant.

Following the sheriff and his official posse were more than

one hundred and fifty well armed "volunteers.
On November 6 this mounted force rode into Monroe and searched the
town for the two Federal officers.

They found Hodgson in his rocm at

the Ouachita House Hotel and arrested him.

Selye eluded capture for a

time, but the posse finally located and apprehended him at the home of
J. T. Ludeling, chief justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Hodgson

and Selye were hustled on horseback and, surrounded by the sheriff's
posse and the volunteers, they galloped out of Monroe, heading towards
Vienna.

Captain George Head hastily assembled a dozen soldiers and sent

them chasing pell mell after the posse.

11

Soon after the arrests took place, Frank Morey, a Republican leader
in Ouachita Parish, wired Major Merrill, telling him of the extraordi
nary abductions and recommending that he send a strong military unit to
Vienna to reinforce the troopers who had followed the posse.

12

Morey's telegram inmediately propelled Merrill into action.

He

wired Hodgson in Vienna, directing him to " [d]emand . . . [that] the
Sheriff . . . show you his warrant of arrest . . . [and to learn] the
offense charged in the affidavit."

Next, Merrill informed department

lOwilliam Orton to George H. Williams, October 29, 1874, ibid.
Shreveport Times, November 7, 1874. B. H. Hodgson to Lewis Merrill,
November 16, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17,
p. 31.
^Shreveport Times, November 7, 1874.
•^Frank Morey to Merrill, November 6, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 32. (Unless otherwise noted, all the
messages pertaining to the Hodgson case are found ibid., pp. 32-50.
Many of the originals are found in Microcopy M-666, reels 171-172.)
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headquarters of Hodgson's arrest, adding that he was ordering
Lieutenant James M. Bell to take a company of cavalry to Vienna.
Merrill considered going to Vienna himself, but he realized that he was
widely disliked in north Louisiana and that his presence might be
"regarded as an attempt . . .

[to secure Hodgson's] forcible release and

cause the whole white league force to go there."

Merrill wisely decided

to remain in Shreveport, hoping ultimately to beat the Conservatives at
their own legal game by winning the case in court.
Accordingly, Merrill telegraphed Captain Head in Monroe, ordering
him to take "every disposable man" of his command and go "at once" to
Vienna.

However, Merrill told Head to " [iInterfere in no way with the

execution of any lawful process issued by competent authority. . . . "
Furthermore, Merrill ordered Head to " [o] ffer your services to the
Sheriff to guard the prisoners . . . , [and] all hazards protect the
13
prisoners against any illegal violence. . . . "
But Captain Head was not cooperative, perhaps because he held
pro-Democratic sympathies.

Moreover, he seemed to believe that Hodgson

was guilty and deserved whatever sentence the civilian courts might
impose.

Head informed Merrill that all available men had already been

sent to Vienna— they had followed the sheriff's posse at the time of the
unfortunate lieutenant's arrest.

Head reported that most of his

infantrymen had just returned from an eighteen-mile march and were in no
condition to leave Monroe for at least two days.
that he anticipated no harm would come to Hodgson.

Hie captain concluded
Displeased by Head's

"^Merrill to Hodgson, November 6, 1874; Merrill to AG, Dept Gulf,
November 6, 1874; Merrill to Head, November 6, 1874.
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attitude, Merrill ordered him to " [g]o yourself at once with all the men
you can take" regardless of their condition.

14

Meanwhile, the adjutant general of the Department of the Gulf, on
orders from Emory, informed Merrill that his actions thus far had been
approved.

Furthermore, the adjutant general ordered Merrill to " [u]se

all . . . the force at your command to prevent violence if necessary
but instruct your officers to be very guarded, {that] in aiding to
enforce one law, not to violate another."

In conclusion, the adjutant

general advised Merrill to have Hodgson's case transferred from
Trimble's state court to the nearest Federal circuit court.

15

Merrill acknowledged the adjutant general's telegram and notified
Hodgson of these instructions from headquarters.

Simultaneously, the

major instructed Frank Morey to hire an attorney to defend Hodgson.
Before he set about employing a lawyer, Morey telegraphed Merrill,
informing him that Hodgson and Selye were charged with contempt of court
for not obeying a writ of habeas corpus, namely for failing to produce
in Trimble's court the four prisoners the Army detachment had arrested
on October 25.

However, Morey claimed that the writ had been issued to

Sheriff Ayoock of Claiborne Parish, not to the Federal officers.

16

On November 7, before Hodgson's attorney (a local lawyer named
W. R. Hardy) could apply to have Hodgson's case transferred to a U.S.
l^Head to Merrill, November 6, 1874; Merrill to Head, November 6,
1874.
"^AAG, Dept Gulf to Merrill, November 6, 1874; Merrill to AAG, Dept
Gulf, November 6, 1874.
^Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf, November 6, 1874; Merrill to Morey,
November 6, 1874; Merrill to Hodgson, November 6, 1874; Morey to
Merrill, November 6, 1874.
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court, Judge Trimble arraigned the lieutenant and Marshal Selye on
charges of contempt of court.

Trimble found the pair guilty, sentencing

them to ten days in jail and fining than one hundred dollars each, plus
court costs.

The speedy trial destroyed Merrill" s plans to conduct a

slow, methodical defense in a Federal court.

17

General Bnory was kept abreast of the situation in Vienna by
Merrill's frequent telegrams.

When he learned that Hodgson and Selye

had been convicted, he sent a special message to General Townsend,
giving him the salient facts in the unusual case.

Bnory added that he

was sending Colonel Henry A. Morrow of the 13th Infantry to investigate
the entire matter.

The New Orleans Republican approved of Bnory"s

choice, writing that "Colonel Morrow's report can be relied upon."
However, it later became evident that Morrow was decidedly
pro-Democratic, and his subsequent reports were unsatisfactory to the
18

Republican.

In the meantime, Merrill was still trying fruitlessly to have
Hodgson"s case transferred to a Federal court.

W. R. Hardy, Hodgson's

lawyer, advised Merrill that there was no need for that— the case had
-^Hodgson to Merrill, November 7, 1874; Merrill to Hodgson,
November 7, 1874; Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf, November 7, 1874.
18

Bnory to AGO, November 7 and 8, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-666, reel 171), RG 94, NA; Judge Trimble also wrote Town
send, describing his own version of the affair: Trimble to Townsend,
November 9, 1874, ibid. New Orleans Republican, Novanber 10, 1874.
Henry A. Morrow was a native of Virginia and had fought in the Mexican
War as a private. Afterwards he moved to Michigan. During the first
year of the Civil War he commanded the 24th Michigan Infantry. By the
end of the war he was promoted to major general of volunteers. He
elected to remain in the Army, and in 1865 he was commissioned lieute
nant colonel of the 36th Infantry, transferring to the 13th Infantry
four years later. See Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and
Dictionary of the United States Amy, 1879-1903 (2 vols., Washington,
1903), I, 729.
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already been tried and the sentence given.

Hardy indicated that perhaps

he could apply for a rehearing in Judge Trimble's court.

Although

Hodgson remained technically under arrest, Trimble had given him the
"liberty of the town, . . . [and] his position [was] appreciated by the
very Citizens he arrested . . .

(which indicated that those gentlemen

did not remain in custody for very long). Hardy concluded that Selye
had tried to shift the complete blame of the wire cutting onto Hodgson's
shoulders, and the lawyer suggested that it would be best bo conduct the
appeals separately.

Major Merrill, who had been dissatisfied with Hardy

from the outset, replied that Hardy was employed by the U.S. government,
not by Hodgson and Selye, "who as far as you are concerned are John Doe
& Richard Roe." Colonel Morrow was to take over direction of the case
when he arrived.

19

Before Morrow arrived, Frank Morey filed a complaint against
Captain Head for "unofficer-like and disgraceful" conduct, public
drunkenness, and fraternizing with the White League.
had recognized Head's Democratic sympathies.

Obviously, Morey

Merrill was impressed by

Morey's allegations and was tempted to place Lieutenant James Bell in
charge of the troops in Vienna until Morrow reached the town.

Moreover,

Merrill was convinced that the charges against Hodgson had been trumped
up and that, consequently, his conviction was improper.

20

19
Merrill to W. R. Hardy, November 8, 1874, and reply, in Senate
Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 39; Merrill to AAG, Dept
Gulf, November 8, 1874, ibid.
^Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf, November 9, 1874, ibid.; Morey to
Merrill, November 9, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel
172), RG 94, NA.
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Suddenly, on November 9, Judge Trimble announced a decision that
astonished everyone connected with the case.

He nullified Hodgson's

sentence, rescinded his fine, and discharged the lieutenant from
custody.

Captain Head was so caught by surprise that he asked Merrill

what to do next.

Merrill ordered Head to return to Monroe and ordered

. .

Hodgson to rejoin his company after conferring with Colonel Morrow.

21

By all appearances the case had ended, but on November 10
Judge Trimble filed new charges against Hodgson for cutting the
telegraph wires.

Hodgson was not rearrested, but Head informed Merrill

that a new trial would be held within a few days.

Considering these new

circumstances, W. R. Hardy advised Merrill that Head was "invaluable" to
the conduct of the case because he had "formed and now controls public
opinion [in Vienna]."

Therefore, the captain had to remain in Vienna.

Merrill's patience with Hardy had worn thin.

22

Dismissing Hardy by

calling him "an obstinate ignoramous," Merrill again ordered Head to
have Hodgson's case transferred to a Federal court.

Piqued by Merrill's

language, Hardy responded in kind, threatening to prefer charges against
the major for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."

"There

is a wide difference between a gentleman and a Blackguard," Hardy
boomed.

"You furnish an illustration."

Colonel Morrow's arrival in

^Head to Merrill, November 9, 1874; Merrill to Head, November 9,
1874; Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf, November 9, 1874; AAG, Dept Gulf to
Merrill, November 10, 1874; Merrill to Head, November 10, 1874; Merrill
to Hodgson, November 10, 1874.
^^Head to Merrill, November 10, 1874; W. R. Hardy to Merrill,
November 10, 1874.
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Vienna on November 10 finally made Hardy's services unnecessary and
placed Captain Head in a subordinate position.

23

After questioning the principals in the case, Morrow suggested to
Merrill that Hodgson be placed under military arrest and stand a court
martial for cutting the telegraph wires.

Still nursing the notion that

Hodgson should stand trial in a Federal court, Merrill nevertheless
concurred with the colonel's suggestion and ordered Hodgson's arrest.

24

Morrow placed Hodgson under military guard, ordering him not to
surrender himself to civilian lawmen.

Major Merrill wanted to withdraw

all soldiers from Vienna before the civilian authorities reacted, but
Morrow demurred, preferring to remain in the town a little while longer
to see what the judge and sheriff would do next.

Eventually, Merrill

and the departmental adjutant, acting on Bnory's orders, overruled
Morrow; and the troops returned to their regular stations, avoiding a
new confrontation.

While awaiting court martial, Lieutenant Hodgson was

placed in protective custody in Monroe.

25

Two influential north Louisiana newspapers relished the controversy
caused by the Hodgson case, using it as an opportunity to criticize the
Army and its officers.

For example, the Monroe Ouachita Telegraph

concluded that "the army uniform has not been elevated by his [Hodgson's]
^^Merrill to Head, November 10, 1874; Hardy to Merrill,
November 13, 1874.
24
Henry A. Morrow to Merrill, November 10, 1874; Merrill to Head,
November 10, 1874; Merrill to Morrow, November 10, 1874.
25jYbrrcw to Merrill,
November 11, 1874; Morrow
Gulf to Merrill, November
November 12, 1874; George
November 16, 1874.

November 11, 1874; Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf,
to Merrill, November 12, 1874; AAG, Dept
12, 1874; Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf,
Head to AAAG, Dist Upper Red River,
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course [of action]."

The Shreveport Times referred to the lieutenant as

a "reckless and lawless subaltern," whose guilt was a foregone
conclusion.

The Times delightedly pointed out that Major Merrill was

making "an ass . . . of himself in keeping up all this military display
and excitement."

26

Now that Hodgson's case was out of civilian hands, General Emory
wanted the court martial to begin as soon as possible.
MacArthur was designated judge advocate in the case.
found Hodgson guilty on two counts:

Captain Arthur
The military court

conduct unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman during the arrest of the Claiborne Parish prisoners and
destroying telegraph wire belonging to Western Union.

The court handed

down an unofficial reprimand as the only punishment for these
infractions, citing the "very novel circumstances under which
Lieutenant Hodgson was suddenly placed . . ."as reason for the light
penalty.

Hodgson was restored to duty with his company.

27

The Hodgson case was unique during the Reconstruction years in
Louisiana.

A Conservative judge issued a warrant for the lieutenant's

arrest without consulting the state's attorney general, Major Merrill,
who commanded the Fed River District, or Captain Head, who was
temporarily Hodgson's immediate superior.

In other words, some

26
Shreveport Times, November 8, 1874; Monroe Ouachita Telegraph,
November 20, 1874; see also ibid., November 13 and 27, 1874.
27
Endorsement by Emory, November 18, 1874, on letter, McDowell to
Townsend, October 30, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666,
reel 171), RG 94, NA; Arthur MacArthur to AAG E. R. Platt, December 9,
1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 151/DSL, RG 393, NA. General Order No. 29,
Dept Gulf, December 30, 1874 [results of the court martial of Lt. B. H.
Hodgson], in House Reports, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2,
pp. 950-52.

383
satisfactory acooranodation could have been worked out with one or more
of these officers in relation to the charges against Hodgson.

Instead,

the judge and his sheriff demonstrated their insolence and disrespect
for the Amy; and coincidentally for U.S. Marshal Edgar Selye.

The

sheriff risked bringing on a general engagement with the Amy, boldly
leading his posse and volunteers into Monroe and abducting Hodgson and
Selye.

In taking this precipitate action, the sheriff might have been

counting on the cooperation (or at least inaction) of Captain Head.

If

a Republican officer who supported Reconstruction had teen in command at
Monroe, he might have been able to prevent Hodgson's abduction and
demonstrate a firmness that Head obviously lacked.

Head's pro-

Democratic stance may have encouraged the Conservatives in their
dangerous venture.

Once Hodgson and Selye had been arrested, ESnory and

Merrill elected to press for their release in court rather than sending
a large armed force to Vienna and demanding that they be set free.

Such

an action likely would have been viewed as a military assault on the
courts and would not have earned any friends for either the A m y or the
Grant administration.

Therefore, a few civilian officials seized on the

Hodgson case and used it to embarrass Major Merrill, General Emory, and
the Army.

28

By the time the lieutenant's court martial ended in

December the whole affair had placed another black mark beside Emory's
name, indicating that he had failed to ensure law and order in
Louisiana.
*

*

*

OO

Sefton briefly mentions Hodgson's problems in United States A m y
and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 226-27. While
serving with the 7th Cavalry Hodgson was killed at the Little Big Horn.
Heitman, Register of the Army, I, 534.
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In the weeks following the Hodgson incident, it was evident that
the Republican's hold on northern Louisiana was deteriorating, despite
Major Merrill's conscientious command of the Upper Red River District.
In Merrill's opinion, most Republicans needed to maintain their "actual
residence in the military camp" for self-protection if they tried to
exercise the duties of elected or appointed office during the day.
Furthermore, Merrill claimed that "the entire black population of this
section is absolutely terror-struck," standing "in almost hourly appre
hension of the visits of White leaguers."

According to Merrill, whites

had ooiimLtted "numerous acts of violence" against blacks.

Major Henry L.

Chipman, serving with the 3rd Infantry in Shreveport, oorroberated
Merrill's claims, and advised that it would be unwise "to withdraw any
of the troops stationed in . . . [this] section."

29

Subsequently, Merrill asked Emory to send additional troops to the
Upper Red River District.
troops to north Louisiana.

Emory doubted the necessity for sending more
Merrill already commanded three companies of

cavalry and five companies of infantry— only two companies shy of a
complete regiment.

Therefore, Emory ordered Colonel Morrow to investi

gate "the condition of the troops, [and] the character of the locality
in which they are placed" throughout north Louisiana.

30

Merrill to AAG, Dept Gulf, November 18, 1874, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 19; Merrill to AG, Dept Gulf,
November 26, 1874, ibid., pp. 52-53. Henry L. Chipman to AAG, Dept
Gulf, November 23, 1874, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA.
30Emory to AGO, November 28, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 17, p. 50; E. R. Platt to Morrow, November 28, 1874, ibid.,
pp. 50-51.
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In December Morrow filed two lengthy reports concerning the Army in
northern Louisiana.

First of all, Morrow recormended that in the future

Federal troops should no longer provide posses for U.S. marshals.

With

the Hodgson case fresh on everyone’s mind, Morrow stated that a "marshal
discharging his duty in a gentlemanly manner does not . . . require the
aid of the military."

Morrow thought that if Emory could be persuaded

to adopt this recommendation, "the Army will be relieved frcm a most
unpleasant and onerous duty, and a great cause of local irritation will
be removed."
Moreover, Morrow, disagreeing with Merrill, believed that no
additional troops were needed in the Upper Red River District.

In fact,

the colonel advised Bnory to withdraw most of the troops from northern
Louisiana, including those at Colfax, Alexandria, and Natchitoches,
where a company of the 3rd Infantry had only recently been sent.
" [Tjroops will not be required at these points to ocmpel obedience to
any law of the United States.

Troops will he required, however, in

nearly every section of the State to sustain the State authorities. . . ."
Morrow anphasized that there was "not the slightest desposition to
oppose the General Government, but the opposition to . . . [Kellogg's]
State government . . . [was] determined. . . . "

Only "the presence and

force of Federal soldiers" was restraining the "open defiance" of most
whites against the Kellogg regime, which could not "maintain itself in
power a single hour without the protection of Federal troops."

"The

political condition of the State is the one subject of conversation
everywhere, in public and private, and among all classes, except the
negro, who feels no interest in it, because he does not comprehend it,"
Morrow concluded.

In Morrow's opinion, if the Returning Board declared
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Republicans elected in Caddo and DeSoto parishes, " [n]early all
influential and responsible citizens concur fully and entirely in the
view that violence to any extent will be justified . . . to secure . . .
a change of local administrators. . . . "

By supporting Kellogg, the

Army was going against "the personal and political feeling in the
breasts of nineteen-twentieths of the white inhabitants of the State."

31

The events of the last three months had convinced General Qnory
that Morrow's observations and conclusions were correct.

Bnory was no

longer certain that the Army was capable of consistently enforcing
Grant's Reconstruction policy in Louisiana.

The general waited

expectantly for the Returning Board to tabulate and certify the election
returns.
Meanwhile, it appeared possible that another riot equal to the one
of September 14 was in the offing.

Captain George Head at Monroe

reported that the "mayor of the town has applied . . . for troops in
case of a riot which is anticipated here as the Negroes are said to be
universally arming."

Head asked " [i]f at all, how and in what manner

shall I use the troops at rry disposal?"

Emory ordered him "to interpose

United States forces only to prevent conflict between armed bodies, or
on requisition of United States marshal. . . . "

Head had overstated the

seriousness of the situation and fortunately the violence he had
predicted did not occur.

32

^Morrow to AAG, Dept Gulf, December 3, 11, 24, 1874
(capitalization and emphasis in the original), ibid., pp. 67-68, 70-74.
^Head to AAG, Dept Gulf, December 7, 1874, din Dept Gulf, vol.
151/DSL; Emory to AGO, December 8, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 140/DSL;
AAG E. R. Platt to Head, December 7, 1874, ibid.; all in RG 393, NA.

In contrast, the situation in New Orleans appeared to be quite
dangerous.

On December 9 Governor Kellogg warned President Grant that

the White League might attack the State House at any tine.

He asked the

President to permit Emory to station soldiers in and around the capitol
to protect James M. Wells and the other members of the Returning Board
who were meeting there.

(The troops had been withdrawn from the capitol

on November 24 at General Townsend's direction in order to reduce the
military expenses of the New Orleans garrison.)

Supporting the

governor's request, Wells informed Grant that the "members of the board
are being publicly and privately threatened with violence. . . . "

U.S.

District Attorney James R. Beckwith wrote U.S. Attorney General Williams
that loyal Republicans in New Orleans were "surrounded by an armed camp
with a force exceeding by far the federal land forces new in the
city. . . . There is no respect for Law[,] either State or federal.
The condition is Volcanic and may culminate in bloodshed at any moment."
Beckwith feared that a condition of "anarchy" would result in January
when the next secession of the state legislature was scheduled to
*. 33
meet.

All of these "rumors of intended violence" had not escaped Emory's
attention, and he decided to forestall any repetition of the events of
September 14.

He put the troops at Jackson Barracks on a round-the-

clock alert and informed local political leaders of his plans to keep
33William P. Kellogg to Ulysses S. Grant, December 9, 1874, in
American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events for 1874
(New York, 1875), 502; James M. Wells to Grant, December 10, 1874, ibid.
Post Returns, New Orleans, November 1874, in Records of the AGO
(Microcopy M-617, reel 844), RG 94, NA; J. R. Beckwith to George
Williams, December 11, 1874, in Letters Reed by U.S. Justice Dept from
Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 2), RG 60, NA.
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the peace.

Privately, however, Emory asked both General Townsend and

General McDowell if, in the event of an attack on Kellogg, the Army
should defend the governor or wait for him officially to apply to the
President for help.^
General Townsend promptly replied that the "President directs that
you make arrangements to be in readiness to suppress violence, and have
it understood that you will do it." Emory gratefully accepted those
firm orders, and borrowing Townsend's words, he sent Major Merrill what
was virtually a duplicate message.
about Emory's orders.

Denocratic leaders soon learned

The general probably intentionally leaked the

information to the Conservatives.

Suddenly, the potential for violence

decreased, and Emory wired the adjutant general, telling him that it
appeared "armed conflict will not be used fcy contending parties to
settle the pending political troubles in this city."

,

Mow that a measure

of calm had been restored to politics, the politicians and the soldiers
all waited for the Returning Board to announce the election results.

35

On December 22 and 24 Janes Wells and his Board released the
official returns, after selectively voiding the returns from several
precincts.

The Board was dominated by Republicans, and consequently

many observers believed that it would declare Republican candidates
34E. R. Platt to CO, Jackson Barracks, December 13, 1874, and
Emory's endorsement, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17,
p. 66? Emory to AGO, December 15, 1874, ibid., p. 65. Emory to AAG,
MilDivSouth, December 13, 1874, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 4 0 /DSL, rg 393, NA.
Emory to AG, MilDivSouth, December 15, 1874, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-666, reel 172), RG 94, NA.
35
Townsend to Emory, December 16, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 65; Emory to AGO, December 16, 1874 (two
communications), ibid., p. 66; Platt to Merrill, December 17, 1874, in
Dept Gulf, vol. lWDSL, RG 393, NA.
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elected in a majority of the contests.

Surprisingly, Wells and his

cronies declared only fifty-three Republicans elected to the state house
of representatives, as against fifty-three Democrats.

In a move sure to

cause trouble in the future, the Board announced that it was inpossible
to determine the winners of five legislative seats, leaving the final
decision up to the new house itself.

Furthermore, Democrats had won two

of Louisiana's six congressional seats.

The Conservatives dominated the

local elections in Orleans and Caddo parishes and were victorious in
many other town and parish elections across the state.

The Republicans

were horrified by these results, but they still had a majority in the
state senate, and Republican Antoine Dubuclet had been reelected state
treasurer.

36

Without the protection of Emory's soldiers, the Democrats might
have been able to force Wells to declare that other Conservatives had
been elected.

Having only one member on the Returning Board, the

Democrats had still emerged holding many local offices, two congres
sional seats, and half of the house of representatives.

Obviously, the

Conservatives had tallied so many votes that the Board considered it
unwise to deprive them of too many offices.
Even before the Retun tog Board announced the election results,
President Grant and his advisors had considered sending a special envoy
to Louisiana.

37

This was not a decision made on the spur of the moment.

The events which had taken place during recent months in Louisiana had
3°Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 303-304; Ella Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868 (Gloucester, Mass., 1967), 289;
New Orleans Republican, December 23, 25, 1874; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, December 23, 24, 25, 1874.
37New York Times, December 28, 1874.
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eroded the administration's confidence in Gaieral Bnory, and therefore
Grant had decided to send to Louisiana a senior officer in whan he had
the utmost confidence.

That officer was General Philip H. Sheridan.

When it came to carrying out Reconstruction policy, Grant probably
had more confidence in Sheridan than in any other A m y officer, not
excepting General William T. Sherman.
tion was well known.

Sherman's position an Reconstruc

Had he been assigned to New Orleans, he might have

recommended that the time had come for the Army to withdraw frcrn
Louisiana, leaving Kellogg to his fate.

Sherman had warned

Colonel Philippe DeTrobriand of the 13th Infantry that the continued use
of troops in the South was "pregnant with danger," and he " [1]coked on
increased military display in New Orleans as wrong. . . . "

Later he

wrote his brother, Ohio's Senator John Sherman, telling him that he had
"tried to save our officers and soldiers from the dirty work inposed on
them by the city authorities of the South. . . . "

Furthermore, Sherman

"always thought it wrong to bolster up weak State governments . , .
[with] our troops."

It was the Army's duty to "keep the peace always?

but not [to] act as bailiff constables and catch thieves.
be beneath a soldier's vocation."

That should

Even under the most trying circum

stances Grant had refused to abandon Kellogg, and he would never have
wanted any kind of open rift on his Southern policy with Sherman.
Perhaps, then, it was not so surprising that the President picked
"Little Phil" to go to Louisiana.

38

3®Sefton, A m y and Reconstruction, 240; Richard O'Connor, Sheridan
the Inevitable (Indianapolis, 1953), 328-29; William T. Sherman to
Philippe DeTrobriand, November 13, 1874, in Marie C. Post, The Life and
Memoirs of Comte Regis deTrobriand (New York, 1910), 442. Sherman to
John Sherman, January 7, 1875, in Rachel S. Thorndike (ed.), The Sherman
Letters; Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1637
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On Christmas Eve Secretary of War Willian W. Belknap sent a
telegram to Sheridan at his Chicago headquarters, explaining that Grant
wanted him "to visit" Louisiana and Mississippi to "ascertain the true
condition of affairs [in those states] and to secure such suggestions
. . . as [he] . . . d@an[ed] advisable mid judicious."

In fact, Belknap

gave Sheridan virtual carte-blanche s
Enclosed herewith is an order authorizing you to assume
command of . . . [McDowell's] Military Division of the South,
or of any portion of that Division, should you see proper to
do so. . . . You can, if you desire it, see General McDowell
in Louisville, and make known to M m confidentially, the
object of your trip, but this is not required of you.
Communication with him by you is left entirely to your own
judgement. . . .
[Ijt is best that the trip should appear to
be one as much of pleasure as of business? for the fact of
your mere presence in the localities referred to will have,
it is presumed, a beneficial effect.
After concluding his investigations, Sheridan was to give the President
a complete personal report in Washington.

Until then, Grant expected

Sheridan to keep him informed "from tine to time."

Sheridan acknow-

ledged Belknap's message and prepared for his trip to the Bayou State.

39

When he received the orders sending him to Louisiana, Sheridan was
directing the climactic Indian war of the Southwest, the Red River
Campaign of 1874-1875.

Consequently, Belknap8s orders called for him to

deal with two major command problems at once.
Initially, Sheridan decided to abide by Belknap's suggestion
concerning a "pleasure" trip, purposely not divulging the full
to 1891 (New York, 1894), 342; William A. Dunning, Reconstruction,
Political and Economic, 1865-1877 (New York, 1907), 272.
Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 240; W. W. Belknap to Philip H.
Sheridan, December 24, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 13, pp. 19-20. (See also Tbwnsend to Sheridan, December 24, 1874,
ibid., p. 20.) Sheridan to Belknap, December 26, 1874, ibid.
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implications of his orders to either the press or the public.

Some

observers believed that Sheridan simply planned to pass through
Louisiana on his way to Cuba.

Bolstering this notion, Sheridan's

fiance, Miss Irene Rucker, daughter of the general's divisional quarter
master, announced that she intended to go along on the trip.

Sheridan

notified one of his subordinate commanders, General John Pope, that he
simply "wish [ed] to take a little trip to the south for two or three
weeks & may possibly go as far as Havana. . . . "

Sheridan wanted Pope

to keep him "posted on all the events connected with the Indian
Canpaign . . . " while he was in New Orleans.

40

But most of the reports in the newspapers indicated that Sheridan
did not fool the journalists by pretending he was on a trip to Cuba.
The New York Tines, admitting it lacked official confirmation, neverthe
less reported on December 28 that Sheridan was going to New Orleans to
"take command."

"The case [in Louisiana] is grave enough," the Times

story continued, "to warrant the sending to New Orleans of an officer of
the highest rank to make a personal inspection of affairs, and use a
wide discretion in making changes . . . in the disposition and arrange
ment of forces."

The Tines hastened to add that Sheridan's mission

"implies no dissatisfaction with, or want of confidence in Gen. Emory."

41

In New Orleans the local newspapers quickly picked up the story.
The New Orleans Times claimed that Sheridan was carrying orders giving
him "immediate sway" over Louisiana.

The Republican predicted that

40William H. Dixon, White Conquest (2 vols., London, 1876), II, 40,
42. Sheridan to John Pope, Decanter 28, 1874, in Philip H. Sheridan
Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
4^New York Times, December 28, 1874.

393
Sheridan would assume command of the Department of the Gulf, attaching
it to his grand Military Division of the Missouri.

The Republican added

that President Grant had considered sending General Alfred Tarry on the
mission, but that Sheridan had bean chosen as the officer "who would
promptly grasp the responsibility of the moment."

At first, the

Picayune doubted that Sheridan was coming to Louisiana, but by
42
December 29 it was resigned to the fact.
Meanwhile, no one in Washington or Chicago had informed
General Emory about Sheridan’s mission or its objectives.

In a widely

circulated interview, Emory said that he had "received no official
intelligence concerning the reports alluded to, nor of any measures
looking to my removal."

Using an interesting phrase, Emory accused "the

banditti in Washington who are writing for the newspapers" of trying to
turn public opinion against him.

To Emory, it may have seemed that

everyone was against him, but it was more than just the press coverage
of Louisiana's problems that had brought him to the brink of losing his
command.

Since the fighting on September 14 Emory had seemed to face

one potential crisis after another.

Emory reported on December 27 that

" [f]or nearly two years the condition of affairs has been very
precarious, and the State government has constantly shown itself unable
to cope with the difficulties of the situation in which it is placed.
The state of things is daily growing worse. . . . "

Despite the truth of

Emory's words, Grant wanted someone in New Orleans, as the New York
Times reported, "in whom he has implicit Confidence . . . and of such
42New Orleans Times, December 28, 1874; New Orleans Republican,
December 30, 1874; ibid., December 29, 1874, quoting a story from the
New York Herald, dated December 25, 1874; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
December 27, 28, 29, 30, 1874.
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rank that in case of an emergency he can act without special orders from
43
Washington."
Emory had apparently lost his committment to his unusual
mission— protecting the Kellogg government.

Consequently, Grant had

lost confidence in Emory, and he wanted someone in Louisiana who was
dedicated to Reconstruction.
Late on the night of December 30 Phil Sheridan stepped off the
train at New Orleans.

Accompanying him was his brother Captain Michael V.

Sheridan, his trusted aide-de-camp Major George A. Forsyth, Mrs. M. V.
Sheridan, and the general's fiance, Miss Irene Rucker.

Ihe New Orleans

Republican reported that Sheridan's staff officers appeared to be "out
for a holiday and intending to visit Havana before their return to
Chicago."44 Sheridan was apparently trying to keep up the pretense of a
pleasure trip.

Unfortunately, his mission to New Orleans was going to

be anything but a holiday.

4% e w Orleans Times, December 30, 1874; New York Times,
December 30, 1874. Emory's endorsement (December 27, 1874) on letter,
Morrow to AAG, Dept Gulf, December 24, 1874, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
43 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 17, p. 74.
44New Orleans Republican, December 31, 1874.

CHAPTER XVII
THE EETUPN OF THE "LITTLE VILLAEN"
Phil Sheridan was despised by white Louisianians as was no other
Northern general with the possible exception of Ben Butler.

No other

general had done more to change the structure of their society and their
politics.

Sheridan's first ccremand in Louisiana had been marked by

contention, and his second Reconstruction assignment followed the same
pattern.

Indeed, controversy seared to attend the little general.

Since Sheridan was last in Louisiana, Eastern do-gooders had condemned
him for his harsh warfare against the Indians; diplomats had shuddered
when he offended the French while serving as an official observer during
the Franoo-Prussian War; and politicians had criticized him for his
administration of Chicago after the catastrophic fire in 1871 which
swept that city.'*'
The possibility that Sheridan would assure command in Louisiana had
aroused speculation in the press, but Sheridan and Secretary of
War William Belknap had wanted to keep secret the true intent of the
general's visit.

But the newspaper men were too inquisitive.

Belknap

informed Sheridan that reporters had deduced Sheridan's real mission
from "an occasional remark dropped by the President."

"It is a study to

^■Richard O'Connor, Sheridan the Inevitable (Indianapolis, 1953),
305-15.
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observe the efforts made by the correspondents to learn news & the
2
correct surmises which they often make," Belknap commented.
It had been widely reported that Sheridan had orate to Louisiana
simply "as a conservator of the peace," but the White League took his
assignment to the state as an "ominous token."

Mincing no words, the

New Iberia Louisiana Sugar Bowl branded Sheridan the "little villain"
socn after his arrival.

The Bossier Banner ridiculed him, concluding

that he was "about as well qualified for the position he occupies as a
3
pig would be for running a saw mill."
White Louisianians were antagonized by Sheridan's presence because
they knew him too well.

They knew that his stem reputation was well

deserved and, moreover, they knew that they could not bluff him.
Obviously, the resentment and antagonism many white Louisianians felt
towards him made Sheridan's assignment more difficult.

Such ill will

might have been shown toward General Alfred Terry or any other new
oraimander who was given the mission to pacify the rebellious
Louisianians.

But Sheridan's past reputation should have made it clear

to Grant that, as Claude Bowers wrote, " [a] microscopic search of the
army could not have discovered a single officer . . . more provocative
of the people of New Orleans."

Sheridan's biographer, Richard O'Connor,

concluded that " [i]f there was one man in the North completely
ineligible to effect a cooling off of political passions at New Orleans,
that man was Phil Sheridan."

Similarly, Janes Sefton wrote that

2William W. Belknap to Philip H. Sheridan, January 3, 1875, in
Philip H. Sheridan Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
% e w Orleans Times, January 4, 1875? Dcnaldsanville Chief,
January 2, 1875; Bossier Banner, September 12, 1874? New Iberia
Louisiana Sugar Bowl, Feburary ll, 1875.

397
"Sheridan's mere presence in Louisiana was enough to antagonize
people. . . ."4
Sheridan was not in New Orleans to cool off passions:

he was there

to quash the feelings of rebellion that had been obvious since the
Battle of Liberty Place.
Radicals left.

In fact, Sheridan was one of the few old

Stevais and Sumner were dead? other Radicals had

defected to the Liberal Republicans or had retired from politics.

Their

passing from the scene reflected a decline in the popularity of Grant's
Reconstruction policy, which consistently had involved using the A m y to
support Republican regimes in the South.

By 1875 nost Northerners

displayed a noticeable lack of concern about the ideals of Reconstruc
tion, civil rights for blacks, or punishment and estrangement of former
traitorous Confederates.
was new obsolete.

Essentially, it appeared that Grant's policy

Despite this hard reality, Grant wanted Louisiana to

remain in Republican hands; to achieve this end the Federal government
would have to take firm control again.

Sheridan's arrival, therefore,

was a signal to the Democrats— cease and desist, or face the conse
quences of military suppression.

The Monroe Ouachita Telegraph clearly

recognized that "Kellogg . . . must be up held by the presence, and if
need be, the arms and cartridges of federal soldiers."5
On January 1 Sheridan met with Emory, his old comrade in arms from
the Shenandoah Valley campaign.

At first they may have talked briefly

4
Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln
(Cambridge, Mass., 1929), 443; O'Connor, Sheridan, 328? James E. Sefton,
Hie United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967),
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5Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal
Experiences of the Late War (Richard B. Harwell, ed., New York, 1955),
322; Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, January 1, 1875.
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about the war, Emory's XIX Ann/ Corps, the battles in which they fought
together, Cpequon, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek; after the last battle
Sheridan had recommended that Emory be breveted major general of
volunteers.

Sheridan usually was brusque when

dealing

with subordi

nates, but he may have shown seme consideration for Emory, who had
entered the Army the same year that Sheridan was bom.
They finally turned their conversation to Louisiana politics.

The

legislature was scheduled to open in three days, and the Returning Board
had left five house seats unfilled.

It was up to the state house of

representatives to choose five new natters to fill those seats.

By new

Emory recognized the potential for violence whenever the Louisiana
legislature convened.

Emory showed Sheridan the orders which had been

sent by Adjutant General Townsend and the President in December—
"suppress violence and have it understood that you will do it."
Simultaneously, he handed Sheridan his draft of orders for the disposi
tion of troops on January 4.

After reading the documents, Sheridan

replied that the President's orders were "explicit and unambiguous."
Sheridan remarked that it was his "duty as a military officer . . . to
prevent riot and bloodshed, [and] to take such steps in advance . . .
[to prevent violence] instead of waiting until violence had actually
occurred."

Sheridan then showed Emory the orders from Belknap,

authorizing him to assume command of the Department of the Gulf.
According to Emory, "from that moment no action looking to the troubles
here was taken without consultation with . . . [Sheridan], or without
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his positive orders. . . . "

For all practical purposes Sheridan was in

ocmnand.6
Governor Kellogg had warned Etory that the White League might
instigate a disturbance on January 4, and perhaps even attempt to occupy
the state capitol.

Therefore, the governor wanted Etory to station

troops "in close proximity to the State House" and inside the building,
if Etory believed it advisable.

Sheridan left unchanged Etory8s orders
7

directing Colonel Philippe Regis DeTrobriand of the 13th Infantry and
Colonel Delancey Flcyd-Jones of the 3rd Infantry to protest the
legislature.

Captain Frederick W. Benteen, cOTsnanding Company H, 7th

Cavalry, was ordered to post his men near the Custom House, in which
Etory and Marshal Stephen Packard would have their headquarters on
January 4.®
% h e description of the conversation is based on Sheridan's answers
to interrogatories in the case of Vaughn v. Sheridan, Etory, and
DeTrobriand, undated, in Sheridan Papers, and William H. Etory to AGO,
March 27, 1875, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 173), RG
94, NA.
7

DeTrobriand was b o m in France in 1816 and had married an American
heiress before the outbreak of the Civil War. In 1861 he became a
naturalized United States citizen and obtained the colonelcy of the 55th
New York Infantry. Subsequently he commanded brigades and a division in
the Army of the Potomac, fighting in several significant battles,
including those in the Peninsula campaign, Fredericksburg, Chanoellorsville, and Gettysburg. He aided the war with the rank of brevet major
general of volunteers. His request for retention in the Regular A m y
was approved, and he was posted colonel of the 31st Infantry in 1866,
transferring to the 13th Regiment in 1869. DeTrobriand served in
different stations on the Indian frontier until 1874 whan he and his
regiment were sent to Louisiana, where he immediately found favor
because of his French heritage. Except for a short period of detached
duty, DeTrobriand served in Louisiana until his retirement from the Army
in 1879, and the colonel retained a home in the Crescent City until his
death in 1897. See Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue (Baton Rouge,
1964), 121-22.
8 William P. Kellogg to Etory, January 2, 1875, AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-666, reel 173), RG 94, NA; AAG E. R. Platt to Delaney
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On the evening of January 2, while DeTrobriand and Floyd-Jones were
making preparations to move their troops into position, Sheridan
telegraphed Belknap, informing him that 99[a]ffairs here are still quite
feverish, tot Z scarcely believe there w i U to any serious trouble on
Monday the fourth instant.'9 Without telling Etory of his purpose,
Sheridan had definitely decided "to annex this department to my Military
Division and eventually change the department commander” s he had come
to doubt Emory's "ability to keep things steady and inspire confidence."
To replace Emory, Sheridan recommended Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie,
one of his favorite cavalry officers.
would not displace Etory immediately.

But Sheridan indicated that he
g

On January 3 the Democrats and Republicans caucused separately,,
Each party planned to have their nominee elected speaker of the house.
The Democrats picked former New Orleans mayor Louis A. Wiltz, and the
Republicans chose former governor Michael Hahn.

Zhe details of these

meetings remained secret, leading to frantic speculation that the
Republicans would use the militia, the police, or the Army to secure the
election of their nominee, or that the Democrats would use the White
League to obtain the election for their candidate.

The political atmos

phere in New Orleans was more emotionally charged than at any time since
the antis-laden steamer Mississippi had arrived the previous September.
As stipulated in Emory's orders, between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. on
January 4 Army units occupied positions near the Custom House and the
Floyd-Jones, January 2, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA.
^Sheridan to Belknap, January 2, 1875, in Sheridan Papers.
10Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 (Gloucester,
Mass., 1967), 293-95.
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old St. Louis Hotel, which was serving as the state capitol.
Colonel John R. Brooke csonsnanded five companies of the 22nd Infantry and
three companies of the 13th Infantry in a line from the corner of
Chartres and St. Louis streets, along St. Louis Street to the levee.
Colonel Henry A. Morrow commanded seven companies of the 13th Regiment
stationed at the Inporter *s Bonded Warehouse on Chartres Street.
Colonel Floyd-Jones was in charge of the reserve, comprising four
oanpanies of the 13th Infantry and two companies of the 22nd Infantry
positioned undermath the sugar storage sheds on the levee.

One company

of the 1st Artillery, with a Gatling gun and a twelve-pount Napoleon,
supported Floyd-Jones' reserve.

Colonel DeTrobriand, wearing a civilian

suit, personally commanded a company of the 13th Infantry outside the
State House on St. Louis Street.

Hie force totalled more than 700

officers and enlisted men. ^
Gy 9:00 a.m. the senior commanders were ready to inspect the troops.
Emory toured the lines, returning immediately to his temporary head
quarters in the Custom Bouse.

At 10:00 o'clock Sheridan and his staff

(all in civilian attire) left their rooms at the St. Charles Hotel and
inspected the battle-ready soldiers.

Sheridan neither offered any

comments nor directed that any changes be made in the troop's
dispositions.^
■^Philippe R. DeTrobriand to AAG, Dept Gulf, January 6, 1875, in
AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 173), RG 94, NA; Marie Caroline
Post [ed. ], The Life and Memoirs of Ocmte Regis de Trobriand (New York,
1910), 444-46. Hie 13th Infantry was a mere skeleton of a regiment,
mustering only 338 officers and men, which accounts for the seeming
disparity in the number of companies (23) present and the small total of
troops. See Post Returns, Post of New Orleans, January 1875, Records
of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 844), RG 94, NA.
12See sources cited in note 11, above.
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Outside the capitol, a large and boisterous crowd assembled,
including members of all political factions, policemen, and state
militiamen.

Undoubtedly, many of the civilians in the throng were

armed, and a gunshot probably would have precipitated a riot.

State

senators and legislators slowly made their way through the crowd,
identifying themselves to the policemen guarding the doors.

Kellogg had

ordered his constables to admit only legislators, newspaper correspon
dents with approved credentials, and other persons who were on state
business, but the officers failed to do their job adequately.

By one

means or another, dozens of ineligible persons entered the building,
clogging the halls, filling the chairs set aside for spectators, and
occupying several rooms of the onetime hotel.

13

At noon the clerk, shouting over the hubbub, called the house to
order and began checking off the names of the legislators.
Republicans and fifty Democrats answered the roll call.

Fifty-two

Acting on a

cue, a Democrat nominated Louis Wiltz for speaker of the house.

What

followed reminded Republicans of the eventful opening of the legislature
in 1872— a nightmare of confusion— as different men called for order,
requested recognition from the chair, and shouted threats at opponents
across the room.

Wiltz sprang out of his seat and stepping to the

podium, elbowed the clerk out of his way.

Then he grabbed the gavel

from the hand of the frightened clerk, who was fruitlessly trying to
declare Wiltz's nomination out of order.

Suddenly one of the specta

tors, who identified himself as a justice of the peace, came forward and
quickly administered the oath to Wiltz, who assumed the speakership.
l3See Lonn's vivid description in Reconstruction in Louisiana, 295.
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Without missing a beat, Wiltz ’’administered the oath to the mentors en
masse," accepted the nomination of a Conservative for permanent clerk,
declared him elected, and, to complete his coup, appointed dozens of
sergeants-at-arms.

These man instantly identified themselves, turning

"down the lapels of their coats, upon which were pinned blue ribbon
badges, on which were printed, in gold letters, the words ’assistant
sergeant-at-arms. . .

Under the protection of his sergeants-at-arms,

Wiltz forced the election of Democrats to the five contested house seats
left vacant by the Returning Board.

14

During all of this activity the Republicans had been protesting
vociferously, shouting epithets at Wiltz and other Democrats, and
calling for points of order, which Wiltz studiously disregarded.
Sensing that they had lost this round of the contest, the Republicans
attempted to leave the chamber, which would disrupt the quorum of the
house.

Brandishing knives and pistols, the sergeants-at-arms blocked

some of the exits, forcing several Republicans to remain in the room,
but others, aided by Kellogg's police, escaped to the dubious safety of
the hallway.15
The Republicans notified General Hugh J. Campbell, Kellogg's
militia commander, of the extraordinary proceedings in the house
chamber, calling on him to restore order.

Unwilling to take this

responsibility, Campbell stepped outside the building, located
Colonel DeTrobriand, and asked him to pacify the unruly legislators.
14Ibid., 296. Sheridan to Belknap, January 8, 1875, in Senate
Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, p. 28.
l^Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 296-97; Joe Gray Taylor,
Louisiana Reoonitructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 304-305.
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Simultaneously a messenger from Wiltz approached DeTrobriand, presenting
a similar request from the Democratic speaker, who said that the noise
from the "idlers" in the hallways was disrupting the decorum of the
house.

Under any circumstances it was unusual for the Democrats to

request the Army's help.
Accompanied by two junior officers, DeTrobriand followed the
Republican and Democratic politicians into "the House where . . . [his]
entrance was saluted by general applause."

At Wiltz8s urging,

DeTrobriand ordered the lobby cleared of everyone who had no official
business in the capitol, but he made no attempt to unseat the speaker.
Acknowledging another round of applause, DeTrobriand left the chamber.
Pleased with their handiwork, the Democrats proceeded to consider other
legislative business.^
Meanwhile, Governor Kellogg asked DeTrobriand to remove the
Democrats who he claimed had been illegally seated.

DeTrobriand replied

that he could only consider such a request in "written and explicit
orders." Pulling pen and paper from his desk, Kellogg wrote two similar
notes, one to DeTrobriand and the other to General Etory.

The governor

requested that the A m y "clear the hall and State-house of all persons
not returned as legal members of the house of representatives by the
retuming-board of the State."

DeTrobriand decided to wait until Etory

gave him corroborating orders before he went to the legislature again.

17

16Post [ed. ], Memoirs of DeTrobriand, 446-47; DeTrobriand to AAG,
Dept Gulf, January 6, 1875, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666,
reel 173), PG 94, NA.
■^Post [ed. ], Memoirs of DeTrobriand, 448; Kellogg to DeTrobriand,
January 4, 1875, in House Reports, 43 Gang., 2 Sess., No. 101, Pt. 2,
p. 306.
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At the Costom House, Emory considered Kellogg's note for a moment,
then crossed the room and asked Sheridan to advise him on a course of
action.

Sheridan read Kellogg's note and replied "were I the Department

commander I would not hesitate to ocrnply with tie requisition of the
Governor. . . . "

Furthermore, Sheridan "suggested" that Emory should

warn DeTrobriand "that no number of the State Legislature returned as
such by the returning board . . . should be interfered with. . . . "
•t o

Emory incorporated Sheridan's suggestion into his orders.
Anted with written orders from Emory and Kellogg, DeTrobriand,
after changing from civilian dress into his Army uniform, re-entered the
house chanter.

Supporting the colonel was a lieutenant who commanded a

squad of soldiers carrying bayoneted rifles.

DeTrobriand'1s subaltern

read both the orders of the governor and General Emory to the house.
Protesting against the colonel's mission, Wiltz warned DeTrobriand that
the Louisiana legislature was a legally constituted civil body and that
the Army would have to employ force if it wanted to remove any of the
legislators.

DeTrobriand replied that he had his orders and his "only

duty was to obey [than]." Accordingly, DeTrobriand individually located
each of the five Democrats whose place had been challenged and asked
them if their election had been approved by the Returning Board.

Each

man replied that they were legal representatives, tut acknowledged that
the Returning Board had not authenticated their election.

After giving

a short speech decrying their removal, the five Conservatives were
individually escorted from the chanter by armed soldiers.

In protest,

18The description of the conversation is based on Sheridan's
answers to interrogatories in the case of Vaughn v. Sheridan, Emory, and
DeTrobriand, undated, in Sheridan Papers. Emory to DeTrobriand,
January 4, 1875, in Post [ed.], Memoirs of DeTrobriand, 448.
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the rest of the Democrats angrily stalked out of the legislature,
leaving the house to the Republicans, who promptly elected Michael Hahn
speaker and selected Republicans to fill the five vacant seats.

'Che

Army had thwarted another attenpt by the Democrats to gain power in
T . .
19
Louisiana.
Satisfied that the A m y would act on his behalf, Kellogg asked
DeTrobriand to clear the crowds from all the streets surrounding the
State House.

Receiving permission from Emory, DeTrobriand ordered

Brooke's troops to disperse the bystanders.

While the troops wait about

this duty, they were greeted, by "cheers or groans," depending on the
feelings of the nearby onlookers.

Within a short tine the soldiers had

cleared the streets near the capitol, aiding the possibility of a White
League attack on the State House.

That evening Brooke5s and Floyd-

Jones1 troops remained in the French Quarter, but Morrow's units
returned to Jackson Barracks.

20

The Democratic press was predictably incensed by the Amy's actions
at the legislature.

The New Orleans Bulletin called the expulsion of

the Conservatives " [a]nother outrage, planned and perpetrated against
the people of Louisiana" by the "outlaws of civilization"— the
carpetbaggers.

The Bulletin claimed that such an outrageous "military

display" had been entirely uncalled for under the circumstances. The
•^Sefton, A m y and Reconstruction, 241; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 297; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 305; Post [ed.] ,
Memoirs of DeTrobriand, 449-50.
20
Kellogg to DeTrobriand, January 4, 1675, in House Reports, 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. ini . Pt. 2, p. 307; DeTrobriand to AAG, Dept Gulf,
January 6, 1875, in / r File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel 173), RG
94, NA; E. R. Platt
DeTrobriand, January 4, 1875, in Post [ed.],
Memoirs of DeTrobric. i, 455, and see also ibid., 451-52.
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New Orleans Times observed that " [p]ractically, we have no government,
legal or illegal, and have not had for the past two years. . . . The
rule is that of musket and sword and central authority, and everybody
knows it." The Picayune judged that there was "no situation known to
the law . . . that justifies military interference in the organization
of a legislative body."

The Picayune concluded that DeTrobriand's

action was "the most violent, the most illegal, the most shameless act
yet permitted by an administration whose history is one of violence,
illegality and shamelessness unparalleled in the history of any free
government."

However, the Republican chided the Democrats for calling

the saute soldiers "military despot [s]" who had been so helpful to them
earlier in the day.

21

Obviously the Democrats had not been satisfied with holding
one-half of the seats in the house of representatives and had shown that
they too would use the Army to their own advantage if the opportunity
presented itself.

The Democrats could have bargained with the Republi

cans for two of the five seats left vacant by the Returning Board.

If

the bargaining was successful, it would have given the Republicans an
unsteady majority of one in the house.

Instead of trying this or seme

similar negotiated settlement, the Conservatives chose another coup
attempt, limited though it may have been.

Predictably, it failed.

But

the rest of the nation viewed the Democrats as the injured party in the
imbroglio.

Soon General Sheridan provided more fuel for his critics,

2iwew Orleans Bulletin, January 5, 1875; New Orleans Times,
January 5, 1875; New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 5, 1875; New
Orleans Republican, January 7, 1875.

408
inciting their wrath anew against himself, Louisiana Republicans, and
the Grant administration.
At 9:00 p.m. on January 4 Sheridan "assumed control over the
Department of the Gulf."

(The Picayune wryly commented that this

announcement meant "Sheridan's Cuba excursion has been temporarily
postponed. . . .")

He informed Belknap that there was "in this

State . . . a spirit of defiance to all lawful authority, and an
insecurity of life which is hardly realized by the General Government or
the country at large.

The lives of citizens have become so jeopardized,

that, unless something is done to give protection to the people, all
22
security usually afforded by law will be overridden."
Sheridan's solution to Louisiana's "spirit of defiance" was a stiff
dose of his own bravado, tempered with his own certain logic, which was
completely lost on most people of the day.

Sheridan sent Belknap two

telegrams recommending that stem measures be taken in Louisiana.

The

telegrams immediately caused consternation throughout the country.
"Please say to the President," Sheridan reassuringly began, "that he
need give himself no uneasiness about the condition of affairs here."
Sheridan then got to the meat of the matter.

He premised to "preserve

the peace . . . if Congress will declare the White Leagues and other
similar organizations, white or black, banditti. . . . "

In his second

message Sheridan claimed "that the terrorism now existing in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Arkansas could be entirely removed and confidence and
77

Sheridan to Belknap, January 4, 1875, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, p. 21. At the same time Sheridan informed
McDowell that he was taking command of the Gulf Department. Sheridan to
McDowell, January 4, 1875, in Sheridan Papers. New Orleans Daily
Picayune, January 5, 1875. See also Sefton, Army and Reconstruction,
243.
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fair dealing established by the arrest aid trial of the ringleaders of
the armed White Leagues.

If Congress would pass a bill [or if the

President would issue a proclamation] declaring than banditti[,] they
23
could be tried by a military commission. . . . ”
Sheridan made his intentions quite clear in these telegrams , which
the Danocratic press immediately branded the "banditti" massages.

He

would not act without authorization from Grant or Congress, but he was
recommending the same treatment for the White League's leaders as he had
recommended for the Indian chiefs of the warring Southwestern tribes.

24

The idea in each case was to supersede or bypass any form of civilian
courts.

This could not be done without declaring martial law or rein-

stituting military government, and President Grant was opposed to both.
Therefore, as harsh as his proposal may have seamed, Sheridan actually
had very few options left open to him.

Tie use of massive military

reinforcements was out of the question.

Hie time for that way of

dealing with the problem had passed; the Army was too small and spread
too thin.

Moreover, the Grant administration did not have enough

support in Congress or throughout the nation to insist on an entirely
military solution.

On the other hand, Grant did not want to acknowledge

defeat and simply allow the Democrats to overthrow the Kellogg
^Sheridan to Belknap, January 5, 1875 (two oontimonicafions), in
Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, p. 23. See also Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 298-99, and Sefton, Army and Reconstruction,
242.
24
Sheridan had advised Belknap (October 5, 1874) that he thought
all Indians "who have committed murder or stolen cattle within the last
two years, should be tried by a military commission. . . . " See Joe F.
Taylor, The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains, 1874-1875; Military
Correspondence from War Department Adjutant General" s Office, File'
2815-1874 (Canyon, Tex., 1962), 9i.
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government by the use of violence and intimidation. As Joe Gray Taylor
has pointed out, Sheridan recognized that the civilian courts often had
proven ineffective in trying cases under the Enforcement Acts, and the
use of a military commission seared to be the only practical alternative
available.

Some sort of continued military support was inoperative if

Kellogg was to remain in office.

25

Sheridan's proposal for military trials, his banditti messages, and
DeTrobriand' s interference in the legislature were condemned by most
newspapers in the North and South and by many important men of affairs,
both in and out of Congress.

led by Louisiana5s Democrats, Northern and

Southern state legislatures sent resolutions to Congress denouncing
Sheridan.

These resolutions were widely applauded across the country,

indicating a great decrease in popular support for Grant's Reoomstruc-,
tion policies.

The New York Times compared Sheridan's actions to those

of Oliver Cromwell during the Protectorate and called the second
banditti dispatch an unwarranted "blood"and-iron message."

Tie Times

was disappointed "that a very able graduate of West Point, and a soldier
who has so gallantly and faithfully fought for the supremacy of the
Constitution, should know so little of its requirements."

26

25Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 307.
26Msmorial of the Louisiana legislature, January 20, 1875, in
Senate Misc. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., NO. 45, pp. 1-5. Similar
legislative resolutions and memorials protesting Sheridan's and
DeTrobriand's actions were prepare! in Ohio, Tennessee, Arkansas, New
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Texas, and by the Rochester, New York
Board of Aldermen, the Baltimore, Maryland city council, and the
governors of Ohio, Wisconsin, and Georgia. A special public meeting was
called at New York City's Cooper Institute, where such speakers as
William Cullen Bryant, E. L. Godkin, William M. Evarts, Whitelaw Reid,
and Charles A. Dana denounced Sheridan and the Army. See New York
Times, January 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 1875. See also Lonn's
description of the nationwide reaction to the events in Reconstruction
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But the criticisns of the New York Times vers mild conpared to the
diatribes from the Louisiana press.

Kenanbaring Sheridan9s Shenandoah

Valley campaign* the Alexandria Louisiana Democrat labeled him "'the
great b a m burner," and referring to his more recent actions, the
Democrat dubbed him "Philip, Due d 9Orleans."

The Shreveport Times said

that Sheridan exhibited all the "brush instincts of the lowest class of
Irish" and branded him with the epithet "Piegan H. Sheridan," referring
to the A m y campaign against the Piegans in Montana which nearly wiped
out the tribe.

Taking a different tack, the New Orleans Bulletin

satirically indicated that the banditti messages might earn Sheridan a
place as an "unsurpassed writer of fiction."

Of course, the Bulletin

denied that there were any bandits, murderers, or robbers in the White
Leagues, which the paper claimed were composed of the state's best
citizens.

The New Orleans Times claimed it was "evident that the old

spirit of the raider is strong in Phil and that he is anxious to execute
vengeance on somebody," and accused Sheridan of completely failing to
appreciate the feelings of most white Louisianians.

The Picayune

blasted Sheridan unmercifully, calling him a "mailed and booted
ruffian. ” The Picayune concluded:
It is one of the saddest of the many sad results of our
civil war, that it thrust into positions of power and
responsibility a man like this, whose only notion of power is
the power of the sword. . . . No further proof is needed of
his conspicuous inability to understand the rudiments of law
and the first principles of American republicanism, than his
suggestion that Congress should pass a law . . . [allowing him
to be] the judge and executioner of persons whose political
opinions are objectionable to him.2 '
in Louisiana, 301-307.
^Alexandria Louisiana Democrat, January 6 and 13, 1875; Shreveport
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Residents of New Orleans saw to it that Sheridan did not miss the
press comments.

Massachusetts Congressman George F. Hoar, sojourning in

New Orleans with a committee sent to investigate the previous Noventer’s
election, observed that diners in the St. Charles Hotel's dining roan
frequently greeted Sheridan with "loud hisses and groans."
" [t]he morning papers tested with abusive articles.

Moreover

The [hotel] guests

would take these papers, underscore same specially savage attack, and
tell the waiter to take it to General Sheridan. . . . The general would
glance at it with an unruffled face, and tew and smile toward the sender
of the article.1'28
Despite these bitter snubs, Sheridan had his supporters, though it
was difficult to find any in Louisiana outside of Kellogg, Packard, and
their cronies.

Demonstrating unusual boldness, the Republican editor of

the Donaldsonville Chief wrote an editorial defending Sheridan, saying
that he "may be neither a lawyer or a statesman, but he . . . [had
formed the] correct opinion of the state of society existing in
Louisiana. . . . "

The Chief's editor concluded that Sheridan had done

nothing to "excite the ill feeling of those who are peaceful and law
abiding. . . . "

Many persons in the North sent letters to Sheridan

endorsing his policies, indicating that he was still very popular
outside the South, and undoubtedly these missives bolstered his ego.
Times, January 6 and 9, 1875; New Orleans Bulletin, January 7 and 10,
1875; New Orleans Times, January 6, 1875; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
January 6 and 8, 1875.
28
George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (2 vols., New
York, 1903), I, 208.
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Secretary Belknap assured him that the "President and all of us have
full confidence and thoroughly approve your course."

29

However, in a special message to the U.S. Senate, Grant displayed
less than complete confidence in his old compatriot.

Grant tried to

excuse Sheridan9s and DeTrobriand9s actions, saying that there were
unusual "circumstances connected with the late legislative imbroglio in
Louisiana which seem to exempt the military from any intentional wrong
in that matter."

The President claimed that the Army had acted on

Governor Kellogg's lawful request to remove "a body of unauthorized
persons" from the house.

Grant said that Sheridan had "suggested

summary modes of procedure against them [the White Leaguers], which,
though they can not to adopted, would, if legal, soon put an end to the
troubles and disorders in that State."

These were hardly words of

unstinting support, but the President concluded that " [i]f error has
been committed fcy the Army in these matters it has always been on the
side of the preservation of good order. . . . "

30

The New York Times seated to speak for most people in the country,
however, concluding that "[i]f Federal troops are henceforth to play
this important part in Louisiana politics, the least we can ask is that
29Donaldsonville Chief, January 9, 1875. Many letters of support
were sent to Sheridan during January, filed in Sheridan Papers. Belknap
to Sheridan, January 6, 1875, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 13, p. 25.
^Grant’s message to the Senate, January 13, 1875, in James D.
Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1789-1897 (10 vols., Washington, 1896-1899), VII, 305-14. See also the
excellent analysis of the President's message by Sefton, Army and
Reconstruction, 245.
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they should be placed under a commander who is able to Iceep his head and
his temper under control."

31

| But Louisianians were not only criticizing Sheridan, they were
threatening his life.

After receiving assassination threats from

unidentified White Leaguers, Sheridan assured Belknap that he was "not
afraid"— "the very air [here] has been impregnated with assassination
for several years."

Sheridan erroneously reported that the White League

was "trying to make arrangements to surrender to the civil
32
authorities [,] fearing to come under my jurisdiction."
On the contrary, the White League was recalcitrant and unrepentant.
The New Orleans Times indicated that Louisianians would bide their tine,
waiting until the military was put back into "its proper subordinate
relation toward civil authority, [and] no raiding Sheridan will be
permitted to ride roughshod over a people— his equals in patriotism and
his superiors in intelligence. . . . "

The New Orleans Bulletin

published a lengthy editorial critical of Sheridan and signed it "one
who is not afraid."

33

Sheridan's actions and pronouncements continued to infuriate the
Democratic press.

For example, Sheridan reported to Secretary Belknap

that since 1866 White Leaguers and other lawless individuals in
Louisiana had committed thousands of murders— perhaps as many as 3,500—
and that the perpetrators had gone unpunished in almost every case.

The

31-New York Times, January 10, 1875.
32
Sheridan to Belknap, January 6, 1875 (two communications), in
Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, pp. 24-25; Sheridan to
Belknap, January 6, 1875, in Sheridan Papers.

■^ew Orleans Times, January 7, 1875; New Orleans Bulletin,
January 15, 1875.
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New Orleans Tines concluded that Sheridan was unqualified to describe
incidents that "he never saw, and to pronounce on questions with which
he is wholly incompetent to deal."

The Times commented sardonically

that the general should keep his hand on his sword and leave his pen
alone.

The Bulletin claimed that Sheridan8s report was groundless and

accused the general of being "unable to tell the truth."

The Picayune

derisively called Sheridan the "eminent author and statistician."

The

Picayune concluded that the puffy pranouncanents Sheridan had made since
his return to Louisiana had "shown . . . exactly what sort of a man
Grant v/anted in New Orleans, [and] we understand why Gen. Hnory failed
to give satisfaction."

The Natchitoches People's Vindicator called

Sheridan the "champion liar of the age" and suggested that he should be
dismissed from the Army.

Subsequently Sheridan revised his estimate of

the number of murders, setting the figure specifically at 2,141.

He

made this revision after receiving reports from some of his subordinate
commanders, including Major Lewis Merrill.
To no one's surprise, many of the murders listed in Sheridan's
report had allegedly occurred in the Red River parishes, comprising the
district commanded by Major Merrill.

Moreover, according to Merrill's

latest information, several prominent north Louisiana Democrats had
discharged many of their black employees who had voted for Republicans
in the November election.

Furthermore, Conservative leaders publicly

announced that they planned to refuse to enploy, lease houses, or sell
■^Sheridan to Belknap, January 7 and 10, 1875, in Senate Exec.
Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, pp. 25, 29-31. New Orleans Times,
January 11, 1875; New Orleans Bulletin, January 13, 1875; New Orleans
Daily Picayune, February 16 and January 16, 1875; Natchitoches People's
Vindicator, January 16, 1875. Sheridan to George F. Hoar, February 8,
1875, in House Exec. Docs., 44 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 30, p. 298.
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goods to blacks who remained loyal to the Republican party.

The

Conservatives also pledged not to deal with planters or merchants who
hired or traded with Republicans.

Merrill reported the Conservatives

had premised "that no radical shall find a hone or employment in this
[Red River] country."

Sheridan expressed his concern over Merrill's

reports to Belknap and ordered the major to cate to New Orleans for
35
consultations.
Merrill arrived in the Crescent City on January 26, and the next
day he was seated before a congressional committee which had been sent
to investigate the condition of affairs in the Southern states and to
deduce if there had been any inprqprieties in the Louisiana election of
the previous November.

The ccsrsnitfcee was composed of three Republicans

(George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, chairman, William A. Wheeler of New
York, William P. Frye of Maine) aid one Democrat, Samuel S. Marshall of
Illinois.

The committee called on several civilians and Army officers

to relate their opinions and observations on conditions in Louisiana.
Testifying before the visiting congressmen, Merrill reiterated his
continents concerning the deplorable situation in northern Louisiana and
contradicted Sheridan's statement that the White League had been cowed.
Merrill said that the "State government has no power outside the United
States Army, which is here to sustain it. . . . The White League is the
only power in the State."

As might be expected, the Shreveport Times

condemned "Dog" Merrill's testimony, accusing him of lying in all
list of the specific murders alleged to have occurred was given
in House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 30, pp. 458-544. Merrill
to AG, Dept Gulf, January 11, 1875, i n Senate Exec. Docs., 43 Cong., 2
Sess., No. 17, p. 58. Sheridan to Belknap, January 16, 1875, in New
Orleans Republican, January 19, 1875. Merrill to AG, Dept Gulf,
January 22, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 151/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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particulars, except the fact that the A m y was protecting Kellogg's

g o v e x ^ t .36
In contrast, the Shreveport Times ocnplimented Colonel Henry Morrow
on his testimony before Hoar's cosranittee.

Morrow told the congressmen

(as he had reported previously to General Emory) that it was unnecessary
for the A m y to station troops in northern Louisiana.

Furthermore,

Morrow believed the assurances of the "better class of people," who
premised him that if the Democrats controlled the state, Negroes would
not lose any of their political rights.

According to Morrow, the

"universal sentiment" among the "better class" indicated that they would
prefer to have a military government replace Kellogg, thus assuring that
the state would be "fairly and honestly administered." The New Orleans
Times supported Morrow's conclusions!

" [w]hether constitutional or not,

a military government would he everywhere accepted as a vast
inpnovement. . . . "

37

It was certainly debatable whether most Louisianians really wanted
to have the Grant administration reinstitute a military government.
(Such an option was not practicable barring another full-scale
rebellion.) On the other hand, many military men, had they been asked,
probably would have opposed the reinstitution of military government.
In fact, many of them, such as Colonel Morrow, Captain George Head, and
3&Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 324. Testimony of Merrill, in
House Reports, 43 Cong., 2Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2, pp. 175-76, 179-81,
189-90. Shreveport Times, January 29and 30, 1875.
■^Shreveport Times, February 3, 1875. Testimony of Morrow, in
House Reports, 43 Cong., 2Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2, pp. 197-98, 202-205.
New (Orleans Times, January 29, 1875.
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others, would have preferred to end the Amy's assistance to Kellogg's
government.
Some of the officers, such as Morrow and Head, opposed military aid
for Kellogg because they were Democrats, but others were simply tired of
the thankless duty in Louisiana.

For example, Lieutenant Lorenzo Cook

of the 3rd Infantry told the congressional committee that he gladly
would pay his own expenses if he were transferred to the Great Plains.
"You would rather be among the Indians," one of the congressmen asked?
"I would rather be among the Comanches than among these ignorant . . .
priest ridden people," Cook replied, with some evident anti-Catholic
bias.

Frances M. A. Roe, wife of Lieutenant Fayette W. Roe of the 3rd

Infantry, recorded in her memoirs that "the service for the officers has
often been most distasteful.

Mary times they have teen called upon to

escort and protect carpetbag politicians of a very low type of
manhood. . . . "

General William T. Sherman wrote his brother John "that

our soldier's hate . . . [Reconstruction] duty terribly, and not one of
those officers but would prefer to go to the plains against the Indians,
rather than encounter a street mob, or serve a civil process."

Sherman

himself reluctantly "recognize [d] the great necessity of standing by the
lawful State government, but the soldiers do not."

In fact, the longer

Reconstruction lasted in Louisiana, the more uncomfortable most soldiers
became.

General Sherman told President David F. Boyd of Louisiana State

University that he was glad Grant had "sent Sheridan to New Orleans
instead of me."3®
3^Testimony of Lt. Lorenzo Cook, in House Reports, 43 Cong., 2
Sess., No. 261, Pt. 2, p. 344; Frances M. A. Roe, Army Letters From an
Officer's Wife (New York, 1909), 157; William T. Sherman to John
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Although Reconstruction problems dominated Sheridan's agenda, he
had to consider other matters, especially the recently concluded Indian
war.

Sheridan was determined to hold military trials for the Indian

chiefs who had led their tribes in the Red River War.

Eventually

Sheridan had to content himself with deporting several chiefs and
important braves from the Southwest to prisons in Florida.

His efforts

to obtain their trials by military ccstmission cut into the time he
devoted to Reconstruction.

39

But the matter of deciding who should replace Bnory as commander of
the Department of the Gulf was uppermost in Sheridan's thoughts.
Although he had annexed the department to his military division,
Sheridan did not want to exercise command over the troublesome region
any longer than was absolutely necessary.

Previously, Sheridan had

recommended Colonel Mackenzie for the position.

Mackenzie was a head-

strong, impetuous, hard-driving cavalry officer, and one of Sheridan's
favorite subordinates.

Perhaps Sheridan advanced Mackenzie's name as a

compliment to the young colonel, tut if he pressed the appointment,
Mackenzie would have to be given the assignment over the heads of
several senior officers.

Ultimately Sheridan realized that Mackenzie

was too high-strung to handle the Louisiana assignment effectively.

40

Sherman, February 3, 1875, in Rachel S. Thorndike (ed.), The Sherman
Letters (New York, 1894), 343-44; Sherman to David F. Boyd, February 18,
1875, in William T. Sherman Letters/David F. Boyd Family Papers
(Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge).
^Sheridan to Sherman, February 26, 27, March 1, 1875, in Sheridan
Papers.
40
Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, 244.
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Although he conceded that it was unwise to elevate Mackenzie to the
command, Sheridan definitely had decided that Emory must be replaced.
Rather than making a "hasty and unsupportable appraisal of Emory's
abilities,"41 Sheridan correctly deduced that the Secretary of War and
the President were dissatisfied with Emory's performance.

In 1866

Sheridan had recommended to Grant that Emory be retained on active duty.
In contrast, on February 9, 1875, Sheridan described Emory to
Secretary Belknap as "a very weak old man, entirely unfitted for this
place and [he] should be retired or relieved, and some good man sent
here in his place."

In Sheridan's opinion, Emory had become "uncertain

and unsteady," and "his heart . . . [was no longer] on the side of the
Government"— meaning that Emory no longer supported the Louisiana
Republicans.

Forcing the old officer to retire was "the test way to

make the change," Sheridan decided.

Sheridan considered Alfred H.

Terry, but finally recommended Brigadier General Christopher C. Augur,
commander of the Department of Texas.

Sheridan told Belknap that he and

Augur "have always worked together like one man." Even if Augur was not
approved, Sheridan concluded that " [i]t will not do to leave Emory
here."42
The importance of selecting a new departmental commander and the
possibility of presenting his personal views on deporting the Southern
Indian chiefs prompted Sheridan to ask Belknap if he could come to
Washington to discuss these and "other matters" with him and the

A

Sheridan to Grant, May 4, 1866, in Sheridan Papers; Sheridan to
Belknap, February 9 and 24, 1875, ibid.
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President.

Belknap approved the trip.

Before leaving New Orleans on

March 6, Sheridan cancelled the Mardi Gras carnival (scheduled for
March 9), apparently fearing that the large and boisterous crowds might
become violent.

43

Four days later Sheridan met with President Grant at the White
House.

Grant concurred with Sheridan's choice of General Augur to

replace Emory.

Consequently, on March 11 Adjutant General Townsend

notified Emory that he was relieved of his command.
charge as soon as possible.

Augur would take

General Sherman suggested that Sheridan

should divest himself of the Department of the Gulf, but Grant allowed
him to retain control over the department indefinitely.

Before

returning to New Orleans Sheridan planned to spend a few days in New
York City and Chicago.

Matters relating to an A m y expedition into

Dakota's Black Hills kept Sheridan at his Chicago headquarters longer
than he had expected.

44

Meanwhile, on March 25 Augur arrived in New Orleans, accompanied by
his son Lieutenant Colon Augur, who served as his aide-de-camp.

In a

brief ceremony held at noon the next day Augur assumed command.
General Emory delivered a short speech to the assembled soldiers,
officers, civilians, and reporters.

The band of the 13th Infantry

^Sheridan to Belknap, March 4, 1875, in AGO File 3579-1874
(Microcopy M-666, reel 173), KG 94, NA; Belknap to Sheridan, March 6,
1875, ibid.; New Orleans Times, March 8, 1875; E. Merton Coulter, The
South During Reconstruction (Baton Rouge, 1947), 299.
^^New Orleans Republican, March 11, 1875; Townsend to Emory,
March 11, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 151/DSL, RG 393, NA; Belknap to
Sheridan, March 3, 1875, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel
173), RG 94, NA; [Sherman's adjutant] William D. Whipple to Townsend,
March 11, 1875, ibid.; Townsend to Sherman, March 13, 1875, ibid.
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played martial airs while Emory personally introduced each officer to
General Augur.

Under what must have been emotional circumstances, Emory

kept his conposure.

The New Orleans Republican reported that the "leave

taking was very affecting, the young officers of the army parting with
regret from the old veteran who had done so much for the service and who
had served his country so well."

After the formalities, "an hour was

pleasantly passed in [an] interchange of social sentiment."
The press reaction to Emory’s removal was mixed.

45

The Democrats

could not overlook the manner in which Emory had objectively handled
numerous crises since 1872, thus thwarting their grabs for power.

On

the other hand, the Conservatives commiserated with Emory because his
removal came at the hands of the detested Sheridan.

Briefly mentioning

Emory's "subserviency to Kellogg," the Natchitoches People's Vindicator
wrote that " [pjoor old Gen. Emory" had been "sat upon, . . . [and]
grossly and flagrantly maltreated" ty his superiors.

The New Orleans

Bulletin pictured Emory as having been "snubbed by the President,
insulted by Gen. Sherman, overslaughed by Sheridan, and doomed to attend
the whistle-call of [Kellogg,] the most abject human being in
Christendom. . . . "

Although the Bulletin wrote that Emory had "been

careful to avoid being unnecessarily offensive to our local civil
authorities," the newspaper wished he had "thrown down his sword,"
instead of using "it to overthrow a State government established by the
people."

The Bulletin concluded that Emory had "left a favorable

impression on all who bear in mind the stem will by which the army is
45New Orleans Republican, March 27, 1875; New Orleans Times,
March 26 and 27, 1875.
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ruled and the stringent orders which he, as a soldier, felt bound to
obey." Knowing Emory would be leaving Louisiana soon, the New Orleans
Times generously wrote that "the best wishes of every citizen of New
Orleans" went with him.

Hie Picayune was even more effusive % "We

cannot part with Gen. Emory without saying that if he regrets the
separation as much as we do, his departure will be pleasant neither to
him nor us."

Hie Picayune wrote that Emory had "executed his orders

with the delicacy which distinguishes a gentleman.

No one has ever

dreamed of holding him responsible for the uses to which the military
force of the United States have been put in this State. . . . "

However,

three other important Democratic newspapers (the Shreveport Tiroes,
Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, and Alexandria Louisiana Democrat) did not
print any messages of forgiveness or farewell. ^
Strangely enough, the New Orleans Republican found itself agreeing
with most of what the Democratic newspapers had written about Emory.
Hie Republican noted that Emory had made many friends during his assign
ment in Louisiana and that they all regretted to learn of his
forthcoming departure.

The Republican recalled that Enory had "been

considerate of the opinions and desires of all" and claimed that he was
"intelligent and accomplished beyond others of his rank."

Surprisingly,

the Republican stated that if Emory "were a politician he might be a
Conservative; [but] being a soldier, he . . . [has done] his duty as a
soldier, recognizing only the power of federal and State laws, and the
46
Natchitoches People* s Vindicator, January 23, 1875; New Orleans
Bulletin, January 29, March 13, 1875; New Orleans Times, March 26, 1875;
New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 13, 1875.
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wishes of superior officers."

Above all, the Republican called Story a

"good soldier" and "a true gentleman."

47

Biding adieu to a few close acquaintances and Congressman William
Wheeler, Emory left New Orleans on March 27.

Colonel DeTrobriand and

Captain Edward R. Platt (Story's trusted adjutant for more than three
years) were among the small party of officers who bade him goodby at the
depot.48
Emory went to Washington where he planned to prepare his own
defense in two different cases.

The first involved a civil suit by the

Democrats against him, Sheridan, and DeTrobriand for disrupting the
legislature, a case which was eventually dismissed.
The second case was more complicated, but less formal.

In Emory's

opinion, Sheridan had abruptly and unjustly terminated his command of
the Department of the Gulf.

(Emory told his lawyer that he had "been

ruthlessly stricken down deprived of command for the mistakes of
another," obviously meaning Sheridan, though not mentioning him by
name.) Under these circumstances it appeared that Emory might be forced
to retire from active duty with his actual rank of colonel.

Emory had

been serving as a brevet general for more than thirteen years and may
have extended his active service longer than he really wanted, hoping to
receive his general's stars.

Emory desperately wanted to retire as a

general, though he could always be called by his brevet rank after he
retired.

Grant authorized Emory's prmotion.

Sheridan and Belknap

urged Congress to put Emory's name on the brigadier's list and then
4^New Orleans Republican, March 26, 1875.
48New Orleans Daily Picayur

March 28, 1875.
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retire him forthwith.

Acting at its customary slug-like pace, Congress
4Q
began to consider Emory's promotion.
Story wanted to avoid a general court martial or any other hearings
which might reflect badly on the Army or call his own actions into
question.

Consequently, Emory hired Janes Bmott, a New York attorney

with good Washington connections.

Bmott worked on Emory's defense in

the Louisiana case and at the same tine implicitly agreed to do all he
could to secure Emory's promotion to general.

50

Emory also took steps on his own behalf. In a lengthy letter to
Adjutant General Townsend, Emory cited the "many trying and vexatious
circumstances" in Louisiana, during which "I have endeavored to perform
ny duties not in accordance with the spirit and letter of ny instruc
tions but in a manner which I deemed best calculated to preserve the
peace and good order of the district . . . entrusted to ny command."
Story asserted that after January 1 he had not taken any actions at any
time without Sheridan's approval.

Likewise, Emory defended himself in a

letter to Orville Babcock, President Grant's personal secretary.

Emory

acknowledged that mistakes may have been made on January 4 at the
Louisiana legislature, but he insisted that he did not make than.

Emory

stressed to Babcock that he "was only obeying the unmistakeable order of
4%mory to James Bmott, April 15, 1875, in William H. Emory Papers
(Bienecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University); Belknap to
Sheridan, March 3, 1875, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy M-666, reel
173), RG 94, NA.
50Bnory to Bmott, May 5, 1875, in Emory Papers; Bmott to Emory,
August 6, 1875, ibid.
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ny superior officer then present [and] duly unpowered to give . . .
orders." Of course, Story was referring to Sheridan.51
Story was trying to defend himself on the wrong grounds.

The

crisis in the legislature on January 4 was not his fault, and though
sane newspapers and politicians had criticized him, most of the
invectives had been hurled at Sheridan, DeTrobriand, and Kellogg.
Afterwards, Sheridan himself said that he "endorse [d] and . . . [was]
willing to be held responsible for the acts of the military as conser
vators of the public peace upon, that day."

In any case, most observers

placed the responsibility for the Army's action on Sheridan because he
was the senior officer present.

52

Emory failed to admit, or did not want to admit, that he was
removed not for his part in the legislative crisis, but for his failure
to prevent the insurrection of September 1874.

Neither Grant nor

Belknap said so specifically, but they had lost faith in Emory.

,

They

were probably both sorry that the crisis reached the point on
September 15 when Adjutant General Townsend had to order Emory to take
command of the troops in New Orleans.

Once he arrived in New Orleans,

Emory handled the dangerous situation satisfactorily.

Although he

remained in charge of the troops in Louisiana for three months following
the insurrection, when Sheridan arrived it was almost a foregone
conclusion that there would be a change in commanders.
51Emory to AGO, March 27, 1875, in AGO File 3579-1874 (Microcopy
M-666, reel 173), RG 94, NA; Emory to Orville Babcock, July 7, 1875, in
Emory Papers.
52
Sheridan to Belknap, January 8, 1875, in Senate Exec. Docs., 43
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 13, p. 27; Sefton, Army and Reconstruction, “243.

427
Emory had persevered under intense pressure during more than three
years of Reconstruction duty in the state with the most recalcitrant
populace in the South.

Prior to the September insurrection, he had done

an adqpt job, skillfully maneuvering his troops and using his resources,
maintaining Kellogg in office without persecuting McEnery.

Although he

maintained the peace after the insurrection, Bnory was not as effective
a commander as he had been before.

The unusual exigencies of postwar

Louisiana politics literally exhausted him, undoubtedly left him
embittered toward Reconstruction, and unfortunately ruined any feelings
of comradeship he had shared with Phil Sheridan during the Civil War.
Eventually, Congress approved Emory's promotion to brigadier general.
On July 1, 1876, after more than forty-three years of service, he
retired from the Army.
Emory had tried to do all that was asked of him in Louisiana.

In

the end, he failed to give the full measure of effort that the onerous
task required.

William T. Sherman astutely assessed him:

"a good man,

an excellent officer of the old school, tut perhaps a little timid in
interfering in the civil affairs of the State."

53

53Sherman's quote cited in Natchitoches People's Vindicator,
January 23, 1875.

CHAPTER XVIII
AUGUR, THE WHEELER COMPROMISE, AND
THE OPENING GUNS OF THE '76 CAMPAIGN
Christopher ColuiTibus Augur aid William Unary haul seen service
together in Louisiana under Banks during the Civil War.

Consequently,

Augur was no stranger to the state, though he had not been there since
1863.

Augur began his military career in 1839, entering West Point as a

cadet from Michigan, where his family had moved after his birth in New
York in 1821.

He was graduated in 1843 with his class, which produced

thirteen generals, three for the South and ten for the North, including
Ulysses S. Grant.

After serving in the Mexican War and at various

frontier posts, mostly in the Pacific Northwest, Augur was promoted to
the rank of major in 1861 and appointed commandant of cadets at West
Point.
He spent most of the early months of the war at the Military
Academy, iirpatiently waiting for field service.
a division under Banks.

In 1862 Augur was given

While oonmanding this division, Augur was

wounded at the Battle of Cedar Mountain.

Recovering from his wound,

Augur accompanied Banks to Louisiana, where he supervised the District
of Baton Rouge and directed the left wing of Banks' army at the siege of
Port Hudson.

In late 1863 Augur returned to the East, serving there as

commander of the XXII A m y Corps and the Department of Washington.

By

the end of the war Augur had attained the rank of major general of
volunteers, but according to the reorganization of the A m y in 1866, he
428
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reverted to the rank of colonel.
brigadier general.

Three years later he was promoted to

Augur successively commanded the Department of the

Platte and the Department of Texas before Sheridan picked him for the
Louisiana past in 1875. ^
Augur assumed command of the Department of the Gulf on March 26,
and a few days later, on April 4, Sheridan returned to New Orleans.
Sheridan came tack to Louisiana because he wanted to be on hand when a
special session of the legislature convened on April 14.

2

Governor Kellogg had called the special session to enable the
legislature to consider the so-called Wheeler Compromise.

Republican

Congressman William A. Wheeler of New York had been serving with
George F. Hoar's House subcommittee which was investigating the
Louisiana election of 1874.

Wheeler suggested an "adjustment" that

would effectively establish a truce between Louisiana9s antagonistic
Republicans and Democrats.

Use Conservatives had been bitterly disap

pointed over the failure of their attempt to dominate the state house of
representatives in January, when Colonel DeTrobriand had intervened on
behalf of the Republicans.

Since then the Democrats had been making

veiled threats against the Kellogg actadnistration.

In early February

Wheeler suggested a compromise which would allow the Democrats to regain
1-Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue; Lives of the Union Commanders
(Baton Rouge, 1964), 12; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the
Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Acadeny at West
Point, New York, 1802-1867 (2 vols., New York, 1868), II, 82-83;
Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United
States Army, 1789-1903 (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 175.
2New Orleans Republican, April 6, 1875; New Orleans Bulletin,
April 6, 1875; Philip H. Sheridan to William P. Kellogg, March 23,
1875, in Philip H. Sheridan Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
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all of the disputed seats in the legislature— and more besides— if they
ceased trying to overthrow Kellogg.

In effect, the Wheeler Ccsipranise

was a trade-off designed to get the Democrats to accept Kellogg as
governor for the remainder of his term in exchange for Republican
acceptance of an increase in the number of Democrats in the state house
of representatives.

George Hoar's congressional investigating camdttee

would determine the number of new Democrats in the house, based upon a
reexamination of the election returns.

Wheeler's adjustment implied

from the outset that the Democrats would be given a majority in the
house.

Thus the Conservatives would gain control of the house and its

speakership, which had been their twin objectives in January.

3

The movement for some sort of political settlement between the
Republicans and the Democrats actually began as early as 1873.
central objective of the settlement was always the same:

The

Democratic

recognition of Kellogg's right to hold his office in exchange for
increased representation for the Democrats in the house.
the Democrats spumed any attenpts at compromise.

But in 1873

Rill of self-

confidence and seeing themselves as in the right, John McEnery and his
cohorts believed that they could come to power despite the presence of
Emory's troops.

Ultimately their schemes failed, both in the

legislature and in the streets.

4

^New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 7, 1875. Ella Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 (Gloucester, Mass., 1967),
361-79, provides an overview of the entire matter; see also James T.
Otten, "The Wheeler Adjustment in Louisiana: National Republicans Begin
to Reappraise Their Reconstruction Policy," Louisiana History, XIII
(Fall, 1972), 356-66.
4Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 358-59, and supra, Chapters
12-16.
“
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The longer Emory served in Louisiana, the more he believed that a
political solution must be found to end the constant bickering and
fighting between the Republicans and Democrats.

Considering the

Democrats' dislike for the Amy, it was unlikely that they would accept
a proposal offered by a military officer.

Consequently, before he left

Louisiana, Emory had talked with Wheeler about the matter.

It is not

known how many tines the two men met or what they specifically
discussed.

But Emory claimed that the stain "of the acts of January 4

. . . [was] to be covered up by . . . the compromise, a settlement of
the question which I nyself suggested to Mr. Wheeler to undertake in the
interest of the Government."

Probably other men also had given Wheeler

advice, but historians have not mentioned the possibility of Story's
influence on the congressman.

5

Sizeable blocks in each party continued to oppose a political
settlement, but eventually the Democrats saw advantages in Wheeler's
proposal.

The compromise might remove Louisiana from the national

spotlight and thus reduce the consistent support that the Grant adninistration had given to Kellogg.

Same Conservatives had been on the

fringes of political power for too longs

the obvious fact that they

would hold office and control the house encouraged the Democrats to
accept adjustment.

Moreover, some Democrats realized that the house had

the power to initiate impeachment proceedings against a governor.
Although such an action would violate the compromise, some farsighted
Conservatives probably anticipated the likelihood of impeachment
^William H. Emory to James Emott, April 15, 1875, in William H.
Emory Papers (Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale
University).
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ocoirring several months after they were comfortably in control of the
house.

Despite the logic of these arguments, John MdEnery and former

New Orleans Mayor Louis Wilts opposed Wheeler's arbitration, and the
Shreveport Times and the New Orleans Bulletin both disapproved of the
plan.

On the otter hand, the Picayune favored compromise because it

would redress "the violent interference of (fen. Sheridan" in Louisiana
politics. ®
Many Republicans were reluctant to endorse any conpncmise,
believing that it was unnecessary to give anything to the Conservatives .
Overcoming P. B. S. Pinchback' s resolute opposition, Kellogg persuaded a
majority of Republicans to support adjustment as a way to ensure the
7

stability of the government for the remaining two years of his term.
Subsequently, from March 12 to 15, Hoar's committee met in New York
to examine the returns of the Louisiana election of 1874.

The committee

certified the election of sixty-three Democrats and forty-seven
Republicans in the house, but they did not tamper with the Republican's
control of the senate, which they dominated, twenty-seven members to
nine matters. **
Governor Kellogg might have been surprised by the size of the
majority awarded to the Democrats in the house, but he supported the
compromise nonetheless.

He sent out the call for a special legislative

^Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 360-68. Shreveport Times,
January 29, 1875; New Orleans Bulletin, February 6, March 23, 1875; New
Orleans Daily Picayune, February 24, April 10, 1875.
7
Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 361, 364, 367; Charles Vincent,
Black Legislators in Louisiana During Reconstruction (Baton Rouge,

iw r ifo ------------------------ —
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8L°nn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 370; Otten, "Wheeler
Adjustment," 362-63.
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session to ratify the committee's work.

Congressman Wheeler returned to

New Orleans on April 13 to lend his moral support to the adjustment.
General Sheridan, feigning disinterest, waited expectantly, suspicious
9
of the practicality and advisability of the unusual arrangement.
On April 15 the house overwhelmingly approved the Wheeler
Compromise by a vote of eighty-nine to eighteen.

The senate followed

suit two days later, thirty-three votes to three votes.

The Democrats

sealed the adjustment, refusing to renominate Louis Wiltz as speaker of
the house.

Instead, they chose E. C. Estilette, a Democrat who received

Governor Kellogg's support.

10

Shortly after the house approved the

compromise, General Sheridan left New Orleans, taking a train on
April 17, and arrived in Chicago six days later.
Sheridan's departure undoubtedly pleased the Democrats.

The

"Shenandoah rough-rider" (as the New Orleans Bulletin called him) had
left more bitterness in the wake of his second tour of duty in Louisiana
than he had after the first.

Sheridan had expressed his low opinion of

Louisianians in his banditti despatches, and the state's white Democrats
viewed him with a combination of hatred and fear, for the general was a
man who had no sympathy for their goals or their way of life.

In

General Sherman's pithy phrase, Sheridan considered New Orleans as
little more "than an Indian village," and the knowledge that " [h]e would
Q
New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 25, 1875; New Orleans Bulletin,
April 13 and 14, 1875.
10Otten, "Wheeler Adjustment," 363-65; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 374-76; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877
(Baton B5uge, 1974), 308-309.
^Sheridan to Col. R. C. Drum, April 15, 1875, in Sheridan Papers;
Sheridan to Gen. E. O. C. Qnd, April 16, 1875, ibid.
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not hesitate to level it" if it became necessary only redoubled their
abhorrence.

In the Picayune's opinion, Louisianians tolerated a

commander like Emory because he "never slandered the people of
Iouisiana; he . . . never denounced than as banditti and assassins; he
. . . never menaced than with the power which he wielded." In contrast,
Sheridan did all of these things, and more besides.

According to the

Picayune, Sheridan had "shown himself deficient in every one of the
elements of a statesman," and his "brutal tyranny" over Iouisiana during
January and February deservedly made him "conspicuously odious and
ridiculous in the eyes of the whole country. . . . "

12

It was understandable that most white Louisianians opposed
Sheridan.

He had expected their wrath, but perhaps he had not

anticipated their insults.

Acceding to the wishes of President Grant,

Sheridan had gone to New Orleans, although he was dissatisfied with the
idea of a second tour of duty in the Bayou State.

Subsequently, he had

handled the situation there according to his own views on Reconstruction,
which essentially had remained unchanged since 1867.

But by 1875 the

Democrats in Louisiana were much stronger than they had been in the
1860s.

There were many Conservative city councilman, mayors, police

jurors, sheriffs, legislators, and many more registered Democratic
voters.

Sheridan found that it was very difficult to carry out a

governmental policy when a substantial portion of the state's population
was opposed to that policy, no matter how just or beneficial the policy
might be.

Sheridan, Hnory and Augur did not have enough soldiers to

12New Orleans Bulletin, April 2, 1875. Sherman's quotes cited in
Natchitoches People's Vindicator, January 23, 1875. New Orleans Daily
Picayune, March 13, May 22, February 27, 1875.
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police the entire state.

Ihe A m y could no longer provide sufficient

protection for Louisiana's Republicans, and the President was finding it
impossible to continue the old interventionist Reconstruction policy in
the South without the support of the majority of the elected officials,
newspapers, and citizens of the Northern states.
Returning to his headquarters in Chicago, Sheridan was probably
filled with disappointment over the adoption of the Wheeler Conprcmise.
He had been unable to bend the political situation in Louisiana to his
will.
*

*

*

Following the Wheeler Conprotd.se and Sheridan's departure, an
unnatural calm, lasting several months, settled over Louisiana.

Adding

to this quietude was the resignation of George Williams as U.S. Attorney
General.

Williams had been one of Kellogg's primary supporters in the

national government, frequently advocating the use of the A m y to
sustain the Republicans in Louisiana.

Williams' successor, Edwards

Pierrepont, was disinclined to act as "Secretary of State for Southern
affairs" and mainly devoted his attention to the increasing number of
cases of corruption involving members of the Grant administration.

13

Williams' retirement, coupled with the Wheeler adjustment, afforded
General Augur a leisurely introduction to his duties as ocmmander of the
Department of the Gulf, which remained attached to Sheridan's Military
Division of the Missouri.

Consequently, Colonel Richard C. Drum,

■^^The phrase "Secretary of State for Southern affairs" cited in
William B. Hesseltine, Ulysses S. Grant, Politician (New York, 1935),
374. See also Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 50?; and William A.
Dunning, Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865-1877 (New York,
1907), 277.

436
Sheridan's adjutant, received Augur's routine correspondence, containing
requests for inproving and renting temporary quarters for soldiers in
New Orleans or describing other matters familiar to General Irvin
McDowell and his staff, at the headquarters of the Division of the South
in Louisville.

For all practical purposes, the new arrangement was

permanent; Sheridan kept Augur's department in his division until
1878.

14
The apparent settlement of the "Louisiana question" prompted the

reduction of troop strength in the state.

Sheridan ordered

Captain Frederick Banteen's company of the 7th Cavalry to return to
frontier duty at the Yankton Sioux Agency in Dakota Territory.

Augur

complied with Sheridan's order, and on May 6 Benteen's troopers, with
the exception of Lieutenant Charles DeRudio, left the state.
Governor Kellogg and Marshal Packard requested that DeRudio remain on
duty in St. Martinville because he was particularly experienced in
. .
15
dealing with problems in southwest Louisiana.
Ti«o weeks later the seven companies of the 22nd Infantry which had
been sent to Louisiana following the insurrection of September 1874 were
returned to their regular duty stations in New York and Michigan.

Augur

also ordered Company F, 1st Artillery to resume its post at Fort
Barrancas.

These departures left approximately 900 officers and men on

^^Christopher C. Augur to AAG, MilDivMo, April 20, 1875, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA.
15AAG R. C. Drum to CG, Dept Gulf, April 28, 1875, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 151/DSL; Sheridan to Augur, May 5, 1875, ibid.; Augur to AAG,
MilDivMo, May 7, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 141/DSL; RG 393, NA.

437

duty in Iouisiana.

Augur also commanded 350 other soldiers in

Mississippi, Arkansas, and Florida.1-6
Augur saw this as an appropriate time to make an inspection of his
department.

He went first to Jackson, Mississippi, and subsequently

inspected troops and facilities at Little Rock and Shreveport.

He later

took a side trip to San Antonio to visit his family, which had not moved
to Louisiana.

17

During Augur's absence a fight broke out among several off-duty
soldiers who were "drunk and disturbing the peace at the comer of
Burgundy and Canal" streets in New Orleans.

Metropolitan Policemen

quickly arrived on the scene, freely using their nightsticks to break up
the fight, injuring several soldiers in the process.

In the past, the

Picayune certainly had found little to admire about the Metropolitan
Police.

Ironically in this instance, the Picayune praised the effi

ciency of the policemen and directed a barb at the Army, commenting that
" [t]he spectacle of drunken soldiers has teen unpleasantly conton upon
our streets of late.”

"The boys in blue are very superior creatures we

have no doubt," the Picayune continued, "but we like them parading in
Lafayette Square or answering roll call at the Barracks much better than
we like them staggering along the boulevard and airing their Hessian
manners before the New Orleans public."

The Picayune called for scmeone

16AAG E. R. Platt to Augur, May 17, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 141/
DSL; Platt to 00, Jackson Barracks, May 18 and 20, 1875, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 115/DSL; RG 393, NA. SW, Annual Report, 1874-1875 (House Exec.
Docs., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. l), pp. 84-85.
^Augur to AAG, MilDivMo, April 29, May 7, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol.
141/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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to investigate "the propriety of keeping so much army [sic] in New
Orleans.”18
On May 27, the day that Augur returned from his "extended trip
through Texas, north Louisiana, and Arkansas," another altercation
occurred between soldiers and the New Orleans police.

Fifteen soldiers,

who were intoxicated with the cheap whiskey available "on credit from
the different dens which infest Girod street," attacked a policeman who
was walking home alone.

The Picayune denounced " [t]he presence of

drunken and disorderly soldiers [which] has become an eyesore to the
whole community. . . . "

The Picayune reckoned it was "high time that

19
they should be sent to the plains, where they belong."
General Augur issued no statement following the incident.

After

spending only three days in New Orleans, he left the state again,
traveling to Chicago, where he attended the wedding of General Sheridan
and Irene Rucker. ^
On June 9 Augur returned to New Orleans and four days later another
fight took place between soldiers and police— this time in Shreveport—
and one policeman was killed.

Once more the Picayune accused the

"shoulder strapped gentry" of instigating the violence, and ratdnded its
readers that " [t]hese military outrages are becoming unbearable, and
18New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 8, 1875.
19Ibid., May 28, 1875.
20
Augur to Major G. B. Russell, May 30, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol.
141/DSL, RG 393, NA. The Shreveport Times (June 20, 1875) said that it
wished the newlyweds "many little banditti."
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must be checked by seme strong means."

"No one is safe with such a

command in our midst," the Picayune concluded*

21

Notwithstanding the Picayune8s denunciations, these incidents of
violence between soldiers and policeman apparently were nothing more
than drunken troopers having conflicts with their natural antagonists—
the local constabulary.

During the early years of Reconstruction such

incidents might have led to more violence, forcing the commander to
declare martial law.

But new the summer fever season was close at hand,

and Augur took the opportunity to send the soldiers out of New Orleans,
temporarily removing the temptation of additional altercations while
simultaneously protecting them from the danger of yellow fever.
Augur had no trepidations about moving his troops to Mississippi in
the summer of 1875.

He must have been cognizant of the fact that the

year before Emory had left New Orleans virtually without military
protection, but the political situation was different one year later.
The White League had been inactive, and the Democratic politicians
appeared to be quite satisfied with the provisions of the Wheeler
Oonpromise.
consequently, Sheridan permitted Augur to "make such movements of
the troops . . . [from] New Orleans as the [yellow fever] emergency may
demand and at such time as he thinks proper."

Augur selected the Gulf

coast town of Mississippi City for the summer encampment.

Emory

previously had used the town for the same purpose, and Augur's chief
quartermaster, Major Joseph A. Potter, reported that the site was "in

2% e w Orleans Daily Picayune, June 18, 1875.
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every way suitable, . . . situated almost immediately on tie bank of the
Gulf in the midst of a Pine Grove, with bathing facilities, &c, &c."

22

On July 21 soldiers from Jackson Barracks boarded a train taking
them to the coast, and three days later Colonel Philippe DeTrbbriand's
New Orleans garrison arrived on the beach.
to be on guard against yellow fever.

(DeTrbbriand was cautioned

Fifteen cases already had been

reported at Fort Barrancas in Pensacola.)

Following Story's policy, and

probably abiding by the advice of Captain Edward R. Platt, his
dependable adjutant, Augur decided that it was unnecessary to move the
troops from the other posts in Louisiana.

He left a few orderlies and

staff officers (including Platt) in New Orleans.

According to the post

returns, only "the Ordnance and Commissary Sergeants, Hospital Stewards
and guards" remained at Jackson Barracks.

After seeing the troops off,

Augur went on leave to visit his family in San Antonio.

23

The soldiers had been in Mississippi City less than a month when an
outbreak of yellow fever in nearby Pascagoula forced Augur to relocate
the command.

On August 17 he ordered his men to move to Holly Springs

in northern Mississippi, the town that ESnory had found was the most
suitable simmer camp.

Meanwhile, in Louisiana two soldiers died of

yellow fever at Coushatta, and that garrison was moved to the nearby
^Endorsement by Sheridan, July 8, 1875, on the medical report by
Dr. V. B. Hubbard to Augur, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA;
Joseph A. Potter to AAG, Dept Gulf, July 6, 1875,
ibid.
^■^Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, July 1875, in Records ofthe AGO
(Microcopy M-617, reel 524), R3 94, NA; Post Returns, Post of New
Orleans, July 1875, ibid. (reel 844). AAG Platt to Col. Philippe
DeTrobriand, July 24, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 1 5 /DSL; Major John M.
Brannon to AAG, Dept Gulf, ibid.; Gen. Augur to Lt. Jacob A. Augur,
August 1, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 141/DSL; RG 393, NA.
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village of Springville.
succombed to the fever.

However, five other infected soldiers later
24

Although the fever did not reach epidemic proportions, Augur was
reluctant to have his family crane to New Orleans.

Therefore, following

a brief inspection trip to Baton Rouge and New Orleans, he decided to
send his family and their household belongings to his hate in
Ogdensburg, New York.

25

On November 6 Augur returned to Louisiana and ordered the troops at
Holly Springs to take their regular posts at New Orleans and Jackson
Barracks.

By Novoriber 21 the move was oonpleted.

In November 1875

Augur commanded 921 officers and men distributed among eight Louisiana
posts (counting New Orleans and Jackson Barracks as one garrison). The
year before Emory had commanded 1,998 soldiers located at nine posts.
The decrease was caused by the removal of several units, including the
companies of the 22nd Infantry, 16th Infantry, and 2nd Infantry.

Some

of these units had been returned to their regular stations in other
departments and sane had been relocated within the Department of the
Gulf.

In contrast, the rest of the garrisons in the South were woefully

undermanned.

There were 575 soldiers in South Carolina; 480 in

Virginia? 311 in Georgia; 293 in Florida; 266 in Alabama; 247 in North
^Augur's Report, September 9, 1875, in SW, Annual Report, 18751876 (House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 1 Sess., NO. 1), p. 115. Aa g Luke
O*Reilly to 00, Coushatta, October 2, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 141/DSL,
RG 393, NA. Natchitoches People's Vindicator, October 9, November 6,
1875.
^^Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, September 1875, in Records of the
AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA; Augur to AAG, Dept Gulf,
October 1, 1875, in Dept Gulf, vol. 151/DSL, RG 393, NA; Augur to Emory,
October 12, 1875, Emory Papers.
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Carolina; 210 in Tennessee? 178 in Mississippi; and only 89 in
Arkansas.
Augur's troops were inactive during the early months of 1876.

The

state legislature convened on January 3 with none of the forebodings of
violence which had been common in previous years.
to post troops around the State House.

Augur saw no reason

27

On February 28, near the end of the legislative session, Democrats
in the house of representatives shattered the existing political tran
quility, voting sixty-one to forty-five to impeach Governor Kellogg,
thus violating one of the cardinal provisions of the Wheeler Compromise.
The idea of impeaching Kellogg had been bandied about for several weeks,
but when it came the move caught the Republicans off-guard.

If the

senate failed to act on the irrpeachment before the legislature
adjourned, the Democrats planned to claim that Kellogg was technically
out of office.

Thus Lieutenant Governor C. C. Antoine would become

"acting governor"— duplicating the peculiar arrangement of Warmoth and
Pinchback a few years before.

If the Democrats" ruse worked, it would

cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Republican state government.

Acting

promptly, the Republicans in the state senate demanded specific
impeachment charges from the house.

On the evening of February 28 the

senate acquitted Kellogg on all charges by a vote of twenty-five to
nine, allowing him to retain his precarious seat.

The impeachment

AAG E. R. Platt to DeTcobriand, November 13, 1875, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 115/DSL/ r g 393, NA; Post Returns, Post of New Orleans, November
1875, in Records of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 844), RG 94, NA; Post
Returns, Jackson Barracks, November 1875, ibid. (reel 524); Monthly
Returns, Dept Gulf, November 1874, November 1875, RG 393, NA. SW,
Annual Report, 1875-1876, pp. 146-57.
27
New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 4, 1876.
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episode convinced Kellogg that he would not be a candidate for governor
in the 1876 election.
Within a few hours, however, everyone seemed to put aside the ill
will created by the impeachment to celebrate the Mardi Gras.
General Sheridan had canceled the Shrove Tuesday celebrations the
previous year, and perhaps for that reason Mardi Gras day, February 29,
1876, was a particularly festive occasion.

A few Army units marched in

the parades, and it was traditional for a squad of soldiers, disguised
in gay costumes, to act as guards for Rest, the king of carnival.
Selected officers and their wives were invited to attend the Rex and
Camus balls.

By inviting the soldiers to participate in one of the most

important social events in New Orleans, sane of Louisiana's most
prominent citizens indicated that their hostile attitude toward the Army
had mellowed somewhat.

29

For several weeks following Mardi Gras, Louisiana politics remained
remarkably peaceful.

Consequently, General Sheridan ordered the

remaining companies of the 7th Cavalry from the Department of the Gulf
to Dakota Territory, where they were needed for a simmer campaign
against the Sioux.

In April Companies B, G, and K, 7th Cavalry, left

Louisiana and reported for duty under the regiment's field oomnander,
Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer.

Hie change of locale and the

prospect of a campaign against the Indians pleased most of the troopers,
although this would be the last campaign for many of them.

2%aylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 310; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 393-"55I
79

Edward King, The Great South (Hartford, Conn., 1879), 43;
Frances M. A. Roe, A m y Letters Ifrrcm an Officer's Wife (New York, 1909),
154; New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 29, March 1, 1876.
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With the departure of the cavalry, Augur gave orders

d i s c n n t i . nu.rng

the District of the Upper Red River which had been in existence since
October 1874.

Major Lewis Merrill, the district's former ocnmander,

went to Philadelphia, where he acted as the assistant to the director of
the Gentennial Exposition.

Therefore, Merrill was not present at the

Battle of the Little Big Horn.

The exit of Merrill's cavalry left Augur

without any mounted troops serving in his department, a deficiency which
Augur keenly felt in the 1876 election campaign.

30

The first violent incidents associated with that campaign occurred
in May near Ooushatta.

An unidentified gunman severely wounded Republi

can state Senator Marshall H. Twitchell and killed his traveling
companion, George King, former Republican tax collector for Red River
Parish.

Twitchell's brother had been killed by unknown assailants in

the same area two years earlier.

King's murderer was never caught.

31

A second incident, which took place in central Louisiana,
frightened Republicans throughout the state and demonstrated that the
A m y was unable (or unwilling) to protect Republicans at all times and
in all places.

Democrats in the little town of Bayou Sara, in West

Feliciana Parish, had been threatening Republican officials for several
weeks, hoping to force them out of office.

In late February, responding

to Republicans1 request for help, General Augur had sent Company B, 13th
30Post Returns, Post of Shreveport, March-April-May 1876, in
Records of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 1169), RG 94, NA. Dept Gulf,
Journal of Events, pp. 82, 85; AAG to CO, Shreveport, April 11, 1876, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 142/DSL; Lt. Colon Augur to Major Lewis Merrill,
April 29, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 115/DSL; RG 393, NA. For Merrill's
role in Philadelphia, see Edgar I. Stewart, Custer's Luck (Nontan,
1955), 177.
33New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 3 and 4, 1876.
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Infantry* Cagptain Gustavus M. Basccm conmanding, from Baton Rouge to
Bayou Sara to ensure the safety of the officials.

32

Initially, Basoom

seemed confused by his assignment and wrote the departmental adjutant
asking if ”[i]n case of a mob Joining] after local officials, am 1 to
interfere and must I act on ny own judgment, or whose call for
assistance must I recognize?'9 Augur ordered Basoom "to do all in your
power to preserve peace and prevent bloodshed."

33

On May 11 a group of angry blacks killed Marx Aaronson, a white
farmer who had whipped severed Negroes responsible for butchering cattle
on his land.

Four days later white vigilantes from West Feliciana,

cooperating with an armed posse of Mississippians led by the sheriff of
Wilkinson County, hunted down Aaronson's killers, hanging two of than
and killing several others in a shoot-out.

Captain Basoom made no

effort to stop the vigilantes or arrest the Mississippians.

Taking

advantage of Basccm's inactivity, the white "bulldozers" rode through
the parish threatening black voters and generally intimidating
Republicans.

34

Democrats justified the actions of the vigilantes, citing the
violent acts which supposedly had been perpetrated by blacks in the
parish.

However, Lieutenant Governor C. C. Antoine, himself a black,

32D. A. Weber to Kellogg, March 6, 1876, in William P. Kellogg
Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State
University Library, Baton Rouge); Lt. Colon Augur to 00, Bayou Sara,
March 7, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 1 5 /DSL, rg 393, NA.
33Capt. G. M. Basoom to AAG, Dept Gulf, May 2, 1876, in House
Reports, 44 Gong., 1 Sess., No. 816, p. 737? Augur to Basoom, May 2,
1876, ibid., pp. 736-37.
3^Basccm to AAG, Dept Gulf, May 15, 1876, ibid., p. 737.
Orleans Daily Picayune, May 11 and 16, 1876.
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took exception to the Democrats' evidence and called upon General Augur
to restore order.

At first Augur was reluctant to honor Antoine's

request unless the U.S. marshal called for the Army"s assistance.

But

after reconsidering, Augur ordered Basoom to have patrols march through
the parish and prevent any disturbances.

Furthermore, Augur wanted

Basoom to write a complete report on the situation in the Felicianas.

35

Reporting as ordered, Basoom informed the departmental adjutant
that perhaps as many as thirty blacks had been killed in the recent
fighting.

Basoom tried to excuse his own inaction, claiming that most

of the disturbances actually had taken place in Wilkinson County,
Mississippi, which he apparently assumed was outside his jurisdiction.
Within a few days the New Orleans Picayune reported that the area around
«
—Ml■
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I

Bayou Sara was "all . . . quiet and that the people . . . [wane]
returning to their tores. . . . "

Believing these reports, Augur decided

that no additional military action was necessary.

The Picayune

complimented Augur for avoiding even the appearance of military inter
ference during the Feliciana ocranotion.

But Augur had been forewarned;

the "bulldozing" at Bayou Sara indicated that the political campaign
could become a violent one.36
On June 1 Augur left for Chicago, where he planned to confer with
General Sheridan concerning Louisiana matters.

The evening before Augur

33New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 17, 1876. Augur to C. C.
Antonine, May 16, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 1 1 5 /DSL, rg 393, NA. Augur
to Basoom, May 16, 1876, in House Reports, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 816,
p. 738.
36Basoom to AAG, Dept Gulf, May 16, 1876 (two ccmminications), in
House Reports, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 816, pp. 738-39; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, May 18, 1876.
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departed, Governor Kellogg wrote Sheridan, informing him that
President Grant and U.S. Attorney General Piemepont had pledged, to give
Louisiana Republicans "every possible assistance . . . to keep the peace
and enforce the laws and secure a fair election." Kellogg asked
Sheridan to provide Augur with "all the assistance you can." The
governor reminded Sheridan that " [tjhe Republicans of this state depend
greatly upon you."

Kellogg would have been pleased to know that

Sheridan had anticipated his request.

Acting on Sheridan’s orders,

Augur already had begun, preparations designed "to prevent open violence
as far as possible and to afford protection to all requiring it."

37

Upon returning from Chicago, Augur initiated his plans for the
usual summer encampment for the New Orleans garrison.

The Crescent City

had been quiet and free of any major disturbances, and Augur believed
that it would remain peaceful during the campaign.

General William T.

Sherman had given Augur permission to relocate his troops to safer
ground if disease appeared to endanger their health.

Augur made no

plans to move any garrisons other than the one at New Orleans.

38

The wisdom of not relocating any of the other garrisons became
evident when a riot occurred on June 17 at the Mount Pleasant Planta
tion, situated about two miles south of Port Hudson in East Baton Rouge
Parish.

Troops were sent to restore order, tut only after the end of

the disturbance, which apparently began when two black Democrats refused
to cooperate with the members of a Negro Republican club on the
37
Kellogg to Sheridan, May 31, 1876, in Sheridan Papers; Augur to
Sheridan, May 17, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 142/DSL, RG 393, NA.

38William T. Sherman to Augur, April 21, 1876, in Christopher C.
Augur Papers (Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield).
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plantation.

Several members of the club fired shots into the houses of

the two black Democrats, wounding one of than.

Recognizing his

attackers, one of the victims reported the incidents to local white
Democratic leaders, who formed a posse and rode to Mount Pleasant to
apprehend the assailants.

But the blacks had built barricades to

protect themselves and fired on the posse, driving them off of the
plantation.

On June 18 the Democrats gathered seme reinforcements, and

now numbering more than 200 strong they rode tack to Mount Pleasant.
The reinforced posse carried the barricades, wounded several blacks, and
arrested eight men.

Five blacks were lynched and left hanging frcm

trees as a warning to other Republicans in the area.

39

Augur ordered Colonel John R. Brooke to investigate the incidents,
and Brooke sent Captain Basoom to Mount Pleasant.
Democratic feelings were evident in his report.

Basccm's proHe blamed the violence

on a militant black organization called the "Union Right Step Republican
Club." Basoom, who admitted being on friendly terms with several
Democrats in the Baton Rouge vicinity, tried to exonerate the "bull
dozers," calling them "the best citizens here."

The New Orleans Times

naturally agreed with Basoom's findings, and the Picayune printed
Basccm's report on the disturbances, accompanied by an editorial filled
with compliments for the captain.

In contrast, the New Orleans Republi

can "protest[ed] against the one-sided conduct of this officer [Basoom],
who does not comprehend his duty." The Republican wanted "the War
Department . . . [to] prarptly exchange him for one of better
^New Orleans Republican, Jure 20 and 21, 1876; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, June 20 and 21, 1876. Basoom to AAG, Dept Gulf, June 19,
1876, in Senate Reports, 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 701, vol. 3,
p. 2 1 1 4 -2 TTF;—
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discretion,"

Disregarding the Republican*s advice, Augur left Basccm in

command of the company at Bayou Sara.

40

As a result of the Mount Pleasant disturbances, Augur established a
new military district in central Louisiana and Mississippi.

He created

the District of Baton Rouge, comprising six Louisiana parishes (East and
West Feliciana, East Baton Rouge, St. Helena, Livingston, and
Tangipahoa) and three Mississippi counties (Wilkinson, Amite, and Pike).
He placed Colonel Brooke in ooisnand of the district and transferred a
well known Democrat, Colonel Henry A. Morrow, to Little Rock, Arkansas.
41
(Morrow was Brooke's senior.)
The —Picayunen attributed Morrow's transfer to "his courteous
mmrnm&n m i

department and impartial official conduct [which] had secured him the
esteem of the respectable people of East Baton Rouge."

Hie Picayune

concluded that the popular colonel's transfer was "the first step taken
toward carrying out that programme of Federal interference . . .
intended to carry Louisiana in the interest of the Republican
party. . . . "

Echoing the Picayune's conclusions, the Thibodaux

Sentinel added that Morrow ("a just and hightoned gentleman") had been
removed to allow Brooke ("clad in a once honorable, but now prostituted
uniform") to fulfill the Republicans' "design of terrorizing the State."
Providing its usual counterpoint to these Democratic Garments, the New
Orleans Republican saw " [t]he relief of Col. Morrow . . . and the
40
In addition to sources cited in note 39, see New York Times,
June 20, 1876; New Orleans Times, June 20, 1876; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, June 26, 1876; testimony of Basccm before a congressional
committee, in House Reports, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 816, pp. 735-36; New
Orleans Republican, June 25, 1876.
41Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, pp. 90-91.
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assignment of Col. Brooke to succeed . . . [as] a hopeful sign."

Hie

Republican concluded that "the Republicans of the disturbed region were
to be afforded something like justice at last."

42

Soon after Brooke took command of the Baton Rouge District, another
violent incident occurred near Bayou Sara.

On July 11 a group of armed

white vigilantes tried to arrest Gilbert Carter, a Negro who the whites
claimed had been plotting to kill several prominent Democrats in the
vicinity of Bayou Sara.

When Carter supposedly tried to escape, the

vigilantes shot and killed him.

In a report to Colonel Brooke,

Captain Basoom indicated that Carter had been the chief conspirator in
such a plot, and therefore, the vigilantes were justified in trying to
arrest him.

Basccm reported that the "gentlemen" who killed Carter were

all "men of character, education, and property.

Want of confidence in

the sheriff, . . . [was] the reason they [gave] . . . for their irre
gular action in this case," Basccm concluded.

Colonel Brooke was not

satisfied with Basccm1s explanation of the "irregular action," and he
decided to investigate the matter personally.

Brooke found that there

was no clear evidence implicating Carter in any conspiracy.

Moreover,

Brooke determined that the whites had sinply refused "to place the
investigation of such matters or the arrest of accused parties in the
hands of proper authorities, even when all possibility of bloodshed,
&c., might be avoided by so doing." Brooke ordered Basoom to "prevent
bloodshed" in the future and stationed Company C, 13th Infantry, in
^^New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 26, 1876; Hiibodaux Sentinel,
July 1, 1876; New Orleans Republican, June 25, 1876.
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Clinton, Louisiana, to provide more protection for blacks in the
district.^
Despite Brooke's efforts to keep the peace, the District of Baton
Rouge (especially East and West Feliciana parishes) was overrun by armed
groups of mounted white "bulldozers."

White employers fired severed, of

their black employees who refused to pledge their support for the
Democratic ticket.

The Mount Pleasant riot and Carter's murder were the

opening salvos in a campaign of terror, demonstrating the Conservatives'
determination to win the election of 1876.

44

Rumors concerning the possibility that General Phil Sheridan would
take command of Iouisiana heightened interest in the political campaign.
The possibility of Sheridan's return provoked an outpouring of invec
tives from several newspapers.

For example, the Thibodaux Sentinel

called Sheridan the "blind, brutal tool of . . . Grant," and the
Picayune branded him "a cold-blooded, narrow-minded martinet— a sort of
diminutive Grant, without brains, without culture, and utterly oblivious
of the civil rights of the unfortunate people who happen to fall into
his power." The Monroe Ouachita Telegraph endorsed an editorial in the
New York Sun, which concluded that Sheridan was going to "leave the
extermination of the Indians of the Northwest to inferior officers and
troops, while he, with the flower of the Army, was engaged in putting
^AAG, Dept Gulf to Augur, July 11, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol.
142/DSL; Col. John R. Brooke to Basoom, July 11, 1876, in Dist of Baton
Rouge, vol. 162/DSL; Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, p. 93; RG 393, NA.
Basoom to AAAG, Dist of Baton Rouge, July 13, 1876, in Senate Reports,
44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 701, vol. 3, p. 2619. Lonn, Reconstruction an
Louisiana, 431.
^Senate Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2, pp. 11-12, 22, 26,
28-29, and passim.
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down the white 'banditti'" of Louisiana.

The New Orleans Democrat

claimed that in the past Sheridan had "displayed all the cowardly
brutality of a ruffian, and . . . that he [had] made the national flag a
terror to those to vhom it should have teen a protection."

In short,

the Democrat denounced Sheridan "as the shameless tool of an infamous
administration" and an officer who had "disgraced his uniform." The
Democrat had no doubts that he would do anything to "prolong the
domination of Radicalism in Louisiana." The Picayune warned "that if
the attempt is renewed to carry Louisiana at the point of the bayonet,
the reaction of 1874 will be repeated in 1876."
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Under the shadow of the Picayune's threat, the delegates to the
Republican state nominating convention gathered on June 28 in New
Orleans.

Confirming everyone's expectations. Governor Kellogg declined

renomination, leaving U.S. Marshal Stephen B. Packard and former
Lieutenant Governor P. B. S. Pinchback as the chief contenders.
Although boasting the support of former Governor Henry Clay Warmoth,
Pinchback failed to pick up much strength, and the convention nominated
Packard, who, as leader of the Custom House faction, was the
Republican's logical choice.
A native of Maine, Packard was thirty-seven years old in 1876 and
had served without distinction as a captain in the 12th Maine Volunteer
Infantry during the Civil War.

In 1864 he came to Louisiana with his

regiment, married a local vroman, and opened a law office in the Crescent
City after the war ended.

He quickly became influential in the

45Thibodaux Sentinel, July 1, 1876; New Orleans Democrat, June 26,
1876; Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, July 28, 1876; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, June 25 and 27, 1876. See also Alexandria Louisiana Democrat,
3uTy37~l876.
'
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Republican party and was appointed U.S. marshal for Louisiana in 1869.
Subsequently exercising power beyond the limits of his office, he
dominated the Custom House faction of his party.

He probably could have

obtained the gubernatorial nomination in 1872, but instead continued as
marshal and cooperated closely with the Amy, wielding his considerable
influence on behalf of Kellogg.

In 1876 Packard decided to secure the

governorship and the official powers that went with the office.
Caesar C. Antoine, Kellogg's lieutenant governor and a Negro, was
renominated to balance the Republican ticket.

In a move to assure the

support of Negro voters, the convention also nominated black politicians
for secretary of state and superintendent of education.

Although the

Republicans tried to appear united, Pinchback and other blacks were
dissatisfied with the slate of candidates.

But whatever their

differences, few Republicans could picture Pinchback or his followers
giving their support to the Democrats.
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On July 24 the Conservatives net in Baton Rouge to nominate a
standard bearer.

The most likely candidates were "Governor" John

McEnery; David B. Penn, hero of Liberty Place and one-time "acting
governor;" former New Orleans Mayor Louis A. Wiltz; and former Confed
erate General Francis R. T. Nicholls.

Wiltz led on the early ballots,

but McEnery broke the deadlock, withdrawing his name and announcing his
support for Nicholls.

The convention delegates followed McEnery's lead

and overwhelmingly nominated "all that was left" of General Nicholls,
who had lost his left arm at the battle of Winchester and his left foot
46Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 481-82; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 402-407. On Packard's life see New Orleans Times, July 4,
1876.
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at Chancellorsville. The convention completed its business, nominating
Wiltz for lieutenant governor and filling the lesser spots on the ticket
with other stalwart Democrats.

Running on his glorious bloodstained war

record, Nicholls proved to be an excellent candidate.

47

In spite of the violence in the Felicianas and the evident concern
about the campaign displayed by mentors of both parties, General Augur
had decided to proceed with his plans for the annual summer encampment
of the New Orleans garrison.

In early July the troops at Jackson

Barracks had boarded trains taking them to Holly Springs.
small caretaker squad was left behind at the barracks.

As usual, a

However, the

soldiers in New Orleans, who expected to go to Holly Springs, were
ordered to spend the summer at the small town of Lewisburg, Louisiana,
twenty-five miles from New Orleans.
were moved to special summer camps.

No other garrisons in the state
48

Following the accustomed practice that General Emory previously had

adopted, Augur left Louisiana on a combined business-pleasure trip to
Washington, D.C. and New York.

He met with his superiors at the War

Department for a few days and subsequently spent the remainder of July
and most of August in Ogdensburg, New York, visiting his family.

During

Augur's absence, his adjutants kept him informed of the situation in the
department.

49

^Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 482-83; Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 408-Tl; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the
Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge, 1959), 224-25.

4^AAG, Dept Gulf to 00, Jackson Barracks, June 20, 1876, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 115/DSL, RG 393, NA. Post Returns, Jackson Barracks, July
1876, in Records of the AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 524), RG 94, NA; Post
Returns, Post of New Orleans, July 1876, ibid. (reel 844).
49Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, p. 92; AAG, Dept Gulf to Augur,
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During Augur's absence, there were no major disturbances, riots, or
violent incidents.

In fact the reports from the adjutants were usually

brief and lacking in detail, such as the one on July 18:
the Department— no news of iirportanoe."

"all quiet in

But the Democrats probably

derived a psychological boost from Augur's absence.

His presence in

Louisiana during the stamer and his close attention to the details of
the campaign might have discouraged sore of the Democratic intimidation.
Although it appeared that there was "no news of importance" to report,
the Democrats were girding themselves for the final push of the campaign
during September and October.

In fact, the Democratic "bulldozers" in

East and West Feliciana, East Baton Rouge, Morehouse, and Ouachita
parishes set to their work with unaccustomed ferocity, making it plain
that they planned to deliver the votes of their parishes to the
Democratic column,

Several minor incidents in his district prompted

Colonel Brooke to ask for reinforcements, but the departmental
adjutant's reply was discouraging:
what you now have."

you "must manage to [make] do with

It was impossible for Brooke to have soldiers

everywhere they were needed.

As the campaign intensified, the white

vigilantes did not hesitate to use violence.

By the time troops arrived

on the scene the vigilantes were gone, and witnesses were reluctant to
testify about what they had seen.

50

Time was running out for most local

Republican officeholders, and without strong reinforcements, the Army
July 18, 22, 25, 29, August 1, 5, 6, 11, 14, 23, 1876, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 142/DSL, PG 393, NA.
SO

Ibid.; AAG, Dept Gulf to 00, Baton Rouge, August 17, 1876, in
Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL, RG 393, NA. Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana,
412-15, 431; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 486-87.
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was unable to stop the final sands from dropping to the bottom of the
hour glass.
Officially, at least, national policy regarding the protection of
Republican voters and officeholders in the South remained unchanged.

In

fact, the U.S. House of Representatives buoyed President Grant's hopes,
passing a resolution confirming his authority to use any Army troops
"not engaged in subduing the savages on the Western frontier . . . for
protecting all citizens without distinction to race, color, or political
opinion in the exercise of the right to vote. . . . "

Moreover, the

newly appointed U.S. Attorney General, Alonzo Taft, informed
General Sherman that he expected the A m y to aid any U.S. marshals who
were trying to protect voters in the South. ^
Louisiana's Democratic newspapers bitterly attacked the national
administration's plans to use the Army in the election.

For example,

the Shreveport Tines criticized the planned cooperation between Attorney
General Taft and General Sherman, and suggested, as it had in the past,
that the soldiers were supposed to be serving on the frontier rather
than in the South.

Disregarding the "bulldozing" that had already

occurred, the Picayune declared that the Republicans would do anything
to justify the use of troops in the South.

Purposely distorting the

role the A m y was intended to play, the Picayune asserted that "the
presence of the army is itself calculated to exercise an undue and
unlawful influence upon the colored voter, and is practical, effective
52
intimidation."

5%ew Orleans Daily Picayune, August 17, 1876; New Orleans
Democrat, September 5, 1876.
52New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 17, 18, 23, 25, September 5
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The New Orleans Republican tried its test to defend Grant's policy.
Counterattacking the Picayune, the Republican concluded that " [t]he
presence of the entire arny of the United States in Louisiana would not
deprive any Democrat of voting just as he thought best. . . . "

But the

obvious fact was that the majority of white Louisianians were intent
upon electing General Nicholls.

Turning the Republican's statement on

its head, it actually might take the entire U.S. Arny to guarantee ary
53
Republican the privilege of voting as he thought test.
Meanwhile, General Augur had decided to return to Louisiana.

He

went first to Chicago, where he conferred with General Sheridan and
learned that he was to receive reinforcements from other Southern
states.

Sheridan wanted the 1876 election to be one of the most

peaceful ever held in Louisiana.

Concluding his meeting with Sheridan,

Augur returned to New Orleans on August 31.

The Reconstruction era's

climactic political campaign was about to begin.
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and 6, 1876 (quote from August 25); Shreveport Times, July 7, August 24,
September 10, 1876.
~*^New Orleans Republican, August 17, 18, September 5, 1876.
54
AAG R. C. Drum to Augur, August 21, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 154/
DSL; Sheridan to Augur, August 22, 1876, ibid.; Dept Gulf, Journal of
Events, p. 96; RG 393, NA.

CHAPTER XIX
AUGUR AND THE 1876 ELECTION
At their conference in Chicago Generals Sheridan and Augur
apparently formulated a plan designed to prevent Louisiana Democrats
from riding roughshod over the Republicans during the election of 1876.
Within a few days after his return to New Orleans, Augur began issuing
orders that eventually sent Army detachments to more Louisiana towns and
precincts than had ever been garrisoned before a single election.
The need for such a plan was evident.

Augur had been back in New

Orleans only a matter of hours when he received a report that an
unidentified gunman had killed B. F. Dinkgrave, the former Republican
sheriff and tax collector of Ouachita Parish.

Although the Democrats

claimed that Dinkgrave's murder was the result of a personal feud
unrelated to politics, Dinkgrave had a reputation as a political
organizer among Ouachita blacks, and his murder was probably politically
motivated.^
Consequently, General Augur sent his son, Lieutenant Jacob A.
Augur, to Monroe with orders for Captain James T. McGinnis, acting
coirmander of the post.

The general ordered McGinnis "to preserve the

peace as far as he . . . [could] lawfully do so— to prevent collisions
■^Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 (Gloucester,
Mass., 1967), 432; New York Times, August 31, 1876; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, August 31, 1876; Shreveport Times, August 31 and September L,
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between opposing factions, and to give protection to innocent parties
who may be threatened or be driven from their homes."

Remembering

Captain George Head's previous associations with Ouachita Democrats,
Augur also instructed McGinnis to maintain "friendly relations with all
parties, but be intimate with none."

Moreover, Augur suggested that

McGinnis meet with several important Ouachita Conservatives to inform
them of his orders.

Augur planned to reinforce the Monroe garrison, and

in the meantime he let McGinnis decide whether to split his company into
detachments for duty in different parts of the parish.

McGinnis

subsequently reported that Monroe was temporarily "quiet & no trouble
2
was apprehended."
Discounting McGinnis' assurances, Governor Kellogg believed that
the Democrats would ocranit additional murders unless the Army protected
Republicans throughout northern Louisiana.

The governor suggested that

Augur station troops in DeSoto, Morehouse, and Catahoula parishes.

The

general agreed to Kellogg's suggestion, and planned to locate detach
ments in Mansfield and Bastrop, and ordered a reliable officer
3

(Captain Clayton Hale) to investigate the situation in Harrisonburg.
Augur ordered the transfer of one officer and twenty enlisted men
from Little Rock to Mansfield, and took steps to strengthen several
other posts in Louisiana.

A squad of infantrymen was sent from Holly

Springs, Mississippi, to St. Martinville.

More than one hundred

^New Orleans Daily Picayune, September 2, 1876. Gen. C. C. Augur
to Lt. J. A. Augur, September 4, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL;
Capt. J. T. McGinnis to AAG, Dept Gulf, September 10, 1876, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 154/DSL, RG 393, NA.
3Augur to William P. Kellogg, September 21, 1876, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 116/DSL; AAG, Dept Gulf to 00, Jackson, Mississippi, September 21,
1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 142/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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recruits, who had recently arrived in New Orleans, were distributed
among the garrisons at Baton Rouge, Natchitoches, Ooushatta, and
Pineville.

Furthermore, Augur dispatched Company G, 16th Infantry, from
4
Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama, to Baton Rouge.
During October Augur arranged for Republicans in other towns to
receive military protection.

Detachments consisting of one officer and

ten or fifteen enlisted men inarched into the towns of Colfax in Grant
Parish, Minden in Webster Parish, Franklin in St. Mary's Parish, and
Evergreen in Avoyelles Parish.

In each case the detachment carmanders

understood that they were to remain in the towns until the balloting was
finished on November 7.5
Despite these extraordinary precautions, Republican officials
wanted more troops stationed in the state.

Che of Louisiana's U.S.

senators, John R. West, informed President Grant that unless
Colonel Benjamin Grierson's 10th Cavalry (a black regiment) was sent to
the northern parishes by the end of October, the state's electoral votes
would be forfeited to Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic nominee for
President.

Buttressing West's opinion, Governor Kellogg urged

Republican National Ccmmitteeman R. B. McCormick to convince the
4AAG, Dept Gulf to CO, Little Rock, September 21, 1876, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 142/DSL; Col. DeLanoey Floyd-Jones to AG, Dept Gulf,
September 15, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 154/DSL; AAG, Dept Gulf to COs,
Baton Rouge (September 27, 1876), Natchitoches, Ooushatta, and Pineville
(September 28, 1876), and Mount Vernon Barracks (September 19, 1876),
ibid.; Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, pp. 98, 100. All in RG 393, NA.
5AAG, Dept Gulf to 00, Pineville, October 19, 1876, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 116/DSL; Augur to Kellogg, October 24, 1876, ibid.; AAG, Dept Gulf
to CO, St. Martinville, October 27, 1876, ibid.; Augur to Col. J. R.
Brooke, October 27, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 142/DSL; RG 393, NA.
Colfax Chronicle, November 4, 1876.
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President that Grierson's cavalry was desperately needed to reinforce
troops already in the state.

Although Grant previously had indicated

that he might send "some colored troops from the plains" to Louisiana,
he was reluctant to issue the necessary orders.

Stephen Packard's

replacement as U.S. marshal for Louisiana, John R. G. Pitkin, told Grant
that it was "absolutely vital" for additional soldiers to be stationed
in all parts of the state "to discourage attempts at violence" by the
Democrats.

The Republicans continued to hope for the transfer of
g
Grierson's regiment, but the troops were never sent.
Overcoming this disappointment, Governor Kellogg buoyed Republican
spirits, reporting that Phil Sheridan planned to cone to New Orleans.
The little general had been ordered to supervise the protection of the
state Returning Board after the election had been held.

Kellogg urged

Secretary of War J. Don Cameron to send Sheridan to Louisiana as soon as
possible.

Kellogg believed that "the moral effect of his presence in

the city will go very far towards preserving the public peace, averting
violence and bloodshed, and securing to all citizens protection in the
exercise of the right to vote. . . . "

However, General Sherman informed

Augur that "Sheridan will not come to New Orleans unless it is a case of
extreme urgency."

Answering a question from a reporter for the New

Orleans Times on the likelihood of Sheridan's assuming oarrmand, Augur
said that there was "no probable truth in the rumor of General Sheridan's
%ohn R. West to U. S. Grant, October 3, 1876, in House Exec.
Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 30, p. 151; Grant's quote from his
endorsement on Stephen B. Packard to J. R. Beckwith, September 5, 1876,
ibid.; J. R. G. Pitkin to Grant, October 17, 1876, ibid. Kellogg to
Republican national committeeman R. B. McConrdck, October 16, 1876, in
Rutherford B. Hayes Papers (microfilm copy, Rutherford B. Hayes Library,
Fremont, Ohio).
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visit to New Orleans."

In view of these conflicting reports,

Republicans did not know what to expect, but considering Kellogg's
assurances, they hoped that if the cavalry was not canning, at least
Sheridan could be sent instead.

Perhaps the effect of his presence
7

would be equal to that of a regiment of soldiers.

Until "Little Phil" arrived, Augur was charged with the
responsibility of ensuring a peaceful election campaign.

Although post

commanders had been ordered to prevent violence, they hesitated to
challenge armed groups of Democrats who used violence and intimidation
on a broad scale, especially in the parishes of East Baton Rouge, East
and West Feliciana (all in the District of Baton Rouge), Morehouse, and
Ouachita.

Despite the fact that A m y garrisons had been established in

each of these parishes, vhite vigilantes, or "bulldozers" as they were
commonly called, terrorized local Republicans almost at will.

By

election day on Novatber 7 many Republicans had teen threatened,
bullied, shot at, roughed \p, and had had their property damaged or
destroyed by Conservatives who believed that the election of Francis
Nicholls would rescue their state from Republican misrule.

8

7
Kellogg foretold of Sheridan's plans in the New Orleans Daily
Picayune, October 23, 1876. (SW J. Don Cameron specifically ordered
Sheridan to make certain that the members of the Returning Board were
not "prevented by force or intimidation from performing their proper
functions."
Cameron to Sheridan, October 31, 1876, filed with Dept
Gulf, Letters Recsd, RG 393, NA.) See also Kellogg to Cameron,
November 1, 1876, in AGO File 4788-1876 (Microcopy M-666, reel 298),
R3 94, NA; Sherman to Augur, November 6, 1876, ibid. New Orleans Times,
November 7, 1876.
®For overviews of the violence and its effect an the election, see
Joe Gray Taylor's perceptive comments in Louisiana Reconstructed,
1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 485-89. See also Ella Lonn, Reconstruc
tion in Louisiana , 431-37, a noticeably pro-Democratic view of the
campaign" Although conflicting in many particulars, the overwhelming
weight of the testimony given by men of both parties to congressional
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For example, in the District of Baton Rouge, Captain Gustavus
Bascom, an avowed Democrat, failed to curtail the mounted vigilantes
near Bayou Sara in West Feliciana Parish.

(Testifying before a congres

sional committee, Bascom said the nickname "bulldozers" had been given
to the vigilantes as "a joke.")

But the well armed riders were no

joking matter to the Felicianas' blacks, who were intimidated to such an
extent that few of than voted in the election.

The murder of Ike

Mitchell, one of Bayou Sara's most prominent black businessmen,
undoubtedly had a petrifying effect on his friends and neighbors.

Other

than the fact that several unidentified horsemen had committed the
crime, Bascom claimed that he was unable to learn any details of
Mitchell’s murder.

9

In the neighboring parish of East Feliciana, Republicans asked the
Army to provide protection for ore of their political rallies.

But

Lieutenant William S. Davis, commanding at Clinton, was hesitant to
furnish a detachment without specific orders from district headquarters.
Acting in the temporary absence of Colonel Brooke, Lieutenant Fayette W.
Roe, the district adjutant, ordered Davis to use his troops to prevent a
collision between hostile political parties in the area.

Responding to

Roe's orders, Davis sent guards to the Republican rally and provided an
committees indicates conditions of unrest and violence in several
Louisiana parishes. See Senate Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2;
Senate Misc. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 14; Senate Reports, 44 Cong.,
2 Sess., No. 701, vols. 1-3; House Misc. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 34, vols. 1-3; House Reports,'~T4 Cbng., 2 Sess., No. 156,
Pts. 1 & 2.

g

Testimony of Capt. Gustavus Bascom before a congressional
committee, in Senate Reports, 44 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 701, vol. 3,
pp. 2599, 2606, 2613; Bascom to AAAG, Dist of Baton Rouge, October 3,
1876, in Dist of Baton Rouge, RG 393, NA.
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escort for East Feliciana's Republican tax collector, Frank Powers,
while he traveled between Clinton and Jackson, Louisiana.

Bushwackers

fired on Davis from ambush and quickly made good their escape.

Neither

the tax collector nor the lieutenant was wounded, but the incident was
only one of fifty occurrences of politically inspired violence in East
Feliciana reported to Colonel Brooke between June and November.
Following the election, lieutenant Davis testified that the parish was
"overwhelmingly [RJepublican," but that "every [R]epublican in the
parish . . . was afraid to vote the way he wished. . . . "

Although East

Feliciana had 2,127 registered black voters, there were no votes
recorded for Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican presidential candidate,
or for Stephen B. Packard, the Republican gubernatorial candidate.

In

an effort to disuade the Democrats frcsn using violence, Brooke ordered
his small detachment of thirteen mounted infantrymen to help U.S. deputy
marshals W. H. Murphy and George Thompson arrest several men accused of
intimidating blacks in the Baton Rouge area.

The marshals jailed the

accusal men, but other bulldozers carried out their program of
intimidation and the Democrats dominated the District of Baton Rouge in
the election.
The New Orleans Democrat criticized the activities of "Grant's
Janissaries" in the Baton Rouge area.

The Democrat noted that the Army

10Lt. W. S. Davis to Ool. Brooke, October 16, 1876, in Dist of
Baton Rouge, RG 393, NA; Lt. F. W. Roe to Davis, October 16, 1876,
ibid.; Roe to Bascom, October 26, 1876, ibid.; Brooke to AAG, Dept Gulf,
October 28, 1876, ibid.; Capt. B. H. Rogers to AAAG, Dist of Baton
Rouge, November 6, 1876, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA.
Testimony of Col. J. R. Brooke before a congressional committee, in
Senate Reports, 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 701, vol. 2, pp. 1694-95; ibid.,
vol. 1, pp. iii-iv; testimony of Lt. W. S. Davis, in Senate Exec. Docs.,
44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2, pp. 227-28.
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was on a "war footing" and that the troops had been dashing "through
sane quiet plantation quarters/' firing their guns into the air, and
disturbing blacks who belonged to the Democratic party.

The Baton Rouge

Weekly Advocate denounced "Uncle Sam's roosters"' and their "Grand
Military Sortie." Although the Army was "strengthening the broken
backbone of Radicalism in this parish and overaweing the white and
colored Democrats,” the Advocate said that the Amy's behavior was
another example of how "this arm of the public service has so often been
prostituted during the past eight years for political purposes by the
bastard party in power/'

Disregarding the crimes and acts of intimida

tion committed by the Democrats, the Advocate ironically concluded that
the Amy's assistance to U.S. marshals and its protection of Republicans
was a disreputable "chapter . . . to be . . . handed down to future
generations as a part of the history of the Centennial year."

11

The situation was just as chaotic in the northeastern part of the
state, where Captain Clayton Hale tried to protect the Republicans in
Ouachita and Morehouse parishes.

Hale said that the "condition of

affairs in Ouachita Parish . . . was very much unsettled" during the
weeks before the election.

Several different "mounted and armed

organizations of white men" rode through the parishes, whipping blacks,
breaking into and ransacking their hemes, and disrupting Republican
political rallies.
to vote at all.

The vigilantes told blacks to vote Democratic or not

On at least six separate occasions during October and

November, Hale dispatched Army detachments to guard Republican campaign
meetings.

Hale usually designated his most reliable officer,

"^^New Orleans Democrat, October 27 and 28, 1876; Baton Rouge Weekly
Advocate, October 277°TB757
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Lieutenant Henry M. McCawley, to command the detachments.

McCawley

reported that on one occasion boisterous Democrats forced Republicans to
adjourn their meeting prematurely.

A few days later twenty armed

Democrats boldly rode into another Republican rally and it was clear to
McCawley that they "meant mischief."

When the Conservatives tried to

disrupt the convocation, McCawley personally challenged the most vocal
Democrat to a fight, and subsequently the noise subsided.

Hale himself

attended a similar meeting just prior to the election.

The visiting

Democrats unmercifully heckled the Republican speakers.

Drawing his

sword, Hale threatened to order his troops to disperse the hecklers
unless they remained quiet.

He told them that they were welcome

to leave if they did not like the speeches.

The Democrats stopped their

harassment, and when the rally ended, rode away in a cavalry-style
column of twos under good discipline.

Obviously, all of the riders were
12
armed, and they openly displayed their weapons.
Among the numerous forms of intimidation the Democrat used in
Ouachita, murder was the most terrifying.

On October 11 two masked

white men killed Primus Jackson and wounded Eaton Logwood at the
lather's farm located six miles north of Monroe.
Logwood were Negroes.

Both Johnson and

Johnson had been an important Republican leader

in the parish and had built a school for black children near Monroe.
After the shootings, neighbors sought a doctor and the U.S. marshal,
both of whom refused to venture out of Monroe, "considering the mission
12Testimony of Capt. Clayton Hale before a congressional committee,
in Senate Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2, pp. 331, 333; testimony
of T3E. H. M. McCawley, ibid., p. 337; Hale's testimony in Senate
Reports, 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 701, vol. 1, pp. 629-30; McCawley's
testimony, ibid., pp. 247-48.
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too dangerous." Captain Hale sent Lieutenant McCawley with eight
enlisted men to investigate the incident.

Under the lieutenant's

questioning, Logwood named Robert Logan as one of the murderers and
implicated William F. Theobalds, captain of a local rifle club, as the
other.

McCawley left three soldiers to guard Logwood, and when he was

well enough to travel, the soldiers escorted the wounded man into
Monroe.
Hale severely criticized all of the local civil authorities in
Ouachita for not taking charge of the case, indicating his lack of
respect for the district judge ("a time-serving man, desirous of
adapting his course to the changing political condition of the State")
and the sheriff, who Hale said was "wholly inefficient." The captain
branded U.S. Deputy Marshal John H. Dinkgrave "a coward" who was
"utterly worthless."13
The Monroe Ouachita Telegraph condemned the partisan tone of Hale's
report on the Johnson-Logwood incident, claiming that the captain had no
evidence to connect Logan and Theobalds with the shootings.

The

Rayville Richland Beacon accused Hale of "turning the outrage mill . . .
with a vigor and earnestness that shews that he understands the object
of his mission," in other words, implying that the captain was trying to
distort the incident to the Republicans' political advantage.

In

contrast, the Donaldsonville Chief, a Republican newspaper, complimented
Hale's exemplary sense of duty and advised Republicans to take
13McCawley's testimony, in Senate Reports, 44 Cong., 2 Sess.,
NO. 701, vol. 1, p. 249; Hale's testimony, ibid., p. 639. Hale to AAG,
Dept Gulf, October 12, 1876, in Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, November 3,
1876.
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heed:

Johnson's murder was proof that the Democrats were using every

available means to win the election.

14

Although the intentions and tactics of the Democrats were obvious,
General Augur had not ordered the troops spending the sumner at Holly
Springs to return to New Orleans.

The big city had been quiet, and

therefore Augur could have used these troops at other locations in the
state.

Eventually, toward the end of October, Augur decided to reestab

lish the garrison in the Crescent City, thus ensuring that it would
remain quiet during the election.

The troops Who had spent the summer

months at Lewisburg also returned to the New Orleans vicinity.

Augur

divided the garrison, placing 234 soldiers at different locations within
New Orleans itself, and holding 52 soldiers in reserve at Jackson
Barracks.

Augur sent a special letter of instruction to Colonel Philipe

DeTrobriand, commander of troops in the city, ordering him to hold his
forces in readiness to act at the call of the U.S. marshal, but
otherwise to keep the soldiers at or near their assigned locations.
The troops were not "to approach any poll of election except in the
performance of some duty under . . . [DeTrobriand' s‘
J orders" to keep the
peace.^
Acting on the personal request of Governor Kellogg, Augur
dispatched troops to the towns of Delta and Tallulah in Madison Parish.
The governor feared that vigilantes from Mississippi might cross the
^Monroe Ouachita Telegraph, November 3, 1876; Rayville Richland
Beacon, November 4, 1876; Donaldsonville Chief, November 4, 1876.
"^Dept
October 28,
November 1,
November 6,

Gulf,
1876,
1876,
1876,

Journal of Events, p. 106; SO No. 207, Dept Gulf,
in SO, Dept Gulf; Circular Letter No. 18, Dept Gulf,
filed with ibid.; AAG, Dept Gulf to Col. Floyd-Jones,
in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL; RG 393, NA.
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state's border and disrupt the election in those towns.

Kellogg also

advised Augur "that disorder and bloodshed . . . [were] imminent,"
unless military units occupied West Baton Rouge Landing and Houma.
Consequently, Augur ordered soldiers to go to each of those towns.

On

his own initiative Augur stationed troops in the towns of Port Hudson,
Breaux Bridge, and Oak Ridge before the election.

By election eve on

November 6 almost eight hundred officers and enlisted man had been sent
to twenty-one towns and forty separate parish precincts outside of New
Orleans.

Augur was attempting to shew the flag in as many different

locations as possible.

The general told a reporter for the New Orleans

Times that "a good feeling" existed "throughout the country between the
16
troops and citizens," but by then the bulldozers had done their work.
Reports from Army officers across the state indicated that
November 7, 1876, was one of the quietest election days in Louisiana
history.

17

Although there was virtually no violence at the ballot

boxes, Democrats patrolled the roads in some parishes, especially near
Baton Rouge and Monroe.

Captain Hale said "that the town of

•^Special Return, November 7, 1876, filed with Monthly Returns,
Dept Gulf; Kellogg to Augur, November 4, 1876 (two communications), in
Dept Gulf, Letters Reed; Augur to Kellogg, November 4, 1876, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 116/DSL; RG 393, NA. New Orleans Times, November 2, 1876.
SW, Annual Report, 1876-1877 (House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 1), pp. 99-100.
17
The troop commanders filed separate reports on the quiet
election, reporting "no disturbances" or "all quiet" from Evergreen,
Clinton, Bayou Sara, Baton Rouge, Colfax, Franklin, Minden, Bastrop,
Coushatta, Shreveport, Houma, St. Martinville, Natchitoches, and
Alexandria on either November 7 or 8; in Dept Gulf, vol. 154/DSL. See
also Sgt. James MoCrea (Lobdell's Store, West Baton Rouge Parish) to
Post AG, Baton Rouge, November 8, 1876, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Augur to AAG, MilDivMo, November 7, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 142/DSL;
RG 393, NA. Testimony of Lt. Fayette Roe (Post Hudson) before a
congressional committee, in Senate Reports, 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 701,
vol. 2, pp. 1492-95.
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Monroe . . . was encircled and picketed by armed men, and that all of
the roads and approaches thereto were so strongly guarded by the same
class of men as to effectively prevent Colored [sic] people from either
going to or from it without great risk to their lives."

Apparently,

Hale held his soldiers in Monroe to prevent any disturbances at the
polls themselves.

Colonel John Brooke reported that most blacks in the

Baton Rouge area had been so intimidated before the election that they
were too scared to vote.

Lieutenant William Davis, who guarded the

polls at Jackson, said that many blacks were "afraid to hold nestings or
vote as they wished." Lieutenant William Gerlach, an Army officer who
sympathized with the Democrats, claimed that he did not witness any
intimidation of blacks by whites, but he acknowledged that some
Conservatives had used various means to "coax" Negroes into voting for
the Democratic ticket.

Despite General Augur" s effusive congratulations

to his troops for their "good conduct and courtesy" on election day, the
Army obviously had been unable to prevent the Democrats from
intimidating black voters in several parts of Louisiana.

18

It appeared that the Democrats had won a signal victory in the
election of 1876.

"The Carnival of Thieves, State and National, [is] at

an End," trumpeted the Shreveport Times. Francis Nicholls1 election
seemed assured, and Samuel Tilden's chances appeared to be rosy.
Overjoyed by these indications, the Thibodaux Sentinel claimed that
^^Testimony of Clayton Hale before congressional committee, in
Senate Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2, pp. 332, 334, 336. See
also Hale to AG, Dept Gulf, November 7, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 154/
DSL, RG 393, NA. Testimony of Col. J. R. Brooke, in Senate Reports, 44
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 701, vol. 2, p. 1696; testimony of Lt. W. S. Davis,
ibid., p. 1294; Lt. William Gerlach to Mayor of Baton Rouge Leon
Pastremski and Dr. J. W. Dupree, November 16, 1876, in House Reports, 44
Cong., 2 Sess., No. 156, Pt. 1, p. 75.
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finally the "iron heel of despotism . . . [was] about to be lifted off"
of Louisiana's neck.

The New Orleans Picayune believed that Tilden had

undoubtedly carried the nation and Louisiana.

But the New Orleans Times

was reluctant to award the laurels of victory just yet and predicted
that Tilden's winning margin would be very close— in fact, his election
hinged on the results in South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana,
Southern states which still had Republican governments.

The New Orleans

Democrat agreed with the assessment of the Times; the election turned
on the electoral votes of the three doubtful Southern states, xhere each
party was claiming to have won.

Until the results were officially

announced, neither Tilden nor Hayes could be inaugurated.

19

In contrast to the gloom of the Tines and the Democrat, the New
Orleans Republican was hopeful about Hayes' chances, encouraging all
Republicans in the state to "Hold the Fort" and remain "Steady."
Republican warned that it was going to be "A Very Close Vote."

The

20

So many conflicting and confusing elements attended the election of
1876 that a winner could not be named for almost four months.

Even in a

time without the benefit of computers and electronic mass communica
tions, the results of a national election were usually known within a
week's time.

The initial results in 1876 indicated that Tilden

undoubtedly had carried sixteen states, including his hate state of New
York, giving him a total of 184 electoral votes, only one shy of the
amount needed for victory.

On the other hand, Hayes had won in

19
Shreveport Times, November 8, 1876; Thibodaux Sentinel,
November 11, 1876; New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 10, 1876; New
Orleans Times, November 10, 1876; New Orleans Democrat, November 11,
1876.
^^New Orleans Republican, November 9, 1876.
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seventeen states, and he unquestionably deserved two of Oregon's three
electoral votes, giving him a total of 165 electoral votes, twenty less
than the number needed to win the presidency.
disputed electoral votes.

But there were twenty

In addition to one disputed electoral vote in

Oregon, all of the votes from Florida (four), South Carolina (seven),
and Louisiana (eight) were contested.

Republicans and Democrats in the

Southern states asserted that their party had carried their respective
states, and in Oregon the Democrats forced one of Hayes' electors to
resign when he admitted that he was a Post Office atployee, and persons
holding Federal jobs were ineligible to serve as electors.

The man who

had finished second was a Democrat, but Oregon's voters had overwhelm
ingly supported Hayes, and within a short tine some of Tilden's
supporters and several Democratic newspapers conceded that Hayes
deserved the contested vote in Oregon.

If Hayes could obtain the

remaining nineteen votes from the Southern states, he would be elected.
In the first hours following the election even Hayes believed that
Tilden had won, but in a matter of days he saw that victory was
possible.

Republican leaders, especially Zachariah Chandler, Grant's

secretary of the interior, encouraged the governors of Florida, South
Carolina, and Louisiana to hold their states for Hayes.

The Republicans

wanted authenticated election returns for their candidate sent to
Washington as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, Northern and Southern

Democrats maintained their claim that Tilden had carried the unredeemed
Southern states.

21

21Harry Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes and His America (Indianapolis,
1954), 315-23; T. Harry Williams, Hayes; The Diary of a President (New
York, 1964), 47; Keith I. Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The
Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge, 1973),
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The furor over the electoral votes in the three former Confederate
states made Grant realize that the Arm/ must protect the ballots against
damage, tanpering, or abduction.

Consequently, on November 10 he

ordered General Sherman to " [ijnstruct Gen. Augur . . . to be vigilant
with the force at . . . [his] contend to preserve peace and good order
and to see that the proper & legal hoards of canvassers are unmolested
in the performance of their duties."

Furthermore, if Augur had any

"suspicion of fraud . . . on either side it should be reported &
denounced at once."

Sherman promptly telegraphed the President's

instructions to Sheridan, who relayed then verbatim to Augur.

Moreover,

Sheridan warned Augur that " [t]he slightest suspicion of trouble or
[even] ordinary precaution should require the presence of all your
troops in New Orleans."

Sheridan told Augur "if you think that the

three regiments now in your Dept are not sufficient for this purpose let
me know at once."

22

Responding to Grant's orders, and acting on Sheridan's suggestion,
Augur planned to assemble most of the troops in Louisiana at New
Orleans.

23

As scon as the ballots were safe, Augur ordered

Colonel Brooke to bring most of his soldiers from Baton Rouge to New
Orleans, leaving only a few men with Captain Rogers at Clinton and one
infantry csonpany with the quartermaster at Baton Rouge Barracks.

Augur

201-210.
22
Grant to William T. Sherman, November 10, 1876, in AGO File
4788-1876 (Microcopy M-666, reel 298), RG 94, NA; Sheridan to Augur,
November 10 and 11, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 154/DSL, RG 393, NA. In
fact, Augur had issued orders for sate troops to oame to New Orleans
before he received Sheridan's messages.

23
On the general movement of troops see James E. Sefton, The United
States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1967), 248.
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directed the commanders at Coushatta and Natchitoches to dismantle their
posts "at once" and transport their garrisons to the Crescent City.

The

commander at Pineville was ordered to send one of his two companies to
the capital.

When completed, these movements left only two companies on

duty in central Louisiana, one at Pineville and the other at Baton
Rouge.

24

During the next few days the military telegraph hummed with
messages from Augur's headquarters to other post orarsnanders in Louisiana
and nearby states, ordering them to bring their detachments or companies
to New Orleans.

The Army abandoned Alexandria, Shreveport, and Morgan

City; and the garrison at Monroe was reduced to Captain Hale's lone
company, the last one left in north Louisiana.

25

To further ensure the safety of the Returning Board and to preclude
the possibility of an insurrection in New Orleans, Augur drew on the
resources of other states in his department.

He ordered nine companies

of the 16th Infantry frcm Mississippi, Arkansas, and Alabama to assemble
in the Crescent City under Colonel Galusha Pennypacker, the regiment's
commander.

Troops at Vicksburg, Columbus, Holly Springs, Jackson, and

McComb, Mississippi, Mount Vernon Barracks, Livingston, Huntsville, and
Mobile, Alabama, and Little Rock, Arkansas, boarded trains or steamers
and rendezvoused in New Orleans.

A reporter for the Picayune asked

Augur if he believed that his force would be strong enough to maintain
2^a a g Oliver D. Greene to Brooke, November 8, 1876, in Dist of
Baton Rouge; Augur to Brooke, November 9 and 10, 1876, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 142/DSL; AAG, Dept Gulf to COs, Coushatta, Natchitoches, and
Pineville, November 11, 1876, ibid.; RG 393, NA.
^^Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, pp. 107-110, RG 393, NA.
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the peace.

Considering the question for a moment, the General "answered

that it depended upon 'how belligerent the peqple were.

26

By November 19 twenty-five companies of infantry from the 3rd,
13th, and 16th regiments had asseribled in the New Orleans vicinity.
Ttoenty-two companies, totaling 1,118 soldiers, were located in the city,
and three other companies (172 officers and man) occupied Jackson
Barracks.

The Picayune kept close tabs on the military arrivals,

reporting to its readers that "New Orleans is beginning to assume a
truly warlike appearance."

Troops marched through the streets, mounted

messengers maneuvered their horses in and out of the civilian traffic on
Canal Street, groups of officers conferred in hotel lobbies, a detach
ment of U.S. Marines patrolled the riverfront, and "lumbering baggage
wagons" transported military supplies to soldiers bivouaced in the
city's parks.

The Picayune concluded that the "very atmosphere breathed

of the military. . . . "

27

In spite of the thorough precautions Augur had taken,
President Grant wanted Sheridan to command the troops in New Orleans.
Grant telegraphed Sheridan that " [tjhere is such apprehension of
violence in New Orleans during the canvassing of the vote of the state
. . . that . . . you should go in person."

The President ordered his

favorite general "to keep the peace and to protect the legal canvassing
board in the performance of its duties," virtually the sane orders he
had given to Augur only a few days before.
26

Ibid., pp. 108-110.

Reluctantly, even

New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 11,

1876.
^Monthly Returns, Dept Gulf, November 1876, in Dept Gulf, PG 393,
NA. New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 1876
(quotes from ibid., November 12 and 13).

476
unwillingly, Sheridan bowed to the orders of his chief and prepared once
again to enter the perilous labyrinth of Louisiana politics.

28

The New Orleans Picayune inmediately picked up the story of
Sheridan's impending arrival, running a short news article about the
general under the headline "Philip Expected."

Sheridan left his Chicago

headquarters on November 13 and detrained in New Orleans two days later,
accompanied by his brother, Captain Michael V. Sheridan, and other
aides.

The little general was now forty-five years old, and since the

slashing Shenandoah Valley carrpaign he had gained several pounds, making
him appear shorter than his five feet, five inches.

A correspondent for

the Picayune, who had net Sheridan the previous year, described him as
"a smiling red-faced man, of a short cut Herculean style of architec
ture, and very . . . stout. . . .

He would make a severe trial of any

Fairbanks scale in the city.” The reporter called Sheridan "the very
incarnation of a soldier, and a generous feeder."

One of Sheridan's

most striking characteristics, according to the reporter, was his head,
which "was . . . almost globular in shape."

Remembering Sheridan's past

adherence to Radical Reconstruction policies, the newspaperman believed
that it was "just the sort of a head calculated to hold an idea very
tenaciously, and which would require an Archimedian battering ram to
reduce into submission."

29

The Shreveport Tines disdainfully greeted the news of Sheridan's
arrival and used the occasion to ridicule the Amy.

The Times called

^Grant to Sheridan, November 11, 1876, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 298), RG 94, NA.
29

1875.

New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 11, 1876; ibid., January 1,
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Sheridan a "Bully" and. accused him of using "the Army to Assist in the
Infamous Work" of the Republican Returning Board.

In a biting

editorial, the Times claimed that the Radical Republicans had been doing
the Devil's work in Louisiana for many years and that the A m y had been
acting as the agents of the Fallen Angel, protecting a Republican
governor, who, like his Radical compatriots in the North, "dared not
show all of . . . [his] cloven foot."

30

In a strongly worded editorial of its own, the Picayune charged
that "all this marshalling of battalions here, this hasty military
investiture of the city, . . . cannot be justified on the ground of
supervising the counting of votes."

Obviously, the Picayune believed

that Louisianians needed no help from either Sheridan or the Army to
count the votes from the recent "quiet and peaceable election."

The

Picayune rhetorically asked whether "the sword of Phil. Sheridan [was]
considered necessary, in seme way yet undefined, to cut the Gordian Knot
of the Louisiana difficulty?"

31

According to the Picayune, Sheridan's presence "Phil-ed" Louisiana
Republicans with courage, and outwardly the general indicated no
dissatisfaction with the administration's Reconstruction policy.
Actually, Sheridan was quite uncomfortable about having been asked to
play the role of savior (or devil) in Louisiana politics.
that his presence in New Orleans was not required.

He believed

Augur had skillfully

marshaled most of three infantry regiments in New Orleans, and he
appeared to have the situation under control.

Since Sheridan's arrival,

^Shreveport Times, November 22 and 17, 1876.
31
New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 15, 1876.
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James Madison Wells had held several meetings of the Returning Board
without interference from the Democrats.

At Grant's urging, more than

thirty "gentlemen of both political parties" had arrived in the city to
"observe the conduct of the canvass."

These so-called "visiting

statesmen" included Democrats Lyman Trumbull and George W. Julian, and
Republicans John Sherman, Janes Garfield, and lew Wallace.
On November 16,

32

the day after he arrived, Sheridan wired Adjutant

General Edward Townsend that
appearance of any trouble."

there was "very little excitement [and] no
A few days later, Sheridan informed Sherman

that there was no need for him to remain in Louisiana, and he asked to
leave before the Returning Board ruled on the outcome of the election.
(The only Democrat on the Board had resigned.

He was not replaced, and

no one doubted that the Board would eventually declare the Republicans
victorious in Louisiana.) However, Sherman replied that the President
and Secretary of War

Cameron both "will feel more comfortable if you

will remain till the

canvass is completed." Disgruntled, Sheridan

nevertheless abided by his superiors' wishes and waited for another
opportunity to ask to leave Louisiana.

33

Meanwhile, the Returning Board had called dozens of witnesses to
testify concerning alleged Democratic bulldozing during the election
12

Ibid.; Walter M. Lowrey, "The Political Career of James Madison
Walls," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXXI (October, 1948), 1101;
William E. Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1953), 329-31. Quote on
the visiting statesmen is from Grant to Sheridan, November 11, 1876, in
AG0 File 4788-1876 (Microcopy M-666, reel 298), RG 94, NA. See also
Ralph J. Roske, "Visiting Statesmen in Louisiana, 1876," Mid-America,
XXXIII (April, 1951), 89-102.
■^Sheridan to AGO, November 16, 1876, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 299), RG 94, NA; Sheridan to Sherman, November 22,
1876, ibid.; Sherman to Sheridan, November 22, 1876, ibid.
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campaign.

Soane of the witnesses sent written depositions, but

Marshal John Pitkin arranged for many of than to oome in person to New
Orleans, and in several cases the A m y provided escorts for sane men who
might have teen in danger had they traveled without Federal
^
34
protection.
Sometimes a few of the "visiting statesmen" attended the meetings
of the Returning Board, and the witnesses' testimony appalled the
Northern politicians.

Senator John Sherman wrote his wife that " [w]e

have already heard enough to show in sate of the Parishes the most
extraordinary system of intimidation & violence" had been used by the
Democrats, "but whether this can be clearly proven . . . I neither know
nor will guess."

Sherman concluded that " [t]he whole tone and elements

of society are so different here and in Ohio that no one can realize the
truth of what is here plain and palpable."

Sherman's colleague, Ohio

Congressman Janes A. Garfield, wrote Rutherford B. Hayes that he had "no
doubt" about the "justice of our claim" to Louisiana's electoral votes,
but he "fear[ed] it will be inpossible for our northern people to
understand how difficult a thing it is for anything like regularity and
order to be brought out of such a chaos as this in a few days."

35

340n the A m y escorts for witnesses see New Orleans Daily Picayune,
November 21, 1876, and Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 491-92.
Examples of specific orders for military escorts are Augur to
Capt. B. H. Rogers (Clinton), November 21, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol.
116/DSL; Augur to Capt. Clayton Hale (Monroe), November 22, 1876, ibid.,
RG 393, NA.
John Sherman to Cecilia Sherman, November 20, 1876, in John
Sherman Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; typescript,
R. B. Hayes Library, Fremont, ( M o ) ; James A. Garfield to R. B. Hayes,
November 23, 1876, in Hayes Papers.
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On the other hand, the New Orleans Democrat hoped that the presence
of the visiting Northern Democrats might swing the election to Nicholls
and Tilden.

The Democrat printed a two-paneled political cartoon

showing Grant stabbing "Lady Louisiana" in 1875, with a dog (labeled
"Sheridan") snapping at the lady's feet.

The second panel portrayed

ladies labeled "New York" and "Indiana" preventing Grant from stabbing
Louisiana again in 1876, while Samuel Tilden, holding a copy of the U.S.
Constitution, comforted Louisiana, and the dog (Sheridan) scampered away
• *
an
fear. 36
The Natchitoches People's Vindicator stridently protested the
Army's protection of Kellogg and Grant's orders that had "nationalized"
Louisiana, and menacingly asked, "Shall it be war or Tilden?"

In fact,

many politicians and newspaper editors of both parties were concerned
about the possibility of a second civil war in late 1876 and early 1877.
Angry Democrats, dismayed over the disputed election, were threatening
to force Tilden's inauguration by sending thousands of armed men to
Washington.

Demonstrating his concern over this threat, President Grant

ordered several additional A m y units into the nation's capital.

37

Political tensions were evident in Louisiana's capital as well, and
violence was more likely to occur in New Orleans than Washington.
Notwithstanding this possibility, Sheridan wired Sherman that " [t]here
is no military necessity for iry presence here.
and I doubt if it is fair to me."

It is not fair to Augur

Plainly, Sheridan wanted to leave

■^^New Orleans Democrat, November 19, 1876.
^Natchitoches People's Vindicator, November 18, 1876; William A.
Russ, "Was There a Danger"of a Second Civil War during Reconstruction,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXV (June, 1938), 39-58.
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Louisiana.

After meeting with Secretary of War Cameron, Sherman

reluctantly gave Sheridan permission to return to Chicago.

Sheridan

thankfully made his plans to leave Nov Orleans within twenty-four hours
and soothingly informed Adjutant General Townsend that " [e]verything
[is] all right here.

38
Canvass will give Louisiana to Hayes.”

Sheridan departed without fanfare on November 26 and arrived in
Chicago four days later.

(The Picayune noted that he had slipped

"Quietly Out of Town," apparently "believing that the 'banditti' were in
a harmless frame of mind. . . .")

His last assignment in Louisiana

during Reconstruction had been unproductive.

His superiors had hoped

that his presence in the violence-prone state would be beneficial, or
they would not have sent him there.

Finding that Augur had blanketed

New Orleans with troops, Sheridan iirpatiently had awaited permission to
leave virtually from the day he had arrived.

The responsibility of

keeping the peace was placed in General Augur's capable hands.

39

A correspondent for the Picayune reported that Augur had "no
apprehension of any disturbance" in Louisiana.

Nevertheless, Augur

ordered his regimental commanders to keep their troops under arms and
prepared for any eventuality.

Specifically, Augur directed

Colonel DeTrobriand and Colonel Brooke to "furnish the [matters of the]
Returning Board . . . such protection to their persons and papers as
they may deem necessary."

Brooke was to "confer" personally with

^Sheridan to Sherman, November 24, 1876, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 299), RG 94, NA; Sherman to Sheridan,
Noventer 25, 1876, ibid.; Sheridan to AGO, November 25, 1876, ibid.
39
New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 27, 1876.
Orleans Democrat, November 27 and 28, 1876.

See also New
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Governor Kellogg and J. Madison Wells to learn if they wanted any
special assistance.^
Kellogg apparently was satisfied with the precautions the military
had taken in the capital, but he felt uneasy about the situation in sane
of the country parishes.

He asked Augur to leave troops in Monroe "to

preserve the public peace" in that town.

Furthermore, Kellogg requested

that a detachment be sent to Lafayette Parish "in the interests of peace
and order & to prevent violence and bloodshed. . . . "

Although there

had been no unrest in Lafayette Parish, Augur acceded to Kellogg's
request, ordering Lieutenant Lorenzo W. Cooke and ten enlisted men from
the garrison at St. Martinville to Vermillionville.

The general assured

the governor that the troops would remain in Monroe until Captain Hale
believed it was safe to withdraw than.
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Meanwhile, the soldiers and

politicians waited for Wells to announce the results of the canvass.
The Returning Board reached its decision in early Decanter.

Wells

and his associates (dubbed the "Overturning Board" ty the Picayune)
nullified or discarded the returns from selected precincts in twentyfour parishes, throwing the election to Packard and Hayes.

Louisiana

Democrats cried "foul" and "fraud," and refused to abide by the Board's
decision.

Francis Nicholls, following the example of John McEnery in

1872, claimed to have been elected and planned to be inaugurated in
January.

Rejecting Nicholls' claims, Kellogg declared that Packard was

40
New Orleans Daily Picayune, November 27, 1876. AAG, Dept Gulf to
Ool. Philippe DeTrobriand, November 27, 1876, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL,
RG 393, NA.
41Kellogg to Augur, November 29, 1876 (two ocmnunications), in
Dept Gulf, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA. (Vermillionville was later renamed
Lafayette.)
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the state's next governor and certified the Hayes electors.

Reviving

his dormant governorship, John McEnery proclaimed that Nicholls had
carried Louisiana and forwarded to Washington a separate set of
certificates giving the state's electoral votes to Tilden.

AO

To the dismay of historians, the results of the election of 1876
will never be known to everyone's complete satisfaction.

Contested

elections and dual governments were familiar to Louisianians, but they
could not be tolerated by the nation.

According to the Louisiana

Returning Board, Packard and Hayes were victorious, and John Sherman and
other visiting Republican politicians concurred in the Board's decision,
stressing the evidence of widespread intimidation before the election
that had prevented many blacks from voting or had persuaded sane blacks
to vote for the Democratic ticket.

Historian Harry Barnard concluded

that the election returns "did not include, as it could not have
included, votes not cast, because many qualified voters— mainly
Negroes— were scared off from attempting to vote."
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Undoubtedly

Louisiana Republicans found it difficult to organize an effective
campaign— several of their black leaders had been killed, and members of
the rank and file had been threatened with loss of their lives or their

AO

Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 459-65; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 493; Lowrey, "James Madison Wells," 1103; Highsmith,
"Louisiana During Reconstruction," 329-31; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
November 23 and December 6, 1876.
43
John Sherman and other Republicans to Grant, December 6, 1876, m
Senate Exec. Docs., 44 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 2, pp. 7-8; Barnard, Hayes,
316-17. Also supporting this conclusion is Rambert Patrick, The
Reconstruction of the Nation (New York, 1967), 261.
44T. B. Tunnell, Jr., argues in his article "The Negro, the
Republican Party, and the Election of 1876 in Louisiana," Louisiana
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Regardless of who certified the election returns or how they had
been obtained, Congress had the responsibility to count the electoral
votes of the individual states.

Under the unusual circumstances which

existed after the 1876 election, Congress would have to determine which
set of returns to accept from South Carolina, Florida, and Oregon, as
well as Louisiana because the officials in each of these states had sent
multiple sets of electoral certificates to Washington.
Meanwhile, obeying the orders of Sherman and Sheridan,
General Augur gave military protection to all persons who came to New
Orleans to testify before the oceraiittees of the U.S. House and Senate
which had been empaneled to investigate the election.

But Augur

cautioned that when the witnesses returned to their homes and passed
"out of our reach," the Army could not be held responsible for their
safety.

Augur reported to the adjutant general of the Military Division

of the Missouri that Democrats in some parishes would probably protest
against the Returning Board's decision, but Augur did not speculate on
what form these protests might take.

In fact, he advised Sheridan

against "using troops in the interior . . . to settle mere local
History, VII (Spring, 1966), 101-116, that thousands of Louisiana's
blacks voluntarily abandoned the party of Lincoln because the
Republicans had been corrupt and failed to deliver on all of their
political promises of the 1860s. Furthermore Tunnell rejects most of
the charges that the Democrats used fraud and intimidation against
Republicans in the '76 campaign. Although he presents his argument
forcefully, in light of the military correspondence between June and
NOventoer 1876, Tunnell's thesis seems to lack credibility. Polokoff
accepts Tunnell's argument in Politics of Inertia, 183. Other
historians, led by William A. Dunning, Reconstruction, Political and
Economic, 1865-1877 (New York, 1907), 320-21, have indicated that
Louisiana properly belonged in the Democratic column. See also
Claude G. Bowers, Ihe Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln
(Cambridge, Mass., 1929), 526-29; Hodding Carter, The Angry Scar (New
York, 1959), 328; Robert S. Henry, The Story of Reconstruction
(Indianapolis, 1938), 579-80.
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disturbances.

The limited number of troops available for the purpose,

and their restricted authority for action in such cases, renders it
undesirable, . . . to make the attempt."

Augur correctly concluded that

" [t]he definite and authoritative announcement of who is to be
President, will quickly settle all the questions. . . . "
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In the meantime, Augur had to contend with a more immediate crisis,
one that was familiar to his subordinates, Colonels DeTrobriand,
Floyd-Jones, and Brooke.

The state legislature was scheduled to convene

in January, and the Democrats and Republicans already had caucused
separately.

It appeared that the Democrats would either challenge the

Republicans for control of the legislature, or establish a rival
legislature of their own.

Augur telegraphed Sheridan, asking "what

action . . . to take, if any" when the legislature met.

Hesitating to

issue orders on his own, Sheridan sent the question on to Sherman, who
placed the matter before Secretary of War Don Cameron.

Governor Kellogg

had not yet asked for assistance at the State House, but Grant and
Cameron directed Sherman to send the following orders to Sheridan:

"If

there be any riot or violence!,] General Augur's duty will be to
interpose [his troops], prevent violence, and keep the peace."
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Sheridan dutifully forwarded the orders to Augur, who now faced his
greatest challenge as commander of the Department of the Gulf.
45
Augur to AAG, MilDivMo, December 18, 1876, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 299), RG 94, NA.

^Sheridan to Sherman, December 30, 1876, ibid. (reel 300); Augur
to Sheridan, December 30, 1876, in Letters Reod by the Justice Dept from
Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA; Sherman to J. D.
Cameron, December 31, 1876, ibid.; Sherman to Sheridan, December 31,
1876, ibid.; Sheridan to Sherman, January 1, 1877, ibid.

CHAPTER XX
"THE TROOPS ARE NOT TO RE USED AS A POLITICAL ENGINE"
On New Years' Day 1877 Louisiana's Democratic and Republican
*

legislators convened separately and organized two different
legislatures.

Taking a necessary precaution, General Augur previously

had stationed several companies of infantry in the Orleans Hotel, which
was adjacent to the State House.
capitol itself.

He assigned no units to occupy the

Captain George B. Russell of Augur's staff acted as a

military observer inside the Republicans' stronghold.

In addition, the

general had stationed troops at key locations throughout the city and
had alerted them to be on guard against violence.

Subsequently,

Republicans and Democrats peacefully demonstrated on behalf of their
legislatures, but it was not necessary for the Army to intervene. ^
Representatives of each party were prepared to continue the
spectacle of dual governments.

Cheering partisans surrounded

St. Patrick's Hall, which temporarily housed the Democratic legislature.
Conservative senators elected Louis Wiltz as their presiding officer.
Louis Bush, who had been a colonel in the Confederate army, was elected
speaker of the Democratic house.

Several blocks away, meeting under the

^Philip H. Sheridan to William T. Sherman (enclosing a despatch
from Augur), January 1, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876 (Microcopy M-666,
reel 300), RG 94, NA. AAG, Dept Gulf to Col. Philippe DeTrobriand,
January 1, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL; AAG, Dept Gulf to
Col. Galusha Pennypacker, January 1, 1877, ibid.; Augur to Sheridan,
January 4, 1877, ibid.; RG 393, NA.
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protection of the police and U.S. infantrymen, the Republicans elected
former governor Michael Hahn speaker of their house.
Governor C. C. Antoine presided over the senate.

Lieutenant

The Republican

legislature drafted and passed an appeal for continued military
2
protection, and Governor Kellogg sent it to President Grant.
A few days later Kellogg addressed the President again, asking him
to recognize Packard as the legitimate governor upon his inauguration
and requesting that Augur be instructed to guard the new Republican
administration, which was to take office on January 8.

Grant's reply

must have sent a shiver down the collective spines of all Louisiana
Republicans.

The President wrote that he felt "constrained to decline

your request for the aid of troops to inaugurate the new State
Gov't. . . .

To do so would be to recognize one of the rival govern

ments for the State Executive and Legislature. . . . "

Grant reminded

Kellogg that Congress was investigating the Louisiana situation, and
that in the meantime Federal troops would "suppress violence if any
3
should take place."
For the first time during Reconstruction the President overtly and
promptly had refused to recognize the Republican claimant to the
governorship in Louisiana.

Grant's action was partly due to the fact

that the outcome of the national election remained in doubt.

Moreover,

Grant had been less inclined to order troops to intervene in Southern
^New Orleans Times, January 2, 1877; William P. Kellogg to U. S.
Grant, January 1, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice Dept frcm
Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA; Ella lonn, Reconstruc
tion in Louisiana After 1868 (Gloucester, Mass., 1967), 476-77.
^Kellogg to Grant, January 5, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA; Grant
to Kellogg, January 7, 1877, ibid.
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politics after the incident at the Louisiana legislature in January
1875.

Recently he had tended to take the advice of his Secretary of

State, Hamilton Fish, who opposed any help to Kellogg or Packard and
preferred to have the A m y in Louisiana maintain the peace between rival
parties.

On the other hand, Secretary of War J. Don Cameron and

Secretary of the Interior Zachariah Chandler strongly urged Grant to
recognize Packard and provide him with Federal protection before the
results of the presidential election were known.

4

Meanwhile, in keeping with Grant's intentions and with the dual
inaugurations of Packard and Nicholls forthcoming, General Augur took
precautions to maintain the peace in New Orleans.
force within the city:

He had kept a strong

twenty-one infantry companies totaling more than

one thousand soldiers were stationed at important locations,.

On

January 8 the rival governors took their oaths of office, Nicholls
standing on a balcony of St. Patrick's Hall before an audience of
several thousand well-wishers, Packard choosing to remain within the
protective confines of the State House.

There was no violance at either

location. ^
^Grant supported the creation of a special electoral commission
which would judge the acceptability of the electoral certificates from
Louisiana and the other states which had sent multiple returns. See
Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant
Administration (Mew York, 1937), 851; and Keith Ian Polakott, The
Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction
(Baton Rouge, 1973), 269-79.
5

Post Returns, Post of New Orleans, January 1877, in Records of the
AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 844), RG 94, NA. New Orleans Democrat,
January 8, 1877; New Orleans Tines, January 9, 1877; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, January 9, 1877. AAG, Dept Gulf to Pennypacker, January V,
1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL, RG 393, NA. Lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 481-82.
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On the evening of his inauguration Francis Nicholls boldly decided
that he would attempt to seat his state supreme court appointees and
supplant the Metropolitan Police with a police force of his own.
Nicholls later wrote that he had "resolved to take all risks essential
to our success but to attempt nothing which . . . would be or might be
considered by the federal government as essential to the National
Republican Party [.]"

In other words, Nicholls decided not to attempt to

overthrew Packard, as Penn, Ogden, and the White league had tried to
overthrow Kellogg in 1874.

Instead, he aimed to take partial control of

some important government functions, leaving the State House and his
Republican rival unmolested.

Nicholls could not be sure of Augur's

reaction— or of Packard's either.

But the crippled general's scheme

paid dividends during the remaining months of Reconstruction in

. .

Louisiana.

6

In December President Grant specifically had ordered Augur to
maintain the peace "if there [should] be any riot or violence."

Augur

had no intentions of overstepping his orders:

He would not send in his

troops until violence had actually occurred.

If no violence took place,

the Army would remain strictly neutral.
Beginning at dawn on January 9 Fred Ogden's White Leaguers, serving
as Nicholls' militia, started assembling in Lafayette Square.
Penn served as Ogden's adjutant.

David

Word of the White League assembly

reached the Republican leaders, who desperately dashed off telegrams to
^Barnes F. Lathrop, ed., "An Autobiography of Francis T. Nicholls,
1834-1881," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVII (April, 1934), 255
(emphasis in the original). See also Gamie W. McGinty, Louisiana
Redeemed: The Overthrow of Carpetbag Rule, 1876-1880 (New Orleans,
1941), 94-95, and Joe Gray Taylor, "New Orleans and Reconstruction,"
Louisiana History, IX (Sunmer, 1968), 206.
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Grant, telling him that an insurrection was impending and calling on the
Federal government for protection.

Marshal John Pitkin wired U.S.

Attorney General Alonzo Taft, informing him that armed members of the
"white League [are] in Lafayette Square.

Stores of the city [are] all
7

closing.

Prospects of bloodshed [are] imminent within an hour."

Moving with military discipline, the Leaguers left their assembly
point and, joined by other Nicholls supporters, soon made up a force of
about three thousand men.

As a first step, they demanded the surrender

of several police stations, and Packard's men withdrew without any shew
of resistance.

Ogden then marched on the Cabildo, where the supreme

court chambers were located.

Learning what was afoot, Chief

Justice John T. Ludeling vacated his office, and the leaguers installed
the Democratic justices without any opposition.

By noon the Nicholls

militia had occupied most of the city police stations and the state
arsenal, incorporating the state cannon into the Washington Artillery,
the renowned New Orleans artillery company which had served in the
Confederate army.

Packard's militia and police fell back on the State

House, and the windows of the building bristled with the rifles of the
beleaguered Republicans.

Without firing a shot, Nicholls had taken

control of all of the important state government buildings, with the
exception of the capitol.

8

7
Stephen B. Packard to Grant, January 9, 1877, in Letters Reed by
the U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60,
NA; C. C. Antoine and Michael Hahn to Grant, January 9, 1877, ibid.;
J. R. G. Pitkin to Alonzo Taft, January 9, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA.
g

Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 482-83; Joe Gray Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, 1974), 496; New Orleans
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Word that the White League was inarching was brought to Augur
immediately.

He alerted Colonel Galusha Pennypacker and his men of the

16th Infantry near the State House, as well as the five companies of the
3rd Regiment in the Orleans Hotel, but he rejected any notions of
placing his soldiers in the streets or forming a cordon around the
Cabildo and the Jackson Square police station.

Specially chosen U.S.

Marine signal officers, perched atop the cupola of the State House, used
signal flags to keep Augur and his staff at the Custom House informed as
to the advance of the leaguers and the retreat of the Metropolitans.
A m y officers, holding binoculars to their eyes, lined the balcony of
the Orleans Hotel and watched the coup taking place.

Violence could

have erupted at any time between the rival militias, but the Republicans
refused to engage the White League.

Kellogg and Packard met with

Colonel DeTrobriand, who promised that his troops would be deployed if
violence occurred, but since there had been no collision, the troops
9
remained at the Custom House or in the Orleans Hotel.
Learning of the unsettled conditions in New Orleans, Secretary of
War Don Cameron demanded that Augur send a complete report an the
situation in the city.

Furthermore, Cameron ordered Augur to warn all

unauthorized armed groups to disperse or crane into "conflict with United
States authority sustained fcy the military power of the Government."
However, Cameron cautioned Augur not to recognize "either of the
10
claimants for the Governorship or either Legislature."
9
AAG, Dept Gulf to Pennypacker, January 9, 1877, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 116/DSL; Capt. G. B. Russell to Augur, January 9, 1877, in Dept
Gulf, Letters Reed, RG 393, NA. New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 10,
1877.

^J. Don Cameron to Augur, January 9, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
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Reporting as ordered, Augur explained that the unauthorized armed
groups were the "new police and armed posse acting under orders of the
Nicholls government."

The Nicholls militia had "possession of the city

except for the State House." Obviously, it was too late for Augur to
prevent a coup. Augur advised Cameron that he had "declined to
interfere on either side until there was a violent breach of the peace.
My orders simply authorize me to prevent bloodshed.
occurred."

None has yet

In a second message, the general informed Cameron that

Nicholls wanted to avoid a "disturbance," and that the Democratic
governor had ordered his "aimed forces" to "disband."

Son© of Nicholls'

men left the streets, giving credence to his pledge, but the next
morning the White League still occupied all of the buildings captured
the previous day.11
Louisianians were interested to know how the Federal authorities
would react to the Nicholls coup.

Responding to questions from

reporters, Augur said that the "President is reluctant to proceed
further in the recognition of either party In the Louisiana gubernato
rial question. . . . "

According to his present orders, Augur declared

that he "would not furnish troops [to support] the State authorities on
either side."12
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA.
^Augur to Cameron, January 9,
Augur also informed Sheridan of the
January 9, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol.
ably summarized by James E. Sefton,
Reconstruction (Baton Rouge, 1967),

1877 (two ooitinunications), ibid.
day's events: Augur to Sheridan,
142/DSL, RG 393, NA. The events are
The United States Army and
248-49.

12New Orleans Times, January 10, 1877; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
January 11, 1877.
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Undeterred by Augur's statements, Marshal Pitkin pressed Attorney
General Taft to use his influence on Packard's behalf.
Taft:

Pitkin asked

"should not [the] commanding General be instructed to assist [the

Republican] Supreme Judges to reoccupy their seats[?]"

Momentarily

disregarding Pitkin's plea, Taft and Cameron became concerned when they
learned that a mob was threatening the capital,,

Cameron ordered Augur

not to let the mob molest the Republican legislature— in fact, Augur was
to disperse the mob if one had gathered outside the State House.

Augur

replied that no "mob" threatened the legislature, but that a "larger
crowd than usual" had congregated near the capitol.

Augur saw no reason

to disperse the crowd because members of both parties were allowed to
enter and leave the building, and "Packard's police [were] on duty in
front of it."

Regarding the Cabildo, Augur told Cameron that "Packard

[had] applied for troops to assist . . . in regaining possession of
[the] Supreme Court room," but, Augur continued, he had declined to
provide soldiers for that purpose, saying it was not a legitimate duty
for the Army.

Cameron concurred with Augur's view of the situation; the

Federal authorities allowed the Democrats to remain in control of the
Cabildo, and the Army failed to disperse the crowds.

13

Nevertheless, a minor disturbance on the afternoon of January 10
provided Packard with another opportunity to receive Federal help.
Captain George Russell, Augur's observer at the State House, reported
^Pitkin bo Taft, January 10, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA;
Cameron to Augur, January 10, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876 (Microcopy
M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA; Augur to Cameron, January 10, 1877, ibid.
Capt. G. B. Russell to Augur, January 10, 1877, in Dept Gulf, Letters
Reed; Augur to Packard, January 10, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL,
RG 393, NA.
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that there was "Great excitement" in the streets near the capitol.
Unknown persons had fired some shots at the State House# and vandals
were breaking windows in buildings near Jackson Square.

Under similar

circumstances# certainly Sheridan and possibly Emory would have sent
troops to clear the streets of the French Quarter, or at least sent
military messengers to the White League's officers to demand that they
order their men to disperse.
their troops in check.

Lacking orders to march# the colonels held

Captain Russell concluded that "the Republican

leaders will determine to bring on a row— that is I am afraid they see
it as their only resort to bring us [the Army] in."

However# only a few

shots were fired# and the White Leaguers, demonstrating their discipline# refused to bring on a general engagement.

14

Thus passed the last

logical opportunity for Augur to coirmit his troops in direct support of
Packard's government.

15

The next morning Augur reported to Secretary Cameron that New
Orleans was quiet.

The general ordered half of his troops to stand down

to "ordinary status," leaving the remainder on alert and ready to
respond at a "moments notice."

X6

Still hopeful that he might persuade the military to act on his
behalf# Packard arranged a meeting with Captain Russell.

The governor

asked Russell to help the Republicans reclaim the office of the recorder
14
G. B. Russell to Augur# January 10# 1877, in Dept Gulf# Letters
Reed, RG 393# NA. New Orleans Daily Picayune# January 12# 1877.

15
Taylor# Louisiana Reconstructed# 497.
■^Augur to Cameron# January 11, 1877# in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300) # RG 94# NA; AAG# Dept Gulf to Cols. John
Brooke and Pennypacker# January 11# 1877# in Dept Gulf# vol. 116/DSL,
RG 393, NA.
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of mortgages, located in the Cabildo.

Russell replied that Augur's

orders specified "that if there was a fight" the military would "leave
the 'ins' in & the 'outs' out."

Disgruntled, Packard "then suggested

that under [the] notification [from Secretary Cameron] to unauthorized
. . . men to 'cease' [disperse] you might order [the] Nicholls force to
go away."

Russell responded "that if Packard had an armed force there

[in the Cabildo], they would probably also be ordered to 'cease.
During the meeting one of Packard's aides threatened to order the
Republican militia to "seize any of the captured places," but Russell
correctly assumed that the man was bluffing.

Toward the end of the

meeting Packard informed Russell that he had telegraphed President Grant
asking him to order the A m y to "protect officers holding Kellogg
commissions."

Russell sent a report of the conference to Augur.

17

While Grant considered Packard's latest request for help, the
governor's authority continued to erode.

Isolated in the capitol,

Packard was having difficulty operating the state government.
pay the legislators their per diem was lacking.

Money to

Consequently, on

January 12 and 13 several Republican legislators left the State House
and began attending sessions at the Democratic legislature.

The

Democrats held virtually all of the state agencies and office buildings
in the city, and Nicholls' appointees, or Conservatives who claimed to
have been elected in November, had taken office in several outlying
parishes.

Packard was becoming a governor without a government.

18

Then, suddenly, Packard's claim to office temporarily took on new life.
■^Russell to Augur, January 12, 1877, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed,
RG 393, NA.
18
On the legislature see New Orleans Times, January 12 and 13,
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On January 14 President Grant sent an important telegram to Augur,
telling him that until new the administration had tried to remain
neutral in the Louisiana dispute, "hut it is not proper to sit quietly
by and see the State government gradually taken possession of by one of
the claimants for gubernatorial honors by illegal means."

Grant

admonished Augur that " [t]he Supreme Court set up by Mr. Nicholls can
receive no more recognition than any other equal number of lawyers
convened on the call of any other citizen of the State."

But the

President stopped well short of directing the general to disperse the
court; Nicholls’ appointees could continue to sit as if they were the
supreme court without being formally recognized.

The President conclud

ed his message with a surprisingly firm declaration:

The Returning

Board had "declared Mr. Packard Governor. . . . Should there be a
necessity for the recognition of either, it must be Packard.

You may

furnish a copy of this dispatch to Packard and Nicholls." The New
Orleans newspapers obtained and printed Grant's telegram, which
naturally disconcerted Louisiana's Democrats.

19

Believing that his administration was now official, Packard issued
a proclamation "To the White Leaguers and their attendant Usurpers, The
Supreme Court Cabal, etc.," ordering them to disperse.

The Nicholls

1877; and the very good summary in Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana,
488-92. For an example of Democrats taking officesee 0. A. Foreman to
Kellogg, January 16, 1877, in William Pitt Kellogg Papers (Department of
Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library, Baton
Rouge). See also Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed,497.
19
Grant to Augur, January 14, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3); New Orleans
Times, January 15, 1877; New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 15, 1877;
tfew Orleans Republican, January 16, 1877; lonn, Reconstruction in
Louisiana, 487.
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forces ignored the proclamation.

Augur again refused to order his

troops to clear the offending Democrats from the Cabildo.
rebuff, Packard’s optimism began to evaporate.,

At this

In a pathetic attempt to

obtain Grant’s help, he advised the President that the White League
could be "crushed by the federal government" if it acted promptly.

20

On January 16 Secretary Cameron, acting on behalf of the President,
attempted to clarify Grant's position.

Cameron directed Augur to

preserve "the present status throughout the state . . . until the
Congressional committees now in Louisiana return [to Washington]."

21

Therefore, Augur was to maintain the status quo, and considering the
fact that the Democrats already held most of the state buildings and
offices, the order favored the Democrats,

in the coning weeks Augur

adhered strictly to this order and was loathe to extend even the
slightest help to the Republicans.
For example, Augur categorically denial Packard's request "to
secure the surrender" of "state arms and munitions of War" which the
Nicholls' forces had obtained when they captured the state arsenals.
Augur denied the request despite the fact that Packard simply wanted the
Army to hold the weapons until a new state government was recognized.
(Of course, if the Army secured the guns, they would be out of the
Democrats' hands.)

Lecturing the governor as if he were a schoolboy,

^%ew Orleans Daily Picayune, January 16, 1877; Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 487; Augur to Packard, January 15, 1877, in
AGO File 4788-1876 (Microcopy M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA; Packard to
Grant, January 15, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice Dept from
Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA.
^Cameron to Augur, January 16, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA. This letter was featured in the
New Orleans Times, January 17, 1877, and the New Orleans Daily Picayune,
January 17, 1877.
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the general explained that Secretary Cameron's order required that the
status quo he maintained.

" [T]he surrender, without resistance [sic] of

the Supreme Court room, the Arsenal, and all of the police stations" had
taken place before the secretary's order, and therefore the Army was not
going to make the Democrats give them (or their contents) back to the
Republicans.

Moreover, it was public knowledge that Packard wanted to

reoccupy all of the state buildings, and the governor's own threats had
"furnished an excuse for the Nicholls party to keep a force in readiness
to resist. . . . "

Augur stipulated that no changes would be made in the

status quo until the President decided to recognize one of the two
claimants.

Crestfallen, Packard bold Marshal Pitkin that further "delay

will place the [Republican] State government in jeopardy. . . . "

22

Augur's strict interpretation of his orders pleased the Democratic
press.

"'Oh, that Phil Sheridan were herel' was Packard's agonized cry

when he discovered that Gen. Augur combined the qualities of an army
officer with those of a gentleman," wrote the gleeful editor of the
Shreveport Times. The Picayune concluded that Augur's reply to Packard
was "entirely consistent with the sound judgment and professional
propriety which has marked the attitude of that officer . . . [who
occupied such a] delicate and responsible position. . . . "

23

On the Republican side, the New York Tiroes alertly pointed out that
Augur "seems a little disposed . . . to give the Democratic claimant,
^^Packard to Augur, January 17, 1877, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Augur to Packard, January 17, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL, RG 393,
NA. Packard to Pitkin, January 22, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA.
^Shreveport Times, January 19, 1877; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
January 18, 1877. See also New Orleans Times, January 18, 1877.
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Nicholls, the benefit of the doubt* . . . ” Going further, the Tiroes
accused Augur of favoritism toward Nicholls by allowing him to maintain
possession of the state offices.

The newspaper concluded that the

fiction of two governors in Louisiana must be ended soon, and implied
that Packard should be recognized.

24

To the obvious disappointment of many Northern Republicans, dual
governments continued to exist in Louisiana*
every opportunity to improve his position.

In fact, Nicholls took
For example, on January 19

Nicholls appointed a Democrat to the position of state librarian.

A

party of White Leaguers escorted the appointee to his office, where he
displaced the Republican librarian.

Furthermore, Nicholls constantly

encouraged Democrats to take office in parishes outside of New Orleans.
Packard complained about these usurpations to both Augur and Grant.

In

view of Grant's order to maintain the status quo, the governor was on
firm ground, and he stingingly criticized Nicholls for violating the
status quo.

Caught red-handed, Nicholls recalled his librarian and

"staff," permitting the Republican to resume his position.

25

The controversy ova: officeholders broke out afresh when Packard
accused Nicholls of seating judges and other local officials in
Natchitoches and Ouachita parishes.

An investigation revealed that the

Democrats had indeed taken office after Cameron's status quo order on
January 16.

Perhaps revealing a pro-Democratic bias, Augur refused to

24
New York Times, January 18, 1877.
25
Packard to President Grant, January 19, 1877, in Letters Reed by
the U.S. Justice Dept from Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60,
NA. Packard to Augur, January 19, 1877, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Francis T. Nicholls to Augur, January 19, 1877, ibid., RG 393, NA.
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remove the Conservatives, although it was well within his powers and
responsibilities.

Instead, he described the circumstances to the

authorities in Washington and left the decisions to than.

Considering

the cases in question, Nicholls claimed that the parish judge, recorder,
clerk of court and police jurors in Ouachita and a judge in Natchitoches
all had assumed office before January 16.

Eventually President Grant

dsnanded that the Democratic judge in Natchitoches step down from the
bench and surrender his position to a Republican, but he allowed all of
the Democrats in Ouachita to remain in office.

Patiently biding his

tine, Nicholls saw to it that the President's rulings were obeyed.

26

In Packard's opinion, Augur's inaction during these negotiations
was intolerable, and he wanted the general replaced.

Remaining aloof

and studiously avoiding any involvement, Augur indirectly help©!
Nicholls, who counted on the fact that Augur would refuse to remove
Democrats from office even if they had violated the status quo.
Consequently, Packard and Marshal Pitkin wanted a new oarrmander who
would take a pro-Republican viewpoint.

27

Packard and Pitkin failed in their efforts to have Augur removed,
in large measure because General William T. Sherman supported Augur and
endorsed his posture of noninvolvanent.

Describing Augur with such

26
Packard to Augur, January 22, 23, 25, 1877, in Dept Gulf, Letters
Reed; Nicholls to Augur, January 25, 26, 28, 1877, ibid.; Augur to
Packard, January 23, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL; Augur to AGO,
January 29, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 142/DSL, RG 393, NA. Packard to
Grant, January 25, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S. Justice Dept from
Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA; Augur to AGO,
January 26, 1877, ibid.; Cameron to Augur, January 26, 1877, ibid.
Summary in Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 497-98.
27
Packard's efforts to have Augur removed were reported in New
Orleans Times, January 24, 1877, and New Orleans Daily Picayune,
January 21 and 22, 1877.
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glowing adjectives as "brave, intelligent, just and conscientious,”
Sherman believed that whatever actions the Louisiana commander t<x>k
would "be in the interest of peace and good order."

28

Sherman wrote to

Augur, telling him that he "had interpreted . . . [Secretary Cameron8s]
orders Exactly as he intaided them.

If any one [sic] has tried to

undermine your influence he has utterly failed."

Suspecting that Augur

might still have sate dangerous times ahead, Sherman gave him sane
advice and support;

"Keep perfectly cool and always depend on me as far

as my influence goes to Sustain You in the Right."

Turning his

attention to the disputed presidential election, Sherman predicted that
the "debates this week will be intensely interesting" when Congress
considered "the Bill . * . for "ascertaining and declaring the vote.'"
Sherman hoped the outcome of the debate and the election "result[ed] in
a general understanding."

29

On January 29 Grant signal into law the bill passed by Congress
creating an Electoral Carrsnission which would pass judgment on the
disputed electoral votes from the contested states.

TVto days later the

Congress and the Electoral Commission began opening, examining, and
30
counting the electoral votes of the 1876 election.
2William T. Sherman to David F. Boyd, January 23, 1877, in
William T. Sherman Letters/David F. Boyd Family Papers (Department of
Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library).
29
Sherman to Augur, January 22, 1877, in Christopher C. Augur
Papers (Illinois State Historical Library).
on

James G. Randall and David H. Donald, The Civil War and
Reconstruction (2nd ed., rev.; Lexington, Mass., 1969), 697-98. Ihe
Electoral Cormission included three Republican senators and two Democra
tic senators; three Democratic congressmen and two Republican congress
men; and five justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, three of whan were
Republicans and two of whom were Democrats, giving the Republicans a
majority of one.
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On February 9, after refusing "to go behind the returns/' the
Electoral Canmissian accepted the Republican certificates from Florida
as legitimate and counted the first contested state for Hayes.
Democrats feared that this decision by the Commission foretold the
outcome of the election:
disputed votes.

Hayes would win if he received all of the

Consequently, Nicholls8 official and unofficial

emissaries in Washington began meeting with important Republicans.
Representing Nicholls were Edward A. Burke, railroad entrepreneur and
the general's former campaign manager, and E. John Ellis, former White
League adjutant who was presently serving as a U.S. congressman fran
Louisiana.

The Bayou State Democrats busily conferred with officials of

the Grant administration, friends of Rutherford Hayes, and with
President Grant himself, stressing that although Louisiana's electoral
votes might be given to Hayes, the new President could still recognize
31
the Nicholls government.
Simultaneously, other Democrats and railroad
executives were in almost daily contact with the Hayes camp, trying to
reach a compromise which would give Hayes the presidency in exchange for
Federal favors to the railroad companies.

32

In the meantime, Grant and his advisors were worried that if the
Electoral Commission awarded Louisiana's votes to Hayes, "the friends of
Nicholls [were going] to seize, by force, the State House immediately on
the declaration of an adverse decision."

Adjutant General Edward

Ibid., 699; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 485, 495, 502; Lonn,
Reconstruction in Louisiana, 500-501; Robert C. Tucker, "The Life and
Public Services of E. John Ellis," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIX
(July 1946), 714-16.
*30

C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877
and the End of Reconstruction (Boston, 1966), passim.
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Townsend advised Augur that the President was "loth [sic] to believe
that murder and assassination can be resorted to for such a purpose, but
deems it his duty to call your attention to these rumors in order that
you may . . . prepare an effectual prevention [of such occurrences]."

33

The worries of Grant and Townsend appeared to be justified when, on
February 15, a would-be assassin tried to murder Packard on the streets
of New Orleans.

The assassination attempt failed; Packard was slightly

wounded, and the police captured his assailant.

But the shooting

temporarily caused much excitement in New Orleans.
incident to Sheridan and Townsend.

Augur reported the

34

The excitement over the attempt on Packard’s life died down within
a few hours, but interest remained high in state politics and decisions
in Washington which might affect Louisiana.

Proceeding alphabetically,

the electoral count in Congress had reached Louisiana, and the state's
multiple sets of returns had been given to the Electoral Ccrardssion.
Although many Louisianians were concerned whether the state would be
decided for Hayes or for Tilden, Augur learned that most of the
political discussions in the Crescent City concentrated on the governor
ship, not the presidency.

Augur reported that "Packard's opponents are

numerous, united and aggressive, his friends, few, unorganized and
furnish no moral or material support." Significantly, Augur observed,
"I do not understand that they care so much who is President."

35

33Townsend to Augur, February 14, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA.
34New Orleans Timas, February 16, 1877; New Orleans Daily Picayune,
February 16, 1877; Augur to Sheridan and AGO, February 15, 1877, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 142/DSL, RG 393, NA.
35Augur to AGO, February 15, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876 (Microcopy
M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA.
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On February 16 the Electoral Oomnission awarded Louisiana's
electoral votes to Hayes, prompting Adjutant General Townsend to warn
Augur about rumors that had been circulating in Washington predicting
violence in New Orleans.

He advised Augur to take all necessary

precautions to prevent disturbances in the Gulf Department.

"Should

there be no craranunications with you tomorrow the greatest apprehension
will be felt here," Townsend concluded.

36

Augur acknowledged Townsend's telegram, replying that "[t]here is a
great deal of excitement here but no indications of immediate trouble."
In fact, some Louisiana Republicans, overjoyed because Hayes had
received the state's electoral votes, believed (or hoped) that the
crisis was nearly over and that Packard's ultimate recognition was
assured.

The New Orleans Republican supported these hopes printing news

stories under the headlines "Governor Packard's Title Perfect" and
"Packard's Recognition Sure."

Believing that the outcome was uncertain,

Augur and his troops closely watched the rival governments, and despite
37
Townsend's concern, reported that New Orleans remained peaceful.
Meanwhile, in Washington Nicholls' representatives had continued to
meet with members of Grant's cabinet and friends of Hayes, who by all
odds soon would be president-elect if the electoral count proceeded on
schedule.

The Louisiana press printed articles about these meetings,

keeping Army officers and politicians informed about the negotiations,
which were only imperfectly understood.

Unconfirmed press accounts

^Townsend to Augur, February 16, 1877, ibid.; Woodward, Reunion
and Reaction, 193.
^Augur to AGO, February 16 and 17, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA; New Orleans Republican,
February 17, 1877.
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claimed General Sherman had said that within a short time the Army would
be glad to let Southerners take care of their own political affairs.
Other news articles indicated that Grant had decided not to disturb
Louisiana's precarious political balance, leaving the decision to
recognize either Nicholls or Packard to his successor.

By now Augur was

aware of Grant's reluctance to make such a decision, and he continued to
hold the Army in its neutral position.

38

On February 23 the Electoral Oomnission assigned Oregon's disputed
electoral vote to Hayes, making it more important than ever for the
Democrats to reach some acoomreodation with him.

Several disgruntled

Northern Democrats, supported by some Southerners, began filibustering
in an attempt to block the electoral count.

But the New Orleans Times,

apparently fed on a steady diet of information from Nicholls, reported
that Hayes was willing to let the South handle its own affairs and
cotplimented him on his "New Departure" policy.

After all, during the

campaign Hayes had hinted that eventually "the general government [would
support] the efforts of the people of those states [Florida, South
Carolina, and Louisiana] to obtain for themselves the blessings of
honest and capable local government."

In fact, he had promised that, if

elected, he would "consider it not only my duty, but it will be my
ardent desire, to labor for the attainment of this end."

"The Small Fry

Republicans Stand Astounded," the New Orleans Times concluded.

39

38New Orleans Times, February 19, 20, 22, 1877; Sefton, A m y and
Reconstruction, 250.
3^Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, 194; Hayes' speech quoted in
Polokoff, Politics of Inertia, 105; New Orleans Times, February 24 and
25, 1877.
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After a meeting with Grant on February 26, Edward Burke informed
Nicholls that the President believed northern public opinion was
"clearly opposed to the further use of troops in upholding a State
government*"

That night Burke, John Ellis, and several other Democrats

met with Janes A. Garfield, John Sherman, and other Hayes Republicans at
the old Wormley Hotel in Washington.

The Wormley conference capped

weeks of negotiations between Southern Democrats, railroad executives,
newspapermen, and representatives of the Hayes camp.

Burke obtained the

Republicans' assurances that if Nicholls promised to protect the rights
of Louisiana's Republicans, Hayes would recognize Nicholls and withdraw
the troops, "thus allowing the Packard government to melt away," as the
New Orleans Times cleverly described the arrangement.

(A similar

arrangement was made in regard to the government of South Carolina; in
Florida the Democratic governor had already taken office.)

Furthermore,

the Times reported that Nicholls intended to have the state legislature
elect a moderate Republican to one of Louisiana's two vacant seats in
the U.S. Senate.

In exchange, the Democrats promised not to obstruct

the electoral count, meaning that Hayes was the next President.

Given

the fact that Republicans controlled the presidency, the Supreme Court,
the Amy, and the Senate (the Democrats held a majority in the House),
Burke and his fellows apparently believed that they had made a good
bargain.

Louisiana Republicans were unable to refute the reports of the

"Wormley bargain," and on March 1 the New Orleans Times jubilantly
predicted that Packard would be out of the State House "within 48
hours.
40
Edward A. Burke to Nicholls, February 26, 1877, in House Misc.
Docs., 45 Gong., 3 Sess., No. 31, vol. Ill, p. 618; Woodward, Reunion
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Undoubtedly the hoary tale of the Wormley House conference cannot
stand alone as the only factor in the Compromise of 1877.

C. Vann

Woodward has authoritatively presented the conplex machinations of
speculators, entrepreneurs, and state and national politicians, showing
that economic considerations, particularly the pressure by several
influential men for Federal aid to railroads and other internal
improvements, played an important part in eventually reaching a
oonpromise.

However, if Nicholls and Ellis serve as exanples, many

Louisianians were primarily concerned about the recognition of Nicholls
and the withdrawal of the troops; such matters as a proposed Southern
railway, the appointment of a Southerner to Hayes' cabinet, and the
arrangement to make Garfield speaker of the House were of secondary
^
41
importance.

In his study Woodward perhaps depreciated the symbolic necessity of
Hayes' promise to withdraw the troops.

Woodward indicated that Hayes

might have entered into the negotiations for a compromise without a full
deck of cards.

In February 1877 the House and the Senate, after

considerable debate, failed to reach a oonpromise on an Army appropria
tions bill for fiscal year 1877-1878.

The Democrats seemed to believe

that if the Army went unpaid, Hayes would not be able to use troops to
and Reaction, 195-97; Polokoff, Politics of Inertia, 310-11. Reports in
the New Orleans Times (February 28, 1877) revealed the important aspects
of the Wormley conference. Ibid., March 1, 1877. See also New Orleans
Daily Picayune, February 27, 1877.
^■*See Burke to Nicholls, February 20, 26, 28, March 2, 1877, in
House Misc. Docs., 45 Gong., 3 Sess., No. 31, vol. I, pp. 972, 980,
996-91, 1041. See also Rambert W. Patrick, The Recor^truction of the
Nation (New York, 1967), 273. For a critique of Woodward's Reunion and
Reaction see Allan Peskin, "Was There a Compromise of 1877?," Journal of
American History, IX (June, 1973), 63-75.
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prqp up Republican regimes in South Carolina and Louisiana.

Considering

this to be a valid argument, historian Joe Gray Taylor has asserted that
this "would have forced the removal of the military anyway."
Furthermore, Woodward claimed that this tactic "had teen devised to
insure the removal of the troops in case Hayes forgot his promises or
was unable to carry than out."

However, military appropriations were

available for the first four months of Hayes' administration (through
June 1877), and as historians Randall and Donald have cogently pointed
out, Woodward's "line of reasoning ignores the fact that failure to pay
the troops did not mean disbanding the army; [in fact] Hayes used unpaid
42
troops to break [labor] strikes in the summer of 1877."
There were no
mass desertions from the Army while it went unpaid, and the regiments
obeyed the President's orders.
Perhaps the arguments over appropriations and troops were merely
academic, but in the early days of March 1877, before Hayes was
inaugurated, there was still seme uncertainty about the presidential
succession.

A few Democrats threatened to block the final tabulation of

the electoral votes.

In Louisiana rumors predicted that Grant would no

longer require Augur to maintain the status quo.

In fact, the President

had told Edward Burke that when Hayes was inaugurated, the troops would
be withdrawn.

This information gave Louisiana Democrats reason to

believe that all of their patient negotiations were about to pay off.
Meanwhile, the Democrats abandoned the filibuster, the count proceeded,
and Hayes was elected by one electoral vote.

The Republicans

^^Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, 8, 203; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed, 502; Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
696note.
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inmediately prepared to inaugurate Hayes secretly over the weekend
because inauguration day (March 4) fell on a Sunday in 1877.

In case

there was a disruption of the public inauguration on Monday, March 5,
43
Hayes technically would be President already.
During all of these developments Augur had been careful to keep
clear of any involvement in state politics.

Despite the predictions in

the press that Hayes would recognize Nicholls, Augur had avoided any
sort of unofficial recognition of his own.
From his office in the State House, Stephen Packard now made a
desperate attempt to salvage his governorship, which apparently had been
negotiated away in the Compromise of 1877.

Begging Grant to recognize

him as Louisiana’s governor, Packard predicted that if the troops were
withdrawn the Nicholls forces would attack the capitol and carry the
last remaining Republican stronghold by main force.

44

Packard's desperate tone and menacing prediction had no effect on
Grant.

Disdaining a personal reply, Grant directed one of his secre

taries, Culver C. Sniffen, to draft a telegram to Packard.

"In answer

to your dispatch," Sniffen began, " . . . the President directs me to say
that he feels it his duty to state frankly that he does not believe
public opinion will longer support the maintenance of State government
in Louisiana by the use of the military and that he must concur in this
manifest feeling."

Sniffen continued:

The troops will hereafter as in the past protect life and
properly from mob violence when the State authorities fail,
4% e w Orleans Times, March 2, 1877; New Orleans Democrat, March 2,
1877; Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, 200-201.
44Packard to Grant, March 1, 1877, in Grant Papers (Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress).
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but under the remaining days of his official life they will
not be used to establish or to pull dawn either claimant for
control of the State. It is not his purpose to recognize
either claimant.
The Sniffen telegram devastated Packard's hopes.

His only chance to

continue his political career lay in convincing Hayes to recognize his
clarm to the governorship.

45

General Sherman sent a copy of the Sniffen telegram to Augur for
his information.

After considering the message, Augur replied he under

stood "that the troops are no longer to be used in maintaining the
status quo here but are simply to be used to protect property & life."
It appeared to Sherman that Augur might have misunderstood the
President's intentions.

Ihe commanding general tried to clarify matters

for Augur:46
I cannot undertake to interpret the President's
[Sniffen* s] letter to Mr. Packard— of course you will keep the
peace if possible, and . . . I believe you can prevent any
material changes in the attitude of the contending parties
till the new [national] administration can be fairly
installed, and give the subject mature reflection. The
question of the attitude of the State of Louisiana to the
National Government is too important to be hastily decided.
Every citizen is interested that this question be settled
right.
Following the publication of Sniffen's telegram, conflicting rumors
circulated concerning the status of the troops Which still maintained
the status quo, thereby allowing Packard's government to exist.

There

was considerable speculation about the intention of the Army and what
45
C. C. Sniffen to Packard, March 1, 1877, ibid. The substance of
Sniffen's message is found in Lann, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 514-16.
4^Sherman to Augur, March 2, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300), PG 94, NA; Augur to Sherman, March 2, 1877,
ibid.; Sherman to Augur, March 3, 1877, ibid.
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its orders actually were.

Forlornly maintaining a brave front, the New

Orleans Republican predicted that as long as the troops remained at
their posts, they would uphold the status quo.

In contrast, the

Natchitoches People's Vindicator declared that "Nicholls' recognition
[was] assured,” and that soon the troops would be "ordered to other
quarters and the people permitted to settle, without interfearanoe [sic]
the matter for themselves."

47

On March 5 Hayes was formally inaugurated, after surreptitiously
taking the oath of office two days before.
ceremony.

No disruptions marred the

Speaking in conciliatory tones in his inaugural address,

Hayes said that some Southern states were not enjoying "wise, honest,
and peaceful self-government. " He encouraged Southerners to be patient,
indicating that important announcements regarding the status of the
unredeemed state governments would be forthcoming "when the
48
administration gets fairly to work."
The language of Hayes' inaugural speech prompted the New Orleans
Times to predict that the President would "issue general orders to all
commanding officers in the South to withdraw their troops to government
reservations," thereby "relieving the Federal troops" of their "peculiar
civil and political" duties.

Ihe Times and other Democratic newspapers

undoubtedly were disappointed whai Hayes announced that he was not going
to decide between Nicholls and Packard immediately.

Instead, the

President planned to send a special committee to investigate the
^New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 3, 1877; New Orleans Times,
March 3, 4, 1877; New Orleans Republican, March 3, 1877; Natchitoches
People's Vindicator, March 3, 1877.
48
Barnard, Hayes, 404, 408; New Orleans Times, March 5, 1877.
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political situation in Louisiana, and he would not recognize either man
until after the canmittee had made its report.

In the meantime, Sherman

informed Sheridan that "General Augur’s duty will be to . . . prevent
violence and keep

49
a peace."

Hie prospect of having to endure the status quo was distasteful to
Louisiana's Democratic newspaper editors, who were inpatient with Hayes'
policy.

Clutching at straws, the Conservatives printed every manor

pertaining to the possibility of troop withdrawal.

One manor, which was

widely believed, predicted that Hayes definitely would remove the troops
from the Crescent City on March 19, but that day passed without any
military movements.

Hie New Orleans Tines angrily asked, "Is the New

Departure a Fraud?"
In contrast to the Democrats, Packard was encouraged by Hayes'
policy.

Displaying a never-say-die attitude, Packard informed the

President that the Louisiana legislature had adopted a resolution
calling "for aid in suppressing domestic violence," making it plain that
the state's Republicans were still hoping for Federal aid and
protection.

Hayes replied that Secretary of War George W. McCrary had

ordered Augur to maintain the status quo until the special presidential
4^New Orleans Times, March 7 and 8, 1877. (See also New Orleans
Democrat, March 6 and"'8',' 1877; New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 7 and
8, 1877; Shreveport Times, March 8, 1877.) Hayes made his decision
after a meeting with Grant's old cabinet. Hie meeting is described in
Nevins, Hamilton Fish, 858-59. Sherman to Sheridan, March 7, 1877, in
AGO File 4788-1676 (Microcopy Mr-666, reel 300), RG 94, NA.
^®New Orleans Democrat, March 15, 1877; New Iberia Louisiana Sugar
Bowl, March 15, 1877; Mew Orleans Times, March 17, 18, 21, 22 1877.

,
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commission arrived.

Additionally, Augur was to report any changes that

had taken place in the state governments sines Hayes' inauguration.

51

To assure himself that Augur's report would is complete, Packard
provided him with a list of the large maiber of changes and appointments
Nicholls had made sines March 5.

Packard listed changes in almost every

parish and judicial district, including the Natchitoches judge whom
Grant had refused to recognize, but who recently had reoocvpied the seat
over the objections of the Republican judge.

52

Basing his report partly on Packard's list, Augur stated that since
March 5 each claimant for the governorship had attempted "to strengthen
his government as best he could. . . . "

Although Augur specifically

acknowledged that Nicholls had "renoved certain officers and appointed
others," he tried to soften the inpact of this information, saying that
the new appointees had "entered ipon their duties . . . without
violence."

Since the inauguration Augur reported that his troops had

remained neutral in the political struggle "except 'to protect life and
property.'"

Secretary of War McCrary passed a copy of Augur's report to

Hayes, noting that, no reply was necessary.

The A m y would not be

ordered to oust Nicholls' officials and replace them with Republicans.
^^Packard to
Justice Dept from
to Packard, March
George W. McCrary
(Microcopy M-666,
52
Packard to
RG 393, NA.
RG
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Hayes, March 21, 1877, in Letters Reed by the U.S.
Louisiana (Microcopy M-940, reel 3), RG 60, NA; Hayes
26, 1877, in New Orleans Times, March 27, 1877;
to Augur, March 26, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
reel 300), RG 94, NA.
Augur, March 26, 1877, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed,

~^Augur to McCrary, March 27, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL,
393, NA; McCrary to Hayes, March 27, 1877, in Hayes Papers.
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Nevertheless, the inplications of McCrary's inquiries about changes
in the status quo disturbed Nicholls.

He wrote to Louisiana

Congressman Randall L. Gibson in Washington, explaining that McCrary's
questions had "alarmed the oosraiunity [and] elated our opponents. . . . "
Moreover, Nicholls claimed that these inquiries had damaged his "hold
upon the conservatism of the State & worst [sic] than all shaken for the
first tine ny confidence in the assurances given by you and others from
the President himself & his confidential freinds [sic] as to [the]
purposes of the Administration. . . . "

Nicholls wanted Gibson, who had

been present during some of the negotiations leading to the Compromise
of 1877, to provide him with some "definite information" about Hayes'
intentions.

"Matters can not remain in the uncertain state that they

are. . . .

If confidence is lost here either in me or the President,
54
the consequences may be most serious," Nicholls concluded.
But Nicholls was worrying needlessly, for on April 5 the special

presidential commission arrived in New Orleans, and soon it was evident
that its members intended to help the Democrat confirm his claim to
office.

Apparently Hayes had decided that the smoothest way to

establish Nicholls' legitimacy was to encourage representatives and
senators to leave the Packard legislature, thus giving the Democrats
control of the official state legislature.

The state Returning Board

had authenticated the election of a large number of Democrats, but
several seats were still disputed.

If the Republicans who transferred

to the Nicholls legislature cooperated with the Conservatives, they
54Nicholls to Randall L. Gibson, March 26, 1877, in Francis T.
Nicholls Letterbook (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana
State University Library).
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could elect Democrats to the vacant seats and subsequently control the
legislature.

During the next two weeks several of Packard's legislators

deserted the State House, apparently bribed by the Democrats using funds
provided by the Louisiana Lottery Company.

However, the Republicans had

practical political and economic motives for shifting their loyalties.
Packard was running out of money to pay their salaries, and if they did
not join Nicholls' legislature, Democrats might claim their seats.
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Consequently, Packard lost most of his legislators, and each day he
counted fewer adherents who supported his crumbling administration.

For

example, on April 7 the Danocratic superintendent of public education
displaced the Republican who had held that office in New Orleans, and a
Democrat moved into the office of Rapides Parish tax collector in
Alexandria.

Complaining about Democratic violations of the status quo,

Packard asked Augur to see that the Conservatives returned the offices
to the Republicans who had held them.

Feeling the prevailing political

wind, Augur replied that he did not regard himself as an "authority to
interfere in any way in the civil affairs of this State. . . . "

The

situation prompted the Picayune to remark that " [t]he followers of
Mr. Packard now masticate their hard tack [sic] without the savor of
hope. . .
55Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 522-23; New Orleans Times,
April 7 and 9, 1877; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 504; Woodward,
Reunion and Reaction, 220; Hilda M. McDaniel, "Francis Tillou Nicholls
and the End of Reconstruction," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXXII
(April, 1949), 433-34; Barnard, Hayes, 428-3CTI
'Packard to Augur, April 7, 1877, in Dept Gulf, Letters Reed;
Augur to Packard, April 7, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL, RG 393, NA.
New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 6, 1877.
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In mid-April Packard's last flickers of hope died.

Hayes ordered

that on April 10 the troops protecting the capitol in Columbia, South
Carolina, be withdrawn to their barracks outside the city.

Desperately,

Packard sent Hayes one last plea for recognition, but it fell on deaf
ears; the President declined even to send a reply.
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Obeying Hayes' orders. Secretary of State William M. Evarts
informed the members of the presidential commission that the President
intended "to remove the soldiers from the State-house [in New Orleans]
to their barracks, and he desires that the tine, circumstances, and
preparation for such removal should give every reasonable security
against its becoming the occasion or opportunity of any outbreak of
violence. . . . "

Evarts explained that Hayes "desire [d] to put an end

to even an apparent military interference in the domestic controversies
in the State of Louisiana . . . [and that his desires would] not be
thwarted by the action of any part of its people."
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After Evarts* message became public, the New Orleans Times reported
that "The Troops May Now be Withdrawn Shortly."

Subsequently, in an

editorial, the Times described the "feeling of relief" in New Orleans
now that Packard was literally a man without a government.
editorial continued:

The

59

Seme seem to be waiting for the 'withdrawal of the
troops' to complete the transformation, but this strikes us as
the mere echo of an issue which has now ceased to be vital.
So long as it is known that the troops are not to be used as a
^Packard to Hayes, April 16, 1877, in New Orleans Daily Picayune,
2^>ril 17, 1877; Barnard, Hayes, 430.
5®William M. Evarts to Charles B. Lawrence, et. aL., April 13,
1877, in House Exec. Docs., 45 Gong., 2 Sess., No. 97, p. 9.
~*%ew Orleans Times, April 17 and 21, 1877.
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political engine, it will make no difference whether they
remain in garrison, . * . or whether they are removed
entirely.
On April 20 Hayes directed Secretary of War McCrary to order the
troops near the state capital in New Orleans to be relocated to Jackson
Barracks outside the city.

Hayes picked April 24 for the limited

withdrawal, for only the soldiers stationed in the Orleans Hotel
adjacent to the State House were being relocated.
symbolic "withdrawal."

It was, therefore, a

McCrary issued the necessary orders to the

military oontmanders, and Augur prepared to carry than out.
Several important Louisiana newspapers printed stories about the
planned withdrawal, and some included verbatim copies of the military
telegrams revealing the Army's plans.
expected.

No delay or postponement was

The New Orleans Democrat reported that Packard had announced

he planned "to gracefully retire."^
During the next two days Augur and his subordinates worked busily,
preparing for the ceremony that would signal the end of the Amy's
involvement in Louisiana politics.
lashed them to wagons.

Enlisted men packed trunks and

The musicians of the 3rd Infantry band polished

their instruments and uniform brass for the occasion.

Colonels Brooke,

Floyd-Jones, and DeTrobriand closely supervised the last details of the
transfer, while the qu itermaster and his assistants arranged for the
arrival of the additional soldiers at Jackson Barracks.

On orders from

60
Hayes to McCrary, April 20, 1877, in AGO File 4788-1876
(Microcopy M-666, reel 300); McCrary to Sherman, April 20, 1877, ibid.;
Sherman to Sheridan, April 21, 1877, ibid.; Augur to Sherman, April 20,
1877, ibid.

6^New Orleans Times, April 22, 1877; New Orleans Democrat,
April 22, 1877; Shreveport Tines, April 22, 1877; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, April 21 and 22, 1877.
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General Augur, the troops dusted off their best uniforms and buffed
their shoes, bringing out lustrous shines.

Fittingly, it was to be a

full dress parade.^
April 24 dawned gloomily, and a light drizzle fell throughout most
of the morning.

The Orleans Hotel, which had been serving as a barracks

for five companies of the 3rd Infantry, bustled with activity.

At

11:30 a.m. the band gathered at its assigned assembly point within the
building, lining up to lead the day's momentous event.

Itoenty minutes

later, responding to the shouts of their sergeants, five companies of
infantrymen formed ranks on the stairways and in the hallways of the old
hotel.

Disregarding the rain, hundreds of persons turned out to watch

the ceremony.

According to the Picayune, "Royal and Chartres streets

were absolutely jammed with a living mass of humanity, surging toward
the point where the troops . . . were stationed."

The Democrat reported

that St. Louis Street was "lined with spectators" and the "throng was
dense."

The crowd waited expectantly.

At 12:00 noon sharp the band struck up a marching tune and began
filing out of the Orleans Hotel.
came into the street.

Led by Colonel Brooke, the troops

Catching the cadence provided by the drummers,

the soldiers marched down St. Louis Street toward the levee.

Scattered

applause broke out from the crowd; a rebel yell split the air; then as
the soldiers passed by, there were many cheers, and finally the throng
was "cheering continually."

Individual expressions of delight were lost

in the roar of hundreds of voices.

A Picayune reporter noticed that

" [t]he balconies of the houses on St. Louis street were crowded with
62AAG, Dept Gulf to Col. DeTrobriand, April 22, 1877, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 116/DSL, PG 393, NA; New Orleans Times, April 24, 1877.
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ladies, who manifested their joy by waving their handerchiefs and
smiling" at the troops passing beneath than.
Black smoke curling from its funnels, the steamer Palace waited at
the levee to take the soldiers to Jackson Barracks.

Ohe infantry

companies halted and then, on orders from their officers, filed aboard
the steamer.

The lines were cast off, and the boat "left the moorings

amid deafening cheers" from hundreds of spectators.

The Palace moved

out into the river, catching the current and getting up steam.

The boat

made its way down the Mississippi, and eventually it was lost to the
sight of the onlookers.
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The Amy's long ordeal in Louisiana Reconstruction had ended.

It

had not been the Amy's responsibility to guarantee the success of
Reconstruction, only to carry out the policy, which changed from year to
year, with the tools and men at its disposal.

Despite their lack of

experience in military government, most of the Amy's officers carefully
administered the military Reconstruction Acts, and a few of than,
notably Sheridan and Mower, took a genuine interest in enforcing the
requirements of the acts.

Actually the A m y did a remarkable job,

despite its inexperience, in administering an essentially hostile state,
and then remaining on to offer some protection to what probably was,
despite its faults, the most democratic government Louisiana had had
until that time.

6% e w Orleans Daily Picayune, April 25, 1877; New Orleans Democrat,
April 25, 1877; Augur to AAG, MilDivMo, April 24, 1877, in Dept Gulf,
vol. 142/DSL, RG 393, NA.

EPILOGUE
Actually, as Clarence Clendenen has pointed out, the troops were
not "withdrawn" from Louisiana.1 For that natter, the Picayune reminded
its readers that "the order issued by the President referred only to
those troops stationed in the Orleans Hotel, as they were considered the
guard of Packard. . . . "

The Picayune expected that the r a m ming

soldiers (more than 330 officers and men) would be ordered to leave the
2
city "within a few days."
The troops remained quartered in New Orleans until the end of May,
and soldiers occupied posts near four other towns.

But practically the

result was the same as if they had left the city and the state.
A m y had ceased to be a factor in politics.

The

3

Newspaper editorials and reports reflected the emotions and
feelings of most white Louisianians toward the symbolic withdrawal of
the troops.

The Shreveport Times called April 24 "evacuation day" and

promised that it "will ever be remembered as one of the brightest and
most glorious in the history of our long oppressed State."

The

•^Clarence C. Clendenen, "President Hayes' 'Withdrawal' of the
Troops— An Enduring Myth," South Carolina Historical Magazine, LXX
(October, 1969), 240-50. Clendenen points out that the "withdrawals" in
South Carolina and Louisiana were symbolic.
^ e w Orleans Daily Picayune, April 25, 1877.

3

Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, p. 126; Augur to AAG,
MilDivAtlantic, May 5, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL, RG 393, NA.
Post Returns, Post of New Orleans, April and May 1877, in Records of the
AGO (Microcopy M-617, reel 844), RG 94, NA.
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Alexandria Louisiana Democrat declared that the state was "Free At
Last!"

The Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate and the Opelousas Courier

trumpeted similar notes, proclaiming that "Louisiana is Free.” The
Bossier Banner unfurled a dramatic headline— "Thank God!," and announced
that " [t]he long night is over; day has dawned at last. . . .

[T]he

people of Louisiana are once more free and independent of carpetbag,
scalawag and BAYONET rule."

The Picayune proclaimed that the troops

were "GONE!," and asked state officials to select ”a day for a general
thanksgiving to Almighty God for our deliverance from worse than
Egyptian bondage." The Natchitoches People*s Vindicator correctly
presumed that relocating the troops meant "Radicalism is dead in
Louisiana."

The editorial writer for the Thibodaux Sentinel believed

that the air of late April was "perfumed with the odor of roses" and
A

something even more heady— freedom. '
Francis Nicholls took office as undisputed governor on April 26.
The next day General Augur and his staff acknowledged the fact, making a
formal call on the governor at the State House.
Within the next three months the War Department virtually
dismantled the Department of the Gulf.

By the end of May Augur had

closed the Army posts at Monroe, Clinton, St. Martinville, and
Pineville.

Responding to the need for more troops on the frontier, the

4
Shreveport Tomes, April 24, 1877; Alexandria Louisiana Democrat,
April 25, 1877; Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate, April 27, 1877; Opelousas
Courier, April 28, 1877; Bossier Banner, April 26, 1877 (emphasis in the
original); New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 25, 1877; Natchitoches
People's Vindicator, April 28, 1877; Thibodaux Sentinel, April 28, 1877.
See also New Orleans Times, April 28, 1877.
^AAG, Dept Gulf to Francis T. Nicholls, April 27, 1877, in Dept
Gulf, vol. 116/DSL, RG 393, NA.
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16th Infantry left Augur's department for duty at Port Leavenworth,
Kansas.

During May and June the 3rd Infantry was reassigned to posts in

Alabama.®
The most important removals from the Gulf Department came during
July.

Acting on the orders of President Hayes, Secretary of War McCrary

directed that Army units from all over the nation be sent to the East
and Mid-West to put down the massive strikes which occurred in the
suraner of 1877.

Once the troops were removed they were not sent back.

By the end of 1877 only thirty-five soldiers were serving in the New
Orleans vicinity.

Tne only sizeable military garrison in Louisiana was

located at Lake Charles, where two coitpanies of the 13th Infantry were
assisting U.S. Marshal John Pitkin in the investigation and apprehension
of persons accused of illegal lumbering operations on Federal lands in
7
Calcasieu Parish.
*

*

*

Late in his career Phil Sheridan became oornnanding general of the
U.S. Army in 1884 upon the retirement of his friend William T. Sherman.
®Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, pp. 121-27; Augur to William T.
Sherman, May 4, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 142/DSL; SO NO. 84, Dept Gulf,
May 24, 1877, in Dept Gulf, SO; RG 393, NA.
^Clendenen, "President Hayes' 'Withdrawal' of the Troops," 248-50;
for a good study of the strikes see Robert V. Bruce, 1877; Year of
Violence (Indianapolis, 1959). Dept Gulf, Journal of Events, pp.
129-30; Augur to Pitkin, May 19, 1877, in Dept Gulf, vol. 116/DSL,
RG 393, NA. SW, Annual Report, 1877-1878 (House Exec. Docs., 45 Gong.,
2 Sess., No. 1), pp. 24-25; Donald J. Millet, HThe lumber Industry of
'Imperial' Calcasieu, 1865-1900," Louisiana History, VII (Winter, 1966),
56-57.
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Following his retirement from the Army in 1876, William H. Emory
resided in Washington, D.C., observing politics, both civil and
military, well into Grover Cleveland's first administration.
After leaving the governor's office William Pitt Kellogg was
elected U.S. Senator by the Packard legislature.

'There was seme dispute

over the legitimacy of his election, but the Senate finally approved his
credentials over those of a Democrat who had been elected by the
Nicholls legislature.

Kellogg was the last Republican to serve in

Congress from Louisiana until the election of David Treen to the House
of Representatives in 1972.
Nominated by the Democrats, Winfield Scott Hancock ran for the
presidency in 1880.

He was narrowly defeated by James A. Garfield.

(Voting with the rest of the "Solid South," Louisiana gave its electoral
votes to Hancock.)

General Hancock remained in the Army until 1886.

Failing to secure the Louisiana governorship, Stephen B. Packard
applied to the Hayes administration for a job.

The President appointed

him U.S. consul in Liverpool, England.
Iirmediately following Reconstruction, Christopher C. Augur served
as conmander of the Department of the South, comprising eight Southern
states, including Louisiana.

Subsequently, he oortmanded the Department

of Texas, and later he was in charge of the enlarged Department of the
Missouri, which included Kansas, Indian Territory, New Mexico Territory,
and Colorado, as well as Texas.

Augur retired from the Array in 1885.

John R. Brooke, Lieutenant Colonel, 3rd Infantry, was promoted
successively to colonel, brigadier general, and finally, major general
in 1897.

During the Spanish American War he participated in the Puerto
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Rican campaign under General Nelson A. Miles.
served as military governor of Cuba.

After the war, Brooke

He retired fncm the Army in 1902.

After Reconstruction, Henry Clay Warmoth settled in Louisiana,
purchasing a sugar plantation in Plaquemines Parish.
governor again in 1888, losing to Francis T. Nicholls.

He ran for
Many years later

a modem power artist named Huey P. Long studied how Warmoth had
governed the state during the postwar years.

Warmoth was still living

in Louisiana when Long was elected governor in 1928.
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APPENDIX I
POSTWAR DEPARTMENTAL CHANGES PERTAINING TO LOUISIANA
DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1862-1877
Date Department
Established

________ Departmental Designation and Area________

May 1, 1862

Department of the Gulf [consisted of the occupied
parts of Louisiana, Texas, Florida, Mississippi]

May 7, 1864

Military Division of West Mississippi [occupied
parts of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi]

May 17, 1865

Department of the Gulf [Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida]

May 29, 1865

Military Division of the Southwest [parts of
Louisiana and Arkansas, Texas, Indian Territory]

July 17, 1865

Military Division of the Gulf [Louisiana,
Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Arkansas, Indian
Territory]

August 6, 1866

Department of the Gulf [Louisiana, Texas, Florida]

March 2, 1867

5th Military District [Louisiana, Texas]

July 28, 1868

Department of Louisiana [Louisiana, Arkansas]

March 31, 1870

Department of Texas [Louisiana, Texas]

November 1, 1871

Department of the Gulf [Louisiana, Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Florida forts]
[January 4, 1875, Dept Gulf added to Military
Division of the Missouri]
[June 26, 1876, Alabama and part of Tennessee added
to Dept Gulf]
May 1, 1877, Dept Gulf transferred frcm Military
Division of the Missouri to Military Division of
the Atlantic]
[June 21, 1878, Dept Gulf merged with Dept South,
C. C. Augur oommanding]
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APPENDIX II
RECONSTRUCTION COMMANDERS OF LOUISIANA, 1862-1877
Department Carmander
(subordinate state andrj

_________ Dates of Carmand_________

Benjamin F. Butler

May 1, 1862-Decanter 17, 1862

Nathaniel P. Banks

December 17, 1862-June 9, 1864

Edward R. S. Canby

June 9, 1864-July 17, 1865

[Stephen A. Hurlbut]

[September 23, 1864-April 22, 1865]

[Nathaniel P. Banks]

[April 22, 1865-May 17, 1865]

Philip H. Sheridan

May 17, 1865-September 5, 1867

[E. R. So Canby]

[July 17, 1865-May 28, 1866]

Charles Griffin

September 6, 1867-September 13, 1867

Joseph A. Mower

September 16, 1867-Noveriber 29, 1867

Winfield S. Hancock

November 29, 1867-March 18, 1867

Joseph J. Reynolds

March 18, 1867-March 25, 1867

Robert C. Buchanan

March 25, 1867-September 15, 1868

Lovell H. Rousseau

September 15, 1868-January 7, 1869

Robert C. Buchanan

January 11, 1869-March 31, 1869

Joseph A. Mower

March 31, 1869-January 6, 1870

Charles H. Smith

January 7, 1870-April 16, 1870

Joseph J. Reynolds

April 16, 1870-November 28, 1871
[April 16, 1870-Nbvember 28, 1871]

[Charles H. Smith]
William H. Emory

November 28, 1871-March 27, 1875

Christopher C. Augur

March 27, 1875-June 21, 1878
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APPENDIX III
APPROXIMATE TROOP TOTALS IN LOUISIANA
DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877
Month

Year

# Troops

June

1865

25,800

September

1865

23,747

January

1866

9,772

11

October

1866

5,124

10

October

1867

2,434

6

October

1868

2,254

12

October

1869

953

6

October

1870

598

5

October

1871

616

2

October

1872

427

14

November

1873

643

5

August

1874

130

3

September

1874

1,182

8

November

1874

1,998

9

November

1875

921

8

October

1876

529

9

November*

1876

800

21

Ndvemberf

1876

1,390

4

April

1877

731

4

♦before election

+after election
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